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The goal of the present research is to define a Semantic Web framework for precedent 
modelling, by using knowledge extracted from text, metadata, and rules, while maintaining a 
strong text-to-knowledge morphism between legal text and legal concepts, in order to fill the 
gap between legal document and its semantics. The framework is composed of four different 
models that make use of standard languages from the Semantic Web stack of technologies: a 
document metadata structure, modelling the main parts of a judgement, and creating a bridge 
between a text and its semantic annotations of legal concepts; a legal core ontology, modelling 
abstract legal concepts and institutions contained in a rule of law; a legal domain ontology, 
modelling the main legal concepts in a specific domain concerned by case-law; an 
argumentation system, modelling the structure of argumentation. The input to the framework 
includes metadata associated with judicial concepts, and an ontology library representing the 
structure of case-law. The research relies on the previous efforts of the community in the field 
of legal knowledge representation and rule interchange for applications in the legal domain, in 
order to apply the theory to a set of real legal documents, stressing the OWL axioms definitions 
as much as possible in order to enable them to provide a semantically powerful representation of 
the legal document and a solid ground for an argumentation system using a defeasible subset of 
predicate logics. It appears that some new features of OWL2 unlock useful reasoning features 
for legal knowledge, especially if combined with defeasible rules and argumentation schemes. 
The main task is thus to formalize legal concepts and argumentation patterns contained in a 
judgement, with the following requirement: to check, validate and reuse the discourse of a judge 
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“The element in which the universal mind exists in art is intuition and imagery, in religion 
feeling and representative thinking, in philosophy pure freedom of thought. In world history 
this element is the actuality of mind in its whole compass of internality and externality 
alike. World history is a court of judgement because in its absolute universality, the 
particular – i.e. the Penates, civil society, and the national minds in their variegated 
actuality – is present as only ideal, and the movement of mind in this element is the 
exhibition of that fact.”  
– Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §341. 
 
Capturing the semantics of human-created texts for processing by machines is not a linear 
process. In order to provide a comprehensive representation of the contents of a document it is 
necessary to adopt multiple perspectives, and to give account for different aspects, and depths, 
of representation.  
The paragraph of G. W. F. Hegel cited above is an example of this complexity: different readers 
may understand different contents from that piece of text. Probably these interpretations have 
different degrees of accuracy, in the light of external factors (the preceding and following 
paragraphs of Der Philosophie des Rechts, the specific meaning attributed by Hegel to certain 
terms or combinations of them, and so on), and one may exclude the other, yet it could well be 
that several meanings are expressed by that combination of words and, in order to capture the 
semantics of that text, all of them must be represented. An authentic interpretation (that 
intended by Hegel himself) could exist, indicated in some other text, but is it sufficient to say 
that all other possible interpretations are wrong, or meaningless? 
The multiplicity of perspectives does not involve only the translation between signs and 
concepts, but also the relation between signs located sharing the same source. The source of 
Hegel’s paragraph presented above is reproduced in Figure 0.1, but how many people could say 
so without looking at the figure’s description? The two texts could be bound to the same map of 
(possible) meanings, but yet those two are distinct in several aspects: the introducing quote is in 
English language (and translation has many entailments), presents itself in the form of a piece 
of text inside a digital document, and there are additions in the text’s format (words highlighted 
in bold) which are not from the original author. The text in Figure 0.1, instead, is in German 
language, presents itself in the form of a picture, and reproduces the text format of the original 
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edition of 1821. It is a derivation of the original document, just like the English citation, yet 
their differences with the original are totally diverse. 
 Legal documents require further depth for representing its semantics, as they contain not just 
plain information but rather codify an order of an authority which can be translated into logical 
operators, but whose 
syntax is not fixed. Unlike 
a text from Hegel, where it 
is reasonable to expect 
some explanation from the 
original author (often 
contained in other works) 
on the intended meaning 
of the combination of 
signs, interpretation of 
legal documents is a 
different matter. The 
language used is important 
by itself, its conventional 
meaning being codified by 
the legal system. However it is known that assigning a meaning to legal dispositions not 
straightforward: there are gray areas in the interpretation of legal concepts, and the effects of 
legal acts are susceptible to change in time, either depending on a change of the legal text itself 
or on external influences (i.e. of other norms, or of judgements). In order to build a model that 
represents this net of information for the use by Computers, it is necessary to rely on several 
disciplines:  
 Law, to understand precisely the concepts contained in legal documents and to identify 
where legal reasoning diverges from other forms of reasoning; 
 Logics, to model the meaning of the dispositions; 
 Argumentation theory, to represent the relations between speech acts; 
 Information Technologies (ITs), for encoding these information in a machine-readable 
way. 
 Object of the research 0.1.
Object of the present research is to represent the semantics of judicial documents and to encode 
such information in a machine-readable form, giving account for the multiple perspectives of a 
legal document’s form and of its contents and always maintaining a strict link between the legal 
concepts and the piece(s) of text that originate them. In three years of research, a judicial 
framework was realized, composed by a set of computational ontologies written in the Ontology 
Web Language (OWL) and by a rule base written in different languages (LKIF-Core, Clojure, 
LegalRuleML). 
0.1.1. Judgements 
Fig. 0.1 – The original text of the citation in the beginning of this 
chapter, from [Hegel 1821]. 
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The kind of legal knowledge that the present research tries to model is judgement, used to 
identify three different concepts: 
 The action performed by the judge when analyzing a claim (adjudication); 
 The action performed by the judge when applying laws to facts (interpretation or 
subsumption); 
 The legal act (document) containing those actions, also called judicial decision. The 
information contained in the legal act is important for two reasons: 
o It contains information on the legal consequences applied on the parties of the 
trial (it is hence a source of rights or obligations); 
o The legal reasoning contained in it is capable of influencing successive 
judgements on the same matter (it hence constitutes a precedent). 
Judgements are core elements of legal knowledge worldwide: by settling conflicts and 
sanctioning illegal behaviours, judicial activity enforces law provisions within national borders, 
therefore supporting the validity of laws as well as the sovereignty of the government that 
issued them. Moreover, precedents (or case-law) are a fundamental source for law 
interpretation, to the point that the exercise of jurisdiction can even influence the scope of the 
same norms it has to apply, both in common law and civil law systems – although to different 
extents. The AI & Law research community has gathered significant results on the 
representation of precedents since the 1980s, with different approaches: legal case-based 
reasoning [Ashley 2009, Bruninghaus 2008], ontology-based systems [Mommers 2010], and 
more recently argumentation [Prakken 2008, Gordon and Walton 2009]. 
The present research focuses on a key aspect of judgement: the judicial interpretation. More 
precisely, the research will try to provide a complete and functional representation of judicial 
subsumptions acts of judgement that subsume facts under abstract categories. The quote of 
Hegel in Figure 0.1 can be analysed to get a first insight into the kind of judgement which is the 
object of the present work. In this paragraph (parts in bold) he implicitly defines a court of 
judgement as being an authority that verifies the correspondence between concepts and external 
reality. It is a perspective on judgement that is particularly helpful for Information 
Technologies, as it focuses the attention on the concept of logical truth, rather than on the 
concept of justice. Following Hegel, in fact, “Truth in philosophy means that concept and 
external reality correspond”. This definition of Hegel is particularly interesting when compared 
to the concept of judicial subsumption, which is the main concept modelled by the framework 
presented by the present research: the concept of judicial subsumption identifies the operation 
performed by the judge when he considers a material circumstance (a fact, a document, a 
behaviour) and applies a legal status (a legal qualification or attribute) to it. 
This is the meaning intended for judicial interpretation or judicial subsumption in the present 
research, whose main task is to correctly identify the concept in legal texts, classify it in an 
ontology of legal concepts, reason on it with logics, and use it for argumentation in legal 
discussions. 
 Contents of the thesis 0.2.
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0.2.1. Judicial reasoning 
The thesis begins with a presentation of judicial reasoning-related disciplines. After a brief 
overview of the main contributors of philosophy of law and legal reasoning, the various families 
of logics are presented. Such an extensive 
presentation of logic languages is rendered 
necessary by the fact that the various 
applications of ITs and of the Semantic Web 
rely on different combinations of these 
languages: it is hence necessary to outline 
the features that justify one choice for 
informatics model rather than another. 
General argumentation theory and 
diagramming is then presented, followed by 
a review of the most significant applications 
in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Finally, the state-of-the-art of Artificial 
Intelligence and Law (AI&Law) studies related to judicial reasoning is presented. 
0.2.2. The Semantic Web and AI & Law 
The second chapter is still devoted to a state-of-the-art presentation, this time on the stack of 
technologies which constitutes the Semantic Web – an offspring of the World Wide Web where 
data are interconnected in a semantically aware net of relations. Semantic Web-aware 
technologies can exploit this net of data, automatically retrieving structured information from 
the Internet and processing it to provide advanced reasoning services on an immense 
Knowledge Base (KB). The layers of the Semantic Web stack, represented in Figure 0.2 (from 
the bottom to the top), are all presented in the chapter, together with their main applications in 
the legal domain:  
 Identifiers and character set, providing a “name” for entities on the web and a set of 
character to spell those names and communicate information about their content; 
 Syntax, setting the pattern for the additional description of the entities on the web; 
 Data interchange, allowing to establish relations among different sets of entities on the 
web; 
 Ontologies, introducing restrictions to these relations in order for the knowledge base to 
be valid (free from errors) and consistent (free from contradictions). 
 Unifying logic, performing complex reasoning on the knowledge base which involves 
different sets of entities on the web; 
 Proof and trust, ensuring that the knowledge base and the reasoning performed on it 
are authored, substantially correct, and up-to-date. 
0.2.3. The judicial framework: ontology 
Fig. 0.2 – The Semantic Web stack of technologies. 
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The third chapter contains a presentation of research project, and a review of its first steps. 
Relying on existing technologies for document markup, the project built a set of computational 
ontologies (a core ontology providing the taxonomy of a judicial decision’s structure and of its 
main components, and a domain ontology containing knowledge on the domain’s facts, legal 
statuses and norms) upon the following tasks: 
 Semantic representation of the information contained in the decision’s text; 
 Enrichment of the information through identification and classification of legal, 
material, and judicial instances; 
 Highlighting of a legal norm’s applicability to a material instance and the relevancy of a 
material instance to a legal norm, with an open world perspective; 
 Inferencing new possible 
applicabilities of legal statuses 
coming from norms or 
precedents, in an open world 
perspective. 
The last two tasks, however, could not 
be fully achieved, because of the 
necessity of balancing between a 
faithful representation of the source 
legal document and the syntactic 
expressivity in the model of legal 
semantics. In order to set up the 
knowledge base for argumentation, the 
axioms covering these two tasks had in 
fact to be translated into a rule base in the upper layer of the Semantic Web stack of 
technologies. 
0.2.4. The judicial framework: rules and argumentation 
The trade-off between an efficient and versatile representation of the decision’s text and an 
advanced reasoning on the legal contents suggested a division of the two aspects, creating ad 
argumentation layer on top of the core and domain ontologies. The set of ontologies can be fully 
oriented at the representation of the decision’s text and at the enrichment of some of the text’s 
semantic contents, while the argumentation on the applicability of norms or judicial precedents 
is carried out by a different tool which imports the knowledge contained in the set of ontologies. 
The two elements constitute a judicial framework, useful for filling the gap between the original 
legal document and the data representing its contents
1
. 
                                                     
1
 The judicial framework presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 was shown in [Ceci 2012] at the 2012 RuleML 
International Doctoral Consortium of the ECAI Conference in Montpellier, and the paper received the Best Paper 
Award within the Doctoral Consortium. 
Fig. 0.3 - Tim Berners Lee's Semantic Web layer cake, 
adapted to the legal domain in [Sartor 2009] 
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In order to build an effective logics- and rule-based argumentation layer, it was necessary to 
stray the attention away from open-world reasoning and descriptive logics, delving into 
defeasible logics. This was the purpose of the research periods spent at the Fraunhofer-FOKUS 
Institute of Berlin, under the tutorship of prof. Thomas Gordon. The research highlighted that 
the Carneades, in its last implementation of a Policy Modeling tool, includes many features 
which are fundamental to the management of legal cases, in particular the argumentation theory 
and the defeasible logics, but lacks in representing temporal dimension and in keeping 
isomorphism with the source document.  
An important distinction has to be made on the kind of knowledge being modeled in the fourth 
chapter: the argumentation reproduced in the framework is not the court trial itself (the sequence 
of claims and counterclaims brought forward by the parties before a judge), but rather the 
argumentation contained in the decision’s groundings (the part of the judicial decision which 
contains the motivation of the final adjudication of the claim).  
0.2.5. Advanced considerations 
The fifth chapter tries to make a sum of the critical aspects met in the preceding chapters, and to 
elaborate them in order to lay down a set of requirements for the ideal legal rules language, 
analyzing different approaches to the representation of judicial knowledge: from general data, 
through legal concepts, up to case-law. Successively, a summary of the requirements for a rule 
markup language, as identified during the present research, is enumerated. It is divided into two 
sets of requirements: ontological requirements, for the correct binding of the abstract concepts 
to the part of the original text, and syntactical requirements, for the correct representation of the 
connections between abstract legal concepts. Finally, the LegalRuleML language is presented. 
This language is a work-in-progress, would-be standard language for legal rules. It contains 
most of the features discussed in the present chapter, and therefore it is taken as the starting 
point for the ideal legal rules language. The presentation also highlights where the standard built 
so far fails to capture aspects and semantics of judicial documents, as identified by the present 
research. 
0.2.6. Conclusions: Hybrid engines 
In the concluding part of the work, two projects in the field are analyzed in the light of the 
requirements laid down in chapter 5. Those projects rely on hybrid reasoning, an interesting 
approach which mixes case-based and rule-based reasoning to capture that kind of composite 
deduction process that takes place in several branches of human knowledge, from medicine to 
law. The research thus concludes by suggesting further exploitation of these hybrid engines, in 
order to verify which of the requirements for legal reasoning can be fulfilled by an extension of 
these projects. The requirements set by Chapter 5 constitute, in this perspective, a step towards 
the definition of a standard in the logic and proof layers of the Semantic Web layer cake in the 





Chapter 1  
Judicial Reasoning: a State of the Art. 
 
 
 “Whatever is referred to must exist. Let us call this the axiom of existence.”  
– John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
 
“«It is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.» 
«A melancholy conclusion, » said K. «It turns lying into a universal principle. »” 
– Franz Kafka, The Trial. 
 
  A brief history of legal reasoning through its main characters 1.1.
1.1.1. G. W. Leibniz: understanding law through logics 
The work of the great mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz encompasses 
the full range of human knowledge of the XVII Century. Information Technologies have, 
however, the luck and the pride of taking foundation in a main part of Leibniz’s work. His main 
contribution to logics is directed by his search for a representation of human matters through 
arithmetical formula. Working on a purely philosophical perspective, Leibniz evoked the scene 
of two disputing philosophers which finally sit down at their abaci and – inviting each other 
with a friendly “calculemus!” – begin calculating “the Truth”. According to the philosophy of 
Leibniz, human reasoning could be transformed into a kind of arithmetic using numbers instead 
of notions. In such a way, the logical truth of a proposition corresponds to the arithmetical truth 
of a calculation. In Leibniz’s example: if the number of animal were 2 and that of rational were 
3, then the number of man (the rational animal) would be obtained by the multiplication 3·2. 
Then the answer to the question ‘Is every man a rational being?’ could be reduced to the fact 
that 6 is divisible by 3. 
In order to achieve this objective, Leibniz examined all aspects of mathematics: arithmethics, 
trying to translate Aristotelian Syllogistic (Calculi universalis elementa – in [Leibniz 1694], VI, 
II, 205–216), algebra, looking for the abstract representation of the logical laws (De formis 
syllogismorum mathematice definiendis – in [Couturat 1903], 410–416), and geometry, 
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reproducing the Aristotelian theory on how material things are formed from combinations (in 
[Leibniz 1666]) and drawing representations of notions upon the Euler and Venn
2
 diagrams (De 
formae logicae comporatione per linearum ductus - in [Couturat 1903], 292–321). 
Leibniz’s work constitutes the basis of the modern mathematics. On one side, it is undeniable 
that its fundaments are now known as inappropriate for the task: for example, all Leibniz’s logic 
operates with atoms of the form ‘A est B’ and therefore is limited to syllogistic logic or monadic 
predicate calculus, both decidable while, on the contrary, nowadays it is known that the 
predicate calculus with dyadic (A+B) relations is not decidable [Davis 1958]. On the other side, 
however, Leibniz’s work is the starting point of a certain way of thinking logics towards the 
sake of justice. 
1.1.2. G. W. F. Hegel: a legal ontology 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, great German idealist whose work prosecuted the long road 
which was already traveled by Plato and Kant, contributes to the construction of the legal 
ontology through his work Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts, [Hegel 1820]). In this book, he defines the main concepts of law (the concepts of 
right, will, law, morale, ethics, necessity, obligation, property, State..) with a perspective 
strongly focused on a series of universal principles (some kind of dialectic axioms) from which 
he derives the definition of various legal concepts. In this short presentation it is not the case to 
delve into the details of Hegel’s thought: it is just important to mention that a large part of 
Western culture has tried (since ancient times) to build an ontology of all the concepts in reality 
based on universal values rather than on material phenomena. Such an approach may be 
considered, in our times, a typical “philosophical” approach in the degenerate meaning of 
something abstract, verbose, overthought and in the end useless. Of course such an approach is 
(and can) not give account for the infinite variations of material phenomena, nevertheless it is an 
approach which directs the thoughts of us people belonging to the Western culture, and which is 
also reflected in legal sources: statutory law itself, as well as a relevant part of legal doctrine, 
are in fact based on abstract concepts, the first disposing abstract and general provisions and the 
second (trying to) provide an explaination for these provisions, often linking them to more 
abstract – rather than more concrete – mechanics.  
1.1.3. J. Bentham: introducing deontic logics 
Born in the changing times of the late XVIII Century, Jeremy Bentham was a British 
philosopher and jurist. As part of his work, he investigated the nature of law and of its essence, 
which he defined (in Of Laws In General) as: 
“[…] an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the 
sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain 
person or class of persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject to 
his power: such volition trusting for its accomplishment to the expectation of certain events 
which it is intended such declaration should upon occasion be a means of bringing to pass, 
                                                     
2 See 1.3.3. for an insight into logical diagramming. 
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and the prospect of which it is intended should act as a motive upon whose conduct is in 
question.” [Hart 1970] 
This definition, which opens his book On Laws in General, can be rephrased as “Law is an 
expression of sovereign’s will concerning the conduct of its subjects and relying on punishment 
and motivation for its enactment”. Bentham supported utilitarianism: he believed that the 
actions of men are led by the desire to maximize utility, which means increasing happiness and 
reducing suffering. Law has the role of leading those actions: it is not the simple expression of 
the sovereign's preferences concerning the conduct of his subjects, it is rather the sign of his 
positive intention to influence their conduct. Bentham defines the “force” of a law as the 
“motives it relies upon for enabling it to produce the effects it aims at.” Bentham therefore 
conceives law as a system of social control based on motivation. In these concepts lies the 
origin of deontic logic, a concept that would have been created only fifty years later by Von 
Wright but which was already conceived by Bentham as a particular logic, different from an 
Aristotelian logic of understanding. He called it the logic of imperation, or logic of the will. See 
1.2.4.1. for a presentation of that logics. 
Bentham also imagined a useful instrument, which he called “Pannomium”, providing to the 
legislator a complete and coherent system of laws. By measuring the force of a law, the 
legislator can use such a tool to ensure that the addressed agents will follow his wishes as 
expressed by law. Here Bentham introduces the idea of managing law through logical tools, and 
foresees that the main issue of that invention would be the practical reasoning on the side of the 
governed, which can be resumed in the question “which is the valid logic formula for a given 
law: that in the mind of the legislator, or those understood by the law’s addressees?” The 
research of Bentham delves deeper into these concepts (and out of the scope of this brief 
presentation) by discussing of Legal Practical Reasoning. 
1.1.4. F. C. von Savigny: the completeness of law 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny was a jurist and historian. He was one of the founders of the famous 
German Historical School (Historische Rechtsschule), which supported codifications and 
regarded law as the expression of the convictions of the people, in the same manner as language, 
customs and practices are expressions of the people. In his view, the law is grounded in a form 
of popular consciousness called the Volksgeist. Von Savigny founded the Jurisprudence of 
Concepts (Begriffsjurisprudenz), the first sub-school of legal positivism, according to which the 
written law must reflect concepts, when interpreted. In general, Begriffsjurisprudenz is assigned 
to three elementary positions, related to each other:  
 The given law contains no gaps; 
 The given law can be traced back to a logically organized system of concepts (the 
“pyramid of concepts”);  
 New law can be logically deduced from superordinate legal concepts, which themselves 
are found inductively (“method of inversion”).  





 century legal scholarship, and, despite not being 
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recognized as a valid model to manage the production of new law (due to alleged flaws in the 
approach such as obfuscation of values, remoteness from real life situations, a lack of 
consideration of super-positive law and generally an overestimation of the purely dogmatic 
method), it still constitutes an important tool to understand, categorize and connect different 
legal provisions. Jurisprudence, in particular, often give account for such generalizations when 
trying to subsume heterogeneous norms under the same legal principles. 
1.1.5. E. Ehrlich: enriching the legal painting 
Among the main critics of the Begriffsjurisprudenz is Eugen Ehrlich, an Austrian legal scholar 
and sociologist whose positions have given birth to the “Living Law School” 
(Freirechtsschule). Influenced by the cultural mood of the times (among other by the work of 
the Grimm brothers on popular stories and traditions), Ehrlich noted that legal theories 
recognized law only as a sum of statutes, and judgements gave an inadequate view of the legal 
reality of a community. He therefore drew a distinction between norms of decision and norms of 
conduct (also called social norms). It is the latter that actually governs the life of a society and 
can justifiably be regarded in popular consciousness (if not necessarily by lawyers) as law. 
Ehrlich gives the example of customary law and commercial usage, which may develop and be 
recognized by courts of law as having normative force and legal significance. The point Ehrlich 
tried to make was that the "living law" which regulates social life may be quite different from 
the norms for decision applied by courts, and may sometimes attract far greater cultural 
authority which a legal system cannot safely ignore. In contrast to von Savigny and his 
Begriffsjurisprudenz, Eugen Ehrlich provides a perspective of law “from below”, which means 
that in order to represent the law it is necessary to give account for its thousands of applications. 
Together, the two approaches provide a first draft for a model of legal knowledge: it is possible 
to describe the legal system from the perspective of abstract concepts of from single 
occurrences, but in order to achieve a complete representation neither of the two can be rejected: 
a complete model of legal knowledge must thus include both approaches, or at least deal with 
them. 
1.1.6. H. Kelsen: describing law as it is 
Hans Kelsen was a jurist and a legal philosopher. He was one of the main supporters of legal 
positivism, a general and descriptive theory of law developed by John Austin in opposition to 
natural law theory
3
. Underlying legal positivism is meta-ethical noncognitivism, according to 
which moral claims have no cognitive meaning, and is therefore important to distinguish 
between moral rules and “positive law”, which is the only law concerned by legal studies and 
corresponds to nothing more than a “specific social technique of a coercitive order” ([Kelsen 
1945]). Legal positivism is a sort of meta-theory, (a theory about theories) of law, setting down 
the requirements that an adequate theory of law must meet.  
                                                     
3
 Natural law theory asserts that there is a conceptual connection between law and morality, and that moral values 
and standards exist independently of people’s beliefs and attitudes. According to natural law theory, the moral 
authority of law is part of the concept of law, and an unjust law cannot be legally valid, since it cannot be a law at all 
(lex injusta non est lex). Sofocles’ “Antigone” perfectly explains the ancient, never-ending clash of the two views on 
gods and men. 
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In his masterpiece Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre) Kelsen was interested in 
understanding law as it is, not as it ought to be. His method is structural analysis: more 
specifically, he provides a set of fundamental legal concepts (legal system, norm, right, duty, 
sanction, imputation) in order to describe the law in a scientific manner. Pure Theory of Law 
has the purpose to lay down the theoretical basis for the various disciplines of law (law of 
contracts, tort law, constitutional law, comparative law…). Its basic methodological aim is to 
free the study of law from all foreign elements, to avoid methodological syncretism (see 
[Paulson 1990]). 
Kelsen conceives law as a system of norms structured in a Stufenbau, a layered stack of norms 
where norms on a higher level authorize the creation of norms on a lower level. Kelsen gives the 
maximum importance to the concept of validity: to say that a legal norm is valid, he explains, is 
to say that it exists, and to say that it exists is to say that it ought to be obeyed or applied, that it 
has binding force. He, however, accepts as fundamental the distinction between what is (Sein) 
and what is ought to be (Sollen), where the latter is to be intended in “the specific sense in 
which human behavior is determined by a norm” ([Kelsen 1945], p. 37). 
Tracing the validity of a given legal norm through the upper layers of the legal system, one 
finally arrives at the basic norm (Grundnorm), described as “the first postulate, upon which the 
validity of all the norms of our legal system depends” ([Kelsen 1945] p 115). In the opinion of 
Hägerström reported in [Spaak 2012], Kelsen had difficulties finding the fundament of validity 
for the Grundnorm, nevertheless this structure of the legal system (where validity descends 
from other norms and not from abstract moral values) and the approach to the Pure Theory of 
law (distinguishing it from external notions) constitute a fundamental contribution to the 
modelling of legal knowledge. Hans Kelsen not only shaped the positivist approach to legal 
disciplines, but also provided it with the tools necessary to describe it without necessarily 
referring to social, economic or physical effects: he defined what part of the human knowledge, 
reasoning, and behavior pertains to the legal field. 
1.1.7. H. L. A. Hart: the law made of rules 
Legal positivism was further developed during the last century. Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, 
an influential legal philosopher, while still conceiving law as a system of norms taking 
foundation from a single, fundamental norm, criticized some aspects of legal positivism. In 
particular, in The Concept of Law ([Hart 1961]) Hart maintains that what is missing in Austin’s 
theory is the idea of a rule. According to Hart, this idea is necessary in order to analyze the 
concept of a legal obligation. Hart identifies two kinds of rules:  
 Duty-imposing rules: to say that someone has a (legal or moral) obligation to a certain 
behavior is to assume a background of rules that makes that behavior standard, and to 
apply a rule to that person and his behavior. Such duty-imposing rules, [Hart 1961] 
explains, are “conceived as binding independently of the consent of the individual 
bound”; 
 Rules of change, adjudication and recognition: they are used to identify, create, 




o rules of change give legal power to persons in order for them to modify the 
legal system; 
o rules of adjudication constitute organs to apply the law; 
o the rule of recognition sets the criteria for identifying the rules of the legal 
system by: 
 identifying and ranking the sources of law; 
 laying down the criteria for validity of a law; 
 imposing a legal duty on legal officials to apply all and only the norms 
that fulfill the criteria of validity. 
It is this distinction, in Hart’s words, that constituted “the step from the pre-legal system to a 
legal world” ([Hart 1961], 91). Such categorizations constitute the ideal starting point for 
modeling the law as a consistent organism standing on solid foundations. On the same time, 
however, the law cannot be taken as a perfectly logical system originated exclusively out of 
deduction from general principles: when facing the reality, norms (and their underlying logics) 
need always to change their formulas so that they can cope with the material instances. It is Hart 
himself that warns about that: 
“There can be no final and exhaustive definitions of concepts, even in science.... We can only 
redefine and refine our concepts to meet the new situations when they arise” [Hart 1983] 
1.1.8. W. N. Hohfeld: disambiguating legal language 
An important contribution to legal reasoning was brought by the American jurist Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, whose few law journal articles were collected after his death in [Hohfeld 
and Cook 1919], constitutes an important step towards understanding the nature of rights and 
the implications of liberty. In his work as a jurist, Hohfeld noticed that respected colleagues mix 
various meanings of the term right, sometimes using the same word several times, for different 
meanings, in the same sentence. In his view, such imprecision of language indicated an 
imprecision of thought, and thus also of the resulting legal conclusions. In order to facilitate 
reasoning and clarify rulings, Hohfeld attempted to disambiguate the term right by breaking it 
into eight distinct concepts. He defined these terms on the basis of their relationsips, grouping 
them into four pairs of Jural Opposites and four pairs of Jural Correlatives (see Figure 1.1). 
Note that this use of the words right and privilege corresponds respectively to the concepts of 
claim rights and liberty rights (see [McCormack 2005]). 
 Jural Opposites Jural Correlatives 
Right / No-right Right / Duty 
Privilege / Duty Privilege / No-right 
Power / Disability Power / Liability 
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Immunity / Liability Immunity / Disability 
If two concepts are correlative, one must always be matched by the other. If A has a right 
against B, this is equivalent to B having a duty towards A. If B has no duty, which means that B 
has a privilege: he/she can do whatever he or she pleases, having no duty to refrain from doing 
it, and A has no right to prohibit B from doing so. This approach to the classification of legal 
concepts constitutes an interesting basis for automatic inferencing on the legal bonds which 
exist between subjects. 
Moreover, in Hohfeld’s conception each individual is located within a matrix of relationships 
with other individuals. By summing the rights held and duties owed across all these 
relationships, the legal expert can identify the degree of liberty (an individual would be 
considered to have perfect liberty if it is shown that no-one has a right to prevent the given act) 
and whether the concept of liberty is comprised by commonly followed practices, thereby 
establishing general moral principles and civil rights. 
1.1.9. J. Searle: doing things with words 
John Searle, an American philosopher, brought very interesting contribution in the conception 
and ontology of legal rules through the speech acts theory. Together with J. L. Austin, he 
introduced the concept of performative language, a kind of verbal behaviour where not only 
speaking, but also an act of some sort is involved (i.e. a promise, a curse, a sentence). 
Performative utterances not only passively describe a given reality, but they directly change the 
(social) reality they are describing. Searle also defined as declarations those speech acts whose 
successful performance is sufficient to bring about “the fit between words and world, to make 
the propositional content true” ([Searle 1975]). He calls this direction of fit doubled direction, 
world-to-word-to-world. Searle is also important for having distinguished between regulative 
and constitutive rules: while regulative rules encode a form of behavior which exists before or 
independently from them, constitutive rules do not regulate but rather create or define new 
forms of behavior. Rules of a game (i.e. chess) are not limited to regulate the game, but create 
the whole new possibility of playing that game. 
1.1.10. Recent contributions by Italian legal philosophy scholars 
In the last fifty years the various tools for the analysis of legal phenomena were further 
expanded in various directions. Amedeo Giovanni Conte, legal philosopher, delved deep into 
the study of deontic and legal language. He structured his work (and his representation of 
normative utterances) in a strongly formal way, and his research is interesting in the perspective 
of legal language formalization: he studies the same legal provision (or logical statement) in 
different languages in order to highlight the several hidden implications of translating legal 
terms. He studied, among else, the different meanings of the term truth producing the table in 
Figure 1.2. 
His work represents a precious example of the approach to be kept when trying to formalize a 
discipline based on language, such as law: the meaning has to be kept distinct from the signs 
used to express it, and yet the connection between the two has to be ensured. No matter how 
Fig. 1.1 – Jural Opposites and Jural Correlatives from [Hohfeld, 1919]. 
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complex or subtle a distinction in meaning (or notation) may be: it has to be recognized, 
dissected and represented in the abstract model. Dura lex, sed lex. 
Enrico Pattaro connected his research for the source of a norm’s validity in legal philosophy to 
Scandinavian legal realism, a very influent school of thought of the last century its main 
exponent is Alf Ross, which declared the reality of legal system as an undistinguished mix of 
abstract principles and practical applications, brought together by the social belief of the validity 
of some (and not other) norms. Pattaro develops these positions, investigating how belief and 
compliance interact in a person’s position towards the legal system. He deeply relies on J. 
Searle and distinguishes between abstract law provisions (fact-types) and material occurrences 
(fact-tokens).  
These studies bring indeed contributions to the representation of the legal system in formal 
terms, but nevertheless they astray a bit from the pure concepts of law to get involved with a 
social or literary analysis of its effects. The work of Giovanni Sartor brings the attention back 
on the form of the normative principle, but this time with an explicit focus on formal logics and 
argumentation. Among the most important contributions to the recently growing discipline 
called Artificial Intelligence & Law, [Sartor 2005] (see 1.4.) presents a comprehensive view on 
the cognitive approach to law, which draws from formal logics (see 1.2.8.1. for his analysis on 
the relationships between logics and legal reasoning), argumentation theory and philosophy of 
law to build a model of legal phenomena that is formally valid, and at the same time consistent 
with the tradition of philosophy of law. In particular, Sartor affirms the need for defeasible 
logics to capture the dynamics of legal phenomena: as shown in [Sartor 2012], it is impossible 
to capture legal norms through what Sartor calls conclusive reasoning, where one can always 
adopt R’s conclusions while endorsing R’s premises (and one should never reject R’s 
conclusions while endorsing R’s premises). It is therefore necessary to adopt a defeasible 
 Truth 
De Dicto 
Dictum=what is said 
Eliocentrism is a 













The true name 









A house without a 




A contract with 
only one party is 
not a true contract. 
Eidonomic 
νόμος=norm 
A contract without 
patrimonial 
content is not a 
true contract. 
Fig. 1.2 – The “table of thruths” by A. G. Conte. Note that the terminal concepts are five: truth de dicto 
(addressing the content of its object), idiologic truth (addressing the object as a single entity), axiologic truth 
(relying on moral evaluations on the object), eidonoic truth (relying on human reasoning) and eidonomic truth 
(relying on valid laws). 
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reasoning approach, where one should, under certain conditions, refrain from adopting the 
conclusions of an argument though endorsing its premises.  
In order to understand the state-of-the-art of legal knowledge representation, it is then necessary 
to build on different subjects: logics, argumentation theory, and information technologies. In the 
following sections these subjects are presented, providing the basis for an application of legal 
theories (among which are those presented in the chapter part about to end) which fully exploits 
technologies, relies on solid formal roots and is as well consistent with the legal tradition. It is 
something that can be – as it has, in some sense, already been - achieved. 
 Logics 1.2.
1.2.1. Overview 
From an epistemic point of view, a logical argument is a set of one or more propositions (called 
“premises”) that provide inferential warrant for another set of one or more propositions (called 
“conclusions”) To say that one proposition “x” (premise) provides inferential warrant for 
another proposition “h” (conclusion), is to say that, according to the argument presented, the 
truth of x would to some extent support the claim that h is true. For example, the two premises 
provide inferential warrant for the conclusion in this classic argument from Aristotle's 
syllogisms, which corresponds to the modus ponens in modern argumentation theory: 
 All men are mortal. 
 Socrates is a man. 
therefore 
 Socrates is mortal. 
Logic is the study of the different modes of logical inference that different kinds of arguments 
display.  
1.2.2. First-order classical logic 
First-order classical logic was established by mathematicians such as George Boole, Gottlob 
Frege, and Bertrand Russell (see [Boole 1847, Frege 1970, and Russell 1903]) , between the end 
of the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
, though the ﬁrst book distinguishing ﬁrst order 
logic from other logical formalisms was probably [Hilbert and Ackermann 1927]. The power 
and the limitations of this formalism were properly circumscribed in the ﬁrst half of the 20th 
century, by the work of other great mathematicians, such as [Gödel 1929] and [Tarski 1941]. 
1.2.2.1. Propositional Logic 
Propositional logic is built out of two fundamental elements: 
 atomic propositions are sequences of words constituting a unit of meaning, each 
represented by a different atomic symbol (a different propositional constant), and 
represent the building blocks of logic language; 
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 propositional connectives specify relationships between propositions, with the help of 
parentheses delimiting their scope.  
These connectives express the structure of knowledge supporting the inferences of propositional 
logic. In the following list the basic logical connectives, which express (one particular 
interpretation) of the corresponding expression in natural language, are introduced:  
Logical connective   English conjunction 
˄     and 
˅     or 
¬     not 
→        if . . . then 
←        . . . if . . . 
↔       . . . iff . . . 
Molecular propositions are obtained by combining atomic propositions by means of 
propositional connectives. For instance consider the following propositions: 
[a: Freddie Mercury is a singer] 
[b: Freddie Mercury is a guitarist] 
[c: Freddie Mercury is a drummer] 
[d: Freddie Mercury is a musician] 
Combining them through connectives a logical formula can be obtained, such as: 
(a ˅ b ˅ c) → d  
The distinguishing feature of the propositional connectives in classical logics is that they are 
truth-functional: this means that the truth or falsity of every composite proposition only depends 
upon the truth or falsity of the component propositions. Thus, every propositional connective is 
a truth function: it provides a single truth value (true or false) for every combinations of truth 
values of the propositions it connects. This means that in the end all composite propositions are 
truth-functions of elementary propositions. As [Wittgenstein, 1922] puts it, “when we know the 
truth values of the atomic propositions, we can determine the truth value of any combination of 
them”.  
The function realized by each connective in propositional logic can be speciﬁed by means of a 
truth table, which indicates, for each combination of truth values of the connected propositions, 
the truth value of their composition. 
Conjunction - In classical logic, conjunction is represented with the symbol ˄. This connective 
corresponds to the English conjunction “and”. Thus the sentence: 
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Freddie Mercury is a singer and Brian May is a guitarist  
can be reformulated as: 
[a: Freddie Mercury is a singer] ˄ [b: Brian May is a guitarist]  
using the letters this is: 
a ˄ b  
Conjunction is a dyadic operator: it applies to any two propositions A and B and joins them into 
compound proposition A ˄ B. The connective ˄ assigns to A ˄ B a truth value that depends 
upon (is a function of) the truth values of A and B: A ˄ B true if and only if, both A and B are 
true. Thus, its meaning is expressed by the truth table of Figure 1.3. 
A B A ˄ B 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
 
Fig. 1.3 – A truth table. Each column of the table indicates truth values (0 or 1, denoting falsity or truth) for 
the formula on the top of it. The table shows how the truth value of the component propositions determines the 
truth value of the compound proposition. Each couple of truth values for the component propositions 
describes a possible state of affairs with regard to the concerned proposition, also called a case or a “truth 
possibility” for them (see [Wittgenstein, 1922]). The last column determines the truth possibility of the 
compound proposition, depending on what possible state of affair is realized. This truth table represents the 
truth possibilities for the conjunction operator. 
Negation - Logical negation is represented by the symbol ¬, which can be read as “not” or “it is 
not the case that”. Thus the natural language sentence:  
Freddie Mercury is not a guitarist  
can be reformulated as 
¬ [a: Freddie Mercury is a guitarist]  
In the abbreviated form 
¬a  
Please note that, in natural language, negation goes inside the sentence to which it applies, 
which is not the case in usual logical language. This corresponds to a general feature of logical 
syntax: It is compositional, in the sense that it allows building larger units by combining smaller 
units, without modifying the latter (the context where a certain syntactic structure appears does 
not modify its form). This contributes to making logical syntax much simpler than the syntax of 
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natural language, more precise and easier to control. On the other hand, this leads to awkward 
and redundant expressions. More generally, every logical formalism tends to be more rigid than 
natural language, but it often enables to achieve more clarity and sometimes it facilitates the 
expression of ideas that it would be very difﬁcult to articulate in natural language. The operator 
¬ is monadic, namely, it applies to a single proposition: ¬A is true if and only if A is false. Thus 





Fig. 1.4 – The truth table for negation 
Disjunction - Disjunction is represented through the symbol ˅, which corresponds to the 
English conjunction “or”. Thus the natural language proposition:  
Freddie Mercury is a singer or a guitarist  
can be reformulated as: 
[a: Freddie Mercury is a singer] ˅ [b: Freddie Mercury is a guitarist]  
in the abbreviated form: 
a ˅ b  
Like conjunctions, also disjunction is a dyadic operator and a truth function: A_B true if and 
only if at least one of A and B is true. Thus ˅ is characterized by the truth table in Figure 1.5. 
A B A ˅ B 
1 1 1 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
 
Fig. 1.5 – The truth table for disjunction 
Thus the formula will be false only in case that Freddie Mercury is neither a singer nor a 
guitarist. It will be true in all other possible cases. The concept of disjunction just described is 
the so called weak disjunction, which the Romans expressed with the word vel (this is why the 
symbol ˅, similar to a “v”, is used to express this idea). However in English the word or is also 
(though more rarely) used, often preceded by either, to express a different, more speciﬁc 
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(stronger) notion of disjunction: the idea that only one of the disjoined proposition is true, not 
both of them. Consider the following proposition:  
Either Freddie Mercury is a singer or he is a guitarist 
This seems to assert that he has one musical talent but no more. Similarly consider the 
prescription  
It is allowed to take either the fruit or the dessert 
This permission does not seem to cover the case where one takes both the fruit and the dessert 
(the addressee of the prescription should consider that this remains forbidden). It is often said 
that the Romans used the term “aut” to express the second kind of disjunction. In logic the 
strong disjunction is also called xor, and is expressed with the symbol ⊻. Thus  
[a: Freddie Mercury is a singer] ⊻ [b: Freddie Mercury is a guitarist]  
is true if Freddie Mercury is just one of those, it is false if he is both. The functioning of ⊻ is 
expressed by the truth table in Figure 1.6.  
A B A ⊻ B 
1 1 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
 
Fig. 1.6 – The truth table for the strong disjunction 
Material Conditional - The symbol → represents material conditional, which corresponds to 
the English conjunction “if...then…”. Thus the conditional  
If you don't like fruit, then take the dessert 
can be reformulated as  
[a: you don't like fruit] → [b: you take the dessert]  
Using the abbreviation: 
a → b  
Similarly, the conditional 
if a plane hit the Pentagon then plane debris can be found around the impact area 
can be reformulated as 
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[a: a plane hit the Pentagon] → [b: plane debris can be found around the impact area]  
Like conjunction and disjunction, material conditional is a truth functional dyadic operator: A 
→ B is false if and only if A is true and B is false. Thus → is characterized by the truth table in 
Figure 1.7. 
A B A → B 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
 
Fig. 1.7 – The truth table for the material conditional. 
Thus in our example, a plane hitting the Pentagon is sufﬁcient condition for plane debris to be 
found around the impact area, or equivalently, that plane debris being found around the impact 
area is a necessary condition of the plane having hit the Pentagon. There is a mismatch between 
the logical equivalence and our linguistic intuitions, since speaking of a condition usually means 
that an event or situation which precedes the conditioned event, but this is not captured by 
propositional logic. 
Biconditional - The symbol ↔ is used to represent material biconditional, to be read as “if and 
only if”. Thus the conditional  
Socrates will drink the poison if and only if he is condemned by the Athenians.  
can be reformulated as 
[Socrates will drink the poison] ↔ [Socrates is condemned by the Athenians]  
Also the biconditional is a truth functional dyadic operator: A ↔ B is true if and only if both A 
and B are true or both of them are false. Thus ↔ is characterized by the truth table in Figure 1.8. 
A B A↔B 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
 
Fig. 1.8 – The truth table for the biconditional. 
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1.2.2.2. Considerations on Propositional Logic and Legal Reasoning 
It is now the time to take a first step from logics into the legal field. Comparing this logical 
feature with legal mechanics, we realize that a material conditional does not fully capture the 
connection between a legal antecedent and a legal conclusion, this being prevented by two 
features of legal norms: legal norms are both counterfactual and defeasible. This does not mean, 
however, that we cannot use classical logic for modelling legal norms: we must be aware of the 
limits of the formal tool we are using.  
An interesting feature of classical propositional logic is the possibility to infer whatever 
conclusion from a contradiction (from a falsity anything follows, in Latin ex falso sequitur 
quodlibet). This means that in propositional logic contradictions do not remain isolated, but 
rather sprawl arbitrary conclusions. As noted in [Sartor 2005], in the legal field it is instead 
necessary to keep contradictions local, and to solve them without getting to further absurdities. 
Assume for instance to have two conﬂicting rules, one saying that citizens have the right to 
vote, and the other saying that people of minor age do not have the right to vote. Translating 
them into propositional logic:  
[a: the person is a citizen] → [b: the person has the right to vote] 
[c: the person is of minor age] → ¬[b: the person has the right to vote] 
Assume also that, as a matter of fact, the person considered is both a citizen and of minor age. 
The following derivation is obtained: 
a (premise) 
a → b (premise) 
c (premise) 
c → ¬b (premise) 
b (from 1 and 2 by →) 
¬b (from 3 and 4 by →) 
? (from 3 and 6 by →) 
[d: every citizen is a senator] (from 7 by ?) 
Thus an arbitrary formula d can be derived from the inconsistency between b and ¬b. Clearly, 
this is not the right way to address inconsistencies in the law. Nobody would accept this 
argument, though it appears to be semantically sound (in all cases in which the inconsistent 
premises are true, that is never, also the consequence d is true). 
1.2.2.3. Predicate Logic 
Predicate logic is built on top of propositional logic, to which it adds the feature of formal 
structure analysis for atomic propositions. To use the metaphor of [Frege, 1970], “atomic 
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propositions can be looked into only when we take the microscope of predicate logic”. In 
particular, using predicate logic, the following elements of a sentence are identified:  
 Predicates, which express actions, properties and relationships; 
 Terms, which indicate the objects to which predicates refer.  
For instance, in the propositional formula: 
Socrates drinks Poison 
predicate logic allows to further define the proposition by distinguishing the predicate 
1 drinks 2  
having two arguments, indicated by the numbered place-holders, and terms Socrates and poison. 
By substituting the terms for the place-holders in the predicate, as suggested by [Quine, 1974], 
the result is propositional formula. In the usual, compact logical syntax, the predicate precedes 
its arguments: 
drinks(Socrates;Poison)  
The distinction between terms and predicates is arbitrary rather than fixed, and depends on the 
opportunity in the single case: if we were interested only in establishing who drinks Poison, 
then we could have used the following predicate 
1 drinks Poison 
In propositional logic there are two kinds of terms: constants and variables. Constants refer to 
speciﬁc individuals, while variables refer to any object within the domain of discourse. 
Variables are indicated with letters x, y, w, z. For instance, 
[x drinks y]  
or 
Drinks(x; y)  
is a formula expressing that an undetermined individual, referred to as x, sings an undetermined 
object, referred to as y. 
A formula like this does not yet express a proposition: as seen in propositional logic, a 
proposition is an entity which is subject to be true or false, but it cannot be established whether 
the present formula is true or false until the variables are specified. To transform a formula 
containing variables into a propositional formula individual names for the variables have to be 
substituted, as in the following example: 
Socrates drinks Poison 
Predicate logic offers also another way to refer to individual entities, namely by using function 
symbols. A function identifies an individual entity on the basis of its connection with other 
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entities. For instance, the function mother(x) denotes a particular person (a mother) on the basis 
of the fact that it has a particular connection (motherhood) with another individual (a child). For 
instance, mother(Sarah) identiﬁes a particular woman (Sarah’s mother), on the basis of the fact 
that she is is the unique mother of Sarah.  
1.2.2.4. Quantifiers 
There is a second way to obtain a propositional formula out of an expression containing 
variables. This consists in using two typical constructs of predicate logic, the universal 
quantiﬁer FORALL, also denoted through the symbol ∀ and the existential quantiﬁer 
FORSOME (to be read as “it exists an”), also denoted through the symbol ∃. Let us consider 
ﬁrst the universal quantiﬁer. The very general proposition expressing that any object is a thing 
can be expressed as follows: 
FORALL (x) [x is a thing]  
which in the symbolism of mathematical logic becomes: 
∀x(Thing(x)) 
Very little can be said, in general, of all the possible objects. More interesting assertions can be 
obtained by using universal quantiﬁcation over conditionals. In this case it can be specified that 
all objects which satisfy a certain condition have certain properties: 
FORALL (x) 
IF [x is a citizen] THEN [x has the right to vote] 
which in the symbolism of mathematical logic becomes: 
∀x(Citizen (x) → RightToVote(x))  
meaning that everyone who is a citizen has the right to vote. The existential quantiﬁer 
FORSOME is used to express the idea that there exists at least one individual that satisﬁes a 
certain predicate. For example: 
FORSOME (x) [x; is Senator of France]  
expresses the idea that there is at least one entity, which is Senator of France (France has at least 
one Senator). In the usual syntax of predicate logic it becomes the proposition: 
∃x(SenatorOf(x;France)  
similarly, the following proposition  
FORALL (y) IF[y is a person] 
THEN FORSOME (x) [x is y’s mother] 
in the logical symbolism 
∀y(Person(y) → ∃xMother(x; y))  
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shows how one can combine the two quantiﬁers. It is to be read as: “for any entity, if that entity 
is a person then some other entity is the mother of that person” or more simply “every person 
has a mother”. 
1.2.2.5. Horn Clause Logic 
The logician Alfred Horn, investigating the mathematical properties of sentences with at most 
one positive literal
 
in [Horn 1951], highlighted some features which are now largely exploited in 
logic programming and constructive logic. 
A Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive literal. Any Horn clause therefore belongs to 
one of four categories: 
 A rule: 1 positive literal, at least 1 negative literal. A rule has the form:  
¬P1 ˅ ¬P2 ˅ ... ˅ ¬Pk ˅ Q 
This is logically equivalent to  
(P1 ˄ P2 ˄ ... ˄ Pk) → Q 
thus, an if…then implication with any number of conditions but one conclusion.  
Examples:  
o ¬man(x) ˅ mortal(x) (All men are mortal); 
o ¬parent(x,y) ˅ ¬ancestor(y,z) ˅ ancestor(x,z) (If x is a parent of y and y is an 
ancestor of z then x is an ancestor of z.). 




o knows(x,x) (Everyone knows himself – in a trivial sense). 
 A negated goal: 0 positive literals, at least 1 negative literal. In virtually all 
implementations of Horn clause logic, the negated goal is the negation of the statement 
to be proved; the knowledge base consists entirely of facts and goals. The statement to 
be proven, therefore, called the goal, is a single unit or the conjunction of units; an 
existentially quantified variable in the goal turns into a free variable in the negated goal. 
E.g. If the goal to be proven is  
∃x(male(x) ˄ ancestor(elizabeth, x)) (show that there exists a male descendent of 
Elizabeth)  
the negated goal will be  
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¬male(x) ˅ ¬ancestor(elizabeth,x). 
 The null clause: 0 positive and 0 negative literals. Appears only as the end of a 
resolution proof. 
Horn clause logic is equivalent in computational power to a universal Turing machine. As long 
as resolution is restricted to Horn clauses, some interesting properties apply: 
 When resolving Horn clauses A and B to get clause C, then the positive literal of A will 
resolve against a negative literal in B, so the only positive literal left in C is the one 
from B. Thus, the result of two Horn clauses is a Horn clause; 
 When resolving a negated goal G against a fact or rule A to get clause C, the positive 
literal in A resolves against a negative literal in G. C is left with no positive literal, and 
thus is either a negated goal or the null clause; 
 When trying to prove G from D, where ¬G is a negated goal, and D is a knowledge base 
of facts and rules, and using the set of support strategy in which no resolution ever 
involves resolving two clauses from D together, then every resolution combines a 
negated goal with a fact or rule from D and generates a new negated goal. Taking a 
resolution proof, and tracing the way back from the null clause at the end to ¬G at the 
beginning (since every resolution involves combining one negated goal with one clause 
from D) it is clear that the sequence of negated goals involved can be linearly ordered. 
That is, the final proof, ignoring dead ends has the form: 
¬G resolves with C1 from D, generating negated goal P2 
P2 resolves with C2 from D, generating negated goal P3 
... 
Pk resolves with C2 from Gamma, generating the null clause. 
Therefore, the process of generating the null clause can be viewed as a state space search where: 
 A state is a negated goal; 
 An operator on negated goal P is to resolve it with a clause C from D; 
 The start state is ¬G; 
 The goal state is the null clause. 
Propositional Horn clauses are also of interest in computational complexity, where the problem 
of finding truth value assignments to make a conjunction of propositional Horn clauses true is a 
P-complete problem (solvable in linear time), sometimes called HORNSAT as in [Cook and 
Nguyen 2010]. 
[Van Emden and Kowalski 1976] investigated the model theoretic properties of Horn clauses in 
the context of logic programming, showing that every set of definite clauses has a unique 
minimal model. An atomic formula is logically implied by the definite clauses if and only if it is 
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true in this model. It follows that a goal clause is logically implied by a set of definite clauses if 
and only if it is true in the minimal model. The minimal model semantics of Horn clauses is the 
basis for the stable model semantics of logic programs. 
1.2.3. Modal Logic  
Modal logic is the study of modal propositions and of their logical relationships. The basic 
modal propositions concern necessity and possibility. For example, the following are modal 
propositions: 
 It is possible that it will be sunny tomorrow; 
 It is possible for humans to travel to the center of the Earth; 
 It is not possible that: every person is mortal, Socrates is a person, and Socrates is not 
mortal; 
 It is necessary that either it is raining here now or it is not raining here now; 
 A proposition p is forbidden if and only if the negation of p is obligatory. 
Modal logic was first discussed in a systematic way by Aristotle in De Interpretatione. Aristotle 
noticed that the notions of necessity and possibility were interdefinable. The proposition p is 
possible may be defined as: not-p is not necessary. Similarly, the proposition p is necessary may 
be defined as: not-p is not possible. Aristotle also pointed out that from the separate facts that p 
is possible and that q is possible, it does not follow that the conjunctive proposition p and q is 
possible.  
As [Lemmon and Scott 1977] reports, philosophers after Aristotle added other interesting 
observations to the long list of implications spawning from these considerations. Contributions 
were made, among others, by the Megarians, the Stoics, Ockham, and Pseudo-Scotus. Besides 
an incursion on the field by Leibniz (described in [Poser 1969]), interest in modal logic resumed 
only in the twentieth century with Clarence Irving Lewis' search for an axiom system to 
characterize `strict implication' in [Lewis 1918]. As explained in the next paragraph, G. Henrik 
von Wright was among the principal developers of deontic systems of modal logic. The model-
theoretic study of the logical consequence relation in modal logic began with [Carnap 1947]. 
Further innovations in modal logic (among which the introduction of the domain of possible 
worlds) were developed in [Kripke 1959], though they were anticipated in [Kanger 1957] and 
[Hintikka 1957].  
The operators “it is possible that” and “it is necessary that” are called “modal” operators, 
because they specify a way (modus) in which the rest of the proposition can be said to be true. 
There are other modal operators, for example: it once was the case that, it will once be the case 
that, and it ought to be the case that. Moreover, certain modal propositions logically imply 
others. For example, the proposition it is necessary that p logically implies the proposition that 
it is possible that p, but not vice versa. These implications enhance the intuitive understanding 
of the modal propositions involved, because to understand a proposition is, in part, to grasp 
what it logically implies.  
27 
 
Models provide interpretations for the language. A model M for the language is typically 
defined to be a triple <W, R, V> where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R the 
accessibility relation, and V a valuation function that assigns to each atomic sentence p a set of 
worlds V(p). These models allow to define the model-theoretic notions of truth, logical truth, 
and logical consequence. Whereas truth and logical truth are semantic properties of the 
sentences of the language, logical consequence is a semantic relation among sentences. A 
sentence is said to be logically true, or valid, only if it is true in all models, and it is said to be 
valid with respect to a class C of models only if it is valid in every model in the class. The proof 
theory proceeds along similar lines: rules of inference relate certain sentences to others, 
indicating which sentences can be inferred, and from which sentence. A logic Σ is a set of 
sentences delimited by the rules of inference defining that logic. A theorem of a logic is simply 
a sentence inside Σ. A logic Σ is said to be sound with respect to a class of models C just in case 
every sentence that is a theorem of Σ is valid with respect to the class C, and a logic Σ is said to 
be complete with respect to a class C of models just in case every sentence that is valid with 
respect to C is a theorem of Σ. 
1.2.4. Deontic Logic 
In the last 60 years there has been a large amount of research on formal models of normative 
concepts. This is an interdisciplinary domain, where philosophers like [Conte et al., 1977] 
logicians like [von Wright, 1951]), legal theorists like [Alchourron, 1996], and computer 
scientists like [McCarthy, 1986] have merged their efforts. 
Any logical analysis of the normative legal concepts requires a formal modelling of deontic 
notions, such as obligation (duty) and permission. These ideas have been applied by using 
different logical tools, most frequently related to the possible-worlds semantics of modal logic.  
1.2.4.1. Obligatory  
We can represent obligations through formulas having the following structure: 
Obl A  
which stands for “it is obligatory that A”, where A denotes any action or state of affairs, and 
Obl is the deontic operator for obligation, to be read as “it is obligatory that.” For instance, the 
following formula states that Sarah has the obligation to pay taxes: 
Obl [Sarah pay taxes]  
1.2.4.2. Forbidden 
As intuitively expected, when one is obliged not to perform a certain action he is forbidden from 
doing that action. Here is an example: 
Forb [Sarah download copyrighted work] 




The operator Perm is used to express permissions. For example, to indicate that Sarah is 
permitted to access the Springer Online Catalogue: 
Perm [Sarah access Springer Online Catalogue] 
which stands for “it is permitted that Sarah accesses the Springer Online Catalogue”. 
1.2.4.4. Hohfeldian relations between deontic operators 
Following Hohfeld (see 1.1.8.), in deontic logic the concept of permission is defined as the 
opposite of the one of obligation. It seems intuitively obvious that: 
Forb A ≡ Obl ⌐A 
which stands for “Being prohibited to perform an action means being obliged not to do it”. 
For instance, that Sarah is forbidden from smoking means that she is obliged not to smoke. 
Likewise, that some A is permitted means that A is not forbidden: 
Perm A ≡ ⌐Forb A  
then: 
Perm A ≡ ⌐Obl ⌐A  
The deontic qualifications “obligatory” and “forbidden” are complete, in the sense that they 
determine the deontic status of both the action or state of affairs A they are concerned with and 
the complement of A: to say that the action or state of affairs A is obligatory is equivalent to 
saying that ⌐A is forbidden, and to say that A is forbidden is equivalent to say that ⌐A is 
obligatory.  
On the contrary, to say that an action or state of affairs is permitted does not add information 
about the status of its complement. In particular, when a positive action or state of affairs is 
permitted (namely, the action is not forbidden), then its negation can be likewise permitted or it 
can be forbidden (this will be the case when the action, besides being permitted, also is 
obligatory).Consider for example, “wearing a full helmet”, abbreviated as H: 
Situation  wearing a 
helmet (H)  




Forb H  Obl ⌐H 
Riding a 
motorbike 
Obl H Forb ⌐H 
Riding a bike Perm H Perm ⌐H 
 
Fig. 1.9 – Complete deontic qualiﬁcations 
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The omission of the helmet (⌐H) is permitted when riding a bike, but it is forbidden when riding 
a motorbike, and is obligatory inside the Parliament. From the table 1.x it appears that to 
express the normative qualiﬁcation of wearing a helmet while riding a motorbike or inside the 
parliament, it is sufficient to say that while riding a motorbike wearing the helmet is obligatory 
while inside the Parliament it is forbidden.  
On the contrary, saying that H is permitted (namely, not prohibited) when riding a bike is not 
sufficient to fully specify H’s normative status in that case: the permission to wear a helmet 
(Perm H) is consistent both with the permission not to wear it (Perm ⌐H) and with the 
prohibition not to wear it (with Forb ⌐H), that is, with the obligation to wear it (with Obl H). 
Thus, to provide a complete deontic specification, it is necessary to specify whether not wearing 
the helmet is forbidden or permitted. When riding a bike, wearing a helmet is permitted (as 
when riding a motorbike, and contrary to what is the case when inside a Parliament), but not 
wearing the helmet is permitted too (as when inside a Parliament, and contrary to what is the 
case when riding a motorbike). In conclusion, besides an action or state of affairs being 
obligatory (and its negation being forbidden), and besides its being forbidden (and the negation 
being obligatory), there is a third way for the deontic status of an action or state of affairs to be 
fully speciﬁed: this consists in both the action or state of affairs being permitted and its negation 
being permitted. In common speech, when one says “permitted,” one usually refers to this third 
option. 
1.2.4.5. Facultative  
Any A is facultative when both A and ⌐A are permitted: 
Facult A ≡ (Perm A ˄ Perm ⌐A) 
which stands for “it is facultative that A is equivalent to it is permitted that A and it is permitted 
that ⌐A. 
For example, saying that when riding a bike it is facultative to wear the helmet corresponds to 
saying that it is permitted both to wear the helmet and to not wear it. Note that something being 
facultative does not entail that others are forbidden to prevent it (or that other are forbidden to 
prevent its negation. In this sense, faculty is a weak notion of freedom.  
In deontic logic the permission that one agent j does some A has to be distinguished from the 
prohibition that another (or all others) prevents j from doing this A: it is possible that one is 
permitted to do actions that others are permitted to prevent. Otherwise, there are general 
prohibitions upon others that—by limiting in general their action—prescribe certain ways of 
interfering with the holder of a mere permission, and thus indirectly provide a certain legal 
protection for the possibility of doing the permitted action. As in [Hart 1982], at least the cruder 
forms of interference, such as those involving physical assault or trespass, will be criminal or 
civil offences or both, and the duties or obligations not to engage in such modes of interference 
constitute a protective perimeter behind which liberties exist and may be exercised. 
[Alexy, 1985] refers to such faculties by speaking of directly protected freedoms, as opposed to 
unprotected freedoms, which are not accompanied by the prohibition on interference. Among 
such directly protected freedoms are the negative liberties one has towards the State in liberal 
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countries (for instance, freedom of speech, of religion, and so on). Thus a protected freedom, 
with regard to action A would be expressed as: 
Facult A = Forb [prevent A] ˄ Forb [prevent ⌐A]  
An even stronger notion of one’s liberty to do A is obtained when the others’ prohibition from 
interfering with A is coupled with the obligation (upon others or upon the government) to 
provide some means for performing A, namely, the obligation to ensure that the concerned 
agent has the effective capability of doing what he or she is permitted to do (in this way, the so-
called negative freedom becomes as well a positive or substantive freedom; see [Sen, 1999]). 
But in order to capture all aspects of facultativeness it would be necessary to represent and 
reason about actions and to introduce a logic of agency, which is outside the scope of the 
present research. 
1.2.4.6. Bentham’s Logic of will 
The formalization presented in the last section relies on formulations by Jeremy Bentham made 
way before the authors above formalized deontic logics. Bentham came to these considerations 
by investigating the essential elements of law. According to Bentham, “There are two things 
essential to every law: an act of some sort or other, being the object of a wish or volition on the 
part of the legislator; and a wish or volition of which such act is the object.”  
In Bentham’s thought legal science needed a particular logic, different from the Aristotelian 
logic of the understanding. He calls this new logic the logic of imperation or logic of the will. In 
chapter ten of [Hart 1970] Bentham presents these aspects, more than one hundred fifty years 
before Von Wright: 
“Concerning an act, the aspect is either decided or directive; either neutral or undecided. If it 
is decided, this is a command or a prohibition which expresses the wish of the legislator to 
see people to whom the legal norm is addressed perform or refrain to perform a specific act. 
If it is neutral, it is a non-command or a nonprohibition, which is the equivalent of 
permission: the legislator does not command anything to his subjects concerning a specific 
conduct to adopt.” [Hart 1970] 
These different aspects of the will act like a deontic operator in contemporary logic and this is 
exactly what Bentham has in mind. As for von Wright, symbols following a deontic operator 
denote for Bentham properties for class of acts like stealing, killing, smoking etc. Bentham's 
example can be represented like this:  
Every man shall wear a helmet = Obl H.  
No man shall wear a helmet = Forb H.  
Any man may avoid to wear a helmet = ¬ Obl H. 
Any man may wear a helmet = Perm H. 
Bentham suggests a parallelism between relations that can be established between these 
statements and the relations of conversion existing between classical logical statements as they 
appear in a logical square: as in classical logics two contradictory statements cannot be 
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simultaneously true or false, also two contradictory directive statements cannot be 
simultaneously valid or invalid. Therefore, Obl H and ¬ Obl H can't be valid simultaneously but 
one of them must be valid. That is: 
 ¬ (Obl H & Obl H) & (Obl H v ¬ Obl H) 
similarly concerning Forb H and ¬ Forb H: 
 ¬ (Forb H & Forb H) & (Forb H v ¬ Forb H) 
If Bentham's proposal is a system of axiomatic calculus of deontic logic obtained through two 
definitions, one axiom, and rules of propositional calculus. The two definitions in Bentham’s 
sentence “a negative aspect towards a positive act is equipollent to an affirmative aspect towards 
the correspondent negative act”. These two definitions can be obtained from the sentence: 
Forb H if and only if Obl ¬H 
¬Obl H if and only if Perm ¬H 
The sole axiom is the following: 
Obl H implies Perm H 
Adding to this basis the following passage of [Hart 1970], which can be formalized to obtain 
other theorems that can be demonstrated, it is possible to foresee the possibility of formalization 
offered by Bentham:  
“First, it may be commanded: it is then left unprohibited: and it is not prohibited nor left 
uncommanded. 2. It may be prohibited: it is then left uncommanded: and it is not 
commanded nor permitted (that is left unprohibited). 8. It may be left uncommanded: it is 
then not commanded: but it may be either prohibited or permitted: yet so as that if it be in the 
one case it is not in the other. 4. It may be permitted: it is then not prohibited: but it may be 
either commanded or left uncommanded: yet so as that if it be in the one case, it is not in the 
other, as before.” [Hart 1970] 
For example: ‘it may be commanded: it is then left unprohibited’ can be formalized as: 
OblH → ¬ForbH. 
It is then clear that Bentham's logic of the will is a deontic logic, and that, when formalized, it 
leads to a deontic calculus. It is a logic of affirmative statements concerning prescriptive 
statements. Legal validity means belonging to the field of law. One should understand that 
Bentham's interest goes beyond an attempt of formalization, even in common language and 
even it creates a great theoretical field. The logic of the will finds a place in a broader project of 
reforming English law at the level of his vocabulary and his grammar, which is within the scope 
of Benthamian jurisprudence. For more on the subject see [Bozzo-Rey 2009]. 
1.2.5. Description Logics 
The term Description Logics (DLs) doesn't define a logics formalism but rather a family of 
knowledge representation (KR) formalisms that represent the knowledge of an application 
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domain by first defining the relevant concepts of the domain, and then using these concepts to 
specify properties of objects and individuals occurring in the domain. Description Logics are 
descended from so-called “structured inheritance networks” [Brachman 1977, 1978], which 
were introduced to overcome the ambiguities of early semantic networks and frames, and which 
were ﬁrst realized in the system Kl-One [Brachman and Schmolze 1985]. The following ideas, 
ﬁrst put forward in Brachman’s work on structured inheritance networks, have largely shaped 
the subsequent development of DLs: 
 The basic syntactic building blocks are atomic concepts (unary predicates), atomic roles 
(binary predicates), and individuals (constants); 
 The expressive power of the language is restricted in that it uses a rather small set of 
(epistemologically adequate) constructors for building complex concepts and roles. 
The characteristics of the Description Logics language include formal, logic-based semantics 
and the emphasis on reasoning as a central service: reasoning allows one to infer implicitly 
represented knowledge from the knowledge that is explicitly contained in the knowledge base. 
The two main inference patterns supported by Description Logics are classification of concepts 
and individuals, described in [Baader and Nutt 2003]. 
 Classification of concepts determines subconcept/superconcept relationships (called 
subsumption relationships in DL) between the concepts of a given terminology, and 
thus allows one to structure the terminology in the form of a subsumption hierarchy. 
This hierarchy provides useful information on the connection between diﬀerent 
concepts, and it can be used to speed-up other inference services; 
 Classiﬁcation of individuals (or objects) determines whether a given individual is 
always an instance of a certain concept (i.e., whether this instance relationship is 
implied by the description of the individual and the deﬁnition of the concept). It thus 
provides useful information on the properties of an individual. Moreover, instance 
relationships may trigger the application of rules that insert additional facts into the 
knowledge base.  
Implicit knowledge about concepts and individuals can be inferred automatically with the help 
of inference procedures. In particular, subsumption relationships between concepts and instance 
relationships between individuals and concepts play an important role: unlike IS-A links in 
Semantic Networks, which are explicitly introduced by the user, subsumption relationships and 
instance relationships are inferred from the deﬁnition of the concepts and the properties of the 
individuals. 
1.2.5.1. The issue of computability 
Because Description Logics are a KR (Knowledge Representation) formalism, and being 
assumed that a KR system should always answer the queries of a user in reasonable time, the 
reasoning procedures DL researchers are interested in are decision procedures, which means 
they should always terminate, both for positive and for negative answers. Since the guarantee of 
an answer in ﬁnite time does not imply that the answer is given in reasonable time, investigating 
the computational complexity of a given DL with decidable inference problems is an important 
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issue. Decidability and complexity of the inference problems depend on the expressive power of 
the DL at hand. On the one hand, very expressive DLs are likely to have inference problems of 
high complexity, or they may even be undecidable. On the other hand, very weak DLs (with 
eﬃcient reasoning procedures) may not be suﬃciently expressive to represent the important 
concepts of a given application. Investigating this trade-oﬀ between the expressivity of DLs and 
the complexity of their reasoning problems has been one of the most important issues in DL 
research.  
The ﬁrst formal investigations of the computational properties of the languages used in early DL 
showed that these languages were too expressive, which led to undecidability of the 
subsumption problem [Schmidt-Schauß 1989; Patel-Schneider 1989]. The ﬁrst worst-case 
complexity results [Levesque and Brachman 1987; Nebel 1988] showed that the subsumption 
problem is intractable (i.e., not polynomially solvable) even for very inexpressive languages. 
Intractability of reasoning, however, does not prevent a DL from being useful in practice, 
provided that sophisticated optimization techniques are used when implementing a system based 
on such a DL, described in [Horrocks 2003]. When implementing a DL system, the eﬃcient 
implementation of the basic reasoning algorithms is not the only issue, though. On the one hand, 
the derived system services (such as classiﬁcation, i.e., constructing the subsumption hierarchy 
between all concepts deﬁned in a terminology) must be optimized as well [Baader et al. 1994]. 
On the other hand, one needs a good user and application programming interface. Most 
implemented DL systems provide for a rule language, which can be seen as a very simple, but 
eﬀective, application programming mechanism. 
1.2.5.2. Building Knowledge Bases 
A KR system based on Description Logics provides facilities to set up knowledge bases, to 
reason about their content, and to manipulate them. A knowledge base (KB) comprises two 
components, the TBox and the ABox. The TBox introduces the terminology (the vocabulary) of 
an application domain, while the ABox contains assertions about named individuals in terms of 
this vocabulary. 
The vocabulary consists of concepts, which denote sets of individuals, and roles, which denote 
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role names), all DL systems allow their users to build complex descriptions of concepts and 
roles. The TBox can be used to assign names to complex descriptions. The language for 
building descriptions is a characteristic of each DL system, and diﬀerent systems are 
distinguished by their description languages. The description language has a model-theoretic 
semantics. Thus, statements in the TBox and in the ABox can be identiﬁed with formulae in 
ﬁrst-order logic or, in some cases, a slight extension of it. A DL system not only stores 
terminologies and assertions, but also oﬀers services that reason about them. Typical reasoning 
tasks for a terminology are to determine whether a description is satisﬁable (i.e., non-
contradictory), or whether one description is more general than another one, that is, whether the 
ﬁrst subsumes the second. Satisﬁability checks of descriptions and consistency checks of sets of 
assertions are useful to determine whether a knowledge base is meaningful at all. With 
subsumption tests, one can organize the concepts of a terminology into a hierarchy according to 
their generality.  
1.2.5.3. Description languages  
Elementary descriptions are atomic concepts and atomic roles. Complex descriptions can be 
built from them inductively with concept constructors, and a set of constructors defines a 
description language. The language AL (= attributive language) has been introduced in 
[Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka 1991] as a minimal language that is of practical interest. The 
other languages are extensions of it. To give examples of what can be expressed in AL, let’s 
suppose that Person and Female are atomic concepts. Then Person ˄ Female and Person ˄ 
¬Female are AL concepts describing, intuitively, those persons that are female, and those that 
are not female. In addition, the supposition that hasChild is an atomic role allows forming the 
concepts: 
Person ˄ ∃ hasChild and 
Person ˄ ∀hasChild.Female,  
denoting those persons that have a child, and those persons all of whose children are female. 
Using the bottom concept (⊥), the persons without a child can be described by the concept: 
Person ˄ ∀hasChild.⊥ 
The next step is to introduce interpretations I consisting in a non-empty set ∆(I) and a function 
assigning to each atomic concept A a set A(I) ⊆ ∆(I) (interpreted atomic concepts as subset of 
the interpretations domain), and to each atomic role R a binary relation R(I) ⊆ ∆(I) × ∆(I). The 
interpretation function is extended with the following basic definitions: 
⊤(I)  = ∆(I) 
⊥(I)  = 0 
(¬A)(I)  = ∆(I) \ A(I) 
(C ˄ D)(I)  = C(I) ˄ D(I) 
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(∀R.C)(I)  = {a ∈ ∆(I) | ∀b. (a, b) ∈ R (I) → b ∈ C (I)}  
(∃R.T)(I)  = {a ∈ ∆(I) | ∃b. (a, b) ∈ R (I)}  
We say that two concepts (C and D) are equivalent if C(I) D(I) for all interpretations I. For 
example, one can easily verify that  
∀hasChild.Female ˄ ∀hasChild.Student 
and 
∀hasChild.(Female ˄ Student) 
are equivalent. 
More expressive languages are obtained adding further constructors to AL.  
 The union of concepts, indicated by the letter U; 
 Full existential quantiﬁcation, indicated by the letter E; 
 Number restrictions, also called cardinality restrictions and indicated by the letter N; 
 The complex concept negation, indicated by the letter C, for “complement”. 
Extending AL by any subset of the above constructors yields a particular AL language. Each 
AL language is named with a string of the form 
AL[U][E][N][C]; 
where a letter in the name stands for the presence of the corresponding constructor. Other 
relevant extensions are: 
 Functional Properties indicated by the letter F; 
 Role Hierarchy indicated by the letter H; 
 Limited Complex Role Inclusion Axioms (reflexivity and irreflexivity; role 
disjointness), indicated by the letter R; 
 Nominals (enumerated classes of object value restrictions), indicated by the letter O; 
 Inverse Properties, indicated by the letter I; 
 Qualified cardinality restrictions, indicated by the letter Q; 
 Use of datatype properties, data values or data types, indicated by the letter (D). 
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ALC is a centrally important description logic from which comparisons with other varieties can 
be made. ALC is simply AL with complement of any concept allowed (not just atomic 
concepts). S is an abbreviation for ALC with transitive roles. The Protégé ontology editor 
supports SHOIN(D). OWL 2 provides the expressiveness of SROIQ(D), OWL-DL is 
based on SHOIN(D), and for OWL-Lite it is SHIF(D). 
1.2.6. Default Logic 
Knowledge about a world is “almost” always true, as there is always some exceptions that could 
apply. For example, most people are liable to criminal laws except for heads of State, 
ambassadors and so on. Given a particular person, we will conclude that it is liable unless we 
happen to know that it satisfies one of these exceptions. How is the fact that most people are 
liable to be represented? The natural first order representation explicitly lists the exceptions to 
liability:  
Person(x) ˄ ¬HeadofState(x) ˄ ¬Ambassador(x) ˄ … = Liable(x) 
The problem is that with this representation one cannot conclude of a “general” person that it is 
liable, if there is no further information besides the fact that it is a person we are talking about. 
Concluding that a general person is liable is prevented even though intuitively desirable. 
Something is required to allow a person to be liable by default.  
Default Logic achieves this by introducing a statement such as: “If x is a person, then in the 
absence of any information to the contrary, infer that x is liable”. The problem then is to 
interpret the phrase "in the absence of any information to the contrary". The interpretation 
adopted in Default Logic is “It is consistent to assume that x is liable”. Thus “If x is a person 
and it is consistent to assume that x is liable, then infer that x is liable”. This is represented more 
formally as the following default formula:  
Person(x) : MLiable(x)  
     Liable(x)  
Here M is to be read as it is consistent to assume. The exceptions to liability are then given a 
standard first order representation.  
HeadofState (x) = ¬Liable(x)  
Ambassador(x) = ¬Liable(x)  
Notice that if Liable(x) is inferred by default then the assertion Liable(x) has the status of a 
belief; it is subject to change, say by the subsequent discovery. The default rule can then 
reinterpreted as  
If x is a person and it is consistent to believe that x is liable then one may believe that x is 
liable.  
Default logics was introduced in [Reiter 1980], which also provides an appropriate formal 
definition of the consistency requirement. Interestingly, in order to achieve its goals of default 
knowledge representation, the author defines the concept of closed world assumption, where 
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failure to find a proof sanctions an inference. The concepts of open and closed world 
assumption will be presented in section 2.2.5.1. 
1.2.7. Defeasible Logic 
Any reasoning system that preserves truth must be monotonic, but a reasoning system that 
preserves justification will not be monotonic. That means that a belief that φ might be justified 
based on our belief in some set of propositions S, but there could be another set of propositions 
T such that if we came to believe all the propositions in S ∪ T we would no longer be justified 
in believing φ.  
Defeasible logics were introduced by [Nute 1994]. A defeasible theory consists of ﬁve different 
kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation.  
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Socrates is a citizen”. Written formally, this 
would be expressed as  
citizen(Socrates) 
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g., facts) 
then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is  
Citizens are men  
written formally 
citizen(x) → man (x). 
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule 
is “Men typically speak”; written formally: 
man (x) ⇒ speaks (x). 
The idea is that if we know that something is a man, then we may conclude that it speaks, unless 
there is other, not inferior, evidence suggesting that it may not speak.  
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent 
some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing 
evidence to the contrary. An example is “If a man is a savage then it might not be able to 
speak”. Formally: 
savage (x) ⇝ speaks (x). 
The main point is that the information that a man is a savage is not sufﬁcient evidence to 
conclude that it does not speak. It is only evidence that the man may not be able to speak. In 
other words, we do not wish to conclude ¬speaks(x) if savage(x); we simply want to prevent a 
conclusion speaks(x).  
The superiority relation among rules is used to deﬁne priorities among rules, i.e., where one 
rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules 
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r: man (x) ⇒ speaks (x) 
r´: mute (x) ⇒ ¬speaks (x) 
Because these rules contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a 
man who is mute can speak. But if we introduce a superiority relation with r´ > r, with the 
intended meaning that r´ is strictly stronger than r, then we can indeed conclude that the man 
cannot speak. 
Notice that a cycle in the superiority relation is counterintuitive. In the above example, it makes 
no sense to have both r > r´ and r´ > r. Also, in Defeasible Logic, priorities are local in the 
following sense: two rules are considered to be competing with one another only if they have 
complementary heads. Thus, since the superiority relation is used to resolve conﬂicts among 
competing rules, it is only used to compare rules with complementary heads; the information r > 
r´ for rules r, r´ without complementary heads may be part of the superiority relation, but has no 
effect on the proof theory. 
1.2.7.1. DefLog  
The concepts presented above were applied in [Verheij 2003] to a “sentence-based” (as opposed 
to “argument-based”) logic for defeasible reasoning, called DefLog4. Verheij assumes a logical 
language with just two connectives, a unary connective × which informally stands for ‘it is 
defeated that’ and a binary connective ⇝ for expressing defeasible conditionals. He then 
assumes a single inference scheme for this language: modus ponens for ⇝: 
a ⇝ b 
a 
Therefore, b 
The central deﬁnition of Deflog is the notion of the dialectical interpretation of a theory, 
described in [Verheij 2002] as a variant of the extensions of default theories of [Reiter 1980], 
the models of logic programming of [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988], the extensions of 
argumentation frameworks of Dung (see 1.3.2.1.), and the extensions of assumption-based 
frameworks of [Bondarenko et al. 1997]. A theory is any set of sentences, and when it is 
dialectically interpreted, all the sentences in the theory are evaluated either as justiﬁed or as 
defeated. This is in contrast with the interpretation of theories in standard logic, where all 
sentences in an interpreted theory are assigned the same positive value when the theory is given 
a model. 
A dialectical interpretation of the theory consists in the assignment of the values justiﬁed or 
defeated to the sentences in a theory. Two properties are required: first, it must be conﬂict-free; 
second, it must attack all sentences in the defeated part. Following are some basic definitions: 
                                                     
4
 Please note that the presentation of Deflog uses notions of argumentation theory. Refer to 1.3.3.3. for concepts such 
as modus ponens, justified arguments and attack relations 
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 Let T be a set of sentences and a a sentence. Then T supports a when a is in T or 
follows from T by the repeated application of ⇝-modus ponens. T attacks a when T 
supports × a; 
 Let T be a set of sentences. Then T is conﬂict-free when there is no sentence a that is 
both supported and attacked by T; 
 Let ∑ be a set of sentences, and let J and D be a partition of ∑, i.e. subsets of ∑ that 
have no elements in common and that have ∑ as their union. Then (J, D) dialectically 
interprets the theory ∑ when J is conﬂict-free and attacks all sentences in D. The 
sentences in J are the (actually) justiﬁed assumptions of the theory ∑, the sentences in D 
are the (actually) defeated assumptions. The sentences in ∑ are the theory’s (prima facie 
justiﬁed) assumptions; 
 Let ∑ be a set of sentences, and let (J, D) dialectically interpret the theory ∑. Then 
(Supp J, Att J) is a dialectical interpretation or extension of the theory ∑. Here Supp J 
denotes the set of sentences supported by J, and Att J the set of sentences attacked by J. 
The sentences in Supp J are the justiﬁed statements of the dialectical interpretation, the 
sentences in Att J the defeated statements. 
1.2.7.2. The concept of reinstatement 
Consider the following set of (prima facie justiﬁed) assumptions:  
p 
q 
q ⇝ ×p 
It expresses that the prima facie justiﬁed assumption that q attacks the prima facie justiﬁed 
assumption p. The theory has one dialectical interpretation: the assumptions q and q ⇝ ×p are 
actually justiﬁed, and p is defeated. There is one other interpreted sentence, namely ×p, that is 
justiﬁed. Consider the following set of assumptions:  
p 
q 
q ⇝ ×p 
r 
r ⇝ × q 
The attack of q by the prima facie justiﬁed assumption r has been added to the assumptions of 
the previous example. There is one dialectical interpretation. In it, the assumptions p, q ⇝ ×p, r 
and r ⇝ × q are actually justiﬁed, and q defeated. There is one other interpreted sentence, 
namely ×q, that is justiﬁed. 
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This example of attack and counterattack shows the phenomenon of reinstatement (presented 
among others by [Caminada 2006]), that is strictly related to Dung’s argumentation framework 
(see 1.3.2.1.) and typical for defeasible reasoning: an assumption that is defeated can become 
justiﬁed when additional information enters into the knowledge base. 
1.2.8. The relationship between Logics and Legal Reasoning  
Since Leibniz proposed to apply the logic approach to law in [Leibniz 1974], with his famous 
foresight of men discussing moral issues through mere calculus (see 1.1.1.) many lawyers were 
fascinated by the idea of deriving a judicial decision from legally binding sources just like the 
logical deduction of a conclusion is derived from a set of axioms. Reducing judicial reasoning 
to logical deduction would in fact ensure certainty and testability, therefore limiting the 
arbitrariness of human decisions. 
However, as [Sartor 2005] puts it, the relation between law and logics has not always been a 
peaceful cooperation. More speciﬁcally, legal experience may appear to the logician (and more 
generally to the scientiﬁcally trained mind) as dominated by rhetorical forms, blurry concepts, 
and unreasoned reliance on validity intended as a result of acts of empowering authorities. On 
the other hand, a lawyer may ﬁnd logic trivial and barren: Its complex and technical 
mechanisms just make explicit what is already known, without offering any substantial help to 
the complex task of constructing legal solutions to new issues. 
1.2.8.1. The set of oppositions by G. Sartor 
Starting from the end of the ﬁfties, many contributions such as [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1969] tried to compare legal reasoning and the tradition of rhetoric and argumentation. Legal 
reasoning often deﬁned itself according to the argumentative technique which [Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969] call dissociation, identifying the conflict between legal reasoning and 
formal logic in the following set of oppositions enumerated by [Sartor 2005] in the fifth volume 
of the Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence: 
 Abstraction / concreteness: 
o (language)  
 Logics are abstract: they only take into consideration the elements 
which have been introduced in their languages; 
 Legal reasoning is concrete: it preserves the richness of natural 
language in order to capture the content of legal issues; 
o  (context)  
 Logics are abstract: they rely on a formalization of the network of 
beliefs and attitudes underlying each piece of information; 
 Legal reasoning is concrete: it takes into account the social and 
linguistic background of the audience; 
 Closeness / openness:  
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o (knowledge base)  
 Logics are closed: they assume a ﬁxed context of knowledge; 
 Legal reasoning is open: its assumptions are freely chosen from general 
ideas, maxims or principles; 
o  (reasoning)  
 Logics are closed: they necessarily derive all valid consequences of a 
consistent set of premises; 
 Legal reasoning is open: it allows for alternative principles to be 
dialectically harmonized without necessarily giving birth to 
inconsistencies; 
o  (world assumption)  
 Logics are closed: they assume the legal system to be complete; 
 Legal reasoning is open: it assumes the incompleteness of any set of 
sources and it relies on various inferences for ﬁlling the gaps; 
 Rigidity / ﬂexibility:  
o (assumptions)  
 Logics are rigid: they do not distinguish between the status of its 
premises: all axioms are assumed to be true facts, and their conﬂict 
determines an insoluble contradiction; 
 Legal reasoning is ﬂexible: it admits different types of premises, and in 
particular it distinguishes facts from presumptions, where the latter 
must be accepted only in so far as there is no evidence to the contrary; 
o (argument weight)  
 Logics are rigid: they ﬁnd inferences to be either fully correct or fully 
incorrect;  
 Legal reasoning is ﬂexible, since arguments may have different degrees 
of strength; 
 Formality / materiality.  
o Logics are formal: they evaluates inferences only on the basis of their syntactic 
structure; 
o Legal reasoning is material: the acceptability of a legal argument depends not 
only on the form, but also on the substantive value of that argument (that is, on 
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the intrinsic goodness of its premises and conclusions or on their 
correspondence with social beliefs and attitudes); 
 Statics / dynamics.  
o Logics are static: they are concerned with the eternal relationships between 
truths; 
o Legal reasoning is dynamic: it develops in time according to procedural 
constraints; 
 Monologue / dialogue.  
o Logics are monological: its inferences always move from a unique consistent 
pool of premises; 
o Legal reasoning is dialogical: it consists in confronting different points of view; 
 Impersonality / personality.  
o Logics are impersonal: its inferences are supposed be convincing for every 
rational being; 
o Legal reasoning is personal: it has to convince each particular audience, by 
appealing to the premises and inferences that would be acceptable to it; 
 Positive / negative reasoning.  
o Logics are a positive form of reasoning: they support a conclusion by showing 
that it is derivable from certain premises; 
o Legal reasoning emphasises negative reasoning: it usually supports an argument 
by undermining its competitors; 
 Objectivity / evaluation.  
o Logic are objective, since they excludes choices: either there is a contradiction, 
so that the whole axiomatic base collapses, or there is consistency, so that no 
choice is required; 
o Legal reasoning is subjective (evaluative): it admits conﬂicting theses and 
supports the evaluative choices required to adjudicate between them; 
 Constraint / persuasion.  
o Logic is constraining: it is not possible, for any rational being, to refuse assent 
to a logically valid inference; 
o Legal reasoning is persuasive: it leads its addressees towards a certain 
conclusion without forcing its acceptation. 
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In the 1970’s the dispute reached a stalemate. In fact, the formal approach — even if extended 
beyond ﬁrst-order predicate logic thanks to the equipment of modal and deontic logics — was 
incapable of giving a reasonably wide account of legal reasoning: legal logic was in fact 
effective only for limited fragments of law text, where a logical formalization was possible. The 
logical application of the law therefore required a radical change—with regard to the usual legal 
practice—both in the formulation of legal knowledge and in the methods of legal inference. On 
the other hand, the informal approach—even if extended beyond general rhetorical moves, into 
speciﬁc aspects of legal reasoning—was more successful in pointing to problems than in ﬁnding 
convenient solutions. Its refusal of any formal tools impeded the development of a precise 
deﬁnition of the forms of legal reasoning.  
In the last years, the hostile opposition between logic and argumentation has been largely 
overcome through fruitful interaction between formal logic and legal reasoning. This started in 
legal theory, where many scholars have approached legal reasoning adopting an analytical 
perspective. Some authors such as [Alchourron and Bulygin 1971, Tammelo 1978] have applied 
in innovative ways classical and deontic logic to the analysis of legal reasoning, and others such 
as [Tarello 1980, Alexy 1989, Taruffo 1998] have embedded deductive reasoning within 
broader accounts of legal argumentation. Analytical legal theory has indeed offered a common 
language for logic and jurisprudence. More recently, in the field of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and 
Law (See 1.4.), some new logical accounts of legal reasoning have been provided [Gardner 
1987, Gordon 1995, Prakken 1997, Branting 2000]. These accounts preserve the preciseness of 
deductive logic, but try to further extend the formal analysis of legal reasoning. These recent 
results (presented in the following sections) seem to indicate that the conﬂict between logic and 
informal accounts of legal reasoning could after all end in a harmonious cooperation. 
1.2.8.2. Enthymemes  
A familiar problem in the evaluation of non-formal legal rules (rules whose logical structure is 
not explicit) and non-formal legal arguments is that they are very often enthymematic.  
An enthymeme is any rule or argument whose logical form is not explicitly clear from its 
original mode of presentation (for example, in a judicial sentence or a lawyer's act). 
Enthymemes have been investigated, among others, by [Brewer 1996] and [Walton 2001]. In 
general, two types of enthymeme can be identified: the rule-enthymeme and the argument-
enthymeme (see 1.3.1.3. for a description of the latter). It is however unusual to find 
enthymemicity attributed to rules in the literature. It is much more easy to find the property of 
enthymemicity attributed to arguments, and enthymemicity is indeed an important property of 
many arguments, especially legal arguments.   
Here is an example of a rule-enthymeme from [Brewer 1996]: 
Any person who knowingly transports stolen property over state lines is guilty of a felony 
The point here is to determine whether R equivalent to  





Any person who knows that he is transporting over state lines property that is stolen is 
guilty of a felony 
Note that under R2 a person can be guilty of the felony even if he doesn't know that the property 
is stolen, whereas under R1 he is not guilty unless he knows that it's stolen (indeed, under R1 he 
need not even know that the stolen property has been taken over state lines). This is a 
particularly obvious example of a rule-enthymeme, because R itself is ambiguous.   
 Argumentation Theory  1.3.
1.3.1. Introduction  
Logics constitutes a huge efforts towards the formalization of abstract phenomena that 
everybody can witness, such as the connection between truth and its objects. This discipline, 
however, despite having developed in several directions and covering a very widespread and 
detailed set of mechanics, always remains on the formal, mathematical side of the 
representation. It is the discipline of argumentation that cares for the adaptation of the logic 
schemes to real phenomena, by distinguishing among different logical forms and guiding the 
evolution of logics while being guided by it, in a continuous comparison of abstract 
mathematical models and qualitative reasoning. 
The concept of logically valid inference is seen as ‘foolproof’ reasoning: an argument is 
deductively valid if the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. In other 
words, if one accepts all premises of a deductively valid argument, then one also has to accept 
its conclusion, no matter what. However, real life arguments are often not foolproof in this 
sense but merely make their conclusion plausible when their premises are true. For example, if 
we are told that Hans and Ingrid are married and that Hans lives in Berlin, we conclude that 
Ingrid will live in Berlin as well, since we know that usually married people live together. Such 
arguments can be overturned by counterarguments: for example, if we are told that Ingrid works 
at the foreign offices of her company in Rome for two years, we have to retract our previous 
conclusion that she lives in Berlin. As long as such counterarguments are not available, the 
conclusions of our fallible arguments hold. As seen in 1.2.6., logics for defeasible reasoning 
(partly inspired by earlier developments in philosophy and argumentation theory) were 
developed in the last decades to manage such kind of reasoning. At first sight it might be 
thought that patterns of defeasible reasoning are a matter of applying probability theory. 
However, many patterns of defeasible reasoning cannot be analyzed in a probabilistic way. In 
the legal domain this is particularly clear: while reasoning about the facts can be regarded as 
probabilistic – at least in principle, reasoning about normative issues clearly is of a different 
nature. Moreover, even in matters of evidence reliable numbers are usually not available so that 
the reasoning has to be qualitative. 
1.3.1.1. Different kinds of reasoning 
The first concepts to be introduced in order to delve into a presentation of Argumentation theory 
are the different forms of valid reasoning (deductive, inductive, abductive, analogical) and the 
distinction of normal premises from assumption and exception. 
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Deductive reasoning is one of the two basic forms of valid reasoning. It begins with a general 
hypothesis from which it generates a specific conclusion. The basic idea of deductive reasoning 
is that if something is true of a class of things in general, this truth applies to all members of that 
class. One of the keys for correct deductive reasoning, then, is to be able to properly identify the 
members of the class. If the generalization is wrong, though, the specific conclusion can be 
logical and valid but still can be incorrect. For example, a generalization might be "All bulls 
have horns". The logical conclusion of a specific instance would then be, "That is a bull, so it 
has a horn." This is a valid deduction, the truth of which depends however on whether the 
observed animal is, indeed, a bull.  
Inductive reasoning is a method of drawing a probable conclusion from an emerging pattern of 
data. When data show a large scale of regularity, an analyst can logically predict that those 
patterns will continue to repeat. This inference, commonly known as generalization, can 
produce scientific deductions so probable that they are widely accepted as fact. Any theory 
involving generalization, however, can be disproved by one instance of inconsistency. In 
medicine, this type of inductive reasoning can be a very powerful diagnostic tool. As a specific 
illness often presents with a particular list of symptoms, it is reasonable to presume that a 
patient who exhibits those indicators also has that malady.  
Abductive reasoning is a form of reasoning based on the formation and evaluation of 
hypotheses using the best available information. It starts with the observation of a phenomenon 
for which one does not have an immediate, clear explanation. One can then use this form of 
reasoning to develop an explanation that is sufficient to describe the observed phenomenon, 
though it must be noted that, without further testing, this explanation is only sufficient, not 
necessarily accurate. Abductive reasoning is similar to inductive reasoning, but only involves 
developing a guess based on what limited data is available at a given time, before detailed 
testing and rigorous observation. 
Analogical reasoning is a method of processing information that compares the similarities 
between new and understood concepts and then uses those similarities to gain understanding of 
the new concept. It is based on the brain’s ability to form patterns by association. Similarly to 
abductive reasoning, analogical reasoning is a form of inductive reasoning because it aims to 
identify what is likely to be true, rather than deductively proving something as fact. The 
reasoning process begins by a person determining the target idea to be evaluated. It is then 
compared to a similar idea that is already well-understood. Specific qualities that belong to this 
known idea are then chosen, and related to the qualities in the target idea to find similarities. For 
example, trying to catch a valuable baseball can be an analogy to pursuing a fox because they 
are both efforts put towards an expected gain.  
1.3.1.2. Different kinds of premises 
A basic argument may have multiple conclusion and multiple premises. Defeasibility tells how 
arguments do not always support conclusions in the same way, but it is necessary to introduce a 
distinction also between premises: aside from ordinary premises, which support the validity of 
arguments only as 
far as they are 





Fig. 1.11: basic argument structure. 
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assumptions and exceptions.  
Assumptions behave like ordinary premises, with the exception that they do not prevent the 
validity of arguments unless they are rejected: their default value is favorable to the validity of 
the argument as if the premise was accepted. On the contrary, exceptions are premise which, if 
accepted, would render the argument invalid. In order not to prevent the validity of the 
argument, they must be rejected. However, their default value is favorable to the argument as if 
the exception was rejected: they do not prevent the validity of arguments until they are accepted. 
In other words, their negation is assumed. 
This definition of assumption and exception follows the conception of assumption-based 
frameworks (see [Bondarenko et al. 1997]), and is different from that proposed by [Gordon et 
al. 2007] where the assumption is not equivalent to the negation of an exception (see 4.2.2.2.) 
1.3.1.3. Argument enthymemes 
Here is an example of an argument enthymeme. Suppose a judge writes in an opinion resolving 
a contracts dispute: 
The general clause is not knowable, so it is invalid  
This might be represented as a premise p1 that provides inferential warrant for conclusion h: 
p1: The general clause is not knowable. 
therefore,  
h: The general clause is invalid. 
Taken as literally quoted, the argument seems not to be a valid deductive argument. By its 
literal terms the argument provides no reason to believe that every general clause that is not 
knowable is invalid. Without more, it is conceivable that some types of general clauses are 
valid.   
In fact the argument, properly interpreted, is not deductively invalid. If we believe that the judge 
offering this argument from p1 to h was relying on the unstated but assumed premise, ‘All 
general clauses which are not knowable are invalid’, then we would conclude that the best way 
to interpret the judge's argument is as follows: 
p0: All general clauses which are not knowable are invalid' 
p1: The general clause is not knowable. 
therefore,  
h: The general clause is invalid. 
This is a valid deductive argument. In this example, we conclude that the true logical form of 
the argument (that premises p0 and p1 provide inferential warrant for h) was not explicitly clear 
from the way in which it was originally presented; at first glance it seemed like the argument 
was that p1 by itself provided the inferential warrant for h. But, on second analysis, we might 
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judge that the argument is an enthymeme, an argument, as defined above, whose logical form is 
not explicitly clear from its original mode of presentation but whose proper logical can be 
distinguished only through a more formal representation.  
Note that it is necessary to pay attention to the circumstances under which interpreters are 
warranted in treating arguments as enthymemes: in fact, every argument could be interpreted as 
a valid deductive argument, but surely not every argument is a valid deductive argument or 
indeed is a deductive argument at all – some are inductive, some analogical, some abductive. 
For example: 
We provide the example for that by representing Aristotle´s syllogism, presented in section 
1.2.1 when first introducing Logic, and which Philosophers have long offered as the paradigm 
of a valid deductive inference: 
p1: All men are mortal. 
p2: Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, 
h: Socrates is mortal. 
This does indeed seem to be a valid deductive inference, for it does seem that in any possible 
world in which p1 and p2 are true h must also be true. But consider what kind of justification 
there could be for the first premise, ‘All men are mortal.’ Surely it rests on an inductive 
generalization (highly confirmed, that’s for sure). Might one not fairly represent the “Socrates 
syllogism” not as a deductively valid inference but as an inductive specification, that is, an 
application of an inductive generalization to an individual, where the major premise is not 
assumed or known to be a true universal generalization, which inductive generalizations are 
incapable of producing? What criteria should be used? When relying on logics of legal 
argument such questions are fundamental.  
1.3.2. Reasoning with defeasible arguments 
As [Prakken and Sartor 2009] explains, reasoning with defeasible arguments consists of 
constructing arguments, attacking these arguments with counterarguments, and adjudicating 
between conflicting arguments on grounds that are appropriate to the conflict at hand. In 
deductive reasoning, arguments must instantiate inference schemes (called ‘argument schemes’ 
in the present work, following [Walton 2005] – see 4.2.1.1.) which represent fool-proof 
reasoning: in the presence of defeasible arguments, however, deductive logic turns out to be the 
special case of argument scheme that can only be attacked on their premises.  
Consider the following example. According to Article 1341 of Italian Civil Code, oppressive 
clauses are not efficacious unless specifically signed. Let’s suppose Clause x is argued to be 
inefficacious since it is oppressive and not specifically signed. Then in standard propositional 
logic this argument would be:  
Argument A: 
The clause is oppressive &  The clause is signed   The clause is efficacious 
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Clause x is oppressive 
 Clause x is signed  
Therefore,  Clause x is efficacious 
This argument is deductively valid, since it instantiates the deductively valid argument scheme 
of modus ponens: 
Modus Ponens Scheme: 
P  Q 
P 
Therefore, Q 
This scheme is deductively valid since it is impossible to accept all its premises but still deny its 
conclusion: the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion.  
However the deductive validity of argument A does not mean that its conclusion is accepted, as 
the deductive argument can still be challenged on its premises. According to Decision 
1248/2003 of the Italian Cassation Court, clauses contained in statutes known to parties are 
considered as signed. The following deductive argument against the premise “The clause is 
signed” can be constructed, in two steps. First application of Decision 3848 results in the 
conclusion that the clause is signed: 
Argument B: 
The clause is contained in a statute ˄ The statute is known  The clause is signed 
Clause x is contained in a Statute y 
Statute y is known 
Therefore, Clause x is signed 
This conclusion can then be used to attack the third premise of argument A: 
Argument B (continued): 
Clause x is signed 
Clause x is signed  Clause x is efficacious 
Therefore, Clause x is efficacious 
It is necessary to choose whether to accept the premise “ law provides otherwise” of argument 
A or to give it up and accept the conclusion of counterargument B. Clearly the phrase “unless 
the clause is specifically signed” of Article 1341 of Italian civil code is meant to express that 
any case in which the clause is specifically signed represents an exception to Article 1341. Since 
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argument B is based on such an exception, the premise of A is rejected and the counterargument 
is accepted. In this case argument B not just attacks, but also defeats argument A
5
. 
However, not all attacks are a matter of statutory exceptions. In the example, argument B could 
be attacked by saying that the statute was not known to parties. This gives rise to an argument 
attacking the third premise of argument B (before the continuation):  
Argument C: 
The statute is known  The clause is signed 
Statute y is known  
Therefore, Clause x is signed 
This time a genuine conflict has arisen, between the claim that the statute is known to parties 
(the third premise of argument B) and the claim that the status is not known to parties (the 
second premise of argument C). Please note that if one accepts all premises of argument C, then 
one must also accept its conclusion, since argument C instantiates the deductively valid scheme 
of modus ponens. And if one accepts argument C’s conclusion, one must, of course, reject the 
third premise of argument B. In the latter case argument C not only attacks but also defeats 
argument B. So far all three arguments are deductively valid but argument A is defeated by 
argument B on its third premise while argument B is in turn defeated by argument C on its third 
premise. This implies that it is rational to accept the conclusions of arguments A and C: even 
though A is defeated by B, it is defended by C, which defeats A’s only defeater.  
In order to determine what to believe or accept in the face of a body of conflicting arguments it 
does not suffice to make a choice between two arguments that directly conflict with each other: 
it is also necessary to look at how arguments can be defended by other arguments. In the 
example it is intuitively obvious that C defends A and, since C is not attacked by any argument, 
both argument A and argument C (and their conclusions) are acceptable. However, it is easy to 
imagine more complex examples where intuitions fall short. For instance, another argument D 
could be constructed such that C and D defeat each other, then an argument E could be 
constructed that defeats D but is defeated by A, and so on: which arguments can now be 
accepted and which should be rejected?  
Here intuitions are out of play and a calculus, or an argumentation logic, is needed. Its input will 
be a collection of arguments plus an assessment of which arguments defeat each other, while its 
output will be an assessment of the dialectical status of these arguments in terms of three 
classes: 
 The justified arguments are those that survive all conflicts with their attackers and so 
can be accepted; 
                                                     
5
 This definition allows that two arguments defeat each other, namely, if neither argument is inferior or superior to 
the other. In such cases we say that the two arguments weakly defeat each other; otherwise (if one argument is 
superior to the other) we say that one argument strictly defeats the other.   
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 The overruled arguments are those that 
are attacked by a justified argument and 
so must be rejected;  
 The defensible arguments are those that 
are involved in conflicts that cannot be 
resolved.  
Furthermore, a statement is justified if it has a 
justified argument, it is overruled if all arguments 
for it are overruled, and it is defensible if it has a 
defensible argument but no justified arguments.  
1.3.2.1. Dungean semantics and the 
problem of new information 
The logic of argumentation relies on a dialogical rather than a monologue-like structure. The 
proponent starts with the argument that he wants to justify and then the turn shifts to the 
opponent, who must provide all its defeating counterarguments. For each of these defeating 
arguments the proponent must then construct one strict defeater (it has to be a strict defeater 
since the proponent must prove his argument justified). This process is repeated as long as it 
takes: at each of her turns, the opponent constructs all mutual and all strict defeaters of the 
proponent’s previous arguments, while at each of his turns, the proponent constructs a strict 
defeater for each of the opponent’s previous arguments, and so on. The initial argument is 
justified if the proponent can eventually make the opponent run out of moves 
(counterarguments). This process can be visualized as shown in Figure 1.12. 
Note that if an argument is justified this does not mean that the proponent will in fact win the 
game: he could make the wrong choice at some point. All that it means is that the proponent 
will win if he plays optimally. In terms of game theory [Rahwan and Larson 2009], an argument 
is justified if the proponent has a so-called winning strategy in a game that starts with the 
argument. In fact, there is a simple way to verify whether the proponent has a winning strategy. 
The idea is to label all arguments in the tree as in or out according to the following definition of 
[Dung 1995]: 
An argument is in if and only if all its defeating counterarguments are out 
An argument is out if and only if it has a defeating counterargument that is in 
Argument A 











Suppose now that new information becomes available that gives rise to a strictly defeating 
counterargument. Then the situation is as in Figure 1.13.  
Now it is the proponent who has a winning strategy. This illustrates that when new information 
becomes available from which new arguments can be constructed, the dialectical status of 
arguments may change. The phenomenon is known as reinstatement (see 1.2.7.1.). 
It should be noted that each argument appearing as a box in these trees has an internal structure. 
In the simplest case it just has a set of premises and a conclusion, but when the argument 
combines several inferences, it has the structure of an inference tree similar to that of standard 
logic. This is illustrated by 
Figure 1.14, which displays all 
three arguments of the 
example, plus their defeat 
relations (solid lines represent 
inferences while dashed lines 
stand for defeat relations): 




Giving a close look at 
arguments as they are 
constructed and attacked in 
practice, it is clear that they can 
often be attacked even if all their premises are accepted. In fact, many factual generalizations 
that are used in daily life and also many that are used in in legal proof are of presumptive or 
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Fig. 1.13 – An extended dialectical tree. 
 
Clause X is inefficacious 
 Clause X is signed Clause X is oppressive 
Clause X is contained 
in statute Y 
Statute Y is known 
 Clause X is signed 
 Statute Y is known 
 Statute Y is public  Statute Y was given 
to counterpart 




defeasible nature. At the beginning of this section the example “usually married people live 
where their spouses live” was given, which can have exceptions, for instance, when a spouse 
temporarily works abroad. Not only factual generalizations are defeasible but also, for example, 
interpretation rules or reasons for action. An example of a defeasible interpretation rule in 
contract law is “a statement ‘I accept ...’ is an acceptance”, but an exception was “a statement ‘I 
accept’ followed by terms that do not match the terms of the offer is not an acceptance” (see 
[Gardner 1987]). It has even been argued that legal rules are also defeasible, since there can 
always be unforeseen cases in which a rule should be set aside because of higher principles or 
unwanted consequences.  
As [Prakken 1997] noted, these features do not escape a logical analysis, if recent developments 
in logic and Artificial Intelligence on so-called nonmonotonic reasoning and defeasible 
argumentation are used, and if logic is regarded as a tool in (rather than as a model of) legal 
argumentation. An important point is that the application of defeasible generalization cannot be 
regarded as an instance of the modus ponens argument scheme, since P → Q means that always 
when P is true then Q is true, and this is not the same as saying that usually when P is true then 
Q is true. So a new argument scheme is needed, namely the defeasible modus ponens: 
Defeasible modus ponens: 
If P then usually Q 
P 
Therefore (presumably) Q 
In [Prakken 2010], this scheme is used as the basic building block for reasoning about rules, 
together with the underlying rule validity scheme inspired from the work of [Sartor 2008] and 
[Bex 2009]: 
Rule validity scheme: 
Rule r is valid 
Therefore 
If P then usually Q 
The previous section explained how argumentation logic systematizes this process of testing an 
argument in light of all possible counterarguments, but an argument can be attacked not only on 
its premises, but also on its conclusion.  
In fact, a conclusion of an argument can be attacked in a stronger and a weaker way. The strong 
way is to build an argument with the opposite conclusion, as done above with argument D. Such 
a conclusion-to-conclusion attack is called a rebutting attack (or rebuttal). A rebutting 
counterargument may attack the final conclusion of its target but it may also attack an 
intermediate conclusion. However, sometimes an argument can be attacked in a weaker way, 
namely, by saying that the premises, even if true, do not support their conclusion in the case at 
hand, because the case at hand is an exceptional case. This weaker form of attack is often called 
undercutting attack (or undercutter). Undercutting counterarguments do not attack a premise or 
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the conclusion of their target but instead deny that the scheme on which it is based can be 
applied to the case at hand. Obviously, such a denial does not make sense for deductive 
argument schemes. See 1.3.4.2. for an example of undercutting attack. 
1.3.2.3. Argumentation Schemes  
When looking at defeasible rules or generalisations, it can be noted that often they are not just 
specific statements about the world but conform to certain reasoning patterns. It is important to 
note that arguments based on such patterns speak about states of affairs in general: unlike 
specific generalisations like ‘summer in Italy is usually very hot’ or ‘fleeing from a crime scene 
typically indicates consciousness of guilt’ they express general ways of obtaining knowledge 
from certain information. For these reasons it is natural to regard such patterns not as 
conditional premises of a defeasible modus ponens argument but as additional presumptive (or 
defeasible) argument schemes. For instance, the defeasible argument scheme for witness 
statements can be given the following form:  
Argument scheme from Witness Testimony: 
Person W says that P 
Person W was in a position to observe P 
Therefore (presumably), P 
The use of presumptive argument schemes in an argument grants new expressivity to the two 
new ways of attack presented in the last section: rebutting and undercutting attacks. For 
example, an application of the scheme from witness testimony can be rebutted by an application 
of the same scheme to a contradicting witness. Undercutting attacks are instead based on the 
idea that a presumptive argument scheme has typical exceptional circumstances in which it does 
not apply. For example, a witness testimony is typically criticised on the witnesses’ truthfulness 
or the functioning of his memory or senses. In general, then, each argument scheme comes with 
a set of critical questions which, when answered negatively, give rise to undercutting 
counterarguments (or sometimes to rebutting counterarguments). For example, the Witness 
Testimony Scheme is often given the following critical questions: 
Critical questions to the Argument Scheme from Witness Testimony 
 W1: Is the witness truthful? 
 W2: Did the senses of the witness function properly? 
 W3: Does the memory of the witness function properly? 
Please notice that while some schemes can arguably be used in any domain, other schemes are 
domain-dependent. For instance, it has been argued that in legal contexts the Argument Scheme 
for Witness Testimony has different critical questions than in ordinary commonsense reasoning. 
See Chapter 3 for a complete presentation of Walton’s theory on Argumentation Schemes, 
which constitutes the backbone of the Carneades Argumentation System. 
1.3.3. History of Diagramming in Logic 
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This section contains a brief 
description of how argument 
diagramming has evolved as a tool 
for the critical analysis of everyday 
argumentation from the nineteenth 
and through the twentieth century, 
mostly following [Reed et al., 2007]. 
The 19
th
 century saw not only a 
revival of interest in formal logic, but 
also an accompanying interest in 
representations of formal systems. 
Venn and Euler diagrams for 
syllogistic reasoning [Venn 1880], 
and other visual techniques meant to 
represent logical reasoning of one sort or another could be cited. 
1.3.3.1. R. Whately: The invention of argument diagrams 
The first example of diagrams used to illustrate argumentative processes may be traced back to 
Richard Whately in 1836. Whately, an English logician and Archbishop of Dublin, in Appendix 
III of his textbook Elements of Logic [Whately 1836], entitled 'Praxis of Logical Analysis', 
described a method of argument analysis. He described it as a method of taking 'any train of 
argument that may be presented to us', and reducing it to a form in which logical rules can be 
applied to it. The method consists in trying to figure out what the conclusion of the argument is 
supposed to be, and then tracing the reasoning backward, to find out the grounds of that 
assertion. The process can then be repeated, searching for further grounds for these premises. 
The outcome is what Whately described as the construction of a 'chain of arguments', a process 
he represented by a diagram (Figure 1.15). This diagram has many of the basic characteristics of 
the modern argument diagram. Statements are represented as the nodes, joined by lines to make 
up a tree or graph structure. The structure represents a chain of argumentation with an ultimate 
conclusion at one end.  
Whately represents an isolated case in the 19th century, and argument diagramming only 
resurfaces in the proliferation of logic texts using diagramming in the 20th century.  
1.3.3.2. J. H. Wigmore: increasing complexity 
If Whately is considered the pioneer of diagramming arguments in the logical field, John Henry 
Wigmore was the first to visually represent, in [Wigmore 1913], complex diagrams to represent 
proof-hypothesis in legal matters. His schemes were disregarded after his death, but his idea of 
organizing evidential arguments has been recently reconsidered and developed in [Schum et al. 
2005]. He can be regarded as the initiator of the current of the study of using diagramming to 
map facts and inferential links in a body of evidence in a case at trial in law.  
 
Fig.1.15 – Whately’s diagramming [Whately, 1836, p. 422] 
Ultimate conclusion: 
Z is X 
proved by 
Y is X 
proved by 
Z is Y 
proved by 
B is X 
(etc.) 
Y is B 
(etc.) 
C is X 
(etc.) 
Y is C 
(etc.) 
A is Y 
(supposed) 




the argument    and the argument 
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The chart in Figure 1.16 represents evidence in a case from [Wigmore 1931]. In this diagram, 
Wigmore indicated the statement “Y died of poison” as being the ultimate probandum, at least 
of this part of the evidential argument, Circle 7 is an interim probandum, and the line 
connecting 7 with the ultimate probandum means “provisional probative force given to the 
evidence”. The other kind of inference is the type representing strong probative force, 
connecting, in this example, 8, 9, 10 with 7. The focus of Wigmore's interest is in demonstrating 
the acceptability of the hypothesis given the factual evidence. The direction, consequently, is 
upward, from evidence to hypothesis. The arrow direction indicates the kind of hypothesis-
evaluation approach Wigmore developed in his theory. It proceeds from the evidence to the 
hypothesis, the latter being proved or disproved by the evidence.  
Another interesting feature of Wigmore diagrams is the notion of complex inference. The 
probandum is supported by evidence, which is in turn supported by other evidence. The whole 
process of justifying the hypothesis is constituted by a complex argumentation where facts are 
warranted by other proofs. Evidence, in his words, is not certain, but must be supported in order 
to be acceptable as a conclusive proof. [Macagno et al. 2007] notes that by utilizing complex 
inferences Wigmore introduced what now is being analysed by the term inference networks: 
nets of links between nodes, influencing each other's probabilities.  
From these characteristics follows the third main feature of Wigmore's charts: the conditional 
dependency of arguments. Arguments are related to each other by dependency links, and their 
probability is influenced by the probability of the supporting evidence. The force of the ultimate 
Fig. 1.16 – Wigmore diagram example from [Walton et al. 2007]. Key list: 7. Y died, 
being apparently in health, within three hours after the drink of whiskey; 8-10 Y’s 
Wife and the Northingtons witness to 7; 11 Y might have died by colic from which 
he had often suffered; 11.1 colic would not have had as symptoms the leg cramps 
and teeth-clenching, only strychnine could produce these; 11.2 Y’s wife and the 
Northingtons witness to Y’s cramps and teeth-clenching; 11.3 expert witness to 
significance of symptoms; 11.4 no testimony as to strychnine traces in the body by 
post mortem; 12 anon witness to his former attacks; 13 Y might have died from the 
former injury to his side; 14 anon witness to that injury. 
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conclusion, for this reason, is the result of a complex calculus of probabilities and factual 
probabilities. In Wigmore's theory inferential links themselves are not deemed relevant in the 
consideration of the relationship evidence-conclusion. They do not need to be warranted: the 
calculus of probabilities is based only on proofs (nodes), not on the strength of the inference.  
Finally, Wigmore, in his diagrams, introduced triangles to indicate a form of evidence distinct 
from the other kinds of affirmative evidence (squares). These proofs are called ancillary - that 
is, they affect the probability of the evidence: in Wigmore they are considered necessary to 
establish and evaluate a hypothesis about a fact. In modern theories this notion has developed 
through the theories of probabilities and inferences, in evidence supporting generalizations 
conceived by David Schum (see 1.3.3.5.). 
1.3.3.3. A. Beardsley: serializing arguments 
Until the 1950s the theory of argumentation was taken up wholly by the predominant interest in 
formal logic. The first example of argument mapping after Wigmore is from Beardsley's 
Practical Logic. In the diagram of an argument supporting the necessity of freedom in the arts, 
he divided the argumentative text into statements. He represented the statements as nodes, using 
circled numbers, and he represented the links between the premises and the conclusion as 
arrows joining the nodes. He drew what he defined as the 'skeletal pattern' of the argument, 
representing its structure. Beardsley identified different kinds of links proceeding from reasons 
(premises) to conclusion: they may back track, shift gear in the middle, run in a circle or go off 
in several directions [Beardsley 1950]. He defined a serial argument as a statement that is both 
conclusion and reason for a further conclusion, and formulated some important general 
principles of diagramming, such as the Rule of Grouping (if you have several reasons for a 
certain conclusion, they should be kept as close together as possible), or the Rule of Direction 
(if you have a serial argument, it should move in one direction, no matter which one). Beardsley 
diagrams are graphs meant to teach how to organize the reasons for a claim, by examining the 
different kinds of argument structures representing reasons supporting the claim as a conclusion. 
They were conceived as an aid in the detection of fallacies like arguing in a circle (petitio 
principii).  
In Beardsley’s model, however, arrows link reasons and conclusions, no relevance being given 
to the implication itself between them. There is no theory, in other words, of inference 
distinguished from logical deduction: the passage is always deemed not controversial and not 
subject to support and evaluation. 
1.3.3.4. S. Toulmin: weighting the links between arguments 
The main revolution in the theory of argumentation was carried out by Stephen Toulmin's “The 
Uses of Argument”, published in 1958. Toulmin can be considered the first in the theory of 
argumentation to take into consideration the defeasible generalization used as the step between 
the premise and the conclusion of an argument. To analyse this step, Toulmin introduced the 
concept of warrant, which he saw as a hypothetical statement that can be subject to defeat in 
some cases acting as a bridge or link between the two poles. He compared warrants with 
questions of law as opposed to questions of fact. For example, the fact that a man was born in 
Bermuda leads to the conclusion that presumably he is British because there is a law that 
warrants that inference [Toulmin 1958]. Toulmin also introduced the qualifier representing the 
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degree of force of the inferential link (necessarily, probably, etc.), which makes the inference 
defeasible because it can fail to hold in some cases. Thus in his scheme two other factors are 
prominent: the rebuttal (the exceptional conditions that might defeat the conclusion) and the 
backing (the assurances supporting the inferential passage).  
In his later work, “An Introduction to Reasoning”, he classified commonly used forms of 
argument, comparable to the ancient τόποι. Toulmin was a man well ahead of his time: during 
the heyday of positivism, in which only deductive and inductive reasoning of the Bayesian kind 
were recognized as forming rational arguments of an objective kind, Toulmin boldly set out a 
paradigm of rational argument that was defeasible, opening the way to the study of 
argumentation schemes that do not fully belong to deductive or inductive form. 
1.3.3.5. M. Scriven: introducing rebuttals 
Michael Scriven introduced the evaluation of the role of the premises in supporting the 
conclusion. He represents the counterargument in his diagrams, taking into account what 
Toulmin defined as rebuttal (an argument leading to a conclusion contrary to the main one), and 
considering it to be a legitimate and important form of argument. [Scriven 1976] distinguishes 
premises pro and contra by marking the former with + and the latter with -. He also indicated 
missing premises in his graphs, designed with an alphabetical letter instead of a number. The 
diagrams become more complex when the conclusion is supported by several premises, which 
are in their turn backed by other assumptions. They constitute, in such cases, an argument 
network.  
1.3.3.6. D. Schum: introducing generalizations 
Wigmore's ideas were further developed in a new theory on evidence in [Schum 1994], based 
on Bayesian probabilities and on Toulmin's analysis of inferences. The passage from evidence 
to a conclusion is defined as a generalization. Generalizations can be interpreted as forms of 
warrant that in some cases fall under the main categories of argumentation schemes. They allow 
a conclusion to proceed from premises that function as evidence, and in this perspective their 
function and nature covers the role of the ancient τόποι. Schum's interest is focused on the 
probability of the link between the nodes, and ancillary evidence acts like Toulmin's backing, 
strengthening or weakening the inferential step. The function of this kind of evidence is very 
close to the notion of critical questions in Walton's theory [Walton 1996]: they provide critical 
elements to evaluate the reliability of the proof. An important feature of Schum’s graphs is the 
inference network: the pieces of evidence may be related to each other, forming dependencies 
networks. This notion became extremely important after the introduction of the probabilistic 
calculus based on the Bayesian approach. 
1.3.4. Argument diagrams in AI 
As [Reed et al. 2007] puts it, there is a natural, bidirectional relationship between arguments 
expressed in diagrams and knowledge represented by AI systems through argumentation theory. 
On the one hand, argumentation theoretical structures in AI are often presented and explored 
using argument diagrams, with those diagrams acting as an abstraction mechanism. For this sort 
of presentation, internal structures of arguments are relatively unimportant, whilst the attack 
relationship between propositions forms a central focus of both the theory and its diagrammatic 
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exposition [Grasso et al. 2000, Carenini and Moore 2001]. On the other hand, diagrams are also 
used informally to visualize and explore complex problems involving different kinds of 
knowledge, with these diagrams informing and framing the subsequent development of the 
theoretical and implemented machinery that handles such information [Crosswhite et al. 2003].  
1.3.4.1. H. Rittel: an Issue-Based Information System 
The first important contributions to computer-based argument diagrams were brought forward 
during the '60s and '70s by Horst Rittel, which – together with Werner Kunz – invented the 
Issue-Based Information System (IBIS). IBIS is an argumentation scheme designed to support 
coordination and planning of political decision processes [Rittel 1972, Kunz and Rittel 1970, 
Rittel and Noble 1989, Kirschner et al. 2003]. IBIS is used in issue mapping [Okada et al. 
2008], an argument visualization technique related to argument mapping. It is also the basis of a 
facilitation technique called dialogue mapping [Conklin 2003]. Its basic structure is a treeview, 
a method often used in AI [Pearl 1984], and therefore it is meant to be used through a computer. 
The elements of IBIS are issues that need an answer, each of which is associated with 
alternative positions – or possible answers. These in turn are associated with arguments which 
support or object to a given position. In the same way are treated new issues which come up 
during the processing of the initial issues. 
The purpose of such systems is to widen the coverage of a problem. By encouraging a greater 
degree of participation, particularly in the earlier phases of the process, the designer wanted to 
increase the opportunity that difficulties of his proposed solution, unseen by him, will be 
discovered by others. Since the problem observed by a designer can always be treated as merely 
a symptom of another higher-level problem, the argumentative approach also increases the 
likelihood that someone will attempt to attack the problem from this point of view. Another 
desirable characteristic of the Issue-Based Information System is that it helps to make the 
design process “transparent”, as participants are allowed to trace back the process of decision-
making. 
1.3.4.2. J. Pollock: a classification of counterarguments 
Perhaps one of the most influential theoretical frameworks is that of [Pollock 2002]. John 
Pollock focused his interest on the phenomenon that Toulmin defined as rebuttal [Toulmin 
1958]. Using tree diagrams to represent reasoning, he analyzed how a conclusion can be 
defeated, weakened or refuted by a counterargument. In his view, a counterargument can attack 
the argument at which it is aimed in two ways: it can refute the conclusion itself or it can attack 
the inferential link between the premises and the conclusion. The first kind of refutation (closer 
to Toulmin's rebuttal) is defined as a rebutting defeater. A given proposition S concluded on the 
basis of a premise R is rebutted when another proposition Q is a reason for denying S. On the 
other hand, an undercutting defeater aims to undermine the inferential link between premises 
and the conclusion. As his leading example, Pollock considers the case of an object x, looking 
red, illuminated by red lights. The inference is from the perception to the reality of the observed 
phenomenon: if the object looks red, it is red. The undercutting defeater intervenes by attacking 
the passage between perception and reality. The fact that the object is illuminated by red lights 
is not a rebuttal of the conclusion however, because a red object illuminated by a red light looks 
red. It gives reasons, instead, for doubting that x wouldn't look red unless it was red: that, in 
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other words, the premise guarantees the conclusion [Pollock 2002]. Pollock defines in [Pollock 
1995] such defeaters as reliability defeaters, for their action works against the reliability of a 
reason.  
Another important topic raised by Pollock concerns the defeaters and the relationship between 
strength and rebuttal. A defeater, in order to rebut a conclusion, must be as strong as the 
argument supporting the original conclusion. In other words, its premises must be as justified 
(likely to win an argument) as the ones supporting the conclusion. If a defeater is not as strongly 
justified as its target, it cannot defeat it but only diminish it. Pollock's theory has been 
influential in many implemented models of AI reasoning [Chesfievar et al. 2000], but reasoning 
is not the only use of argument diagramming in AI. One key area is “Computer Supported 
Collaborative Argumentation” (CSCA), in which the focus is upon developing tools that help 
people work together using computer infrastructure [Kirschner et al. 2003]. 
1.3.4.3. Zeno and QuestMap 
The diagrammatic reasoning systems used in the public argumentation system Zeno [Gordon 
and Karacapilidis 1997] are interesting especially because they were intended for actual 
deliberation, as opposed to education. It was based on the Issue Based Information System 
(IBIS) framework. Zeno was followed by QuestMap, from “Group Decision Support Systems”, 
an online whiteboard that shows a history of online conversations that led to a decision. 
QuestMap has been used not only in academic domains, but also for supporting commercial 
decision making [Conklin 2003, Selvin 2003]. It takes a very broad approach, integrating 
materials often ignored by more traditional diagramming techniques (including background 
resources such as articles, spreadsheets, pictures and so on), and allows exploration of a domain 
in an intuitive and quite unstructured way.  
But perhaps the single most successful use of argument diagramming has been with AI tools in 
education, both in the teaching of critical thinking and argumentation skills themselves, and also 
as a means to teaching in other subject areas. In the pedagogy of argumentation, there are a 
number of important examples of tools developed under the auspices of AI (see 1.3.4.6.).  
1.3.4.4. Araucaria 
Araucaria is a software tool for argument analysis and diagramming developed in 2001 by Chris 
Reed and Glenn Rowe (see [Reed and Rowe 2004]) based on a representation format, the 
Argument Markup Language, formulated in XML (see 2.2.2.). The software was developed in 
Java to achieve interoperability, and is licensed under the GNU General Public License in 
compliance with the Free Software standards. 
The Argument Markup Language (AML) was created to maintain the evolving relationship 
between text and diagram. AML is designed to be an application of the Argumentation theory in 
Artificial intelligence and, because it is based on XML (a standard widely used by developers), 
AML content can be accessed through other software that support XML. 
The diagram construction begins by inserting the text of the argument. The next step is to 
identify each statement that is a premise or a conclusion in the argument and assign it a letter. It 
is then possible to draw lines representing each inference from the letters representing premises 
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to those representing conclusions. The user may also perform argument reconstruction, 
supplying missing premises. The resulting diagram has a tree structure, but the software 
integrates a tool which translates the diagram into either Toulmin diagram or Wigmore diagram, 
the latter being intended to be used for law cases analysis. 
The software is aimed at providing both a pedagogical tool (enhancing the teaching of critical 
thinking skills thanks to diagramming) and a support for research within the fields of 
argumentation theory and informal logic. The program was indeed widely used by professionals 
and scholars in the legal field. Among them are magistrates in Ontario Courts which exploited 
Araucaria to help with a large volume of relatively simple cases [Reed and Walton 2007, 
Prakken 2008]. The advantages of using Araucaria in both learning and teaching philosophy 
was considered by the authors, along with other scholars, in [Rowe et al. 2006]. 
1.3.4.5. Carneades 
Carneades is a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation, based on the 
state-of-the-art of argumentation theory in philosophy contained in [Walton 2006], which 
applies proof standards to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis 
[Gordon et al. 2007]. In particular, the Carneades model of argument enables software to inform 
users whether or not a claim satisfies a proof standard, given the evidence and other arguments 
which have been put forward by the parties and represented in the diagram. User need not 
understand the underlying mathematics in order to use Carneades, any more than one needs to 
understand the formal specification of word processors when writing documents. 
Carneades was conceived as a part of the Estrella project. Its background theory and its features 
will be thoroughly presented in Chapter 4. 
1.3.4.6. Other projects 
There is clearly a main feature emerging from the AI models of argument diagramming: that of 
aiding in a variety of educational domains. Belvedere [Paolucci et al. 1995] offered one of the 
earliest examples, with argument diagrams making concrete the abstract ideas of scientific 
theories.  
Reason!Able [Van Gelder 2001] is designed specifically for pedagogic use, providing a visual 
framework to organise information, structure reasoning and evaluate evidence. Empirical 
studies have shown that students who are taught argumentation skills using Reason!Able 
improve significantly faster and further than those taught using other, traditional techniques 
[Van Gelder and Rizzo 2001].  
More recently, the large SCALE project [Hirsch et al. 2004] has investigated both diagrammatic 
and dialogic argumentation in high school classrooms. Law pedagogy, in particular, has been a 
fertile area of investigation.  
Vincent Aleven in [Aleven 2003] describes one of the most high-profile systems, CATO, a 
case-based reasoner that is designed to support law students as they explore cases. It organizes 
on the basis of issues, and supports a variety of argument structures, but targets text rather than 
diagrams (for a complete presentation of the software see section 1.4.2.2.).  
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Diagramming plays a much more central role in systems such as ArguMed [Verheij 2005], 
where the focus is upon visualizing dialectical argument. For Verheij (the creator of Deflog, see 
1.2.7.1.), a range of diagrammatic conventions are required to uniquely represent: support, 
attack, assumptions, issues, defeat and specificity. One of the key aims of Verheij's work is in 
capturing Pollock-style undercutters and the subsequent defeat status in his diagrams (shown in 
the example above by dashed lines and crossed arrows), which makes the approach particularly 
useful for those AI models derived from Pollock's theory (see 1.3.4.2.). 
 Artificial Intelligence and Law 1.4.
The discipline of “Artificial Intelligence and Law” (AI & Law) joins the state-of-the-art of 
research in legal subjects and information technologies to provide new instruments for the 
discipline of law. Under the category of AI & Law are classified all the scientific efforts aimed 
at creating formal systems that can store conflicting interpretations and consequently propose 
alternative solutions to a legal issue, as well as systems that use legal precedents to generate 
arguments by drawing analogies or by distinguishing precedents, or even systems acting as 
mediator between disputing parties by structuring and recording their arguments and responses. 
The community has presented very significant research outcomes in this topic since the ‘80, 
with different approaches: legal case-based reasoning and more recently also argumentation. 
1.4.1. The first computational models of law 
Systems to address conflicting interpretations of legal concepts date back to the first years of AI 
& Law. Thorne McCarty considered a landmark Supreme Court Case in US tax law, concerning 
differing interpretations of the concept of ownership, and set himself the goal of reproducing in 
his TAXMAN system both the majority and the dissenting opinions. His intention, however, 
was not to create a working system, but to gain insight into legal reasoning through a 
computational model. McCarty’s main contribution was the recognition that legal argument 
involves theory construction as much as reasoning with established knowledge. In [McCarthy 
1995] he summarizes his position as follows:  
“The task for a lawyer or a judge in a “hard case” is to construct a theory of the disputed rules 
that produces the desired legal result, and then to persuade the relevant audience that this 
theory is preferable to any theories offered by the opponent”. [McCarty 1995] 
In the same years, another system was developed by Anne Gardner in [Gardner 1987] on the 
field of offer and acceptance in American contract law. Its task was to spot issues: given an 
input case, it had to determine which legal questions arising in it were easy and which were 
hard, and to solve the easy ones. The system was rule based, and presented a simpler approach 
than McCarty’s system. One set of rules was derived from a coherent set of 385 law principles 
contained in the Restatement of Contract Law. The application of these rules was capable of 
giving a single answer to an issue. A second set of rules was added, taken from case law, 
common sense and expert opinion. At that point, Gardner distinguished questions by verifying 
if, linking both the sets of rules to the fact of the case, either a single answer resulted, or no 
answer, or conflicting answers. In the latter two cases, the question was considered as “hard”. 
1.4.2. Case-Based Legal Reasoning 
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Extensive research in AI & Law in the last decades involved the development of a 
computational model of case-based legal reasoning. The requirements of such a model, set in 
[Rissland et al. 2003], are: 
 A scheme for representing the facts of cases and problems that are legally significant 
and why; 
 A means for assessing the relevance of cases to a problem; 
 A mechanism for comparing cases and drawing legal inferences. 
These requirements, when met, ensure a big advantage of the model over full-text legal 
information retrieval system, in that they can draw inferences from the cases and show how they 
can be used in arguments. At least two representational schemes have been developed, one 
based on Dimensions [Rissland and Ashley 1987, Ashley 1990] or Factors [Ashley and Aleven 
1994, Aleven 1997] which capture stereotypical patterns of fact that tend to strengthen or 
weaken a side's position on a claim, and another involving Exemplar-Based Explanations 
[Branting 1991, 1999] which capture an explanation of how the legal conclusions are justified in 
terms of the facts. See 5.4. for a comparison of those representation schemes with other 
solutions from AI&Law. 
It is worth noticing that, when looking for legal definitions, even statutes are not comprehensive 
sources. Definitions given in ordinary laws are usually given through examples, and it is 
necessary to revert to legal doctrine in order to get a deeper explaination of the concept. 
1.4.2.1. Dimension-based Representation Schemes: Hypo 
Dimensions are highly structured objects, complete with preconditions that determine when 
they apply and ranges of possible values that indicate how extreme an example case is in the 
perspective on that dimension.  
The most influential system using dimensions is Hypo, developed by Edwina Rissland and 
Kevin Ashley (see [Ashley 1990]) in the domain of US Trade Secrets Law. In Hypo, cases are 
represented according to a number of dimensions. One end of the dimension represents the most 
favorable position for the plaintiff, while the other end represents the position most favorable to 
the defendant. In other words, a case’s value on a pro-plaintiff dimension can range from the 
empty set (the weakest value for plaintiff) to the set of all possible measures (the strongest value 
for the plaintiff). Typically a case will lie somewhere between the two extremes, thus being 
favorable to one or the other party, to different extents.  
Hypo uses these dimensions to construct three-ply arguments: 
 First one party cites a precedent case decided for that side and offers the dimensions it 
shares with the current case as a reason to decide the current case for that side;  
 In the second ply the other party responds either by citing a counter example (a case 
decided for the other side which shares a different set of dimension with the current 
case), or distinguishing the precedent by pointing to features which make the current 
case less favorable to the original side; 
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 In the third ply, the original party attempts to rebut the arguments of the second ply, by 
distinguishing the counter examples, or by citing additional precedents to highlight the 
strengths or hinder the weaknesses in the original argument. 
1.4.2.2. Factor-based Representation Schemes: Cato 
Years later, Kevin Ashley developed with Vincent Aleven, author of interesting remarks in 
[Aleven 1997], the Cato system, designed to help law students to learn to reason with 
precedents. Cato simplifies Hypo in some aspects but extends it others. In Cato, the notion of 
dimensions is simplified to a notion of factors. A factor can be seen as a specific point of the 
dimension whose value is binary: it is simply present or absent from a case, rather than present 
to some degree, and it always favors either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus if a pro-plaintiff 
factor applies in a case it represents a strength for plaintiff regardless of the details. In Cato, 
these factors are organized into a hierarchy of increasingly abstract factors, so that several 
different factors can be seen as meaning that the same abstract factor is present. The hierarchy 
allows downplaying (when two factors correspond to the same abstract figure) or emphasizing 
(when a new figure arises) distinctions. 
Cato’s model addresses arguments in which two opponents analogize a problem to favorable 
cases, distinguish unfavorable cases, assess the significance of similarities and differences 
between cases in light of normative knowledge about the domain, and use that knowledge to 
organize multi-case arguments. Cato communicates the model to students by presenting 
dynamically-generated argumentation examples and by reifying argument structure based on the 
model. It also provides a case database and tools based on the model that help make students’ 
tasks more manageable.  
The software was evaluated in the context of an actual legal writing course, finding that 
instruction with Cato leads to statistically significant improvement in students’ basic 
argumentation skills, comparable to that achieved by an experienced legal writing instructor 
teaching groups of 4-10 students. However, on a more advanced legal writing assignment, 
meant to explore the frontier of the Cato instruction, students taught by the legal writing 
instructor had higher grades, suggesting a need for more integrated practice with the Cato 
model.  
It is interesting that students can learn basic argumentation skills by studying computer-
generated examples: it means that an instructional system does not necessarily need to rely on a 
very sophisticated understanding of students’ arguments, which would be a significant obstacle 
to developing such systems. Also, the model presented novel techniques for using background 
knowledge to support similarity assessment in case-based reasoning: drawing on its background 
knowledge, it characterizes and re-characterizes cases in order to argue that two cases are 
similar or different. This is an important feature in the legal domain which was not previously 
modeled.  
1.4.2.3. Exemplar-Based Explanations and Grebe 
Probably the most elaborate representation of cases was produced in the Grebe system in the 
domain of industrial injury, where cases were represented as semantic networks. It is based on 
EBEs (Exemplar-Based Explanations, introduced in [Branting 1991]), which represent not only 
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the relevant facts of a case but also aspects of the judge's analysis of their legal significance in 
justifying her decision. The EBE representation requires the identification of the statutory terms 
that are disputed in a case, and for each one, the explanation of why the judge decided that the 
term was (or was not) satisfied in the case. The explanation includes the criteria, the facts that 
the judge deemed legally significant in his determining the statutory norms applicable to the 
case. These facts are expressed in a relational language and linked to the corresponding 
statutory term in a semantic network which includes the other statutory terms used by the judge 
to reach his conclusion.  
Grebe uses EBEs to measure the relevance between a problem and a retrieved case. The 
program matches portions of the network for the new case with parts of the networks of 
precedents, to identify appropriate analogies. Grebe recursively attempts to apply the statutory 
rules to the facts, and where particular terms are not further defined by rules, it retrieves cases 
indexed by those terms and attempts to map the factors from the case onto the problem. The 
program measures relevance between a problem and a retrieved case as the fraction of the 
number of unshared and shared factors (here called criterial facts) between them. It selects the 
best-matching cases and generates a legal argument by analogy (likewise, it is able to 
distinguish a case from a problem in the light of unshared factors). Grebe had not the task to 
predict who would win in a problem: it just presents its arguments assigning strength to them 
depending on the matching of criterial facts. The main limit of the EBE scheme is that it puts a 
huge effort in representing the cases' and problems' semantic networks, so that the matching of 
factors would work. This is albeit not easy, according to [Bruninghaus and Ashley 2003], given 
the vast number of ways to express any such explanation and the difficulty of determining 
exactly what a judge's rationale is and at what level of abstraction to express it. 
1.4.2.4. Issue-Based Prediction of Problem Outcomes 
With a legal domain model that relates the factors to issues and a database of case-law 
represented in terms of (and indexed by) factors, a program called Issue-Based Prediction (IBP) 
was developed and presented in [Brüninghaus and Ashley 2005]. This software can frame and 
test hypotheses about which side is likely to win, explain its predictions, and even make the 
strongest arguments for and against each side. 
IBP uses the domain model to identify the relevant issues in a given problem situation, 
represented as a set of factors. For each issue, it determines if one of the side will win the issue 
(if all issue-related factors favor the same side) or it poses a hypothesis that the side which has 
the favor of the majority of retrieved case-law will win. It then tests its hypothesis against the 
retrieved case-law. If counterexamples are found, IBP determines whether they can be 
distinguished from the problem situation. 
1.4.2.5. Overview on case-law analysis tools 
Among all these researches, Hypo in particular was highly influential, being the first to put 
explicit stress on reasoning with cases while constructing arguments, and providing a dialectical 
structure in which these arguments could be expressed, anticipating much other work on 
dialectical procedures. For the purposes of the present research, however, Cato and Grebe are 
even more important, the first introducing simplifications which enhance the reasoning 
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capabilities of the system and introducing automatic graph construction, the second enriching 
the data with references to original legal terms. 
The main issue related to this kind of representation of the legal contents, is the scarce 
management of changes. The adaptive nature of case law was explored in [Henderson and 
Bench-Capon 2001], where the authors considered how understanding of a case law domain 
would evolve differently depending on the sequence in which cases were presented. Of course, 
this does have some implications for the use of systems such as Hypo and Cato, which 
presuppose that case law can be seen as a static body of analysis which can be applied to a new 
case without adaptation. In Levi’s model [Levi 1948] a period of ﬂuctuation and development is 
followed by a period of stability, in which the law seems to be well understood and settled. 
During this period, cases tend to retain a ﬁxed interpretation. Eventually tensions will develop 
and this will break down, typically through a landmark case. So, Hypo and Cato presuppose that 
the law be in its period of stability. It is nevertheless necessary to recognize that any analysis 
will have a lifetime and then need revisiting when the understanding of the domain is changed 
by some landmark case.  
A second consideration by [Henderson and Bench-Capon 2001] concerns the granularity of the 
analysis. The more abstract the level of analysis, the more likely a new case can be fit into it. On 
the other hand, results using this coarser classiﬁcation may be less reliable. The abstract factor 
hierarchy of Cato helps with this, as far as new aspects can be incorporated as leaves in the 
abstract factor hierarchy while retaining the structure.  
1.4.3. State-of-the-art in AI & Law 
In the last years, the research branches of AI & Law detached from the studies on legal 
decisions and on the virtual judge to delve into knowledge representation and automation. 
Among the most recent work on the subject, [Prakken and Sartor 1996] utilized a very abstract 
AI framework for representing system of arguments and their relations as developed by [Dung 
1995]. In order to be used in AI & Law research, this framework was adapted to legal domain 
by defining an instantiation of the framework for reasoning with conflicting rules. This inspired 
several further studies such as [Bench-Capon and Prakken 2010]. 
[Rissland et al. 2003] constitutes a good summary of the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law, 
as of 2003. A recent landmark on AI & Law is Giovanni Sartor’s Legal Reasoning: A Cognitive 
Approach to the Law ([Sartor 2005], which is also the source of the set of distinctions between 
logics and legal resoning presented in 1.2.8.1.), contained in the Treaties of Legal Philosophy 
and General Jurisprudence of E. Pattaro ([Pattaro et al. 2005]). A major lesson from research 
on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law is that legal reasoning cannot be viewed, in general, as the 
application of some deductive logic, such ﬁrst-order predicate logic, to some theory of the facts 
and relevant legal domain.  
Regarding the most recent projects in the field, those related to argumentation theory were 
presented in section 1.3.; others are related to the Semantic Web, and will therefore be presented 











The Semantic Web 
 
 
“The Web is now philosophical engineering. Physics and the Web are both about the 
relationship between the small and the large.” 
– Donald Ervin Knuth, Leaders in computing: changing the digital world. 
 
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” 
– William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, scene 5, 166–167. 
 
 Introduction 2.1.
The revolution brought by Information Technologies allows collecting and processing 
enormous quantities of data, easily. During the ‘90s, the Internet introduced a global 
infrastructure to ensure easy access to these data. However, the huge quantity of information 
gathered in the World Wide Web, and the possibility ensured for anyone to add more 
information and make them available to everybody, soon set up an issue on how to manage 
these data in order to efficiently identify the information useful to the person looking for 
knowledge on the Internet. As of today, it is possible to navigate only a small part of the web, 
considering that in order to access a Web page it is necessary to know its URL (Uniform 
Resource Locator, the address of the page) and that only a small part of these pages is reachable 
through external links, coming from other nodes of the Web. In order to know the URL of the 
pages that could be of interest to the user, search engines were developed since the initial stages 
of Internet in order to browse through thousands (now millions) of pages in few seconds, 
looking for keywords indicated by the user and feeding back links to these possibly useful 
pages. Unfortunately, these engines proved very good at browsing through huge quantity of 
data, but not as good at evaluating the relevancy of the results. Together with useful pages, 
matching the purpose of our search, search engines returned “noise”, pages whose content has 
nothing to do with what we´re looking for. That issue didn’t depend on the search engines, but 
was rather a consequence of the Web standards’ poor semantic markup. 
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The standard for web pages is called HTML (HyperText markup Language) and it provides the 
basic tools to encode the presentation of a text in the web together with a slim structure of 
metadata (data about data, qualifying the content of a part of the text). HTML introduces 
hypertextual links, providing connection from a document to one other, or from a node of the 
web to one other. What this essential set of metadata doesn’t allow is to enrich these data with 
information regarding their semantic structure. Without information on its content, machines 
(such as search engines) cannot manage the data scattered throughout the web pages according 
to the meaning given to them (which, in turn, depends on the context).  
For example, if we are looking for a car on the web, the word “black” that we add together with 
the car model and other specifications is not understood by the search engine as being the color 
of the car we’re looking for, but rather as a mere sequence of letters. In a specialized site, we 
could be able to choose “black” among a list of possible colors so that the machine knows that 
we are not looking just for a sequence of letters, but rather for any piece of text whose meaning 
is “black colour of the car”. These information, however, are not encoded in the basic Web 
technologies. 
Since 1999 the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), founded and directed by Tim Berners-Lee 
with the goal of promoting standards that ensure interoperability in the Web (see [Berners-Lee 
et al. 2006]), focused its research on resolving this issue and gave birth to an approach called 
“the Semantic Web”. The purpose of that approach is to develop an extension of the Web that 
will transform it in a net of machine-readable data. The goal is to render computers capable of 
inferencing new knowledge on the basis of given information. Under a technical point of view, 
this is made possible by managing the structure of information so that documents do not remain 
islands of meaningless data, rather becoming “open databases” capable of enriching the 
information available to a software. 
2.1.1. Linked Data 
The term Linked Data defines a set of best practices for exposing, sharing, and connecting 
pieces of data, information, and knowledge on the Semantic Web. It originates from the 
DBpedia initative: a crowd-sourced community effort introduced in [Bizer, et al. 2009], whose 
aim is to extract structured information from the Wikipedia articles in order to make it available 
on the Web for the development of new mechanisms of navigating, linking and editing the 
Wikis. 
Linked Data exploits URIs and RDFa (see 2.2.1. and 2.2.3.)to enhance the connections between 
documents available on the Internet with metadata describing their content, thus improving the 
availability of these data. The ideal audience of such a web of data, besides the human web 
surfer looking for specific information on the Internet, is the web application of civic interest 
which, thanks to this improvement, could rely on a solid knowledge base which could be 
automatically retrieved and managed.  
An example (in the field of medicine) of the utility of such an advancement was given by Tim 
Berners-Lee (creator of the World Wide Web) in [Berners-Lee 2009] while launching the 
Linked Data initative. A lot of data is available on Alzheimer's drug discovery, because 
scientists in that field consider it a good way of getting information out of the “isolated silos” of 
their research center’s computers. Those scientists had genomic data in one database in one 
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building, and protein data in another. Having linked those data it is possible to submit queies to 
the computer such as: “What proteins are involved in signal transduction and also are related to 
pyramidal neurons?”. Submitting this query to Google would return 223,000 results, but none of 
them significant, because nobody has asked 
that question before. Querying the Linked 
Data would return 32 results, each of which 
is a protein which has the requested 
properties, and can be looked at. As 
[Berners-Lee 2009] puts it,  
“The power of being able to ask those 
questions of a scientist, those questions 
which actually bridge across different 
disciplines is really a complete change. 
It's very important. The power of the data 
that other scientists have collected is 
locked up and we need to get it unlocked 
so we tackle those huge problems”. [Berners-Lee 2009] 
In the legal field, such an improvement could prove to be fundamental in enhancing the 
management of legal documents. If legal documents were self-explaining and inter-operable, 
their content being semantically linked to contents of official law repositories of the States 
available online, the real concept of “legal procedure” could change. Legally relevant activities 
performed (or represented) on the web could be linked as raw data, being watchable and 
modifiable by other tools representing other legal activities. However, in order for this to 
happen, the issue of the knowledge acquisition bottleneck has to be resolved (see 5.2.1.). 
 The Layers of the Semantic Web 2.2.
The evolution planned by the Semantic Web goes from the concept of “information retrieval” 
(producing documents which are relevant to a query) to that of “data retrieval” (giving the 
correct answer to a question). It has been represented in 2001 by Tim Berners-Lee as a 7-layer 
cake made of 9 elements (Figure 2.1), where every layer is connected to the others through three 
typologies of information. The architecture has to be presented from the bottom of the cake, 
because the upper layers are built on standards and elements formalized in the lower ones. The 
levels of the Semantic Web pyramid are thus the following: 
 Identifiers and character set, providing a “name” for entities on the web and a set of 
character to spell those names and communicate information about their content; 
 Syntax, setting the pattern for the additional description of the entities on the web; 
 Data interchange, allowing to establish relations among different sets of entities on the 
web; 
 Ontologies, introducing restrictions to these relations in order for the knowledge base to 
be valid (free from errors) and consistent (free from contradictions). 




 Unifying logic, performing complex reasoning on the knowledge base which involves 
different sets of entities on the web; 
 Proof and trust, ensuring that the knowledge base and the reasoning performed on it 
are authored, substantially correct, and up-to-date. 
It is also to be noticed that the top two layers (proof and trust) require technological innovations 
and standards that do not exist yet. For this reasons, the “label” of these layers describes not the 
instrument, but the socio-cultural impact that the transformations brought by these two 
technologies will bring to the web. 
In the following sections the layers of the Semantic Web will be presented, describing their 
functions and introducing the standards which were reached in the last years, as well as 
interesting implementation of these technologies in the legal field. 
2.2.1. Unicode and URI 
These two standards represent the “basic bricks” for the construction of standard semantically-
enriched documents.  
Unicode is a standard for the consistent encoding, representation and handling of text expressed 
in most of the world’s writing systems. The origins of this language date back to 1987, when 
Joe Becker, Lee Collins and Mark Davis from Apple started investigating the practicalities of 
creating a universal character set
6
. In August 1988, Joe Becker published a draft proposal for an 
international/multilingual text character encoding system, tentatively called Unicode. Actually, 
Unicode consists of a collection of more than 109.000 characters together with character 
properties (i.e. upper/lowercase). 
The URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) is a string of characters used to identify a name or a 
resource on the Internet. Such identification allows interaction with other representation of that 
resource over a network. URIs shares its origins with URLs: in 1994, Tim Berners-Lee’s 
proposals for HyperText introduced the idea of a short string representing a resource that is the 
target of a hyperlink. At the time, people referred to it as a 'hypertext name' or 'document name' 
[Palmer 2009] . URIs, in fact, represent a conjunction of URN (Uniform Resource Name, giving 
a unique name to a resource) and URL (Uniform Resource Locator, giving a unique address to 
the resource). By combining information on the identity of a resource and on its location allows 
for other document to refer to it in an unambiguous way. Once every relevant resource on a 
document is provided with its URI, the data contained in the document can be used together 
with similar data coming from other document to make inferences and provide correct answers 
for data retrieval purposes. Thanks to URIs it is possible to refer not just to a document as a 
whole, but also to parts of them, or to their content. 
2.2.2. XML  
                                                     
6
 See History of Unicode, http://www.unicode.org/history/index.html. 
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XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a markup language whose origins are closely related 
with HTML. It is a descendant of SGML (see [Goldfarb 1991]), the Standard Generalized 
Markup Language, invented by Charles F. Goldfarb, Ed Mosher, and Ray Lorie at IBM in the 
1970s and developed by several hundred people around the world until its adoption in 1986 as 
ISO standard 8879. SGML is a powerful semantic and structural markup language for text 
documents first applied in the U.S. military and government, in the aerospace sector, and in 
other domains that needed ways of efficiently managing technical documents that were several 
thousands of pages long. 
HTML was the most famous application of SGML but did not offer anywhere near the full 
power of the original language, since it restricts authors to a finite set of tags designed to 
describe web pages, in a presentational-oriented way. HTML would be the best choice to do 
web pages, but it would never be used, for example, to exchange data between incompatible 
databases. For these tasks, SGML was the obvious choice but there was a problem: it is a very 
complicated language, covering many special cases. It is so complex that almost no software 
implemented it fully, and programs rather relied on differents subsets of SGML which were 
often incompatible to each other. In order to address these issues, in 1998 XML 1.0 was issued 
(W3C Recommendation of February 10, see [Goldfarb 1998]). Built as a lite version of SGML 
retaining most of SGML's power while removing a lot of the features that had proven 
redundant, too complicated to implement, confusing to end users or simply not useful over the 
previous 20 years of experience, XML was an immediate success and is used since then in a 
wide variety of domains. Successive additions were namespaces in XML, an effort to allow 
markup from different XML applications to be used in the same document without conflicting, 
and the Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL), an XML application for transforming XML 
documents into a form that could be viewed in web browsers. 
Being the most common tool for data transmissions between all sorts of applications, nowadays 
XML is as important for the Web as HTML was to its foundation. Applications in the legal 
domain relevant for the present research are introduced in section 2.4.1. For a complete 
coverage of XML-related projects in the legal field see [Sartor et al. 2011]. 
2.2.2.1. Main features of XML 
An XML document contains text – never binary data – and can be opened with any text editor. 
An XML document can be a very short or a very long document, but it has to be a well-formed 
(see below 2.2.2.2.) XML document in order to be correctly read and “understood” by an XML 
parser. The shortest possible example of XML document is the following: 
<person> Freddie Mercury </person> 
This document could be contained in a .xml file, and it wouldn´t matter which is the name of the 
file as far as the parser is concerned. It could even not be in a file at all (for example it could be 
a record in a database) or it could be generated on the fly in response to a browser query. 
There are three important components in the example seen above: <person> </person> 
are tags (start/end-tag), while everything between those tags is called content. Altogether, this is 
an element named person. These tags are different from those of HTML because XML allows 
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making up new tags. It is therefore possible to furtherly define the information in total freedom, 
for example as follows: 
<person><first_name>Freddie</first_name><surname>Mercury<surname
> </person> 
This example shows another property of XML: it allows creating a hierarchy of terms, where 
i.e. <person> is a parent while <first_name> and <surname> are child elements. 
One thing that XML doesn’t allow is overlapping tags: this means that an element beginning 
inside another element must also finish inside that element. This allows the building of semantic 
trees descending from a root (or parent tag) and furtherly specifying bits of information. This is 
very useful for writing database entries, but XML is also very powerful in free-form, narrative 
document tagging: 
<person><name><first_name>Freddie</first_name><surname>Mercury</
surname> </name> was a <nationality>British</nationality> 
<profession>musician </profession>, 
<profession>singer</profession> and <profession>songwriter 
</profession>, best known as the <role>lead vocalist</role> of 
the rock band <band>Queen</band>. 
XML elements can also have attributes. An attribute is a name-value pair attached to the 
element’s start-tag. For example, we can add information on the person we are talking about: 
<person born=”1946-11-05” died=”1991-11-24”> Freddie Mercury 
</person> 
When building databases the choice of which information is to be represented as elements, and 
which through attributes, can be subject to debate. Instead, when marking up free-form texts, the 
distinction is clearer: the information already present in the text should be kept and highlighted 
with the proper element, while all information which is implicit in the text (i.e. the language of 
the text) should be added through attributes. 
2.2.2.2. Well-Formedness 
Every XML document, without exception, must be well-formed. This means it must adhere to a 
number of rules, including (but not limited to) the following: 
 Every start-tag must have a matching end-tag; 
 Elements may nest, but may not overlap; 
 There must be exactly one root element; 
 Attribute values must be quoted; 
 An element may not have two attributes with the same name; 
 Comments and processing instructions may not appear inside tags; 
 No unescaped < or & signs may occur in the character data of an element or attribute. 
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In addition, XML-Schemas and Document Type Definitions (DTDs) provide a more specific set 
of rules concerning the elements which is expected to be found in a well-formed document of 
that type. Validation is the act of checking the correctness of an XML document according to 
pre-deﬁned structural rules expressed in one or more DTDs and XML Schemas. The validation 
veriﬁes whether the XML document contains, in number and position, all the expected elements 
of the type this document is an instance of. If the parser detects an error, he reports it but it is 
not allowed to try to fix the document on itself, even if it involves only trivial operations. This 
way of checking the correct construction of the XML documents is the key to its success: it 
allows checking the integrity of the document without introducing a machine intervention in the 
XML files that could bring to inefficacies (for example if there is a bug in the parser). At the 
same time, the well-formedness sets the basis for the consistency check of the upper layers in 
the Semantic Web stack of technologies. 
2.2.3. RDF and RDF Schema 
The elements introduced through XML tagging are metadata (data on data): they describe a 
resource in such a way to make it more comprehensible to the user. Normally, metadata are 
descriptive notations adding information on the document (author, title, abstract, file type, 
copyrights, version number…). These data are useful for managing resources, to archive and 
identify information. However, the most important function of metadata is to promote 
interoperability, by maintaining a combination of heterogeneous resources on different 
platforms without losing relevant information.  
In fact, the concept of open data refers to an important characteristic of the Semantic Web, 
namely the disposability of data and the consequent possibility to identify and use these data 
(see [Decker et al. 2000] and 5.2.). The Semantic Web is therefore an extension of the Web 
where the concept of “linking” is much more developed in order to work with a relational model 
of data, where the single “link” is not a blind bond between two documents, but rather is a 
conceptual relation between two individuals. In fact, on the Semantic Web every “piece” of 
information is identified through an URI.  
The URIs are put in relation to each other through a language called RDF (Resource Description 
Framework, see [Nejdl et al. 2000]), which allows to build assertions through triples formed by 
a subject, a predicate and an object. RDF was conceived to represent information about 
resources in the World Wide Web, mainly metadata about Web resources (such as title, author, 
modification date of a Web page). However, by generalizing the concept of a "Web resource", 
RDF can also be used to represent information about things that can be identified on the Web, 
even when they represent something that is outside of the Web. Examples include information 
about items available from online shops (information on their characteristics, prices and 
availability) and the description of a Web user's preferences for a service. 
       Subject        Predicate   Object 
Jack -> son_of -> Maria 
Farrokh Bulsara ->birthname_of-> Freddie 
Mercury 
Fig. 2.2 – Basic RDF triple 
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RDF is intended for situations in which this information needs to be processed by applications, 
rather than being only displayed to people. RDF provides a common framework for expressing 
this information so it can be exchanged between applications without loss of meaning. This 
means that the information may be made available to applications different from those for which 
it was originally created. Since it is now a standard framework, application designers can take 
advantage from the availability of common RDF parsers and processing tools. 
RDF is based on the idea of identifying things using Web identifiers (URIs), and describing 
resources in terms of simple properties and property values. The elements are put in relation to 
each other through triples formed by a subject, a predicate and an object represented in Figure 
2.2. This enables RDF to represent simple statements about resources as a graph of nodes and 
arcs representing the resources (through their URIs) and their properties and values. RDF also 
provides an XML-based syntax (called RDF/XML) for recording and exchanging these graphs. 
The combination of RDF and XML not only grants the enrichment of a document with 
information processable by a machine, but also allows to build a conceptual graph, connecting 
the information together and allowing to perform automatically operations more complex than a 
simple search on the document’s content. 
2.2.3.1. RDFa 
RDFa is an extension of the basic RDF language, providing a set of attributes that can be used 
to carry metadata in an XML language (hence the a in RDFa). These attributes are: 
 About: a URI or CURIE specifying the resource the metadata is about; 
 Rel and rev: specifying a relationship and reverse-relationship with another resource, 
respectively; 











Fig. 2.3 – A small RDF graph. 
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 Property: specifying a property for the content of an element or the partner resource; 
 Content: optional attribute that overrides the content of the element when using the 
property attribute; 
 Datatype: optional attribute that specifies the datatype of text specified for use with the 
property attribute; 
 Typeof: optional attribute that specifies the RDF type(s) of the subject or the partner 
resource (the resource that the metadata is about). 
RDFa reportedly meets a set of principles of interoperable metadata met by RDFa
7
: 
 Publisher independence: each site can use its own standards; 
 Data reuse: data are not duplicated, separate XML and HTML sections are not required 
for the same content; 
 Self-containment: the HTML and the RDF are separated; 
 Schema modularity: the attributes are reusable; 
 Evolvability: additional fields can be added and XML transforms can extract the 
semantics of the data from an XHTML file. 
2.2.3.2. Dublin Core 
The Dublin Core set of metadata elements is an ISO Standard providing a fundamental group of 
text elements which can be used to describe and catalogue multimedia resources such as books, 
video, sound, image or text files, and Web pages. Being it a standard on both the fields of 
library science and computer science, the metadata records based on Dublin Core are also used 
in cross-domain information description. The work originated during the 1995 invitational 
OCLC/NCSA Metadata Workshop, hosted by the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) and 
the National center for Supercomputing Application (NCSA). The expansion and development 
of this standard is brought forward by the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI, see [Weibel 
2009]), which promotes widespread acceptance of metadata standards and practices through 
working groups, global conferences and workshop, standards liaison and educational efforts.  
Being it a “core” work, its elements are broad and generic, usable for describing a wide range of 
resources. The Simple Dublin Core Metadata Element Set (DCMES) consists of 15 metadata 
elements: 
 Title: a name given to the resource; 
 Creator: an entity primarily responsible for making the resource; 
                                                     
7
 See RDF Primer http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-rdfa-primer/). 
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 Subject: the topic of the resource; 
 Description: an account of the resource; 
 Publisher: an entity responsible for making the resource available; 
 Contributor: an entity responsible for making contributions to the resource; 
 Date: a point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource; 
 Type: the nature or genre of the resource; 
 Format: the file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource; 
 Identifier: an unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context; 
 Source: a related resource from which the described resource is derived; 
 Language: a language of the resource; 
 Relationn: a related resource; 
 Coverage: the spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the 
resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant; 
 Rights: information about rights held in and over the resource. 
The standardization process of these elements started in 1998. Notions of best practice in the 
Semantic Web evolved to include the assignment of formal domains and ranges in addition to 
definitions in natural language. Domains and ranges specify what kind of described resources 
and value resources are associated with a given property, expressing meanings which are 
implicit in natural-language definitions in an explicit form that is usable for the automatic 
processing of logical inferences. When a given property is encountered, an inferencing tool may 
use information about the domains and ranges assigned to a property in order to make 
inferences about the resources described thereby.  
Since January 2008 Dublin Core includes formal domains and ranges in the definitions of its 
properties (see [Weibel 2009]). In order not to jeopardize backward-compatibility with existing 
implementations of "simple Dublin Core" in RDF, domains and ranges have not been specified 
for the fifteen properties of the dc:namespace. Rather, fifteen new properties with "names" 
identical to those of the Dublin Core Metadata Element Set Version 1.1 have been created in the 
dcterms:namespace. It is thus possible to choose between the legacy dc: variant and the 
dcterms: variant, depending on application requirements. Over time, however, implementers 
were encouraged to use the semantically more precise dcterms: properties, as they more fully 
follow emerging notions of best practice for machine-processable metadata. 
2.2.4. Computational Ontologies 
RDF/XML constitutes the basis for exchange of information between different application with 
no loss of meaning, representing in a machine-readable way not only the semantics of pieces of 
text (through URIs) but also the links between different resources. In this way, applications are 
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able to represent these resources in a graph which constitutes a first step towards a formal 
representation of the knowledge contained in the document. However, in order to make a 
knowledge field explicit, a further step is necessary, namely the linking of the concepts to logic 
rules concerning their usage. This task is accomplished by ontologies. 
In philosophy, an ontology is a theory on the “essence”, or “nature of existence” of different 
kinds of (material and immaterial) objects. In technical theory, an ontology is an agreement 
based on a common vocabulary (taxonomy) representing the conceptual basis upon which 
different subjects operate. The term has become common between the artificial intelligence and 
web research communities since [Gruber, 1993] to indicate a document formalizing the relations 
between terms. “Computational ontology” is used in the community with two meanings: a 
collection of data and vocabularies (a Tbox defining terms and relations between them and an 
Abox providing assertions on these terms) or a collection of only vocabularies (Tbox). For a 
complete presentation of the concept of Computational Ontologies see [Casellas 2011]. 
An ontology is present also in Figure 2.3, shown in the last section: the is_a relation is in fact 
one of the basic elements constituting an ontology. Relations such as is_a are built-in logic 
connectors of language. The typical Web ontology contains a taxonomy and a set of inference 
rules. The taxonomy defines objects and relations between them: in this way, the meaning of the 
terms contained in a document can be defined through pointers linking to an ontology. A 
semantic agent looking for mercury and finding Freddie Mercury must be able to understand 
that we are not looking for a person, but rather for a chemical element or a planet. 
The ontology is a semantic tree introducing restrictions on terms in the form of relations. 
Through the use of description logic it is possible to express any object or concept in a formal 
way. Ontologies contain the specifications of those objects or concepts which are necessary for 
the understanding of the knowledge domain, its vocabulary, the way concepts and vocabularies 
are connected and the way classes, instances and their properties are defined. 
An ontology can be formal or informal. Only formal ontologies are machine-readable (which 
means that a computer can also make inference from them) but it is quite hard to apply those 
formal construct to practical knowledge. Nevertheless, a first important issue that can be solved 
through ontologies is that of synonyms: two different databases may well use different elements 
to represent the same concept, and in this case it is necessary for an application combining or 
comparing information in these two databases to know that more terms can refer to the same 
concept. Ontologies can build relations between data using a common language, thus enhancing 
sharing of information between different languages. 
2.2.4.1. OWL 
Ontologies are written in either RDF Schema, OWL (Ontology Web Language
8
) or other 
specific languages such as DAML, DAMOIL. The most implemented ontology is actually 
Wordnet, describing concepts (synonyms, opposites, relations between concepts) in several 
                                                     
8
 See OWL Web Ontology Language http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/. 
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languages. It is capable of doing “conceptual dependency searches”, such as mereology (part-
whole) or metonymic (content-container) relations. 
It is possible for anyone to create a reference ontology, hoping it to be shared by others, or to 
choose an existing one, thus embracing an other’s perspective. Usually, ontologies are created 
within a scientific community. An issue raised mostly by philosophers and sociologists is about 
the fact that every person defines the world his own way, and that creating these definitions is 
an important part of the job of any researcher in human or social sciences. There is therefore a 
high risk of creating overlapping or conflicting conceptualizations, while on the other hand a 
single, universal ontology – which is the goal to be reached under a certain perspective – could 
bring to an excessive rigidity in interpretation of facts and phenomena. An enumeration of 
pros/cons in legal domain is contained in [Mommers, 2010]. 
This trade-off between conflicts and rigidity can nevertheless become an advantage. In fact, it 
leads to a multiplicity of ontologies, because a variety of classifying methods can achieve a 
better correspondence between terms and concepts than a unique vocabulary: moreover, it is 
possible to create meta-ontologies specifying correspondence between synonyms, or 
establishing relations between different vocabularies. Often, different research groups develop 
similar concepts independently and it is therefore very useful to describe the relation between 
these concepts. Facing several different ontologies is a normal scenario for any application 
managing semantic contents, and it will be a task of the software itself to highlight differences, 
thus helping the user in understanding the concept in question. 
Another element fostering plurality, which in turn distinguishes Semantic Web theorists form 
Artificial Intelligence researchers, comes from the consequences of the so called Open World 
Assumption, by which the truth of an assertion is independent from the knowledge base. In 
other words, this means that if an assertion is not known to be true it cannot infer that it is false 
(As it would happen following the negation-as-failure axiom of the Closed World Assumption, 
see 5.2.2.5.). 
2.2.4.2. The main elements of OWL  
The building blocks of an OWL ontology are the following: 
Classes provide an abstraction mechanism for grouping resources with similar characteristics. 
Like RDF classes, every OWL class is associated with a set of individuals, called the class 
extension. In addition, the following types of class description add semantic information on the 
class: 
 The class identifier, the URI reference for the class; 
 A list of equivalent element, enumerating the (combination of) classes or properties 
which have the same class description. The equivalent elements may be expressed by an 
axiom (i.e. elements that have a certain propert with a certain range); 




 Intersection of, indicating that the class description is equivalent to the intersection of 
two or more class descriptions; 
 Complement of, indicating that the class includes all the individuals that are not 
member of one (or more) class descriptions; 
 Subclass of, indicating that all the individuals of this class are also member of one (or 
more) class descriptions; 
 Disjoint with, asserting that the class extensions of the two class descriptions involved 
have no individuals in common. 
Instances are the individuals identified in the class extension and in the class description, 
defined by elements such as: 
 Same as, identifying the individuals which have the same identity (two URI references 
that actually refer to the same thing); 
 Different from, identifying two URI references that refer to different individuals. 
Properties are divided into two categories: datatype properties link individual to individuals, 
while object properties link individuals to values. Its main attributes are: 
 Domain, asserting that the subjects of such property statements must belong to the class 
extension of the indicated class description; 
 Range, asserting that the values of this property must belong to the class extension of 
the class description (for object properties) or to data values in the specified data range 
(for datatype properties); 
 Inverse of, asserting that the property is the inverse of another property: its range 
corresponds to the domain of the target property, and its domain corresponds to the 
range of the target property; 
 Subproperty of, similar to subclass of, asserts that the individuals which constitute the 
subject or the value of the property are also subjects (or values) of another property. 
Annotations add information (such as label, description) to the element of the ontology. In this 
way, it is possible to make clear the modelling intentions of the ontology creator, explaining the 
purpose and intended meaning of the OWL code using natural language. 
The OWL language includes many more elements, representing the various aspects of the logics 
supported (AllValuesFrom, SomeValuesFrom introducing elements of description logics in 
class descriptions; transitive and functional attributes for properties, and so on).  
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2.2.4.3. OWL 2.0 
OWL2 is a new version of the Ontology Web Language, released in 2009. OWL2 has a very 
similar overall structure to OWL. Looking at Figure 2.4, almost all the building blocks of 
OWL2 were present in OWL, albeit possibly under different names. The central role of 
RDF/XML and the role of other syntaxes has not changed, and backwards compatibility with 
OWL is complete, with identical inferences in all practical cases. 
OWL 2 adds new functionalities, including keys, property chains, richer datatypes and data 
ranges, qualified cardinality restrictions, asymmetric, reflexive, and disjoint properties, and 
enhanced annotation capabilities (the most relevant of whom will be presented in Chapter 3). It 
also defines new profiles (in addition to the existing OWL DL, OWL Full and OWL Lite the 
new OWL EL, OWL 2 QL and OWL 2 RL dialects were added) and a new syntax. Figure 2.5 
shows the complete table of available syntaxes for OWL. 
Name of 
Syntax 
Specification Status Purpose 
RDF/XML 




Interchange (can be written and read 










Easier to see the formal structure of 
ontologies 







Optional Easier to read/write DL Ontologies 
Turtle 
Mapping to RDF 
Graphs, 
Turtle 
Optional, Not from 
OWL-WG 
Easier to read/write RDF triples 
 
2.2.5. Rules and Logics 
The term rule has different meanings in different fields. In Kelsen’s definition of Law [Kelsen 
1945] it is defined as as “an order of human behavior” The author explained the word order to 
mean a system of rules, and his contribution to the legal positivism represents a fundamental 
step towards the modern vision of normative rules; in fact, while agreeing with the positivists’ 
conception of law as posits (social constructions) rather than derivations from reasons, he 
argues that law always needs a normative base: a Grundnorm (basic norm), from which the 
legitimacy or validity of all the laws derive. 
In ITs, rules are of the form of an implication between an antecedent (body) and consequent 
(head). The intended meaning can be read as: whenever the conditions specified in the 
antecedent hold, then the conditions specified in the consequent must also hold. 
By combining properties expressed in RDF and axioms expressed in OWL (or other ontology 
language) it is already possible to infer new knowledge from the existing information. In Tim 
Berners-Lee Semantic Web Cake, this is the logic layer, where “reasoning” takes place. 
Reasoning means inferring new knowledge: in order to achieve that, specific software must be 
able to connect the terms. Common reasoners include Pellet, Fact++, Hermit. Reasoning can be 
efficacious only if the software is able to recognize synonyms, translating the properties of a 
term into its analogous, and then checking the known data to identify useful information. 
The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) is a proposed language for the Semantic Web that 
can be used to express rules as well as logic, combining OWL DL or OWL Lite with a subset of 
the Rule Markup Language (RuleML). The logic layer, however, is the first layer of the 
Semantic Web stack which has not reached a shared standard yet: the debate is still open from 
here to the top of the pyramid. 
2.2.5.1. Closed/Open World Assumption 
We introduce here an important distinction, central to the present research: the distinction 
between the closed world assumption and the open world assumption. 
The closed world assumption, formalized in [Reiter, 1978], is the presumption that what is not 
currently known to be true is false. An important concept inside the closed world assumption is 
the concept of negation as failure, which implies believing false every predicate that cannot be 
proved to be true. In the knowledge management arena, the closed world assumption is used in 
at least two situations: when the knowledge base is known to be complete (e.g., a corporate 
database containing records for every employee), and when the knowledge base is known to be 
incomplete but a "best" definite answer must be derived from incomplete information. 




The opposite of the closed world assumption is the open world assumption, stating that lack of 
knowledge does not imply falsity. The most important implication of this assumption is that, if a 
rule has a negative requirement (i.e. the body of the rule contains (not) knowlable) and the 
Knowledge Base contains no information on the element (i.e. knowable), the rule will not 
trigger. In order for the rule to apply, the Knowledge Base must explicitly contain the negative 
statement (i.e. (not) knowable). 
This distinction determines the understanding of the actual semantics of a conceptual expression 
with the same notations of concepts. A successful formalization of natural language semantics 
cannot avoid an explicit revelation of the logical backgrounds based on either closed or open 
world assumption. See 5.1. for a more complete discussion on the topic in the legal field. 
2.2.6. Proof and Trust 
The top two layers of the Semantic Web layer cake are still relatively unexplored, and no 
standard on these two subjects has arisen yet. 
Goal of the proof layer is to give a proof that an answer found in the Semantic Web is correct 
under different perspectives, such as how it was derived (logic), on which data (sources) and by 
who (trust). As will be seen in the next chapters, standardization in document modelling, 
markup, and knowledge representation are explicitly aimed at covering part of that issue: with a 
correct implementation of the underlying layers it is in fact possible to render explicit the 
sources and logic paths involved in an answer of the Semantic Web.  
To fully implement trust is a whole different issue: it involves problems of authentication, 
interoperability, scalability, security, exposure control and so on. Some literature on those 
themes can be found in [Wahlforss and Ljung 2008] and [Artz and Gil 2007]. 
 The four layers of a legal document  2.3.
Ever since its creation, the World Wide Web was conceived as a web of documents. The URLs 
for HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) were identifiers for web pages consisting essentially in 
text and images. Additional applications such as Flash allow adding sounds or videos inside the 
URL, but those documents were considered only as a whole. The Web 2.0 brought a revolution 
into that concept, and RDFa introduced the possibility to use URLs to create a web made of 
links not just between documents, but also between the content of those documents: the data 
(this new approach to knowledge construction in the web has been analysed in 2.1.1.). 
The present section focuses the attention on the original web of documents. In fact, representing 
a set of legal documents (such as case-law) in a net-like infrastructure is not an effortless task. 
In order to represent a decision where some contracts and laws are concerned, it is necessary to 
represent those documents differentiating between different versions (i.e., two versions of a law, 
before and after an amendment). In order for the knowledge base to be handled effectively, 
there can be no mistake between the abstract conception of a contract clause, a specific clause of 
a specific contract, and a clause contained only in one copy of that contract. 
This issue does not concern the content of the documents involved in a judicial decision, but 
rather concepts such as succession over time and serialization. It does not concern, for example, 
the status of a law as the enactment of some general guidelines contained in a prior law or on a 
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European decision. It only concerns the management of the production and distribution 
processes that every externalization of concepts (every document) undergoes. 
In order to introduce these distinctions into the representation of the legal documents, the 
standard on the field of general literature will be analyzed: the classification of the Functional 
Requirements for Bibliographic Records. In 1992 the IFLA (International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institution) started the study group on Functional Requirements for 
Bibliographic Records (FRBR) with the purpose of developing an entity relationship model as a 
generalized view of the bibliographic universe, intended to be independent of any cataloguing 
code or implementation. The standard proposal, available in (International Federation of Library 
Associations and Institutions, 2013) includes a description of the conceptual model (the entities, 
relationships and attributes), a national level bibliographic record for all types of materials, and 
user tasks associated with the bibliographic resources described in catalogues, bibliographies, 
and other bibliographic tools. The most interesting part of the conceptual model of FRBR is the 
identification of the four layers of documents, or, in other words, of the four possible “targets” 
that can be intended when a document refers to another document: it can in fact be possible that, 
by pointing at some other document, a source document intends to refer to the original or 
general idea behind it (a work), to that version of the idea (an expression), to the series of 
documents the target is an exemplar of (a manifestation) or to that single exemplar (an item). 
Which of these layers is the intended target of the reference, however, is not always easy to 
determine. A clear distinction of the borders between those layers, especially in the legal field, 
is a necessary starting point. The following paragraphs are therefore aimed at defining the 
shapes that these classes assume in the legal field (see also [Cuninghame 2009]). 
2.3.1. FRBR Classification: Work 
The first entity of the classification is work: a distinct intellectual (or artistic) creation. A work 
is an abstract entity: there is no single material object one can point to as the work. When 
speaking of Homer's Iliad as a work, the point of reference is not a particular recitation or text of 
the work, but the intellectual creation that lies behind all the various expressions of the work. 
Because the notion of a work is abstract, it is difficult to define precise boundaries for the entity. 
The concept of what constitutes a work and where the boundary between one work and another 
lies may in fact be viewed differently from one culture to another. Consequently the 
bibliographic conventions established by various cultures or national groups may differ in terms 
of the criteria they use for determining the boundaries between one work and another. Variant 
texts incorporating revisions or updates to an earlier text, abridgements or enlargements of an 
existing text, and translations from one language to another are usually viewed as expressions of 
the same work. Here is a pair of examples: 
w1 Ridley Scott’s “Blade Runner” motion picture 
e1 the original version 
e2 the director’s cut 
w2 Philip K. Dick’s “Do Android Dream of Electric Sheeps?” 
e1 the original version in English language 
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e2 the Italian version in Italian language 
In the legal field, modifications of single clauses (or articles) of an existing law create a new 
expression of the same work: 
 w1 The Italian Civil Code  
e1 The original version of the royal decree n. 262 of 1942 
e2 The version modified by law 151 of 1975 
e3 The version modified by decision 245/2011 of the Constitutional Court 
By contrast, there must be a certain threshold when the degree of independent intellectual or 
artistic effort involved in the modification of a work where the result is viewed as a new work. 
Thus paraphrases, rewritings, adaptations for children, parodies, musical variations on a theme 
are considered to represent new works. Similarly, adaptations of a work from one literary or art 
form to another (e.g., dramatizations, adaptations from one medium of the graphic arts to 
another, etc.) are considered to represent new works. Abstracts, digests and summaries are also 
considered to represent new works. In the previous example: 
w1 Philip K. Dick’s “Do Android Dream of Electric Sheeps?” 
w2 Ridley Scott’s “Blade Runner” motion picture 
In the legal field, paraphrases of legal norms made by doctrine or jurisdiction are viewed as new 
works. Also sentences summarized in case-law collections constitute new works. 
w1 Art. 1341 of Civil Code  
w2 The chapter “The discipline of art. 1341 of Civil Code” by A. Torrente and P. 
Schlesinger 
… 
w1 Decision of Cassation Court n. 1348 of 1998 
w2 The summary in the paragraph “1348/1998” of the Cassation Court case-law 
collection  
Following some critics on the original FRBR classification presented above, among which are 
[Weihs 1998] in the need for the entity “superwork” and [Smiraglia 2002] on the instantiation 
network, a new version of the classification, called FRBR00, enriched the Work layer creating 
the new classes Complex Work, Individual Work, Self-Contained Expression, Container Work, 
Aggregation Work, Serial Work, Publication Work, Performance Work, Recording Work. 
On a pragmatic level, defining work as an entity in the model serves a number of purposes. It 
enables to give a name and draw relationships to the abstract intellectual or artistic creation that 
encompasses all the individual expressions of that work. Thus, when we describe a work of 
legal doctrine dealing with Civil Code’s discipline of consumer contracts, for example, we are 
able to relate the work of doctrine to the work that it treats as its subject. By naming Civil Code 
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and defining the relationship between it and the work of doctrine, we are able to indicate that the 
subject of the work of doctrine is in fact the abstraction we know as the Civil Code and not any 
specific expression of that work. 
Defining work as an entity also enables to establish indirect relationships between expressions 
of the same work in cases where we are unable to draw direct relationships between individual 
expressions. For example, there may exist many amendments of a work (e.g., discipline on 
Consumer Contracts), and it the text that has served as the basis for a given amendment may not 
always be directly specified (the amendment may in fact e only an indirect result of the 
application of the new norm). In that case we do not draw a direct relationship between 
individual expressions of the work (i.e., between the amendment and original text), but we 
relate those and other texts and amendments of the work implicitly by relating each of them to 
the entity we call the work. 
Relating expressions of a work indirectly by relating each expression to the work that it realizes 
is often the most efficient means of grouping related expressions. In effect, the name given to 
the work serves as the name for the entire set or group of expressions that are realizations of the 
same intellectual or artistic creation. It is the entity defined as work, therefore, that provides this 
grouping capability. 
In Akoma Ntoso [Barabucci et al. 2010a] the identification section classifies the document 
informing the semantic tools that the document is the manifestation of a certain abstract work, 
allowing them to distinguish between different versions of the same work. See 2.4.2.1. for a 
complete explanation of how Akoma Ntoso applies the FRBR00 model to legal resources. 
2.3.2. FRBR Classification: Expression 
Expression is the intellectual (or artistic) realization of a work in the form of text, notation, 
sound, image, object, movement, or any combination of such forms. 
An expression is the specific intellectual or artistic form that a work takes each time it is 
"realized." Expression includes, for example, the specific words, sentences, paragraphs, etc. that 
result from the realization of a work in the form of a text, or the particular notes, phrasing, etc. 
resulting from the realization of a musical work. The boundaries of the entity expression are 
defined, however, so as to exclude aspects of physical form, such as typeface and page layout, 
that are not integral to the intellectual or artistic realization of the work as such. 
Since the form of expression is an inherent characteristic of the expression, any change in form 
(e.g., from text to spoken word) results in a new expression. Similarly, changes in the 
intellectual conventions or instruments that are employed to express a work (e.g., translation 
from one language to another) result in the production of a new expression. Strictly speaking, 
any change in intellectual or artistic content constitutes a change in expression. Thus, if a text is 
revised or modified, the resulting expression is considered to be a new expression, no matter 
how minor the modification may be. For example: 
w1 The song “I Can’t Live With You” by Queen 
e1 The original studio recording 
86 
 
e2 the 1997 “Rocks” retake 
In the legal field, an expression identifies the exact combination of words of a legal text. Any 
modification of the text gives birth to a new expression. Please note that, since differences in 
page layout do not count, this is not the level where the “official version” of the law is 
identified. This function pertains to the lower level (manifestation). 
On a practical level, the degree to which bibliographic distinctions are made between variant 
expressions of a work will depend to some extent on the nature of the work itself, and on the 
anticipated needs of users. Differences in form of expression (e.g., from musical notation to 
recorded sound) will normally be reflected in the bibliographic record, no matter what the 
nature of the work itself may be. Variant expressions in the same form (e.g., revised versions of 
a text) will often be indirectly identified by the data used to identify the manifestation in which 
the expression is embodied (e.g., an edition statement, a software’s version). Variations that 
would be evident only from a more detailed analysis and comparison of expressions (e.g., 
variations between several of the early texts of Shakespeare's Hamlet) would normally be 
reflected in the data only if the nature or stature of the work warranted such analysis, and only if 
it was anticipated that the distinction would be important to users. 
In the legal field, differences in laws and judicial decisions would be tracked with reference to 
the deliberations (and registry entry) which caused those differences. Different contributions in 
doctrine would be reflected in editorial data. The anticipated needs of users could represent the 
legal relevance of a legal document’s version, which does not say much since everything that is 
formal in the legal setting is also relevant. Small details and minimum differences between legal 
documents could always become relevant if the document’s formal integrity (and thus its 
validity) is at stake. 
Defining expression as an entity in the model gives a means of reflecting the distinctions that 
may exist between one realization and another of the same work. It also allows to draw 
relationships between specific expressions of a work. The entity called expression can be used 
to identify, for example, the specific version of the law on which a piece of legal doctrine is 
based, or the specific version of the commentary used for a citation or comparison. 
The entity defined as expression can be also used to indicate that the content embodied in one 
manifestation is in fact the same as that embodied in another manifestation. If two 
manifestations embody the same content, even though the physical embodiment may differ and 
differing attributes of the manifestations may obscure the fact that the content is the same in 
both (i.e. if two books contain the same piece of legal doctrine), we can make the common link 
through the entity defined as expression. 
In Akoma Ntoso, the expression layer represents the original legal text. Thus, any modelling 
done to further qualify the legal text through ITs represents a manifestation of that expression. 
2.3.3. FRBR Classification: Manifestation 
The third entity defined in the model is manifestation: the physical embodiment of an 
expression of a work. 
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The entity defined as manifestation includes a wide range of materials, including manuscripts, 
books, periodicals, maps, posters, films, CD-ROMs, DVDs, etc. As an entity, manifestation 
represents all the physical objects that bear the same characteristics, in respect to both 
intellectual content and physical form. 
When a work is realized, the resulting expression of the work may be physically embodied on or 
in a medium, such as paper, audio tape, video tape, canvas, plaster, etc. That physical 
embodiment constitutes a manifestation of the work. In some cases there may be only a single 
physical exemplar produced of that manifestation of the work (e.g., an author's manuscript, a 
tape recorded for an oral history archive, an original oil painting, etc.). In other cases there are 
multiple copies produced in order to facilitate public dissemination or distribution. Whether the 
scope of production is broad (e.g., in the case of publication, etc.) or limited (e.g., in the case of 
copies made for private study, etc.), the set of copies produced in each case constitutes a 
manifestation. All copies produced that form part of the same set are considered to be copies of 
the same manifestation. 
The boundaries between one manifestation and another are drawn on the basis of both 
intellectual content and physical form. When the production process involves changes in 
physical form the resulting product is considered a new manifestation. Changes in physical form 
include changes affecting display characteristics (e.g., a change in typeface, size of font, page 
layout, etc.), changes in physical medium (e.g., a change from paper to microfilm as the 
medium of conveyance), and changes in the container (e.g., a change from cassette to cartridge 
as the container for a tape). Where the production process involves a publisher, producer, 
distributor, etc., and there are changes signaled in the product that are related to publication, 
marketing, etc. (e.g., a change in publisher, repackaging, etc.), the resulting product may be 
considered a new manifestation. Whenever the production process involves modifications, 
additions, deletions, etc. that affect the legal content, the result is a new manifestation 
embodying a new expression of the work. 
w1 Ridley Scott’s “Blade Runner” motion picture 
e1 The original version 
m1 The film distributed in theaters in 1982 
m2 The 10
th
 anniversary VHS version 
e2 The director’s cut 
m1 The DVD version released in 1997 
m2 A .avi file ripped from the DVD version  
… 
w1 The song “I Can’t Live With You” by Queen 
e1 The original studio recording 
m1 the fourth song in the “Innuendo” music tape 
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m2 the fourth track in the “Innuendo” CD 
e2 the 1997 “Rocks” retake 
m1 the fifth track of the “Queen Rocks” CD 
m2 the MP3 available at amazon.co.uk 
In the legal field, manifestation is useful under different aspects. It allows to define the legally 
binding version of a legal text. For laws, the version of the Official law Gazette can be 
distinguished from any reproduction of the text contained in it (which is not legally binding). 
For judgements, the original document and their legal copies (for the parties) can in this way be 
distinguished from their (even wordly) reproduction in case-law books, their online versions, 
and so on. For legal doctrine, the general considerations for books apply. 
w1 Civil Code (Art. 45) 
e1 Original Version 
m1 The Special Edition of the Official Gazette n. 79 of April 4
th
, 1942 (Art. 45) 
m2 The book “Civil Code” published by Mondadori, ed. 1952 (Art. 45) 
e2 Version modified by law 151 of 1975 (Art. 45) 
m1 The Official gazette n. 135 of May 23
rd
, 1975 (Art. 45) 
m2 The online version available at www.altalex.com (Art. 45) 
… 
w1 Decision 1348/1998 of the Court of Cassation 
e1 The original version 
m1 The copy for the parties 
m2 A photocopy made by one of the parties for his personal records. 
e2 the summary in the collection of cassation court 
m1 The summary in the paragraph “1348/1998” of the Cassation Court case-law 
collection  
m2 The online version of the page in DeJure online database 
Changes that occur deliberately or even inadvertently in the production process that affect the 
copies result, strictly speaking, in a new manifestation. Changes that occur to an individual copy 
after the production process is complete (e.g., the loss of a page, rebinding, or an error in the 
copy of the MP3 file) are not considered to result in a new manifestation. That copy is simply 
considered to be an exemplar (or item) of the manifestation that deviates from the copy as 
89 
 
produced. In the legal field, this can be used to represent the system of “official copies” of legal 
acts: these are all considered as items of the same manifestation. 
Defining manifestation as an entity allows naming and describing the complete set of items that 
result from a single act of physical embodiment or production. The entity serves to describe the 
shared characteristics of copies of a particular publication, edition, release, etc., as well as to 
describe unique productions such as manuscripts, original oil paintings, etc. In the legal field, it 
is useful to identify a unit of text as a speech act, and to relate it to the corresponding legal 
concept(s). 
Through the manifestation entity it is possible to describe the physical characteristics of a set of 
items and the characteristics associated with the production and distribution of that set of items 
that may be important factors in enabling users to choose a manifestation appropriate to their 
physical needs and constraints, and to identify and acquire a copy of that manifestation. It also 
allows drawing relationships between specific manifestations of a work. We can use the 
relationships between manifestations to identify, for example, the specific publication that was 
used to create a micro-reproduction. In the legal field, it is fundamental to identify the legally 
binding version of a work. 
In Akoma Ntoso, the manifestation layer represents the level of the marked-up XML document. 
The general schema employed by Akoma Ntoso documents to express assertion is: 
“the author of a manifestation asserts on the manifestation date that the author of the 
corresponding expression asserts on the expression date in a particular context that subject 
does predicate on object” [Barabucci et al. 2010a], p. 144 
2.3.4. FRBR Classification: Item 
The fourth entity defined in the model is item: a single exemplar of a manifestation. 
An item is a concrete entity, constituted by one or more physical objects (i.e., an encyclopedia is 
a single item even though it is made of several volumes). In terms of intellectual content and 
physical form, an item exemplifying a manifestation is normally the same as the manifestation 
itself. However, variations may occur from one item to another, even when the items exemplify 
the same manifestation, where those variations are the result of actions external to the intent of 
the producer of the manifestation (e.g., damage occurring after the item was produced, binding 
performed by a library, etc.). Following is an exemplification of all the four layers for the 
“Blade Runner” example: 
w1 Ridley Scott’s “Blade Runner” motion picture  
e1 The original version 
m1 The VHS 10
th
 anniversary edition  
i1 The copy of the VHS sold on Ebay with id EPID3056531 
i2 The copy of the VHS in Harrison Ford’s bookshelf 
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In the legal field, it is particularly useful for legal sources such as contracts where the 
differences between single specimens may be relevant, or where it may be important to refer to 
a specific copy (i.e. consumer’s copy) of a contract, as explained in the example: 
w1 the telecom contract for telephone line 
e1 the 2005 “Tutto Compreso” consumer contract 
m1 The contract printed in july 9
th
, 2005 
i1 the copy held by the consumer Mario Rossi 
Defining item as an entity enables to separately identify individual copies of a manifestation, 
and to describe those characteristics that are unique to that particular copy and that pertain to 
transactions such as circulation, etc. involving that copy. It also allows drawing relationships 
between individual copies of manifestations. 
In the legal field, this is useful everytime when bring specific means of proof (not only a 
document but also an object, a probe, etc.) Through the “item” element we can distinguish the 
single object even if they are used as mere tokens to explain facts or circumstances through 
deduction. The factors (or circumstances) that have been proved may lay on the item layer or at 
an upper layer. For example, if a single toy is acquired by the court to prove a fault in the 
production, it is important to indicate whether the results of the probe refer to the single toy 
(item), to the production batch (manifestation) or to the toy’s design (expression). As said in the 
beginning of the section, while work, expression, and manifestation are intentional objects (they 
exist only as the object of one’s thoughts and communication acts), an item is a physical object. 
Items stored on a computer, however, can be easily copied to another location, resulting in 
another item, but still an instance of the same manifestation. This makes it impossible, in 
principle, to add the metadata about the item directly on it. On the Internet only the uniform 
resource locator (URL) is an item-speciﬁc datum. The item level is therefore not very relevant 
to XML standards. 
 Semantic Web Projects Related to the Legal Field 2.4.
2.4.1. URNs and XML 
2.4.1.1. CEN Metalex 
CEN Metalex is defined as an Open XML interchange format for legal and legislative resources. 
Its goal (see [Boer et al. 2009]) is to standardize the way in which sources of law and references 
to sources of law are to be represented in XML. Being an interchange format, it acts as a lowest 
common denominator for other standards. It is therefore not intended to replace jurisdiction-
specific standards and vendor-specific formats in the publications process, but rather to create a 
standardized view on legal documents for the purpose of information exchange and 
interoperability in the context of software development. MetaLex includes a mechanism for 
schema extension, adding metadata, cross referencing, constructing compound documents and a 
basic naming convention. The MetaLex schema is based on the best practices from – amongst 
others – the previous versions of the MetaLex schema, the Akoma Ntoso schema, and the 
Normeinrete schema. Other important sources of inspiration are LexDania, CHLexMOL, 
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FORMEX, R4eGov, all available on the web. MetaLex also implements the distinctions made 
by the IFLA FRBR (see 2.3.).  
MetaLex precribes what counts as a MetaLex metadata statement, how it is stored inside a 
MetaLex document, and what classes of entities and which predicates (properties) MetaLex 
distinguishes. The RDF ontology classiﬁes the following entities: 
 Bibliographic entities: the work, expression, manifestation, and item level, and content 
models; 
 Reference: type of reference between bibliographic entities; 
 Activities: actions and thematic links, and thematic roles of bibliographic entities in at 
least the actions creation, enactment, repeal; 
 Agent and competence: the agents and institutional instruments (legislative power, 
etc.) used in legislative activity. 
MetaLex meta elements are used 
to embed metadata that can be 
stored in the form of RDF 
statements in RDF documents. 
Elements derived from the meta 
content model are carriers of 
RDFa attributes, and are 
therefore of RDFa statements. 
All entities are identiﬁed using 
URIs, and the ontology is 
extensible. 
2.4.1.2. The 
NormeInRete Project (NiR) 
The Normeinrete project (NiR) 
aims at fulfilling the citizens’ right to acquire knowledge of legislation, while at the same time 
supporting Public Administration in efficiently managing the legislative documentation 
lifecycle. The project was promoted by the Italian Authority for Information Technology in 
Public administration (AIPA) and the Italian Ministry of Justice, and it comprehends by the 
following actions:  
 A specialized portal for legislative documents retrieval;  
 Standards to represent legally relevant data;  
 Software distribution to support legislative document management and publishing;  
 Specific courses among public administrations.  
The system is based on a federation of legislative data bases developed with different platforms 
and it is built upon a co-operative technological architecture.  
Fig. 2.6 – A taxonomy of bibliographic entities in MetaLex 
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Normeinrete improves accessibility to legislation by providing a unique point of access to 
Italian and European Union legal documents published on different web sites through a 
specialized portal (formerly www.nir.it, now moved to www.normattiva.it after the renaming of 
the whole project as “NormAttiva”). The portal runs a search engine that operates 
homogeneously on distributed data sources. Its full-text search index is selectively built 
detecting only legislative documents. The standards have been issued as AIPA technical norms 
and published as regulatory acts in the Italian Official Journal. The definitions make use of 
IETF URNs
9
 and XML standards
10
. Normeinrete supports the public administration also in the 
tasks related to law consolidation by providing standard definitions which allow to identify the 
norms in a distributed environment and to track their modifications, thus performing semi-
automatic consolidation. The project also aims at creating a virtual space for knowledge sharing 
within the public administration community, through dedicated services such as e-learning tools 
and open source software. So far, more than 40 public institutions have taken part in the project 
and more than 140.000 documents have been indexed. The site supplies about 150.000 search 
sessions monthly.  
Normeinrete introduced specific elements for URNs, which are used to represent the references 
to laws contained in other laws. The basic elements are: name of the promulgating authority, 
type of law, date, number, as well as a set of more detailed, accessory specifications. The 
adoption of a scheme based on URNs allows the automatic building of an hypertext according 
to a model similar to the DNS (Domain Name System) used to resolve the self-explaining web 
sites names into numerical HTTP addresses. This opportunity relies on the consideration that 
the natural language expressions used in the quotation of laws usually contain repetitive 
patterns, making references automatically detectable. The URN can then be built by combining 
data which are almost always included in the reference. 
The XML representation of legislative documents improves effectiveness in managing, 
publishing and retrieving norms by electronic means (see [Barabucci et al. 2010b]). 
Normeinrete has defined a DTD (Document Type Definition) for the Italian legislation, 
considering the peculiarity of legislative documents and other significant useful information. 
Italian legislative and regulatory acts can be divided into three categories:  
 Documents with a well-defined structure (state laws, regional laws, etc.);  
 Partially structured documents (regulation act, decrees, etc.);  
 Generic documents (enclosures, informal acts, etc.).  
To avoid a proliferation of DTDs, it has been considered more convenient the definition of a 
single DTD containing many elements capable of representing all the types of documents. 
                                                     
9
 Circolare del 6 novembre 2001, n. AIPA/CR/35 - Assegnazione dei nomi uniformi ai documenti giuridici. Available 
at http://www.digitpa.gov.it/sites/default/files/normativa/Circ_AIPA_2001 _11_06_n_35.pdf 
10 Circolare 22 aprile 2002 n. AIPA/CR/40 - Formato per la rappresentazione elettronica dei provvedimenti normativi 




Because the structure of Italian legislative documents may vary, the mark-up language is very 
complex and the resulting DTD has three different versions, containing the same set of elements 
to represent all kinds of documents, but relying on different constraints to distinguish them. 
Documents validated against strict rules are also valid against looser ones.  
Mark-up must be carried out using only elements relevant to the kind of document. The DTD 
elements can be classified as follows:  
 Structural elements, identifying the parts in which the document is structured (heading, 
preamble, articles, etc.);  
 Special elements identifying meaningful parts of the text in the legal context (for 
instance references to other laws) or associating a formatted representation to text 
embedded relevant entities (institutions, dates, places);  
 Elements containing metadata (for instance subject-matter classification, publication 
data, procedures to enact a bill, etc.).  
2.4.2.  The Akoma Ntoso Framework 
The Akoma Ntoso (Architecture for Knowledge-Oriented Management of African Normative 
Texts using Open Standards and Ontologies) framework is a set of guidelines for e-Parliament 
services in a pan-African context. The framework was developed within the “Strengthening 
Parliaments’ Information Systems in Africa” project of the United Nations Department for 
Economics and Social Aﬀairs (UN/DESA), a project aimed at empowering legislatures to better 
fulﬁll their democratic functions by using ICTs to increase the quality of parliamentary services, 
facilitate the work of parliamentarians and create new ways to promote the access of civil 
society to parliamentary processes. 
Akoma Ntoso (see [Barabucci et al., 2010a]) focuses on information content and issues 
recommendations, technical policies and speciﬁcations for building and connecting Parliament 
information systems across Africa. In particular, its framework proposes an XML document 
schema providing sophisticated description possibilities for several parliamentary document 
types (including bills, acts and parliamentary records, etc.), therefore fostering easier 
implementation of parliamentary information systems and interoperability across African 
parliaments, ultimately allowing open access to this information. 
The framework reaches three main objectives which are instrumental for the success of the 
overall project:  
 To deﬁne a common standard for data interchange between parliaments; 
 To deﬁne the speciﬁcations for a base document model on which parliamentary systems 
can be built; 
 To deﬁne an easy mechanism for citation and cross referencing of data between 
parliaments. 
The Akoma Ntoso framework aims at providing two basic types of interoperability: semantic 
interoperability (which means ensuring that the precise meaning of exchanged information is 
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understandable by any person or application receiving the data) and technical interoperability 
(aimed at ensuring that all Akoma Ntoso-related applications, systems, interfaces are based on a 
shared core of technologies, languages and technical assumptions easing data interchange, data 
access and reuse of acquired competencies and tools). Akoma Ntoso ensures technical 
interoperability by enforcing the use of open standards and open document formats, based on 
the XML language. 
The Akoma Ntoso metadata format is primarily focused on resource discovery and records 
management. The aim is to ensure that people searching the knowledge online have easy access 
to descriptions of many different resources. In this way, advanced search is possible as well as 
the generation of structured collections of legislative terms across disparate documents. The 
Akoma Ntoso metadata format is also designed to be extensible (see [Vitali, 1997]). 
2.4.2.1. FRBR00 and Legal Resources 
 [Lima et al. 2008] gives the following operational definitions of the main legal concepts: 
 Norm, a rule of conduct issued by a competent authority and prescribing or regulating 
behavior among individuals and within society. Its form of expression may be the 
written or the spoken word, but it may also be visual or be based on usage and custom. 
 Normative provision, any group of words or piece of writing expressing a norm or 
series of norms. 
 Normative document or act, an officially published, legislative, written document 
through which a competent authority brings a norm into being. 
 Legal system, a set of norms belonging by some criterion to a single system and related 
to one another in different ways, as by hierarchy (one norm having a higher or lower 
standing than another), generality (more specific or more general), time (issued before 
or after another norm), and modification (one norm modifying the other norm or getting 
modified by it). 
 Normative system, the same legal system viewed in a diachronic perspective: its 
changes over time can be represented in its evolution as a series of snapshots or film-
stills in succession. The sequence in the time of legal systems so captured called the 
normative system. [Palmirani 2005] 
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Akoma Ntoso classifies legal resources following the FRBR00 model. In the model, represented 
in figure 2.7 from [Palmirani 2005], an original document (F4 Manifestation Singleton) is 
created through the “F27 Work Conception” and “F28 Expression Creation” events. The “F32 
Carrier Production” event forms a “F19 Publication Work” which, in turn, produces various 
items. Following is a list of classes and instances which can be identified in a signed official 
normative document (the original signed act): 
 Manifestation singleton: the original signed document as a physical object that carries 
an instance of Self Contained Expression; 
 Individual work: the concepts associated with the signed act; 
 Self-contained expression: the normative provision resulting from the legislative 
process. 
Classes and instances which can be identified on a page of an official publication are classified 
as follows, distinguishing between the single entities (the result of the industrial process) and 
the relations to abstract legal resources: 
 Item: the Official Gazette issue (physical object); 
 Manifestation product type: the publication product type with a given title, date and 
author; 
 Serial work: the periodical with a given title; 
 Publication work: the concepts associated with the official publication with a given 
date and author; 
Fig. 2.7 – Work Conception, Expression Creation and Carrier Production Events in [Palmirani 2005] 
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 Publication expression: complete layout and content provided by a publisher; 
 Self-contained expression: the normative provisions published; 
 Individual work: the concepts associated with the published acts. 
In 5.3.2. it is shown how the same model is used to 
represent the lifecycle of a legal norm.  
2.4.2.2. Judgement Structure 
The judgement in Akoma Ntoso is a particular type of 
document modelling for detecting the main significant 
parts of the precedent document: header for capturing the 
main information (parties, coram, neutral citation, 
document numbers and identification information); body 
for representing the main part of the judgement, including 
the decision; conclusion for detecting the signatures.  
 The body is divided into four main blocks: 
 The introduction, where usually (especially in common law decisions) the story of the 
trial is introduced; 
 The background, dedicated to the description of the facts;  
 The motivation, where the judge introduces the arguments supporting his decision; 
 The decision, where the judge gives the final outcome. 
This division is fundamental for detecting facts and factors from the background: in the 
motivation, to detect arguments and counterarguments; in the decision, to detect the conclusion 
of the legal argumentation process. Those qualified fragments of text should be annotated by 
legal experts with the help of a tool for linking text, metadata and ontology classes (see 5.2.1.). 
2.4.2.3. Metadata of judgements 
The metadata of the judgements are divided in different blocks: 
 Descriptive metadata, tracking general data of the judgement such as the date of 
publication, the number of the case, the natural citation, the names of the judges, the 
jurisdiction, the level of the judgement, the nature of the case, the type of court, the 
parties, the lawyers, and so on; 
 Classification metadata, concerning the matter of the case, together with the reportable 
or not reportable case-base. These metadata represent a filtering station of reportable 
judgements, following the common law tradition that underlines the cases producing a 
new rule of law; 
 Lifecycle metadata, containing the history of the document, which is useful for 
versioning; 




 Workflow metadata, tracking each step of of the document production process. Since 
multi-annotation of the same fragment of text is allowed, each actor in the workflow 
chain can annotate the document with his/her specific metadata; 
 Reference metadata, remarking all documents citing/cited by the judgement or links all 
documents which are logically connected to the judgement; 
 Semantic metadata, the annotation and classification of the text under the legal point of 
view, particularly relevant in the decision’s groundings; 
 Ontology metadata, a definition of criteria to link the fragment of text to general classes 
of the computational ontology. 
Using these metadata it is possible to 
annotate very specific knowledge. In the 
following fragment of text, it is necessary 
to capture the role of each person 
involved in the trial: in the example of 
Figure 2.10, Mr. Du Plessis is a lawyer, 
with the role of advocate of the appellant, 
instructed by the Kruger Inc. It is possible 
to annotate these information with XML 
to allow complex queries such as: “give 
me all the judgements where Du Plessis is 
playing the role of instructor of the 
appellant on behalf of a third Inc. company”. 
2.4.2.4. Qualification of the citations in the judgement 
Fig. 2.10 – Actor qualification. 
Fig. 2.9 – Judgment Body sub-elements in Akoma Ntoso 
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 Each judgement citation can be qualified using Shepard’s method that permits to understand 
which references are in favor of the current judgement argumentation and which are not. The 
list of qualifications includes:  
 Support, meaning that the cited judgement supports the current decision;  
 IsAnalogTo, meaning that the current case-law is analogue to a cited precedent;  
 Distinguished, meaning that the current precedent is distinguished from the cited case-
law; 
 Overrules, particularly important since it detects the case-law whose rule of law the 
judge intends to overrule (through a citation in the judgement’s interpretation). 
This qualification mechanism helps to reinforce the main arguments used by the judge to 
provide evidences and parameters (e.g. returning a list of the cited case-law with the role played 
in the argumentation).  
2.4.2.5. Rule of law, stare decisis and ratio decidendi, obiter dicta 
One of the main tasks in common law judgements is to 
define a rule of law fixing the pattern for the similar 
future cases. This monotonic mechanism is called stare 
decisis and guarantees the equal application of justice to 
comparable cases. The stare decisis is applied only to a 
particular and relevant part of the decision called ratio 
decidendi, excluding accessories arguments called obiter 
dicta. The research conducted on the ontology 
framework (see Chapter 3) reveals the importance of 
marking up those relevant and meaningful parts of the 
text. By marking up the ratio decidendi text and using 
this information in combination with the Shepard's 
qualification method for cited cases-law, it is possible to 
provide richer information to the argumentation engine 
devoted to the legal reasoning. For these reasons the 
present research will define new metadata in the analysis 
block of Akoma Ntoso in order to qualify also the ratio decidendi. 
2.4.3. Foundational ontologies 
2.4.3.1. Functional Ontology of Law (FOLaw) 
Several ontologies for the legal domains were developed in the last two decades. Core 
ontologies were conceived in the mid-90s to consolidate the insights acquired in modelling legal 
domain knowledge and to provide a conceptual framework for developing ontologies. Among 
the first projects in that direction is the “Functional Ontology of Law (FOLaw, [Valente 1995]). 




FOLaw represents a legal-sociological view rather than a perspective from the law itself, and 
therefore it lacks the abstract, core concepts that make up law. Being a functional ontology, the 
roles that the legal system plays in society are taken as point of departure. FOLaw identifies the 
dependencies between the types of knowledge, which indicate the roles that types of knowledge 
play in the reasoning. The following six types of knowledge are distinguished in [Breukers 
2004] and represented in Figure 2.12. 
 Normative knowledge, containing deontic operators decompiled into a binary value; 
 Meta-legal knowledge, used to solve conflicts between individually applicable norms; 
 World knowledge, acting as a filter between the legal system and the actual events that 
happen in some jurisdiction, and including common sense-terms used to describe them 
and the causal connections between them. 
 Responsibility knowledge, used to assign or to limit the responsibility of an agent over 
a given (disallowed) state of affairs; 
 Reactive knowledge, specifying which reward or sanction should be taken; 
 Creative knowledge, used to represent the constitutive powers of the legislator. 
The framework of FOLaw was used as a lead for research on responsibility [Lehmann 2003], as 
the basis for practical applications and architectures for legal reasoning such as ON-LINE 
[Valente et al. 1999], and in the CLIME project aimed a t the construction of a legal information 
server [Winkels et al. 2002]. These applications show that FOLaw is more a reasoning structure 
that model the way legal cases are argued for, rather than an ontology. Its dependencies bring, in 
fact, similarities to inference structures: representations of problem solving methods that specify 
the problem decomposition and its dependencies (see [Breuker and Van De Velde 1994] and 
[Schreiber et al. 2000]). 
Figure 2.12: FOLaw, a functional ontology for law as represented in [Breukers, 2004]. 
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2.4.3.2. Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) 
As its name suggests, the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering 
(DOLCE) has a clear cognitive focus, in the sense that it aims at capturing the ontological 
categories underlying natural language and common sense. The ontology is not committed to a 
metaphysics about the intrinsic nature of the world: its categories are rather thought of as 
cognitive artifacts ultimately depending on human perception, cultural imprints and social 
conventions (a sort of “cognitive” metaphysics, similar to Searle’s notion of “deep background” 
[Searle 1983], which represents the set of skills, tendencies and habits shared by humans 
because of their peculiar biological make up, and their evolved ability to interact with their 
ecological niches). As a consequence, the categories of DOLCE do not claim any special 
robustness against the state of the art in scientific knowledge: they are just descriptive notions 
that assist in making explicit conceptualizations which were already formed, without providing 
a prescriptive framework to conceptualize entities. DOLCE is an ontology of particulars, in the 
sense that its domain of discourse is restricted to entities which have no instances. Of course, 
universals (such as predicates and properties) do appear in the ontology, insofar they are used to 
organize and characterize them: simply, since they are not in the domain of discourse, they are 
not themselves subject to being organized and characterized (i.e. through metaproperties). 
An important choice made in DOLCE is the so-called multiplicative approach: entities that are 
different (because they are ascribed incompatible essential properties ) can be co-located in the 
same space-time. The example presented in [Masolo et al. 2002] is that of the vase and the 
amount of clay: necessarily, the vase does not survive a radical change in shape or topology, 
while, necessarily, the amount of clay does. Therefore the two things must be different, yet co-
located. 
The taxonomy of the basic categories of particulars assumed in DOLCE is depicted in Figure 
2.13. They are considered as rigid properties, according to the OntoClean methodology 
[Guarino and Welty 2002] that stresses the importance of focusing on these properties first. 
Fig. 2.13: Taxonomy of DOLCE basic categories from[Masolo et al. 2002]. 
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DOLCE is based on a fundamental distinction between endurants and perdurants, based on their 
behavior in time: 
 Endurants are wholly present (i.e., all their proper parts are present) at any time they 
are present. Endurants can “genuinely” change in time, in the sense that the very same 
endurant as a whole can have incompatible properties at different times; 
 Perdurants, instead, extend in time by accumulating different temporal parts so that, at 
any time they are present, they are only partially present, in the sense that some of their 
proper temporal parts (e.g., their previous or future phases) may be not present. 
Perdurants cannot change in time in a strict sense, since none of their parts keeps its 
identity in time. 
In DOLCE, the main relation between endurants and perdurants is that of participation: an 
endurant “lives” in time by participating in some perdurant(s). For example, a person, which is 
an endurant, may participate in a discussion, which is a perdurant. A person’s life is also a 
perdurant, in which a person participates throughout its all duration.  
In the DOLCE ontology, space and time locations are considered as individual qualities like 
colors, weights, etc. Their corresponding sensorial regions are called spatial (temporal) regions. 
For example, the spatial location of a physical object belongs to the quality type space, and its 
sensorial region is in the geometric space. This allows an approach that remains neutral about 
the properties of the geometric/temporal space adopted: for instance, one is free to adopt linear, 
branching, or even circular time.  
Two kinds of quality inherence are distinguished in DOLCE: direct and indirect inherence. The 
main reason for this choice comes from the symmetric behavior of perdurants and endurants 
with respect to their temporal and spatial locations: perdurants have a well-defined temporal 
location, while their spatial location seems to come indirectly from the spatial location of their 
participants; vice versa, most endurants have a clear spatial location, while their temporal 
location comes indirectly from the that of the perdurants they participate in.  
According to the general methodology introduced in [Gangemi et al. 2001], the DOLCE 
backbone properties rely on a set of basic primitive relations, suitable to characterize the 
ontological commitments as neutrally as possible. According to [Masolo 2002], these relations 
should be: 
 General enough to be applied to multiple domains; 
 Such that they do not rest on questionable ontological assumptions about the 
ontological nature of their arguments; 
 Sufficiently intuitive and well-studied in the philosophical literature; 
 Hold as soon as their relata are given, without mediating additional entities. 
Following are the axioms constraining the arguments of primitive relations; 
 Parthood: x is part of y; 
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 Temporary Parthood: x is part of y during t; 
 Constitution: x constitutes y during t; 
 Participation: x participates in y during t; 
 Quality: x is a quality of y; 
 Sensioral Region: x is the sensorial region of y (during t). 
2.4.4. Core Ontologies 
2.4.4.1. LRI-Core 
LRI-Core is a common sense-based foundational ontology that focus around six major 
categories introduced in [Breuker and Hoekstra 2004]:  
 Physical concepts, divided between objects and processes; 
 Mental concepts, also divided between objects and processes; 
 Roles, representing notions about social behavior; 
 Abstract concepts, for simple proto-mathematicfal ideas; 
Figure 2.14: LRI-Core layers: foundational and legal core share anchors (high level concepts 
typical for law) in [Breuker and Hoekstra 2004]. 
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 Occurrences, which are not by themselves part of the ontology but which can be talked 
about through specific terms. 
Figure 2.14 shows the layered structure of LRI-Core which contains two levels, the most 
abstract being a “shallow”, foundational ontology that covers concepts from physical, abstract, 
mental worlds and roles. Those properties are inherited by the core ontology, which contains 
more specific classification of the various worlds. In Figure 2.14 a subdivision of the 
foundational classes in the legal core ontology is shown. The last layer is the domain ontology, 
containing the specific norms and other entities involved. 
LRI-Core constituted an important advancement in multi-layer ontology modelling for the legal 
domain. Its insights constitute the basis for successive projects such as LKIF (see 2.4.5.) 
2.4.4.2. Core Legal Ontology (CLO) 
The Core Legal Ontology [Gangemi et al. 2004] is developed on top of DOLCE and 
Descriptions and Situations ontologies [Gangemi and Mika 2003] within the DOLCE+ library. 
It has been used to support the definition of legal domain ontologies [Sagri et al. 2004], and of a 
juridical wordnet [Sagri 2003]. Its two pillars are the stratification and reification principles: 
 According to the stratification principle, CLO classifies and relates the heterogeneous 
entities in the legal domain distinguishing between the physical, cognitive, social, and 
legal worlds (or layers); 
 According to the reification principle, CLO represents intensional specifications like 
norms, contracts, subjects, and normative texts in a specific domain through their 
extensional realizations like cases, contract executions, agents, physical documents. 
An important implication of the reification principle is that the link between the specification 
and the realization is achieved through two patterns, called Description and Situation: 
 The Description pattern models the structure of an intensional specification, as 
composed of its concepts and their internal dependencies. For example, the structure of 
a norm (a legal description) employs that pattern.  
 The Situation pattern models the matching between a description and its extensional 
realization, which can be described as the configuration of a set of entities according to 
the structure of a description.  
A legal application of these patterns is contained in [Gangemi 2007] and takes as an example 
the dependencies among the rules in a contract, when they can be matched to a legal case (a 
legal situation or fact) or a contract execution. The matching is typically performed when 
checking if each entity in a legal fact is compliant to a concept in a legal description. As will be 
seen in Chapter 3, the reification principle has been taken into consideration in the present 
research. 
2.4.5. The legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) 
The Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) is an XML application developed in the 
European Estrella project (see [Hoekstra et al. 2007, Boer et al. 2008]) with the goal of 
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establishing an open standard for exchanging formal models of the law, suitable for use in legal 
knowledge-based systems. The Estrella consortium includes a number of companies 
experienced in building legal decision support systems, academic partners from the AI & Law 
ﬁeld, and some public bodies. LKIF aims at encoding in XML four kinds of legal knowledge: 
arguments, rules, ontologies and cases. The application is intended to serve two main purposes:  
 As a reusable and extensible core ontology, application programmer interface (API), 
and inference engine speciﬁcation for legal decision support systems, knowledge 
management systems, and argumentation support systems; 
  As an interchange format for existing (proprietary) legal knowledge representation 
languages.  
The requirements for LKIF are derived from several sources:  
 A survey of research on computational models of legal reasoning and argumentation, 
from the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law;  
 An analysis of the business requirements articulated by the participating vendors, and 
from the logical reconstructions of the logics used by these vendors;  
 Feedback and comments by the participating user organisations and members of the 
observatory board.  
LKIF is a knowledge representation language for legal arguments, rules, terminological axioms, 
and cases. It can be characterized as an ontology of law for the Semantic Web, and as a 
knowledge representation language speciﬁcally suitable for legal reasoning in its own right. On 
the language level LKIF combines existing Semantic Web technology (RDF and OWL) – and a 
new LKIF-Rules language extending RDF and OWL for dealing with presumptive inferences. 
The Rules language has an argumentation-theoretic semantics: its semantics is deﬁned in terms 
of argumentation schemes. 
2.4.5.1. The LKIF Ontology 
The LKIF ontology is a standard OWL ontology, based on Description Logic (DL), and can be 
also used separately from the LKIF-Rules in Semantic Web applications. The main purpose of 
the ontology is to constrain the use of terminology in LKIF applications, and the ontology is 
intended to be the part of the knowledge representation to be reused outside its original context, 
although the applicability of this doctrine in law generates a lot of discussion: as a fact, issues of 
terminology often become subject of legal argument. Important in legal knowledge 
representation are the concepts of obligation and permission. The deontic notions are 
underconstrained to accommodate diﬀerences of opinion on their interpretation, and play a 
considerably less central role in LKIF than in legal knowledge representation in general.  
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The LKIF ontology explcitly distinguishes physical, mental, social, and abstract world, and 
underlines the role of conventional metaphors based on the physical world in the construction of 
the mental, social, and abstract world. The strong focus of the LKIF ontology towards 
intentional entities is much diﬀerent from metaphysically inclined top ontologies such as SUMO 
(see [Niles, Pease, 2001]), in which intention plays a less central role, but shows similarities 
with for instance the DOLCE ontology (see 2.4.3.2.) and the distinction set in [Dennett, 1989] 
between intentional, design and physical stance . The intentional stance introduces a model of 
the mind to account for changes brought about by agents. The agent acts, i.e. he initiates 
processes – physical, social, or mental – that bring about changes that are intended. From here it 
is only a small step to recognizing that the agent can also perform physical “formal” acts (e.g. 
signing something) to eﬀect institutional change by communicating to others one’s intention to 
make that change. This discourse can be strictly related to Searle’s performative (see 1.1.9.). In 
DOLCE the distinction between agentive and non-agentive, which has a similar impact, is 
relatively prominent. The main criticism of DOLCE is that it is rather a representation of the 
terms used for describing knowledge, than a representation of knowledge itself. 
One usage of LKIF is to use it as a basis for domain-specific ontologies. Note that the ontology 
consists of terminological axioms: all claims can be considered defeasible in law, but that the 
proposition represented by the claim terminologically entails some other proposition is not. An 
ontology is not falsiﬁable: it is an agreement about use of terminology. Because the OWL 
axioms are in principle not falsiﬁable they should be used with due care (i.e. to avoid giving rise 
to inconsistencies). 
2.4.6. Rule languages  




Prolog is a general purpose logic programming language associated with artificial intelligence 
and computational linguistics. The language was first conceived by Alain Colmerauer in 
Marseille in the early 1970s [Colmerauer et al. 1972]. Its roots are in first-order logic, and 
unlike many other programming languages, Prolog is declarative: the program logic is 
expressed in terms of relations, represented as facts and rules. Prolog programs describe 
relations, defined by means of clauses, restricted to Horn clauses. Hence there are two types of 
clauses: facts (clauses without bodies) and rules (clauses with body). Execution of a Prolog 
program is initiated by the user's posting of a single goal, called the query. Logically, the Prolog 
engine tries to find a resolution refutation of the negated query. The resolution method used by 
Prolog is called SLD resolution. 
Besides being not a project in the legal field, it is impossible not to cite Prolog when talking 
about rules languages as it constitutes the first programming language based on rules, therefore 
the first argumentation framework ever developed in ITs. Also for this reason, in the present 
thesis this language will be recalled every now and then by other computational architectures. 
2.4.6.2. LKIF Rules 
LKIF Rules semantics is based on the notion of defeasible rules as a type of argumentation 
scheme, particularly an argumentation scheme for each conclusion of the rule. Applying an 
LKIF rule means instantiating an LKIF argument from one of these schemes. 
Argumentation schemes generalize the concept of an inference rule to cover plausible but non-
deductive forms of argument. The semantics of LKIF rules , as specified by [Gordon 2008], is 
based on concepts also found in Carneades (see 4.2.). The issue of “plausible inference” is 
obviously relevant to any domain of knowledge, but it is particularly important in law because 
of the role played by explicit dialectical considerations in legal procedure. Argumentation 
schemes can also be used to fill the gap between a prima facie interpretation of the law, 
ignoring dialectical and procedural considerations, and the ways it is operationalised in speciﬁc 
administrative, and adversarial settings. In this case the same text would map to diﬀerent 
interpretations in the form of LKIF rules, possibly in addition to a terminological interpretation. 
The concept of burden of proof in an adversarial setting provides good examples: for instance, 
anyone who kills a man is guilty of murder, unless he proves that he was acting for self-defense. 
Logically speaking the unless could be easily replaced with a (but) not, and turned into a 
terminological axiom, but by doing so you fail to take account of implied burden of proof: it is 
up to the plaintiﬀ to argue that the killing was done by the defendant, and up to the defendant to 
argue it was made in self-defense. It is valid to argue that a man committed a murder because he 
killed another man, even if the argument may be defeated by arguments made by the 
counterparty. This aspect of burden of proof will be examined in 4.2.1.2. 
The specification of the LKIF-Rules language can be found in [Boer et al. 2007]. In the present 
thesis, rules in LKIF-Rules will be presented mostly in XML source code (a clear yet verbose 
language with nested tags containing the name of the element: for example, individual constants 
are introduced with <rel>, individual variables with <var>, connectives with <and>, <or>, 




AI&Law systems (such as legal argumentation systems) should rely on open and shared 
standards. With that in mind, in the early 2000s the research community joined the efforts 
towards the definition of a standard for the syntax of legal rule extending LKIF-Rules with a 
modelling of temporal parameters, giving birth to the LKIF++ language [Palmirani et al. 
2011c]. Soon realizing that a standard in syntactic representation of norms would require a 
shared rule language to be built from scratch, the OASIS consortium started the development of 
a brand new syntax for legal rules, explicitly relying on the acquired standards in the underlying 
layers of the Semantic Web cake.  
A Rule Markup Language (RuleML) [Boley 2006] is a modular, interchangeable rule 
specification standard to express both forward (bottom-up) and backward (top-down) rules for 
deduction, reaction, rewriting, and further inferential-transformational tasks. It is defined by the 
Rule Markup Initiative [Boley and Tabet 2000], an open network formed to develop a canonical 
Web language for rule serialization using XML and for transformation from different rule 
standards/systems. The language family of RuleML covers the entire rule spectrum, from 
derivation rules to reaction rules including rule-based event processing and messaging, as well 
as verification and transformation rules. 
LegalRuleML [Palmirani et al. 2011c] is an extension of RuleML, an XML based language for 
the representation of legal rules using formal semantics described in [Lee & Sohn 2003]. 
LegalRuleML introduces features which are fundamental for modelling legal rules:  
 Isomorphism; 
 Defeasible logics; 
 Jurisdiction and authority;  
 Legal temporal parameters; 
 Legal deontic operators; 
 Qualifications;  
 Semantic of negation; 
 Behaviors.  
The building blocks of Derivation RuleML are:  
 Predicates are n-ary relations introduced by an <atom> element in RuleML. The main 
terms within an atom are variables <var> to be instantiated by values when the rules 
are applied, individual constants <ind>, data values <data>, and complex expressions 
<expr>. Derivation Rules are defined by an <implies> element which consists of a 
body part (<body>) with one or more atomicconditions connected via <and> or <or>, 
possibly negated by <neg> (for classical negation) or <naf> (for negation as failure), 
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and of a conclusion part (<head>) that is implied by the body, where rule application 
can be in a forward or backward manner; 
 Facts are stated as atoms deemed to be true, also introduced through the <atom> 
element; 
 Queries, introduced with <query>, can be proven backward as top-down goals or 
forward via bottom-up processing, where several goals may be connected within a 
query, possibly negated. 
Besides facts, derivation rules, and queries, RuleML defines further rule types such as integrity 
constraints and transformation rules. The language also allows including other elements and 
statements compliant with external ontologies. LegalRuleML will be thoroughly presented - and 
its implementation in the present research showed - in 4.5. 
2.4.6.4. Reaction RuleML  
Rules which trigger actions as a response to the detection of events have been extensively 
studied since the 1990s. Stemming from the early days of programming language where system 
events were used for interrupt and exception handling, active event-driven rules have received 
great attention in different areas such as active databases, real-time applications and system, 
network management tools and publish-subscribe systems [Paschke 2007].  
Global reaction rules (see [Paschke et al. 2007]) typically follow the Event-Condition-Action 
(ECA) paradigm: "on Event and Condition do Action". These three terms are intended in 
[Dittrich et al. 1995] as having the following meaning: 
 The event part specifies the signal that triggers the invocation of the rule; 
 The condition part is a logical test that, if satisfied or evaluates to true, causes the 
action to be carried out; 
 The action part consists of updates or invocations on the local data. 
A global reaction rule is formalized as an extended ECA rule, represented in the KB as a 6-ary 
fact including the following elements: time, event, condition, action, post condition, else. 
 The time part of an ECA rule defines a pre-condition (an explicitly stated temporal 
event defining a validity time or event processing window) which specifies a specific 
point or window of time at which the ECA rule should be processed by the ECA 
processor; 
 Event, condition and action have the same role as in normal ECA rules; 
 The post-condition is evaluated after the action has been executed. It might be used to 
prevent backtracking from different variable bindings via cuts or it might be used to 
apply post-conditional integrity and verification/validation tests in order to safeguard 
transactional knowledge updates in ECA rules; 
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 The else part defines an alternative action which is executed in case the ECA rule could 
not be completely executed. 
Reaction RuleML [Paschke et al. 2006] encodes reaction rules as an XML-serialized 
sublanguage of RuleML: it adds various kinds of production, action, reaction, and KR 
temporal/event/action logic rules as well as (complex) event/action messages. The building 
blocks of Reaction RuleML are:  
 One general reaction rule form that can be specialized by the selection of the 
constituent subparts, i.e. Condition-Action rules (production rules), Event-Action rules 
(trigger rules), Event-Condition-Action rules; 
 Three execution styles (default value is reasoning): 
o Active: 'actively' polls/detects occurred events in global ECA style, e.g. by a 
ping on a service/system or a query on an internal or external event database; 
o Messaging: waits for incoming complex event message (inbound) and sends 
messages (outbound) as actions; 
o Reasoning: logical reasoning as e.g., in logic programming (derivation rules) 
and KR formalisms such as event/action/transition logics (as e.g. in Event 
Calculus, Situation Calculus, TAL formalizations); 
 Weak and strong evaluation/execution semantics interpretations which are used to 
manage the "justification lifecycle" of local inner reaction rules in the 
derivation/execution process of the outer rules; 
 An optional object identifier; 
 An optional metadata label with i.e.. metadata authoring information; 
 An optional set of qualifications (i.e. a validity value, fuzzy value, a defeasible priority 
value, etc.); 
 A definition for inbound or outbound event messages. 
A reaction rule might apply globally or be locally nested within other reaction or derivation 
rules. The most general syntax of a reaction RuleML
11
 is the following: 
<Rule style="active" evaluation="strong"> 
 <label> <!-- meta data --> </label> 
 <scope> <!-- general scope of rule --> </scope> 
 <qualification> <!-- qualifications --> </qualification> 
                                                     
11
 See Reaction RuleML, http://ruleml.org/reaction/. 
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 <oid> <!-- object identifier --> </oid> 
 <on> <!-- event --> </on> 
 <if> <!-- condition --> </if> 
 <then> <!-- conclusion --> </then> 
 <do> <!-- action --> </do> 
 <after> <!-- postcondition --> </after> 
 <else> <!-- else conclusion --> </else> 
 <elseDo> <!-- else/alternative action --> </elseDo> 
 <elseAfter> <!-- else postcondition --> </elseAfter> 
</Rule> 
2.4.7. The boundary between Ontology and Rules 
LKIF rules are considerably more expressive than OWL, in particular with respect to the use of 
variables. In some cases users will inevitably resort to a rule even where a terminological axiom 
was intended. This makes it hard to maintain that there is any clear conceptual distinction, as 
there are independent technical reasons to make something a rule instead of a terminological 
statement.  
LKIF has been designed to be suﬃciently expressive to support the isomorphic modelling 
[Bench-Capon and Coenen, 1992] of legislation, at a very high level, in order to facilitate the 
development, validation and maintenance of knowledge bases by legal experts. The rule 
language is more expressive than formulas of ﬁrst-order logic, let alone subsets of ﬁrst-order 
logic, such as Horn clause logic or description logic, which have been developed due to 
interesting computational properties, such as (semi-)decidability or even tractability (see 
1.2.2.4.). LKIF has instead been designed to optimize expressiveness for the legal domain, not 
computational eﬃciency. It is designed for use in interactive systems which help users to 
construct theories and arguments, as well as traditional expert systems, which interactively 
acquire facts and deduce propositions from these facts by applying rules. For argument 
construction tasks, the expressivity of the knowledge representation language is more important 
than the computational properties of the inference relation, since users are responsible for 
controlling the search for arguments. For traditional expert system, the computational properties 
of the inference relation may be more important, since the inference engine is expected to fully 
automatically derive logical conclusions from the facts input by the user. LKIF has been 
designed to be expressive enough for both kinds of systems, but when using LKIF for 
traditional expert systems, it is necessary to use a subset of LKIF which can be handled by 
inference engines with the desired computational properties. 
The diﬀerence in expressiveness is unavoidable: LKIF needs more, and OWL cannot be much 
more expressive without losing its usefulness as a Semantic Web integrative technology. For 
OWL, real-time consistency checking is an important design issue. For the LKIF Rules, instead, 
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tractability is much less of an issue, considering its semantics deﬁnition. In practical terms the 
implementer is free to draw the boundary between ontology and rules wherever he likes. It is 
possible to exclusively use rules, but the price to be paid is in its potential for reuse: alignment 
of ontologies is generally considered to be the ﬁrst step to integration of knowledge bases, and 
by using rules one – ﬁrstly – signals that the information is considered to be domain-specific by 
its author, and secondly one loses subsumption as an organizing principle. On the other hand, 
putting obviously defeasible reasoning policies in the ontology will eventually cause 
inconsistencies, and will – considering OWL’s role as a Semantic Web integrative technology – 
generally result in the ontology, and any rules dependent on it, not being used.  
Under a certain perspective, this distinction represents different entrenchment degrees. Even if 
one takes the position that in the end everything is defeasible, one will usually want to impose 
some entrenchment ordering so that in the case of conﬂict some things give way more easily 
than others. This position is taken by [Boer, 2000], who notes the importance to legal 
knowledge engineering of a rhetorical hierarchy in legal argumentation, to the eﬀect that one 
should prioritize technical arguments over normative arguments, normative arguments over 
epistemological arguments, and epistemological arguments over ontological arguments. Also 
outside the legal ﬁeld, raising ontological issues (“Oh, that depends on what you mean with X”) 
in an intellectual discussion that started out with a technical disagreement is generally 
interpreted as a sign of weakness of one’s position. The rules versus ontology distinction can be 
used to model a number of phenomena that knowledge engineers encounter. In these cases they 
may want to impose such an entrenchment by prioritizing stronger forms of argument to weaker 
ones: “classical not” versus a negation as failure, not knowing whether something is the case 
versus knowing something is not the case, constitutive rules versus essential rules of an 
institution, and so on. Relations between these distinctions have been explored, and some have 
been shown to be special cases or alternative formulations of each other: for example, defeasible 
and constitutive rules can be represented as argumentation schemes (see [Governatori 2011]; 
negation as failure, unless, and assuming can be represented as autoepistemic expressions, as 
discussed in [Motik 2006]; essential rules can be represented as terminological axioms. For a 
proposed solution on this central issue on knowledge representation see section 4.4.2. 
 Judicial Reasoning in the Semantic Web  2.5.
The development of the Semantic Web technologies in the last 10 years introduced brand new 
possibilities in terms of knowledge representation and automatic processing. As it has been 
already described, specific projects exploited these technologies to improve creation, workflow 
and management of different kinds of legal resources. Nevertheless, these technologies could 
not allow a complete support for legal reasoning, intended as a speculation on facts and rules 
that includes complex logic operations such as subsumption, analogy, distinction. Under this 
point of view, the Artificial Intelligence technologies introduced for the Semantic Web could do 
nothing more for lawyers than deduce the consequences from a precisely stated set of facts and 
legal rules. This makes many lawyers sceptical about the usefulness of such technologies, since 
this mechanical approach seems to leave out most of what is important in legal reasoning. To 
them, a case does not appear as a set of facts, but rather as a story told by a client, a story that 
has to be interpreted by the lawyer in order to identify the framework of applicable law. 
Depending on the interpretation and thus on the framework applied, several critical questions 
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can be applied to the story, in order to evaluate the importance of single factors and to qualify 
that story. In a legal claim, two incompatible stories concerning the same facts are examined in 
order to compare interpretations, factors and applicable law frameworks. This is true – even if to 
different extents – both for Civil Law and Common Law legal systems.  
As described in 1.4.2., several projects tried to properly represent judicial reasoning with ITs, 
although outside of the Semantic Web. The main objective of the present thesis is to adapt the 
existing Semantic Web technologies to include legal argumentation, and to provide a set of 








An Ontology Set Representing Judicial Decisions 
 
 
“Data is a precious thing and will last longer than the systems themselves.” 
– Tim Berners-Lee. 
 
“I see, these books are probably law books, and it is an essential part of the justice 
dispensed here that you should be condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance.”  
- Franz Kafka, The Trial. 
 
 The Judicial Framework 3.1.
The goal of the present research is to define a Semantic Web framework for precedent 
modelling, by using knowledge extracted from text, metadata, and rules [Bench-Capon 2009], 
while maintaining a strong text-to-knowledge morphism between legal text and legal concepts, 
in order to fill the gap between legal document and its semantics [Palmirani and Brighi 2010]. 
The input to the framework includes metadata associated with judicial concepts, and an 
ontology library representing the structure of case-law.  
The research relies on the previous efforts of the community in the field of legal knowledge 
representation [Mommers 2010] and rule interchange for applications in the legal domain 
[Gordon et al. 2009]. The issue of implementing logics to represent judicial interpretation has 
already been faced in [Boella et al. 2010], albeit only for the purposes of a sample case. The aim 
of the present research is to apply these theories to a set of real legal documents, stressing the 
OWL axioms definitions as much as possible in order to enable them to provide a semantically 
powerful representation of the legal document and a solid ground for an argumentation system 
using a defeasible subset of predicate logics. 
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The ontology library is the cornerstone for a semantic tool that enriches the XML mark-up of 
precedents (the metadata), and supports legal reasoning. It appears that some new features of 
OWL2 unlock useful reasoning features for legal knowledge, especially if combined with 
defeasible rules. The main task is thus to formalize legal concepts and argumentation patterns 
contained in a judgement, with the following requirement: to check, validate and reuse the 
discourse of a judge - and the argumentation he produces - as expressed by judicial text.  
In order to achieve this, four different models that make use of standard languages from the 
Semantic Web layer cake (Figure 3.1) have been used: 
a. a document metadata structure, modelling the main parts of a judgement, and 
creating a bridge between a text and its semantic annotations of legal concepts; 
b. a legal core ontology, modelling abstract legal concepts and institutions contained in a 
rule of law [Ceci and Palmirani 2012]; 
c. a legal domain ontology, modelling the main legal concepts in a specific domain 
concerned by case-law (e.g. contracts, e-commerce services, tort law, etc.); 
d. an argumentation system [Ceci and Gordon 2012], modelling the structure of 
argumentation (arguments, counterarguments, premises, conclusions, rebuttals, proof 
standards, argument schemes, etc.). 
The present chapter introduces the structure of the core and domain ontologies – points b. and c. 
- which have been designed to organize the metadata annotating the text of judicial decisions, 
and to infer relevant knowledge about precedents.  
The metadata structure and the argumentation system are not described in this work: the 
metadata structure relies on the Akoma Ntoso standard (see 2.4.2.), while multiple solutions are 
being tested for building argumentation 
out of the ontology library: an 
application of the ontology library to 
the Carneades Argumentation System is 
described in Chapter 4, while future 
research could focus on SPINdle (see 
6.2.) and a Drools application currently 
under development (see 6.3.2.).Section 
3.2. presents the requirements and the 
methods for the design of the ontology 
library, and its features. Section 3.3. 
describes the application of the 
ontology library to judicial 
interpretation knowledge. In section 
3.4., the method is exemplified with reference to a sample of Italian case law. Section 3.5. 
presents an evaluation of the ontology, section 3.6. discusses related work either in legal 
ontology or legal reasoning fields, and section 3.7. discusses some issues of the proposed 
solution. 
Fig. 3.1 – Tim Berners Lee's Semantic Web layer cake, 
adapted to the legal domain in [Sartor 2009]. 
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3.1.1. Tasks and applications 
The aim of the research described in the present chapter was to apply state-of-the-art techniques 
in ontology design and DL reasoning to knowledge from legal documents, stressing OWL2 
axiomatization capabilities in order to provide an expressive representation of judicial 
documents, and a solid ground for an argumentation system using a defeasible subset of 
predicate logics. 
Modelling judicial knowledge involves the representation of situations where strict deductive 
logic is not sufficient to reproduce the legal reasoning as performed by a judge. In particular, 
defeasible logics [Governatori and Rotolo 2004] seem needed to represent the legal rules 
underlying judicial reasoning. For example, many norms concerning contracts are not 
mandatory: they could be overruled by a different legal discipline through specific agreements 
between the parties. The problem of representing "defeasible" rules, in fact, is a core problem in 
legal knowledge representation.  
On the other hand, argumentation theories (including the dialogue model of adjudication by 
[Prakken 2008], and argumentation schemes by [Gordon and Walton 2009]) introduce tools that 
are fundamental to perform effective reasoning on legal issues. This perspective adopts a 
procedural view on argumentation, which is necessary in order to properly represent those 
processes in an argument graph.  
The purpose of the ontology presented in this article is however limited to enrich the metadata 
annotating a legal document by performing shallow reasoning on the knowledge base, and thus 
preparing it for additional reasoning performed by tools based on deontic defeasible logics and 
argumentation schemes. The ontology library has to satisfy the following functional 
requirements: 
 Text-to-knowledge morphism: the aim is to design the knowledge that can be 
extracted from a a (textual) judicial decision, or a fragment of it, as a module in an 
ontology library, so that each module constitutes a particular morphism of the legal 
meaning expressed by that text [Palmirani et al. 2009]; 
 Distinction between document layers: the ontology must clearly distinguish between 
the medium and expression (the legal text), its meaning (the legal concepts and rules 
contained in the text), and the entities referred by the text. In principle, different (and 
even inconsistent) legal meanings can be expressed by a same legal text; 
 Shallow reasoning on judicial knowledge: the ontology must enable reasoning on 
material circumstances, legal concepts and judicial interpretations contained in 
precedents, deriving inferences out of the legal concepts and elements involved in a 
judicial decision; 
 Querying: being able to perform complex querying, e.g. by using SPARQL-DL [Sirin 
and Parsia 2007], on qualified parts of a judgement text. For example, performing 
queries that encode a question such as: “retrieve all the judgements in the last year, with 
a dissenting opinion, in the e-commerce field, and where the main argument of the 
decision is the application of Consumer Law, art. 122”; 
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 Supporting text summarization: detecting relevant parts of a judicial text by 
reasoning on semantic annotations jointly with judicial ontologies; 
 Modularity: the legal core ontology should define concepts common to as many 
domain ontologies as possible, which in turn should be automatically imported 
depending on the task at hand; 
 Supporting case-based reasoning: performing legal case-based reasoning by using the 
ontology reasoner in combination with a set of rules, and a rule engine. 
Judicial ontologies are intended to create an environment where the knowledge extracted from 
the decision text can be processed and managed, and reasoning on the judicial interpretation 
grounding the decision is made possible. Reasoning intends to satisfy the following domain 
requirements
12
 (also known as competency questions, see [Gruninger and Fox 1994]): 
 Finding relevant precedents that are not explicitly cited in the decision; 
 Validating the adjudications of the judge on the claims brought forward by the parties 
during the trial on the basis of applicable rules, accepted evidence, and interpretation;  
 Suggesting legal rules/precedents/circumstances that might lead to a different 
adjudication of the claim. 
In order to reach those objectives, it is necessary to introduce particular structures (see section 
3.2.2. and its subsections) to represent the instances of judicial interpretation in a special way. A 
judicial interpretation in fact: 
 Performs an act of interpretation (taking into consideration a fact and applying a legal 
rule (legal status) to it; 
 Is itself an interpretation of a legal text (being possible that the same combination of 
words gives rise to alternative interpretation acts, depending on the meaning given to 
the words). 
The abstract categories of “qualifying expression” (see 3.2.2.1.) are aimed at capturing this 
layered stack of interpretations, while keeping an open approach (in order to maximize the 
results of the reasoning, since in the legal field even remote, apparently counterintuitive 
inferences may be decisive. 
The structure of the ontology library also aims at an effective scaling from legal concepts to 
factors, up to dimensions and legal principles: all these concepts can be represented in the 
domain ontology, and the link to judicial concepts from the core ontology should foster 
semantic alignment between differently designed domain ontologies (the current ontology 
library alignments have not been tested yet). Eventually, practical applications of the ontology 
library include: 
                                                     
12  See Chapter 4 for an implementation of the ontology library into the Carneades Argumentation System. 
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 Compliance check of contract drafts, e.g. by using a plugin to a word processor that 
employs NLP techniques to recognize sentences and clauses that could be relevant 
under e.g. consumer law; 
 Juridical analysis tools for legal professionals, enriching case-law collections by 
semantically relating and grouping precedents for lawyers to browse, making a 
precedent extraction process for legal cases easier and more effective; 
 Judgement management tools for courts and tribunals, useful to evaluate and optimize 
judgements (e.g. integrated into a word processor to assist judges while writing 
judgements, so avoiding grounds for appeals due to missing elements in the decision's 
groundings); 
 Impact analysis tools for legislators, providing a list of (common or uncommon) 
judicial interpretations for a given law, in order to take them into account when 
modifying that law; 
 Tools representing formalized legal doctrine and case law, where legal experts could 
rely on a social platform to share their views and interpretations on a law or a precedent, 
e.g. by using a graphical interface and a formal argumentation structure instead of plain 
text. 
 Ontology Design 3.2.
Judicial ontologies are designed in two modules (see also [Ceci and Palmirani 2012]): 
 A Core Ontology describing the constituents of a precedent in terms of general 
concepts, through an extension to the LKIF-Core legal ontology (see 2.4.5.1.); 
 a Domain Ontology representing the concepts and the rules expressed by the Italian 
Codice del Consumo (Consumer Code) and in artt. (articles) 1241 and 1242 of the 
Italian Civil Code, as well as all relevant knowledge extracted from a set of Italian 
judgements containing interpretation of private agreements in the light of those laws. 
Our design method is based on a middle-out methodology: bottom-up for capturing and 
modelling the legal domain ontology, and top-down for modelling the core ontology classes and 
the argumentation theory components (see 1.3.). Middle-out methodology is implemented here 
by using pattern-based design [Gangemi 2007] with Ontology Design Patterns either extracted 
from judicial text or reused from the core ontology, and matched according to requirements. 
The approach adopted is based on a multi-layer paradigm, where a legal resource is managed in 
separate levels that are linked to each other, and organized in order to allow multiple annotation, 
interpretation, and classification with representation redundancy. The syntactical approach is 
based on the following schema: 
 Text annotation in XML: the Akoma Ntoso standard [Vitali 1997, Barabucci et al. 
2010] grants proper mark-up of the structure of the judgement and of citations; 
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 Metadata annotation: the Akoma Ntoso metadata block captures not only the 
metadata concerning the lifecycle of the document (e.g. workflow of the trial, formal 
steps, jurisdiction, level of judgements), but also the legal qualification of relevant parts 
of the decision, such as the minority report or the 
dissenting opinion; 
 Ontology annotation: external OWL 
definitions linked to the XML document are used; 
 Rules: unfortunately OWL, even with the 
functionalities of version 2.0, is unable to represent 
complex and defeasible legal arguments. It is therefore 
necessary to extend the model with rule modelling for 
argumentation representation. 
Evaluation has been performed on a sample set of 
Italian case law including 27 decisions of different grade (Tribunal, Court of Appeal, Cassation 
Court) concerning the legal field of oppressive clauses in Consumer Contracts. The matter is 
specifically disciplined in the Italian “Codice del Consumo” (Consumer Code), as well as in 
many non-Italian legal systems, so that an extension of this research to foreign decisions (and 
laws) can be envisaged.  
Contract law is an interesting field because the (either automatic or manual) markup of contract 
parts allows the highlight of single clauses and their comparison to general rules as well as to 
case law concerning the matter. These possibilities can be used to introduce a semi-automatic 
compliance check of a contract draft.  
The domain considered involves situations where strictly deductive logic is not sufficient to 
represent the legal reasoning as performed by a judge. In particular, defeasible logics 
[Governatori and Rotolo 2004] seem needed to represent the legal rules underlying judicial 
reasoning. For example, many norms concerning contracts are not mandatory: they could be 
overruled by a different legal discipline through specific agreements between the parties. The 
problem of representing "defeasible" rules, in fact, is a core problem in legal knowledge 
representation. Exploring how OWL2 could help designing the background for applying 
defeasible logic is therefore an important goal of the present research. 
The software used to model the ontology (and from which the images of this paper are taken) is 
Protégé 4.1.0, supporting some of the features introduced by OWL2. 
3.2.1. Judgement Structure  
Judgement in Akoma Ntoso [Barabucci et al. 2010a] is a particular type of document modelled 
for detecting the main significant parts of a document about precedents (Figure 3.2): header for 
capturing the main information such as parties, court, neutral citation, document identification 
number; body for representing the main part of the judgement, including the decision; 
conclusion for detecting the signatures.  
The body part is divided into four main blocks:  




 Introduction, where usually (especially in common law de-cisions) the story of the trial 
is introduced;  
 Background, dedicated to the description of the facts;  
 Motivation, where the judge introduces the arguments supporting his decision;  
 Decision, where the final outcome is given by the judge. 
This division allows detecting facts and factors from the background: in the motivation 
arguments and counterarguments are detected, and in the decision lies the conclusion of the 
legal argumentation process. Those qualified fragments of text should be annotated by legal 
experts with the help of a special editor (e.g. Norma-Editor, presented in [Palmirani and Benigni 
2007]) that is handy to create links between text, metadata and ontology classes. 
3.2.2.  Core Ontology 
The judicial core ontology
13
 (Figure 3.3) introduces the main concepts in that legal domain, 
defining the classes that including entities extracted from judicial decisions. Core ontologies are 
domain-generic and not modeled upon a specific legal subject, however being the legal domain 
too large and heterogeneous, the model presented here has been conceived to represent 
interactions in Civil Law, especially as far as contracts, laws and judicial decisions are 
                                                     
13  http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/judging_contracts_core.owl. 
Fig. 3.3 – Core Ontology's specification of LKIF-Core. The 
central column defines  categories already present in LKIF-Core, 




concerned. For other domains, e.g. public contracts, administrative law, tort law, etc. 
adaptations are needed. 
3.2.2.1.  General Structure of the Core Ontology 
The backbone of the Core Ontology is constituted by three LKIF-Core classes:  
 lkif:Qualificatory_Expression (subclass of Legal_Expression<l-
kif:Expression<lkif:Proposition<lkif:MentalObject) represents a 
legal expression that ascribes a legal status to a person or an object. For example:  
o x is a citizen; 
o x is an intellectual work; 
o x is a technical invention. 
 lkif:Qualification (SubClassOf lkif:Proposition) represents the legal 
act which contains the qualificatory expression. (i.e. contractual agreements, 
judgements). 
 lkif:Qualified represents anything that is the object of some qualification. 
On the basis of those classes the following ontology design pattern [Gangemi 2007] has been 
built. Since the main object to be represented in the present set of ontologies is the 
normative/judicial qualification brought forward by performative utterances (contractual 
agreements, legal rules and judicial interpretations), the classes presented above constitute the 
nucleus of the judicial core ontology. The lkif:Qualification and lkif:Qualified 
classes are linked only by a single property (lkif:qualifies/lkif:qualified_by), 
but the need is rather to model an n-ary relation between three elements (Figure 3.4): 




















 A type of qualification; 
 An object being qualified.  
In order to represent this conceptualization, the property qualifies has been forked into two 
new properties: considers and applies. The first one, considers (modeled as a 
superclass of the LKIF-Core properties evaluates, allows, disallows) represents the 
object of the qualification. The second property, applies, shows towards which concept the 
qualification is made. The pattern applies to different entities as follows: 
 A Contractual_Agreement considers a Material_Circumstance 
and applies a Legal_Status;  
 A Judicial_Interpretation considers a Material_Circumstance 
and applies a Legal_Status;  
 A Legal_Rule considers a Legal_Status and applies a 
Legal_Consequence; 
 An Adjudication considers a Judicial_Claim and applies a 
Judicial_Outcome. 
3.2.2.2.  Qualifying Legal Expressions  
To overcome the limited expressivity of the original LKIF-Core classes, a new class called 
Qualifying_Legal_Expression (Figure 3.5) has been conceived, putting together the 
characteristics of the Qualificatory_Expression (Figure 3.6) and Qualification 
classes, enhanced by the specializations of the qualifies property. This class represents the 
formalization of dispositions, which in the sample case are the three legal expressions involved 
Fig. 3.6 – Visualization of the Expression class. 
Fig. 3.5 – Visualization of the Judgement class as a Qualifying Legal Expression. 
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in contract law-related judicial decisions: Contractual_Agreement, Legal_Rule and 
Judgement. 
 As a subclass of Qualificatory_Expression qualifying legal expressions contain all 
the information related to their original “speech act”: its semantics binds with the 
externalization, the legal power and the agents to ensure the representation of all aspects that 
may come into play when facing a legal issue (the legitimacy of the legislative body/court/legal 
party, the characteristics of the corresponding legal document, the identity/characteristics of 
people/bodies involved, etc.). Their main properties are “medium” and “attitude” (see 
below for a specification of the Medium, Attitude and Agent classes).As a subclass of 
Qualification (Figure 3.7),  qualifying legal expressions contain the information related to 
the effects they have in the legal world: 
the legal categories / obligations / effects 
they create, modify or repeal.  
A subdivision can be made between one 
direct subclass (Judgement, which 
in this perspective is furtherly divided 
into the 
Judicial_Interpretation and 
Adjudication subclasses) and two 
subclasses of Norm (Legal_Rule 
and Contractual_Agreement).  
As explained before, the property qualifies - linking the qualifying expression to the 
Qualified expression - has been forked into two new properties: considers and 
applies, representing respectively the direct object and the “destination” of the qualification.  
3.2.2.3. Qualified Expressions 
All the ranges of the considers and applies properties presented above are subclasses of 
the Qualified class (Figure 3.8). Its subclasses are Normatively_Qualified, a class 
already present in LKIF-Core, and Judicially_Qualified, created anew. 
Fig. 3.7 – Visualization of the Qualification class. 
Fig. 3.8 - Visualization of the qualified class. 
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Normatively_Qualified expressions include Material_Circumstance, 
Legal_Status and Legal_Consequence. They represent the expressions that can be 
directly bound to a Norm: while Material_Circumstance represents any fact or act 
which is taken into consideration by the Norm, Legal_Status represents an institutional fact 
(i.e. fulfillment of contract, oppressive clause, contract breach) that is normally 
considered_by a Legal_Rule and applied_by a Contractual_Agreement or a 
Judgement. Please note that the link between a Contractual_Agreement and the 
Legal_Status it applies is a “weak” link until a Judicial_Interpretation has 
confirmed (or denied) it. Finally, Legal_Consequence represents the sanction provided by 
the law in the presence of some Legal_Status or Material_Circumstance. It covers 
all cases when the Legal_Rule considers some Normatively_Qualified 
expression, but does not simply allows, disallows or evaluates it. 
Judicially_Qualified expressions include Judicial_Claim, 
Judicial_Outcome and all elements taken into consideration during a legal proceeding (i.e. 
Contractual_Agreeement, but also Legal_Rule, expecially in Cassation Court and 
Costitutional Court sentences). Judicial_Claim is the claim of the legal proceeding. It is 
considered_by an Adjudication, the answer of the judge to the claim (subclass of 
Qualification>Judgement). The content of the answer (rebuttal/acceptation of the claim 
or any other possible outcome foreseen by the law) is represented by the 
Judicial_Outcome class, applied_by the Adjudication. So the representation is 
the following: a Judicial_Claim is considered_by an Adjudication that 
applies a Judicial_Outcome.  
3.2.2.4. The judged_as Property Chain  
The miscellaneous elements that can be taken into consideration during a legal proceeding are 
included in the Judicially_Qualified class as long as they are actually 
considered_by some Judicial_Interpretation. So, for example, a 
Contractual_Agreement can be considered_by some 
Judicial_Interpretation who applies some Legal_Status to it (i.e. the 
agreement is oppressive, is inefficacious, represents an arbitration clause, is specifically signed 
by both parties). In these cases, a OWL2 property chain (see 3.2.3.1. for a description of this 
feature and of its usage in the present research) directly links the Contractual_Agreement 
to the Legal_Status judicially applied to it. This strong link, represented by the property 
“judged_as”, is the the fundamental information to be represented – and managed – through 
this set of ontologies. This particular model of qualification can be formalized and reused 
through a corresponding ontology design pattern [Gangemi 2007]. 
3.2.2.5.  Mediums, Propositional Attitudes and Agents 
These LKIF-Core classes describe the background of an Expression. The Medium class 
identifies the support through which the proposition is expressed. It does not represent the 




The Propositional_Attitude class was specified with the Jurisdiction, 
Law_Declaration and Agreement subclasses, representing the enabling powers that stand 
behind a Judgement, a Legal_Rule and a Contractual_Agreement, respectively. On 
the contrary, to represent the authors of a Qualifying Legal Expression there was no need to 
specify the subclasses of Agent already present in LKIF-Core (Person and 
Organization). This knowledge about agents and attitudes can be important in some 
judicial cases: i.e. if a claim is based on the lack of contractual power by one of the parties, or 
on the identity/characteristics of a part, or on the lack of force by some law or other regulation 
(which can in turn depend by the lack of legitimacy of one of its authors). Also the modelling of 
roles (already present in LKIF) can be very useful in representing critical factors of particular 
precedents.  
3.2.2.6. Modularity of the Core Ontology  
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The expansion brought by the Core Ontology to the LKIF-Core concepts is currently oriented to 
the representation of the elements involved in civil-law cases regarding contract law. 
Nevertheless, the Core Ontology provides general – and relatively open - categories for this 
kind of judicial activity to be represented, and can therefore be considered as a core to be 
“expanded” with categorization from other branches of law, but not to be “substituted”, since 
the basic concepts introduced here may come into play also in judgements concerning different 
subjects.  
Fig. 3.9 – The Core Ontology graph.  Boxes represent classes. Continuous arrows represent 
either the bears, attitude or considers properties. Dashed lines represent the applies 
property. 
Fig. 3.10 – semantic relations between represented knowledge. The dashed line 
“Through qualified class” means that the connection from legal statuses to legal rules is 
ensured through a qualified class (see 3.2.2.). 
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Figure 3.9 represents the classes and properties of the core ontology. Figure 3.10 shows the 
same information, but allows to better understand the connection between the classes of the 
ontology. 
3.2.3. Domain Ontology 
Following this structure, the metadata taken from judicial documents are represented in the 
Domain Ontology
14
. The modelling was carried out manually by an expert in the legal subject, 
which actually represents the only viable choice in the legal domain, albeit giving rise to 
important bottleneck issues (see below 3.6.1.). Also, building a legal domain ontology is similar 
to writing a piece of legal doctrine, thus it should be manually achieved in such a way as to 
maintain a reference to the author of the model, following an open approach (i.e. allowing 
different modelling of the same concept by different authors). 
3.2.3.1. Modelling of laws  
                                                     
14  http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/judging_contracts_domain.owl. 
Fig. 3.12 – Visualization of the expression class, highlighting the subclasses of 
Contractual_Agreement introduced by the legal rules. 
Fig. 3.11 - Stated 
property assertion of  a 
Legal Rule instance. 
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The laws involved in the domain are represented into the ontology in a quite complex fashion, 
in order to allow full expressivity of their deontic powers. First of all, they are represented as 
instances of the Legal_Rule class, whose only stated 
property is to apply the Legal_Consequence 
indicated in the head of the legal rule (Figure 3.11). The 
reasoner will infer knowledge about the rule, linking it 
(through the considers property) to the contractual 
agreements which fall under the scope of that norm.  
Legal rules are also represented through anonymous 
subclasses of the Normatively_Qualified class 
(figure 3.12), called Relevant_Ex<rulename> (ex 
is the latin proposition for indicating a source). An axiom 
stating the requirements for an instance to be relevant 
under the legal rule is included in the description of the 
class, as well as an equivalence linking each of its 
instances to the legal rule, through the property considered_by (figure 3.13). Please notice 
that these anonymous classes are classified under the Contractual_Agreement class: that 
is, because the effect of the legal rule in this context is to enrich the definition of 
Contractual_Agreement, adding subdivisions which depend on the legal framework 
created by the legal rules of the domain. 
3.2.3.2.  Modelling of contracts 
A contract is a composition of one or more Contractual_Agreements (a Contract for 
the whole, multiple Contract_Clauses for its parts, an example being provided in figure 
3.14), each of which represents an obligation arising from the contract. All components of the 
contract share the same Attitude (the “meeting of minds” between the Agents) and 
Medium (the kind of support in which the expression is contained. A 
Contractual_Agreement normally considers some Material_Circumstance 
and applies some Legal_Status to it. 
In the actual model, the material circumstances considered by the contractual agreement were 
not included: that is, because this has no relevance when capturing the sheer interpretation 
instances these agreement undergo: it would rather become useful when delving deeper into the 
single interpretation, capturing the smaller factors which led to that specific interpretation. 
3.2.3.3. Modelling of judicial decisions 
Fig. 3.14 - Description and property assertions of the 
contract clause's content. 
Fig. 3.13 - Axiom for classification 
of Contractual Agreements under 
the legal rule Art. 1341 comma 2. 
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The Judgement class includes an instance identifying the case as a whole (the precedent) and 
several ones identifying its parts: at least an Adjudication and one or more 
Judicial_Interpretations (figure 3.15). They share a common attitude (a 
Jurisdiction power) a Precedent medium and some agents (claimant, defendant, and 
court). The Adjudication contains the Judicial_Outcome of the Judicial_Claim. 
(it considers the claim and applies the outcome), while the 
Judicial_Interpretation considers a Material_Circumstance and 
applies one or more Legal_Status (and zero or more Precedents) to it. The 
precedents cited by the judge in the decision are added directly to the Interpretation instance: the 
reasoner is then capable of distinguishing between legal statuses and precedents, the latter being 
searchable in queries and other information retrieval applications. Rules expressed by 
precedents (i.e., if a clause is signed 
through a recall at the end of the 
document, it is specifically signed) can 
be modeled in the same way as legal 
rules are. 
3.2.3.4.  Reasoning on the 
knowledge base  
The consistency of the Knowledge Base was checked with the Hermit 1.3.6
15
 reasoner. This tool 
was built to extract data from the OWL ontology, but 
could also be used to check if the ontology gives a 
unique and correct answer to some formalized question 
(i.e. asking about the validity of some proof, or about 
the qualification of factual events under legal 
principles). When a Contractual_Agreement (the 
expression brought by a Contract_Clause) is 
considered_by some 
Judicial_Interpretation, the ontology gathers 
all relevant information on the documents involved: 
contract parties, judicial actors, legal status applied to 
the agreement (eventually in comparison to the one 
suggested by the contract/judicial parties), the law rules 
which are relevant to the legal status, the final 
adjudication of the claim, the part played in it by the 
interpreted agreement, and so on.  
The first objective for gathering all this semantically-rich information is advanced querying on 
precedents, but more can be achieved by combining different 
Judicial_Interpretations with knowledge coming from the contract and the 
applicable law: the ontology reasoner is in fact capable of predicting – to some extents – the 
                                                     
15 http://hermit-reasoner.com/. 
Fig. 3.16 - Inferred knowledge on the 
Contractual Agreement instance. 




outcome of the judge (i.e. predicting that a clause will be judged as valid/invalid) and to run 
inferences about the agreement (for example, as interpreted, the clause in the example of figure 
3.16 is relevant for the legal rule contained in article 1342 comma 2 of Italian Civil Code, and 
inefficacious in the light of the same norm). 
This inferred knowledge is important for two reasons: a. by “predicting” the judge’s final 
statement on the clause (even if not that on the claim), this knowledge represents a logic and 
deontic check on the legal consequences the judge takes from its interpretation; b. it gives a 
fundamental element for the argumentation system to support the explanation of the 
adjudication of the claim. The argumentation system, in fact, will be able to use the (stated and 
inferred) elements of the decision’s groundings to support and explain the Adjudication 
contained in the last part of the judgement. 
3.2.4. OWL2 Constructs Used 
OWL2 (see [W3C Consortium 2012] and 2.2.4.) is one of the latest standard for the Semantic 
Web, and is relevant to any project willing to contribute to the huge network of data that is 
being built on the Web. An objective of the present research is to explore how OWL2 could 
help designing the background for the application of defeasible logic. OWL in general is not 
designed for managing defeasibility directly, being only able to capture the static factual and 
legal knowledge to be reused in the rule layer. Nevertheless, the gap between ontology and rules 
is often underestimated, and the benefits coming from OWL2 have not yet been considered in 
detail. For this reason, well aware of the 
limitations of OWL2 in representing 
defeasible logics, one aim of the present 
research is to investigate how far OWL2 
can be used in order to improve 
performance, computability, and 
management of classes in a defeasible 
logic context. 
OWL2 introduces several features to the 
original Web Ontology Language, some of which allow a richer representation of knowledge, 
especially when dealing with properties and datatypes. Some of these would be useful, but also 
lead to a great increase of complexity in the models: for example, in order to exploit disjointness 
between properties it would be necessary to create as many properties as possible statuses, 
which in turn would greatly affect computability. On the contrary, some of these new constructs 
concerning properties deserve attention because they could enhance expressivity without 
affecting (or even reducing) the complexity of the model built so far. OWL functional syntax 
will be used in examples throughout the paper. 
3.2.4.1.  Property Chains 
The OWL2 construct ObjectPropertyChain used within a SubObjectPropertyOf 
axiom allows a property to be defined as the composition of several properties as in Figure 3.17. 
Such axioms are known as complex role inclusions in SROIQ. The present research relies on a 
particular property chain useful in the judicial domain. The property chain: 
HasBrother 
Person A 
Person B Person C 
HasUncle 
HasParent 
Fig. 3.17 – An example of property chain. 
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considered_by o applies SubObjectPropertyOf judged_as 
is represented in Figure 3.18, and is used in two different ways (in interpretations, as in the 
figure, and in rule applications) to create a direct interpretational link between a material 
circumstance and a legal status. 
When a Judicial_Interpretation considers a Material_Circumstance and 
applies a Legal_Status, the judged_as property chain comes into play and creates a 
direct link between the circumstance and its 
status, that link being distinguished from the 
indirect one introduced by the contract 
(represented by the property applies). 
Reasoners will therefore treat these two 
links accordingly.  
On the other hand, the legal rule axiom 
works through an “anonymous qualified 
class” which links all relevant expressions to the legal rule instance through the 
considered_by property, and the legal rule applies a legal consequence. The judged_as 
property chain unifies the two properties (from the qualified expression to the law, and from the 
law to the legal consequence) and brings their semantics to the surface by creating a direct 
property linking the contract clause to its status (judged_as Inefficacy).  
A better use of the OWL2 property chains could lead to an ever more direct and complete 
solution, mainly by removing the need for the anonymous subclass in order to identify the 
clause instances considered_by the relevant law. In the actual version of the ontology, in 
fact, the property chain judged_as connects a material instance (i.e. contract clause) to a 
legal status or legal consequence (i.e. oppressive, inefficacious) via a judicial 
interpretation. With the open world approach, this creates a sprawling of judged_as chains 
being applied to the metadata. All of these inferences are correct; nevertheless, they greatly 
increase the number of triples in the ontology. In order for the ontology to manage a big 
knowledge base and to perform deep reasoning on it, it is therefore necessary to prune chain-
based inferences in order to retain only those that are interesting for the task at hand. Since 
pruning would eliminate semantic content actually existing in legal documents, it has to be 
performed depending on the task of the rules application. 
3.2.4.2.  Negative object properties  
A negative object property assertion such as: 
NegativeObjectPropertyAssertion(OP a b)  
states that the individual a1 is not connected by the object property OP to the individual a2. 
E.g. given an ontology including the following axiom: 
NegativeObjectPropertyAssertion(hasSon Peter Meg ) 








Fig. 3.18 – The property chain judged_as. 
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ObjectPropertyAssertion(hasSon Peter Meg) 
Negative object property assertions are useful to avoid complicated workarounds for negating 
assertions. For example, the legal status NotSpecificallySigned and more constructs are 





ObjectPropertyAssertion(applies ContractA NotSpecificallySigned) 
but in OWL2 the following construct is sufficient:  
NegativeObjectPropertyAssertion(applies ContractA 
SpecificallySigned) 
3.2.4.3.  Keys 
A HasKey axiom states that each named instance of a class is uniquely identified by a set of 
data or object properties assertions - that is, if two named instances of the class coincide on 
values for each of key properties, then those two individuals are the same. This feature is useful 
for identifying the unique elements in a judicial claim, e.g. the parties, the contract, the norm, 
and the decision itself. 
3.2.4.4.  Annotation properties 
OWL1 allows extra-logical annotations to be added to ontology entities, but does not allow 
annotation of axioms. OWL2 allows annotations on ontologies, entities, anonymous individuals, 
axioms, and annotations themselves.  
This feature is used in the judicial ontology library to provide a full-fledged information 
structure about the author of each piece of the model (i.e., who modeled a certain axiom, which 
legal text it refers to, and who/when/how was the original legal text created). Moreover, it is 
possible to give domains (AnnotationPropertyDomain) and ranges (AnnotationPropertyRange) 
to annotation properties, as well as organize them in hierarchies (SubAnnotationPropertyOf). 
These special axioms have no formal meaning in OWL2 direct semantics, but carry the standard 
RDF semantics in RDF-based semantics, via the mapping to RDF vocabulary. 
3.2.4.5.  N-ary datatypes 
In OWL it is not possible to represent relationships between values for one object, e.g., to 
represent that a square is a rectangle whose length equals its width. N-ary datatype support was 
not added to OWL2 because it was unclear what support should be added. However, OWL2 
includes all syntactic constructs needed for implementing n-ary datatypes. The Data Range 
Extension: Linear Equations note proposes an extension to OWL2 for defining data ranges in 
terms of linear (in)equations with rational coefficients. This kind of equations is of high 
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importance in the process of identifying individuals to 
classify under a legal ontology framework, on the basis of a 
quantitative evaluation of the relationship between several 
factors. 
3.2.4.6.  Property qualified cardinality 
restrictions 
While OWL1 allows for restrictions on the number of 
instances of a property (i.e. for defining persons that have 
at least three children) it does not provide means to 
constrain object or data cardinality (qualified cardinality 
restrictions, i.e. for specifying the class of persons that have 
at least three children who are girls). In OWL2 both qualified and unqualified cardinality 
restrictions are possible through the constructs: ObjectMinCardinality, ObjectMaxCardinality, 
and ObjectExactCardinality (respectively DataMinCardinality, DataMaxCardinality, and 
DataExactCardinality). These restrictions, together with n-ary datatypes, are fundamental to 
enrich the ontology with elements ensuring automatic classifications of qualified properties (e.g 
the minimum income needed for a claim to be classified under a certain category). 
  An Example of judgement Modelling 3.3.
The modelling of the ontology is explained here through a simple example of data insertion and 
knowledge management by the Domain Ontology. Following is a description of the case to be 
modeled:  
In the decision given by the 1
st





contractual obligations between two small enterprises (“New Edge sas” and “Fotovillage srl”, 
from now on α and β), the judge had to decide whether clause 12 of α/β contract, concerning the 
competent judge (Milan instead of Piacenza) could be applied. The judge cites art. 1341 comma 
2 of Italian Civil Code which says: “a general and unilateral clause concerning competence 
derogation is invalid unless specifically signed”. In the contract signed by the parties there is a 
distinct box for a “specific signing” where all the clauses of the contract are recalled (by their 
number). The judge, with the support of precedents (he cites 9 Cassation Court sentences) 
interprets the “specific signing” as not being fulfilled through a generic recall of all the clauses, 
and therefore declares clause 12 of α/β contract invalid and inefficacious. The claim of 
inefficacy of clause 12, brought forward by α, is thus accepted, undercutting the claim of a lack 
of competence by the judge of Piacenza, brought forward by β, which is rejected. 
In order to represent the knowledge contained in that judgement text, three documents have to 
be modelled: Art. 1341 comma 2 of Italian Civil Code, the contract between the two enterprises 
α and β, and the decision by the Court of Piacenza. 
3.3.1. Modelling of the law  
                                                     
16 Sent. N. 507 del 9 Luglio 2009, Tribunale di Piacenza, giudice dott. Morlini. 
Fig. 3.19 - The list of legal 
statuses classified as oppressive. 
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Following is the law disposition involved in the judicial decision: 
Article 1341 comma 2 of Italian Civil Code: Clauses concerning arbitration, competence 
derogation, unilateral contract withdrawal, and limitations to: exceptions, liability, 
responsibility, and towards third parties, are inefficacious unless they are specifically signed by 
writing.  
The disposition is represented as a Qualifying Legal Expression (Legal_Rule) called 
“art1341Co2” (with a Code medium, a Law_Declaration attitude and a Parliament as 
agent) and the qualified class Relevant_ExArt1341co2. As seen in 3.2.3.1., a 
Legal_Rule considers a (combination of) Legal_Status(es) and applies a 
Legal_Consequence (or a deontic operator). Therefore any individual which has the 
characteristics required by the law is considered_by the Legal_Rule, which in turn 
allows/disallows/evaluates or applies some 
Legal_Consequence to it. In the example of figure 15, 
each Contractual_Agreement which applies 
“General”, “Unilateral”, “NotSpecificallySigned” and an 
Oppressive_Status (Figure 3.19) will be 
considered_by art1341Co2, which in turn applies the 
Legal_Consequence of “invalidityExArt1341co2”. The 
individuals competentJudge and notSpecificallySigned are thus 
created as Legal_Statuses that can be considered_by 
a Legal_Rule and applied_by a Contractual_Agreement, and the individual 
“invalidityExArt1341co2” is created as a Legal_Consequence applied_by the 
Legal_Rule “art1341Co2”. 
3.3.2. Modelling of the contract clause 
The Contract_Clause “α/βClause12” (Figure 3.20) is created and linked to a 
Contractual_Agreement which applies the Legal_Statuses of “General”, 
“Unilateral” and “CompetenceDerogation”. This is done because there is no argue between the 
parties about whether clause 12 concerns a competence 
derogation. However, as explained before, this kind of link is a 
“weak” one, considering that the contractual parties have no 
power to force a legal status into a contract, and that 
reconducting a contractual agreement to the legal figure it 
evokes is the main activity brought forward by judicial 
interpretation in the contracts field. For this reason, the 
property “applies” related to a Legal_Status is weak when 
its domain is a Contractual_Agreement, and prone to 
be overridden by a contrasting application performed by a Judicial_Interpretation. 
3.3.3. Modelling of the judicial interpretation  
Fig. 3.21 - Stated property 
assertions of the sample 
judicial interpretation. 
Fig. 3.20 - Stated property 




The Judgement instance is created, as well as its components (single interpretation instances, 
adjudication...). Among them, the tribPiacenzaI_Int1 Judicial_Interpretation is 
created (Figure 3.21): it considers the Contractual_Agreement contained in 
α/βClause12 and applies the notSpecificallySigned Legal_Status. The instance contains 
also a reference to the precedent (Cass.1317/1998), which represent a semantically-searchable 
information on the interpretation instance. Figure 3.22 shows all the elements created for the 
various classes, and the relations between them. 
3.3.4. Reasoning on the 
knowledge base 
In the example, when all the relevant 
knowledge is represented into the 
ontology, the reasoner is capable of 
inferring that “The agreement contained in 
clause 12 of the α/β contract is invalid ex 
article 1341 comma 2”(Figure 3.23). As 
already explained, this result is reached 
through a subclass of the 
Contractual_Agreement and 
Qualified classes, defined by an axiom 
representing the rule of law. Clauses that 
fulfill the axiom are automatically 
classified in that class, and thus considered_by the proper law. At this point, a property 
chain links the clause to the legal consequence through the legal rule (clause is 
Fig. 3.23 - Inferred Description and property assertions 
of the contract clause's content. 
Fig. 3.22 - The graph showing the model of the sample case. The general classes of fig. 11 have been 
substituted with the sample instances. The properties (arrows) connect the same classes of the core ontology. 
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considered_by the law which applies a legal consequence , thus the clause is 
judged_as th legal rule). The judged_as property thus gives the clause its final 
(efficacy/inefficacy) status under that law. Figure 3.24 explains the whole process as a list of 
axioms verified by the ontology reasoner. 
 Evaluation of the ontology library 3.4.
The ontology library, in its sample taken from real judicial decisions, proved to meet the 
requirements of: 
 Text-to-knowledge morphism: the ontology can correctly classify all instances 
representing fragments of text. The connection to the Akoma Ntoso markup language 
ensures the identification and management of those fragments of text and of the legal 
concepts they contain. 
 Distinction between document layers: The qualifying expression class constitutes the 
main expressive element, introducing an n-ary relation that ignites the reasoning engine. 
Its instances can refer to the same text fragment, yet represent different (and potentially 
inconsistent) interpretations of that text. Moreover, the LKIF-Core's Medium class 
allows to represent different manifestations of the same expression;  
 Shallow reasoning on judgement's semantics: the Domain Ontology can perform 
reasoning on a material circumstance’s relevancy under a certain law. The property 
chain judged_as and the axioms for law relevancy and legal consequence application 
allow the reasoner to complete the framework, also with the purpose of easening the 
effort needed to model all knowledge contained in the ontology. These axioms could 
also be used to support tools that automatically complete partially-modeled documents; 
 Querying: the considers/applies properties allow complex querying on the knowledge 
base, and the judged_as shortcuts provide semantic sugar in this perspective. Querying 
on temporal parameters is not yet possible due to limits in LKIF-Core language: 
Fig. 3.24 - Explanation for the sample agreement being inefficacious. 
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solutions for this are being achieved through emerging standards for rules such as 
LegalRuleML. 
 Modularity: the layered (core/domain) structure of the ontology library renders domain 
ontologies independent between each other - and yet consistent, through their 
compliance to the core ontology template. 
 Supporting text summarization: the ontology library supports the identification of 
dispositions and decision’s groundings inside a judicial decision. 
 Supporting case-based reasoning: An argumentation system has been built on a lite 
version of the ontology library. The axioms concerning law relevancy and law 
application have been removed from the ontology and moved to the rules layer, in order 
to have them applied not only on the ontology library's knowledge base, but also on the 
new knowledge derived from the application of the rules. Results of this can be found in 
[Ceci and Gordon 2012]. 
Computability was not an issue in the last ontology library version (<5 seconds reasoning time 
on a Intel i5@3.30 Ghz), while the Carneades reasoner was moderately encumbered by the 
application of the rules to the ontology (8-15 seconds in the example described in Chapter 4). 
This could be improved by optimizing the reasoner and/or with a further refinement of the 
ontology (and rules) structure. 
3.4.1.  Related Work 
The framework presented in this paper relies on the previous efforts of the community in the 
field of legal knowledge representation [Boer et al. 2008] and rule interchange for applications 
in the legal domain [Gordon et al. 2009]. The issue of implementing logics to represent judicial 
interpretation has already been faced in [Boella et al. 2010], albeit only for the purposes of a 
sample case.  
The methods applied for the construction of the core legal ontology are similar to those used for 
[Casanovas et al. 2005], an online repository of legal knowledge to provide answers to issues 
related to legal procedures. The main difference between the two approaches is that the latter 
relies on application of NLP techniques to user-generated questions in order to return the correct 
answer. The judicial ontology, instead, extracts information from official legal documents (laws, 
decisions, legal doctrine), whose content classification requires the intervention of a legal 
expert. Furthermore, the ontology in [Casanovas et al. 2005] focuses on legal procedure, while 
the present ontology concerns mainly the legal operations carried out by the judge in a decision, 
mainly judicial interpretations seen as subsumption of material facts or circumstances under 
abstract legal categories. 
The project presented in [Savvas and Bassiliades 2009] focuses on a lower layer of the Semantic 
Web, concerning document structure and data interchange between different legal documents. 
For the same purposes, the present project relies on Akoma Ntoso (see 2.4.2.). Besides its being 
foucused on administrative procedures, the project in [Savvas and Bassiliades 2009] shows a 
rather interesting view on the procedural aspects of legal phenomena, which is something this 
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ontology does not achieve, being this task demanded to an argumentation layer placed on top of 
the ontology layer. 
[Despres and Szulman 2004] shows an automatic construction of an ontology concerning the 
language of a legislative text. The project is focused on the linguistic aspects, in particular on 
the use of NLP techniques to normalize and formalize the text in a set of concepts organized in 
an ontology. The ontology is built around DOLCE and LRI-Core, which makes it likely to be 
aligned with the ontology presented in this paper. The ontology in [Despres and Szulman 2004], 
in fact, ensures a close relation with the legal text, even though it does not includes axioms 
which allow shallow reasoning on specific legal phenomena. 
The ontology in [Shaheed et al. 2005] is very interesting for the orientation towards NLP, the 
solid basis on metaphysics, and in that it allows shallow reasoning on a set of simple legal 
sentences. It is built around the NM ontology ([Shaheed et al. 2005] contains a comparison to 
LRI-Core), and relies on agents to bridge the legal text with the syntax. The approach is very 
interesting, yet the focus on agents somewhat overcomplicates the reasoning on complex legal 
concepts such as that of judicial interpretation. Detecting advanced concepts in legal documents 
requires in fact a highly complex semantic structure, which prevents the reasoning on a large 
scale of document contents (for a general account on how to model complex legal concepts for 
automatic detection see [Palmirani et al. 2011b]). Moreover, as already noted, modelling the 
dynamics of legal procedure requires a proper implementation of argumentation theory.  
3.4.2.  A bridge towards judicial argumentation 
The argumentation system described in [Ceci and Gordon 2012] allows combining the features 
of the DL-based ontology with non-monotonic logics such as Defeasible Logics. In particular, 
Carneades is based on Walton’s theory [Gordon and Walton 2009] and also gives account for 
most of Prakken’s consideration on the subject [Prakken 2008] including argumentation 
schemes and burden of proof. The Carneades application succeeded in performing the tasks of 
finding relevant precedents, validating the adjudications and suggesting legal rules, precedents, 
circumstances that could bring to a different adjudication of the claim. 
Many projects tried to represent case-law during the nineties, most of which are related to the 
work of Prof. Kevin Ashley such as [Ashley 2009]. Their main focus is similar to the one of the 
present research: capturing the elements that contribute to the decision of the judge. The 
approach was, however, based on concepts rather than on the legal documents themselves. They 
were meant to teach legal argumentation in law classes. No account for the metadata of the 
original text was given, and there was no ontology underlying the argumentation trees that 
reconstruct the judge’s reasoning. Rather than representing a single judicial decision, the 
approach presented in this paper allows instead to connect knowledge coming from different 
decisions and to highlight similarities and differences between them, not only on the basis of 
factors, dimensions or values, but also on the basis of the efficacy of the legal documents 
involved (under criteria of time, hierarchy, and others). Of course, templatizing legal documents 
is a very complex task (see next section, 3.5.1.): the intention, in any case, is not to provide a 
complete NLP tool but to create an interface through which a legal expert can easily identify the 
legal concepts evoked by single words, and combinations of them, in legal documents. 
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Deontic defeasible logic systems, such as those presented in [Nute 1998, Kontopoulos et al. 
2011, Governatori and Rotolo 2004] constitute indeed a powerful tool for reasoning on legal 
concepts. Most of them are explicitly built to import RDF triples, which means that they can 
perform reasoning on knowledge bases contained in ontologies such as the one presented in this 
paper. These projects are therefore placed at an upper layer than the one discussed here: the 
ontology, in the perspective of the present research, should refrain from highly structuring the 
text syntax and focus only on the document semantics and basic relations, in order to perform 
shallow reasoning oriented mostly to the data completion, enhanced by the open world 
assumption. Over a such-built knowledge base, rule systems based on advanced logic dialects 
(such as those presented in the cited works) could perform highly complex reasoning with tools 
such as SPINdle (see 6.2.) by importing only the set of triples that best suits their syntactic 
needs. This should be preferred to approaches that try to extend DL to perform defeasible 
reasoning such as [Antoniou et al. 2009]:the judicial ontology set showed that it is possible to 
perform shallow reasoning while staying within OWL2, and in order to perform an efficient 
reasoning on legal concepts it is not sufficient to implement defeasible reasoning, being also 
necessary to rely on argumentation schemes [Walton et al. 2008] 
 The same considerations apply to the approach in [Minh et al. 2009], very interesting in that it 
provides a simple and intuitive way to encode default knowledge on top of terminological KBs: 
such a reasoning system does not reach the complexity needed to manage legal concepts (for 
which deontic defeasible logics are required, with an account for argumentation schemes). This 
means that a distinct layer is needed in order to perform deep reasoning on the KB: being this 
the situation, it is better to stay within the achieved standard of OWL2 when performing basic 
reasoning on KB. 
In this perspective, the idea of deriving a closed-world subset of an OWL2 KB as presented in 
[Ren et al. 2010] seems an optimal enhancement of the present ontology, and will in fact be 
explored, always keeping in mind, though, that introducing negation-as-failure in OWL2 is not 
sufficient to grant the ontology layer the expressivity required for performing argumentation 
tasks. 
  Issues 3.5.
3.5.1.  The knowledge acquisition bottleneck 
The modelling of the sample ontology library and the extraction of knowledge from the case 
law sample was carried out manually by a graduated jurist. Also the qualified fragment of text 
under the Akoma Ntoso standard should be annotated by legal experts: at the present time, 
manual data insertion seems the only viable choice in the legal domain, as automatic 
information retrieval and machine learning techniques, do not yet ensure a sufficient level of 
accuracy (even if some progress in the field has been made, for example in applying NLP 
techniques to recognize law modifications [Palmirani and Brighi 2010]).  
The manual markup of judicial decisions, however, doesn't seem to be sustainable in the long 
time. For an efficient management of the knowledge acquisition phase, a combination of tools 
supporting an authored translation of text into semantics should limit the effects of this (still) 
unavoidable bottleneck: special editor tools (e.g. Norma-Editor) can allow an easy linking 
between text, metadata and ontology classes, while the more complex ontology constructs (i.e. 
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the "considers/applies" constructs) could be managed by an editor plug-in. In this perspective, 
stronger constraints could be added to the legal core ontology in order to allow these plugin to 
automatically complete a part of the classification work, leaving to the user the duties of 
checking and completing the model drafted by the machine.  
3.5.2.  Representing exceptions 
A critical issue in representing the decision's content is represented by exceptions to legal rules. 
How to model a situation when a material circumstance applies all the legal statuses required by 
the legal rule, but nevertheless does not fall under that legal rule's legal consequence because it 
follows some additional rule which defeats the first one? As it should be clear, that issue has no 
straight solution inside DL, such as OWL-DL logics: introducing some negative condition for 
the rule to apply (in the form if (not (exception))), the open-world assumption OWL 
relies on would requires to explicitly state for each case that no exception applies. This would 
hinder the reasoning capabilities of the ontology library explained so far. A solution to this 
problem could rely on the modelling of the exceptional case as a subclass of the normal case, 
(see Figure 3.25). In this way, only the instances which are relevant under the law are eligible to 
be an exception to the application of that law.  
 This solution has the advantage of allowing reasoning on exceptions without the need to rely on 
rules. The backside is that the classification of the circumstance as "exceptional" is added to the 
classification of inefficacy, not substituted to it (Figures 3.26 and 3.27). Again, this issue takes 
origin from the open world assumption, and cannot be easily avoided while remaining inside 
OWL-DL: whenever the reasoner is prevented to link a circumstance to a legal consequence, 
asking him to check that no exception exists, the reasoner will be incapable of inferring 
anything unless all information concerning the exceptions is explicitly stated in the ontology.  
Fig. 3.25 - Explanation of a sample contract clause being not inefficacious 
because of an exception. 
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Fig. 3.26 - Explanation for Relevancy being inferred as a subclass of Inefficacious. 
This issue represents the main reason why a complete 
syntactic modelling of legal rules is not feasible inside the 
ontology library, requiring instead a rule system (such as 
LKIF-Rules [Gordon 2008], Clojure, or LegalRuleML 
[Palmirani et al. 2011c]) to be fully implemented. 
Nevertheless, the so-built ontology library represents the 
ideal background for such a rule system.  
  Conclusions 3.6.
The ontology library presented in this chapter is the pivot of 
an innovative approach to case-law management, filling the 
gap between text, metadata, ontology representation and rules 
modelling, with the goal of detecting all the information 
available in the text to be enhanced in the legal reasoning 
through an argumentation theory. This approach allows to 
directly annotate the text with peculiar metadata representing 
the hook for the core, domain and argument ontologies. 
OWL2 is used to get as close as possible to the rules, in order to exploit the computational 
characteristic of description logics. On the other hand, the ontology framework has a strong 
weak point in the management of exceptions. It is thus necessary to devolve the deeper legal 
reasoning features to an upper layer in based on a different logics, namely defeasible logics such 
as that presented in [Governatori and Rotolo 2004], with added support for argumentation 
schemes. In the next chapter, an system for argumentation based on the ontology set just 
presented, and on the Carneades Argumentation System, is described. 
  
Fig. 3.27 - Stated and 
inferred property assertions 







Modelling Judicial Arguments 
 
 
“Legal reasoning is not primarily deductive, but rather a modelling process of shaping an 
understanding of the facts, based on evidence, and an interpretation of the legal sources, to 
construct a theory for some legal conclusion.” 
– Jon Bing, Uncertainty, decisions and information systems. 
 
“If you don't like what someone has to say, argue with them.” 
– Noam Chomsky. 
 
 Introduction 4.1.
Part of the present research was conducted at the Fraunhofer-FOKUS Institute of Berlin
17
. The 
aim was the extension of the judicial framework in the rule layer, enhancing the knowledge 
contained in the core and domain ontologies with a set of rules representing the argumentative 
processes followed by the judge when interpreting a material circumstance to apply a legal rule 
to it. To achieve this it is not sufficient to rely on OWL DL reasoning capabilities, but 




 is a set of open source software tools for mapping and evaluating arguments, under 
development by Thomas F. Gordon since 2006. Carneades contains a logical model of 
argumentation based on Doug Walton’s theory of argumentation, and developed in 
                                                     
17 The FOKUS (Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication System) institute develops solutions for 
communications in the future. Prof. Thomas F. Gordon  (co-tutor of thid Ph.D Thesis) heads a research group on 




collaboration with him. In particular, it implements Walton’s argumentation schemes [Walton et 
al. 2008] not only to reconstruct and evaluate past arguments in natural language texts, but also 
as templates guiding the user as he/she generates his/her own argument graphs to represent 
ongoing dialogues. It can therefore be used for studying argumentation from a computational 
perspective, but also to develp tools supporting practical argumentation processes. The main 
application scenario of Carneades is that of dialogues where claims are made and competing 
arguments are put forward to support or attack these claims [Walton 1998], but it also takes into 
account the relational conception of argument
19
 [Dung 1995]. 
4.2.1.  Theoretical background 
The focus of the Carneades framework is the modelling of the different techniques used when 
dealing with argumentation, with a particular attention on dialogical processes: the work relies 
on Wigmore’s charting method (see 1.3.3.2.), Pollock’s Framework (see 1.3.4.2.), and Walton’s 
argumentation schemes ([Walton 1996], see following sections). Reflecting these efforts, 
Carneades proved to be a valid instrument when dealing with fine-tuned schemes about proof 
standards, burden of proof and when the need arises to distinguish between the logical, 
dialectical and rhetorical layers [Gordon 2010]. These features, however, are not central for the 
purposes of the present research: more attention will be focused on the features of evaluating 
arguments and deriving arguments from ontologies and rules. 
4.2.1.1.  Argumentation schemes 
An argumentation scheme is a pattern of reasoning used in everyday conversation and other 
contexts, such as legal and scientific argumentation. Argumentation schemes serve the same 
purpose as their ancestors, the τόποι of Aristotle: they are useful to create, evaluate and classify 
arguments. Interestingly, the other models that claim to fulfill this ancestral role are S. Toulmin 
(see 1.3.3.4.) and D. Schum (see 1.3.3.6.). In recent times, however, the Artificial Intelligence 
field has become increasingly interested in argumentation schemes, due to their potential for 
making improvements in the reasoning capabilites of agents [Garssen 2001; Bex et. al. 2003; 
Verheij 2003]. 
In argumentation theory, argumentation schemes are evaluated through a set of critical 
questions (CQs), specific for each scheme. Critical questions were first introduced by Arthur 
Hastings [Hastings 1963] as part of his analysis on presumptive argumentation schemes. Each 
question reveals possible weak points in the argumentation, and if not answered adequately may 
render that specific argument useless in supporting the speaker’s position in the dialogue. 
Evidently, critical points in arguments should be formalized in a dialogical structure, in order to 
maintain the notion of defeasibility of every argument in the scheme, including those introduced 
to answer one or more critical questions. The following example will better explain this 
dialogical structure. 
                                                     
19 The main difference between the two conceptions of argument is that a proposition which has not been attacked is 
acceptable in the relational model of argument, while in most dialogues it would be not acceptable, since in most 
schemes making a claim involves having the burden of proof on it. 
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Argument from expert opinion is a classic example of how argumentation schemes and 
critical questions can help evaluating the validity of a specific argument: it is a kind of argument 
which is generally considered as reasonable, but also brought to major fallacies in past cases. In 
Walton’s analysis [Walton 1996], expert opinion is represented by the following scheme: 
Source E is an expert in domain D 
E asserts that proposition A is known to be true (or false) 
A is within D 
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true (or false). 
As shown by experiments in social psychology, there is a tendency to defer to experts, 
sometimes without questioning, resulting in fallacious appeals to authority. Many circumstances 
could prevent the apparently deductive conclusion that “if E says A, then A is true”: in 
particular, epistemic closure in an expert field is far from truth, and therefore an expert can 
never be considered as knowing everything in a domain, and neither can its opinion be 
deductively true beyond challenge. Thus for many (if not all) appeals to the expert opinion, the 
deductivist approach does not work. As [Reed et. al 2004] puts it, critical questions are used to 
ease tensions between forms of argument that are clearly reasonable in some instances, but that 
cannot be analysed as deductively valid. 
[Walton 1997] identifies six basic critical questions matching the appeal to expert opinion: 
 How credible is E as an expert source? 
 Is E an expert in D? 
 Does E’ testimony imply A? 
 Is E reliable? 
 Is A consistent with the testimony of other experts? 
 Is A supported by evidence? 
Please notice that, in many cases, asking one of the basic critical questions above will lead to 
critical subquestion at a deeper level of examination. This is one way to create argumentation 
graphs (see 4.2.2.1.). 
4.2.1.2.  Premise evaluation: burden of proof 
According to [Walton 2005], the method for evaluating an argument through critical questions 
is by a shifting of burden of proof in a dialogue: when the proponent arguments his position 
with an expert opinion and the respondent poses one of the six critical questions, a burden of 
proof shifts back to the proponent’s side, defeating or undercutting the agument temporarily 
until the critical question has been answered successfully. Please notice that the notions of 
burden of proof and proof standards (explained later) are relevant only when argumentation is 
viewed as a dialogical process for making justified decisions, and therefore they will not be 
thoroughly exploited in the present research. Nevertheless, also these features of Carneades will 
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be fully explained, for two reasons: first, presenting the capabilities and the theories beyond 
Carneades is impossible without referring to these notions; second, these notions play a role – 
even if a limited one – in the Carneades extension of the Judicial Ontology Set. 
There are differences between the critical questions on how strongly they produce that shift. 
Studies in the field highlighted two main theories about the allocation of the burden of proof 
when critical questions are asked [Walton 2005]: according to one theory, the shift is automatic 
and the argument is defeated unless the proponent provides an appropriate answer, while 
according to the other theory the shift occurs only if the critical question is backed up with some 
evidence. Verhej [Verheij 2003] distinguishes four types of critical questions, applying them to 
his Deflog logic (see 1.2.7.1.).  
a. CQs used to question whether a premise of a scheme holds (redundant); 
b. CQs pointed to exceptional situations in which a scheme should not be used 
(undercutters); 
c. CQs setting conditions for the proper use of a scheme (denying assumptions); 
d. CQs pointing to other arguments that might be used to attack the scheme (rebuttals). 
This classification explains why some critical questions shift the burden of proof back to the 
proponent while others must be backed up with evidence. In particular, the difference between 
these types of CQs comes into play when dealing with a lack of response from the other party. 
Under this point of view, not all argumentation dialogues are the same: in some cases, silence 
implies consent to the major and minor premise, and in this perspective the CQ of type a is not 
redundant, but rather the dialogical instrument used to ask for the proof of a premise. Delving 
deeper into the analysis of the premises being attacked by the CQ, it turns out that the type of 
premise directly determines the type of CQ being posed: When pointing to exceptional 
situations as in b, the CQ is targeting an exception and trying to prove its existence in the 
present case: in this case, the burden of proof does not shift back to the proponent. When setting 
conditions for the proper use of the scheme as in c, the respondent is trying to falsify one of the 
assumptions in the proposer’s argument20. Finally, when the respondent evokes other, 
incompatible arguments to attack the scheme, he has the burden of proof of proving the 
acceptability of the argument, which will then count as a premise towards the rebuttal of the 
proponent’s argument. While ‘static’, relational AI models of argumentation cannot handle the 
distinctions between normal premises, exceptions and assumptions (since these distinctions only 
make sense in a procedural context), Carneades is specifically designed to successfully handle 
the allocation of the burden of proof, especially in legal domain. 
The distinction presented above leads the main intuitions about the allocation of the burden of 
proof: when a party provides an argument instantiating some applicable scheme, the burden is 
                                                     
20 Please note that assumptions are not the same as negation of exceptions, thus the use of the term assumption in 
Carneades’ background theory (see 4.2.2.2.) deviates, e.g., from [Bondarenko, et al. 1997] (see 1.3.1.2.), where it is 
used for negations of what we call exceptions.  
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on that party to prove its ordinary premises and (once challenged) its assumptions, after which 
the burden shifts to the other party to defeat the argument by rebutting it or pointing out 
exceptions. 
4.2.1.3.  Burden of production and burden of persuasion 
In civil law suits of common law, it is normally the plaintiff who has the burden of proof for the 
main claim. However, Wigmore [Wigmore 1940] distinguished two types of burden of proof: 
the burden of persuasion, and the burden of production: “The risk of non-persuasion operates 
when the case has come into the hands of the jury, while the duty of producing evidence implies 
a liability to a ruling by the judge disposing of the issue without leaving the question open to the 
jury’s deliberations” ([Wigmore 1940], pp. 285-286). Wigmore says that the burden of 
persuasion never shifts, while the duty of producing evidence to satisfy the judge does have this 
shifting characteristic. Also McCormick [Strong 1992] and Park, Leonard and Goldberg [Park 
et al. 1998] provide a similar distinction between burden of persuasion and burden of 
production. The two burdens can be distributed over the two parties: for example, the plaintiff 
usually has the burden of production for the premises of the main claim, while the defendant has 
the burden of production for exceptions. 
Efforts towards a modelling of the burden of persuasion are contained in [Gordon and Walton 
2009] and in Prakken and Sartor’s non-monotonic system [Prakken and Sartor 1997] based on 
Dung’s grounded semantics (see 1.3.2.1.), as adjusted in [Prakken 2001] to distinguish between 
cases where the exception merely has to be made plausible and cases where it has to be proven. 
The modified system assumes as input not just a set of rules but also an allocation of proof 
burdens to plaintiff and defendant, which assume different dialectical roles (proponent or 
opponent) for different propositions. Although Prakken does not explicitly distinguish the 
burdens of production and persuasion, Prakken and Sartor [Prakken and Sartor 2006] argue that 
this work in fact models distribution of the burden of persuasion. 
Carneades allows allocation of the burden of production and the burden of persuasion 
separately, during the course of the dialogue. The initial allocation of the burden of production 
is regulated by the premise types: evidence for ordinary premises and assumptions (once 
challenged) must be produced by the proponent of the argument, while evidence for exceptions 
must be produced by the respondent. After the burden of production has been met, the burden of 
persuasion can be distributed by adjusting the proof standard required by the premise. The 
distinction of statements between exceptions, assumptions and ordinary premises is done by 
matching the argument instance with an argumentation scheme. As the dialogue progresses, the 
burdens may be reallocated either by matching some burden of proof or by changing the 
assignment of premise types and proof standards via additional speech acts, each of which must 
be matched to the the appropriate argumentation scheme. 
4.2.1.4.  Proof standards 
According to the definition of [Gordon et al. 2009], the proof standard - a central concept in the 
dialogical approach to argumentation- is a function mapping tuples of the form <issue, stage, 
audience> to the Boolean values true and false, where: 
 Issue is a proposition in a propositional language; 
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 Stage is a tuple <arguments, status> where arguments is a set of arguments (see next 
section) and status is a function mapping the conclusions of the arguments to their 
dialectical status in the stage (possible statuses are claimed, questioned, accepted, 
rejected); 
 Audience is a structure <assumptions, weight> where assumption is a consistent set of 
literals in a propositional language, assumed to be acceptable by the audience, and 
weight is a partial function mapping arguments to real numbers, representing the 
relative weights assigned by the audience to the arguments. 
 
Thus, a literal p is acceptable in an argument evaluation structure <stage, audience, standard>, 
if and only if standard(p, stage, audience) is true. 
These are the proof standards currently defined in Carneades, from [Gordon et. al. 2009, 
Brewka et. al. 2010]:  
 Scintilla of Evidence (se): it is satisfied iff there is at least one applicable argument pro 
p; 
 Preponderance of Evidence (pe), also called best argument in [Gordon and Walton 
2006, Gordon et. al. 2007]: it is satisfied iff p satisfies se and the maximum weight 
assigned to an applicable argument pro p is greater than the maximum weight assigned 
to an applicable argument con p; 
 Clear and Convincing Evidence (ce): it is satisfied iff p satisfies pe and the maximum 
weight of applicable pro arguments exceeds some threshold α, and the difference 
between the maximum weight of the applicable pro arguments and the maximum 
weight of the applicable con arguments exceeds some threshold β; 
 Beyond Reasonable Doubt (bd): it is satisfied iff p satisfies ce and the maximum 
weight of the applicable con arguments is less than some threshold γ; 
 Dialectical Validity (dv): it is satisfied iff there is an applicable argument pro p (p 
satisfies se) and there is no argument con p. 
Please notice that the first four proof standards are ordered by their relative strength, from the 
weakest to the strongest; Dialectical Validity, however, cannot be easily placed into that list, 
since it does not give importance to the weight of the pro argument(s). 
This list doesn’t claim to be exhaustive, nor to adequately model legal proof standards. In 
addition, a proof standard can also be derived from another by switching the roles of pro and 
con arguments of an existing standard: it is called the complement of a proof standard [Gordon 
et. al. 2006; Gordon et. al. 2007]. For example, the complement of the pe standard is satisfied iff 
the statement is supported by some applicable con argument with priority over its strongest 
applicable pro argument. In principle a statement can satisfy both a proof standard and its 
complement, highlighting the difference between acceptability and truth (see 4.2.2.2.): the 
arguments can be sufficient to justify a decision either way without being inconsistent. In 
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practice, however, this will be the case only with very weak proof standards, such as scintilla of 
evidence: if there exists an applicable pro argument and an applicable con argument, then both 
se and its complement are satisfied. 
4.2.2.  Argument structure 
On the basis of the theories explained above, argument structure in Carneades can be explained 
through a set of definitions contained in [Gordon 2006]. The atomic element of arguments is the 
stamement: 
Definition of Statement – Let <statement = complement> be a structure, where 
statement denotes the set of declarative sentences in some language, = is an 
equality relation, modeled as a function of type “statement x statement → 
Boolean”, and complement is a function of type “statement→ statement” 
mapping a statement to its logical complement. If s is a statement, the 
complement of s is denoted ¬s. 
Next, three types of premises are distinguished to allow defeasible argumentation and 
distribution of the burden of proof (as seen above): 
Definition of Premise – Let premise denote the set of premises. There are the 
following types of premises: 
 If s is a statement, then ◊s, called ordinary premise, is a premise. 
 If s is a statement, then ○s, called assumption, is a premise. 
 If s is a statement, then ●s, called exception, is a premise. 
 Nothing else is a premise. 
These elements form the structure of arguments: 
Definition of Argument – An argument is a tuple <c, d, p>, where c is a 
statement, d ∈ {pro, con} and p ∈ 2
premise
. If a is an argument <c, d, p>, then 
conclusion(a) = c, direction(a) = d and premises(a) = p. 
The main distinction between arguments and inference rules is the definition of con arguments: 
semantically, these are instances of inference rules for the negation of the conclusion. This is an 
approach which abstracts from the syntax of the language for statements, in order to be able to 
aggregate arguments pro and con some statement and to resolve the conflicts. 
4.2.2.1.  Argument graphs 
Carneades represents argumentation dialogues in tree-like argument graphs, whose conception 
is similar to Pollock’s concept of an inference graph (see 1.3.4.2.), where there are nodes 
representing statements (propositions) and links indicating inference relations between 
statements. Unlike Dung’s model (see 1.3.2.1.), in which the internal structure of single 
arguments is irrelevant, Carneades’ model of the acceptability of statements is based on the 
concept of argumentation schemes, where each conclusion is linked to a set of premises which, 
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in turn, may be accepted or rejected. On the other hand, the syntax of single statements is not 
relevant, except for the identification of the logical complement of a statement: a statement and 
its complement are in fact, unlike all other statements, related. A dispute about s is also a 
dispute about ¬s: an argument pro one is an argument con the other, and if one of these 
statements is accepted the other is automatically rejected. For these reasons, both statements are 
represented with only one statement node in the argument graph. 
 [Walton 1996] identifies two kinds of arguments: convergent arguments, where each reason 
provided (premise) is sufficient to accept the conclusion, and linked arguments, where all 
premises must hold for the conclusion to be accepted. Convergent arguments are represented in 
the graph by building multiple arguments for the same conclusion, while linked arguments are 
represented by a single argument defended by a set of premises instead of a single one. 
Assumptions and exceptions can be used to model Walton’s concept of critical questions 
[Walton 1996b], as already explained. 
Please note that argument graphs are not restricted to trees, as the same statement can be used in 
different types of premises in several arguments. However, graphs are not completely general: 
in order to enhance the decidability of the acceptability property of statements, in Carneades 
Fig. 4.1 – Example of argument graph (visualized with Carneades 1.0.2). Green boxes represent 
accepted statements (or acceptable and complement non acceptable), red boxes represent rejected 




1.0.2 cycles are not allowed
21
. Even if limitations can arise from this restriction, some of them 
can be successfully tackled: for example, in systems using Dung’s approach most cycles are 
constituted by clashes between arguments with incompatible conclusion, which can be 
represented in Carneades as a pair of arguments pro and con the same statement, without 
introducing cycles. 
4.2.2.2.  Argument evaluation 
In Carneades, argument evaluation consists in determining whether a statement is acceptable in 
an argument graph. The acceptability relation between argument graphs and statements 
measures the sufficiency of the proof: it is accomplished if and only if the argument graph is a 
defeasible proof of the statement. This distinguishes the acceptability relation from the 
defeasible consequence relation of non-monotonic logics: assuming a correct and complete 
calculus for such logics, a statement is a defeasible consequence of a set of statement if and only 
if the statement is derivable from the calculus, whether or not the proof has actually been 
derived in the specific case or not. 
Intuitively, a statement is acceptable if it is true under the arguments which have been put 
forward in the dialogue. Acceptability of a statement, as already explained, depends on its proof 
standard. Satisfiability of the proof standard depends on the defensibility of the arguments pro 
and con the statement, which in turn can be derived from the acceptability of the premises of the 
argument. This behaviour is called recursiveness. 
To evaluate a set of arguments in an argument graph, three factors have to be known:  
 The current dialectical status of each statement in the dialogue 
(stated/questioned/accepted/rejected). This status can be derived pragmatically, from the 
speech acts which constitute the dialogue; 
 The proof standard assigned to each statement; 
 A strict partial ordering on arguments (a1>a2 means that a1 has priority over/is 
stronger than a2).  
These requrements are formalized in the following definition of argument context, contained in 
[Gordon 2006]: 
Definition of Argument context – Let C, the argument context, be a tuple 
(status, ps, >), where status is a function of type “statement→{stated, 
questioned, accepted, rejected}”, ps is a function of type “statement→proof-
standard” and > is a strict partial ordering on arguments. For every statement s 
and its complement ¬s, the proof standard assigned to ¬s is the complement of 
the proof standard assigned to s and: 
                                                     
21 This issue has been tackled in the new Carneades Policy Modelling Tool, following [Brewka and Gordon  2010] 
and [Van Gijzel and Prakken 2011]. 
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 if status(s) = stated  then status(¬s) = stated, 
 if status(s) = questioned  then status(¬s) = questioned, 
 if status(s) = accepted then status(¬s) = rejected, 
 if status(s) = rejected then status(¬s) = accepted. 
Please note that stating or questioning a statement does not imply the assertion of some position 
or viewpoint pro or con the statement: stating a statement merely introduces it into the dialogue, 
while questioning a statement merely makes an issue out of it. 
Definition of Acceptability of statements – Let acceptable be a function of 
type “statement x argument-graph→boolean”. A statement s is acceptable in an 
argument graph G if and only if it satistfies its proof standard: “acceptable (s, 
G) = satisfies (s, ps(s), G)” 
Definition of Satisfaction of proof standards – A proof standard is a function 
of type “statement x argument-graph→boolean”. A statement s is satisfied by a 
proof standard f in an argument graph G if and only if f (s, G) is true. 
Definition of Defensibility of arguments – Let defensible be a function of type 
argument x argument-graph→boolean. An argument α is defensible in an 
argument graph G if and only if all of its premises hold in the argument graph: 
“defensible (α, G)=all(λp.holds(p,G))(premises α)”. 
Definition of Holding of premises – Let holds be a function of type premise x 
argument-graph→boolean. Whether or not a premise holds depends on its type. 
Thus, there are the following cases: 
 If p is an ordinary premise, ◊s, then 
acceptable (s, G)  if status(s) = stated 
acceptable (s, G)  if status(s) = questioned 
   true   if status(s) =accepted 
   false   if status(s) =rejected 
 If p is an assumption, ●s, then 
true    if status(s) = stated 
acceptable (s, G)  if status(s) = questioned 
   true   if status(s) =accepted 
     false   if status(s) =rejected 
 If p is an exception, ○s, then 
Holds (p, G) = 
Holds (p, G) = 
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¬acceptable (s, G)  if status(s) = stated 
¬acceptable (s, G)  if status(s) = questioned 
   false   if status(s) =accepted 
   true   if status(s) =rejected 
Please notice that it can be proven that there is always a unique and complete assignment of 
‘acceptable’ or ‘not acceptable’ to statements, and of ‘holds’ or ‘not holds’ to premises [Gordon 
and Walton 2006, Gordon et al. 2007]. It is also important to notice that whether or not a 
premise holds depends not only on the arguments which have been put forward, but also on the 
type of premise and the status of the premise’s statement in the context, which progresses in the 
course of the dialogue: first they are introduced (stated), and whether or not a premise which 
uses this statement holds depends on the kind of premises (ordinary premises hold only if the 
statement is acceptable given whatever arguments have been put forward, assumptions hold 
unconditionally, and exceptions hold only if the statement is not acceptable given the arguments 
put forward); successively a statement can be questioned, becoming an issue: now both ordinary 
premises and assumptions which use this statement hold only if they are acceptable; finally, a 
decision (whose justification – given the arguments made and the applicable proof standards – 
can be checked by anyone interested) accepts or rejects some statement, and the model respects 
that decision: for example, ordinary premises with accepted statements hold and ordinary 
premises with rejected statements do not hold. 
4.2.3.  Rules 
The kind of rule that Carneades and the AI&Law community is interested in is that defined as 
“One of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct within a 
particular sphere of activity”[Jewell and Abate, 2001]. The argumentation scheme for argument 
from legal rules which constitutes the background theory for the Carneades rule system, 
contained in [Gordon 2010], is based on the one developed by Gordon in The Pleadings Game 
[Gordon 1995] and can be defined formally as follows: 
Argument from legal rules 
Premises: 
r is a legal rule with ordinary conditions a(1),...,a(n) and conclusion c; 
Each a(i) in a(1)...a(n) is presumably true. 
Conclusion: c is presumably true. 
Critical Questions: 
Does some exception of r apply? 
Is some assumption of r not met? 
Is r a valid legal rule? 
Holds (p, G) = 
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Does some rule excluding r apply in this case? 
Here is a simplified example of a Carneades-style rule, built to represent a part of the 
knowledge already present in the ontology set: 
(rule Art1341co2 
 (if (and (oppressive ?c) 
   (general ?c) 
   (unilateral ?c) 
   (unless (specificallysigned ?c))) 
  (inefficacious ?c))) 
Following is the list of characteristics that can be ascribed to that kind of rule, according to the 
AI&Law community [Gordon 2005, Prakken et. al. 1996, Hage 1997, Verheij 1996]: 
 Rules have properties – such as their date of enactment, jurisdiction or authority; 
 When the antecedent of a rule is satisfied by the facts of a case, the conclusion of the 
rule is only presumably true, not necessarily true; 
 Rules are subject to exceptions; 
 Rules can conflict; 
 Some rule conflicts can be resolved using rules about rule priorities; 
 Exclusionary rules provide one way to undercut other rules; 
 Rules can be invalid or become invalid. Deleting invalid rules is not an option when it is 
necessary to reason retroactively with rules which were valid at various times over a 
course of events; 
 Rules do not counterpose. If some conclusion of a rule is not true, the rule does not 
sanction any inferences about the truth of its premises. 
Because of the first characteristic, rules cannot be modeled adequately as material implications 
in predicate logic: they need to be reified as terms, not formulas, so as to allow their properties 
to be expressed and reasoned about for determining their validity and priority. 
Like all monotonic logics, DL – although very powerful and useful – is not sufficient for 
modelling legal rules, such as the rules of contract law, in way which is maintainable, verifiable 
and isomorphic with the structure of legal texts (see [Gordon 1986, 1987, 1988]). This is mainly 
because legislation is tipically constituted by general rules subject to exceptions. Therefore, 
arguments made by applying legal rules are defeasible: their conclusions can be defeated with 
better counterarguments. Moreover, legal rules may conflict with each other, and these conflicts 
are resolved using higher-level rules, defining the priority relationships between rules such as 
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the rules of lex superior, lex posterior, lex specialis. Here is a first example of a rule, 
representing the legal principle that “later rules have priority of earlier rules”: 
(rule lex-posterior 
 (if (and (enacted ?r1 ?d1) 
  (enacted ?r2 ?d2) 
  (later ?d2 ?d1)) 
    (prior ?r2 ?r1)))  
Rules can be defeated in two other ways: by challenging their validity or by showing that some 
exclusionary condition applies. These are modeled with rules about validity and exclusion, 
using two further built-in predicates: (valid <rule>)and (excluded <rule> 
<literal>), where <rule> is a constant naming the rule and <literal> is a 
compound term representing a literal, which thus can also be reified in this system [Gordon 
2008]. Also the valid and excluded relations, like the prior relation, are to be defined in models 
of legal domains. Here are two examples, one for each of these predicates: 
(rule unconstitutional 
 (if  (unconstitutional ?r1) 
  (not (valid ?r1)))) 
(rule Art.1341co2-i 
 (if  (specifically_signed ?c) 
  (excluded Art.1341 (inefficacious ?c))) 
In the Carneades software, expertise from logic programming has been adapted to model legal 
rules and build an inference engine which can construct arguments from rules (see below 
4.2.10.1.). Rules in logic programming are Horn clauses (see 1.2.2.3.). Since it is not possible to 
represent negative facts using Horn clauses, rules do not counterpoise in logic programming. In 
Carneades, both the head and the body of the rules are more general than they are in Horn 
clauses: the head consists of a set of (both positive and negative) literals, while the body 
consists of an arbitrary first-order logic formula, except that quantifiers and bi-conditionals are 
not supported.  
For these reasons, legal rules are modeled in Carneades using a defeasible rule language 
specifically designed for this purpose as part of LKIF (see 2.4.5), and use OWL (see 2.2.4.1.) 
for the only purposes of declaring the language of predicate symbols and to make assertion 
about these predicates using DL axioms representing knowledge which is universally true and 
beyond dispute in the domain. The Carneades version described in [Gordon 2011b] is able to 
import and export both arguments and rules in LKIF format. Carneades version 2.x brings 
changes in both language and syntax for rules: XML language and LKIF-Rules syntax will in 
fact be replaced by s-expressivity and Horn Clause (Lisp-like) syntax. 
4.2.4. Argument construction 
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The argument construction module relies on rules, ontologies and manually inserted statements 
to construct an argumentation tree trying to answer any query concerning a precedent contained 
in the knowledge base [Gordon and Walton 2009]. The target statement can be of two types: a 
query-like statement (i.e. ?x Oppressive_Clause, which means “provide all x, where x is an 
oppressive clause”) or a simple assertion (ME/LaSorgente_Clause8 Oppressive_Clause, which 
means “Clause 8 of the contract between M.E. and La Sorgente is an oppressive clause”): in the 
first case, the system will return a list of results and arguments, while in the second case the 
system will construct a single argumentation tree pro or con the desired goal. 
4.2.4.1. Argument from Rules 
Carneades compiles rules into clauses in disjunctive normal form (see [Gordon 2007a]). Given 
an atomic proposition P, a rule can be used to construct an argument pro or con P if P or ¬P, 
respectively, are present in the head of the rule: if the head of a rule is an atomic sentence s, then 
the rule is mapped to a scheme for arguments pro s. If it is a negated atomic sentence (¬s), then 
the rule is mapped to a scheme for arguments con s. 
The burden of proof for an atomic proposition in the body can be allocated to the opponent by 
declaring the proposition to be an exception. Similarly, it is possible to make a proposition 
assumable, without proof, until questioned.  
The next step is to create argumentation schemes from the rules: 
Definition of scheme for arguments from rules: Let r be a rule, with conditions 
a(1)...a(n) and conclusions c(1)...c(n). Three premises, implicit in each rule, are made 
explicit here. The first, ○v, where v=(not(valid r)), excepts r if it is an invalid rule. The 
second, ○e, where e=(excluded r c(i)), excepts r if it is excluded with respect to c(i) by 
some other rule. The third, ○p, where p=(priority r(2) r), excludes r if another rule, r(2), 
exists of higher priority than r which is applicable and supports a contradictory 
conclusion. For each c(i) in c(1)...c(n) of r, r denotes an argumentation scheme of the 
following form, where d is ‘pro’ if c(i) is an atomic sentence and ‘con’ if c(i) is a negated 
atomic sentence: 
P(a(1))...p(a(n)), ○v, ○e, ○p 
d c(i) 
In order to construct instantiations of these argumentation schemes, the variables must be 
systematicallty renamed using a substitution environment (a mapping from variables to terms 
constructed by matching the conclusion of the argumentation scheme with some goal atomic 
statement). The valid and excluded relation, as well as the priority rules, must be defined in the 
models of the legal domains (see above, 4.2.3.). 
The applies predicate (which has nothing to do with the applies OWL property presented in 
3.2.3.1.) is a ‘built-in’, meta-level relation which cannot be defined directly in rules. It is 
defined in [Gordon 2008] as follows: 
Definition of the applies predicate: Let σ be a substitution environment and G be an 
argument graph. Let r be a rule and S be the set of argumentation schemes for r, with all 
of the variables in these schemes systematically renamed. There are two cases, for atomic 
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literals and negated literals. The rule r applies to a literal P in the structure < σ, G>, if 
here exists a pro argumentation scheme s in S, if P is atomic, or a con argumentation 
scheme, if P is negated, such that the conclusion of s is unifiable with P in σ, and every 
premise of s, with its variables substituted by their values in the σ, holds in G. 
This definition of the applies predicate enables some meta-level resoning: it allows to find rules 
which can be used to generate defensible pro and con arguments for some goal statement, or to 
check whether a particual rule can be used to generate them. Please note that the semantics of 
negation is dialectical, not classical negation or negation-as-failure, as the closed-world 
assumption is not made (see 2.2.5.1.): in Carneades, a negated sentence is acceptable just when 
the complement of the proof standard assigned to the sentence is satisfied, where the 
complement of a proof standard is constructed by reversing the roles of pro and con arguments 
(see above, 4.2.2.) 
The Carneades inference engine uses rules to construct and search a space of argument states, 
where each state consists of [Gordon 2010]: 
 Topic, the statement which constitutes the main issue of the dialogue; 
 Viewpoint, either pro or con. Depending on the viewpoint, the state of the argument 
can satisfy the goal state if the topic satisfies or doesn’t satisfy, respectively, the proof 
standard. Please notice the asymmetry between pro and con: the con viewpoint need not 
prove the complement of the topic, but only prevent the pro viewpoint from achieving 
its goal of proving the topic; 
 Pro-goals, a list of disjoint clauses, each of which represents a set of statements which 
might help the proponent to prove the topic; 
 Con-goals, a list of disjoint clauses, each of which represents a set of statements which 
might help the opponent to prevent the proponent from proving the topic; 
 Arguments, a graph representing all the arguments which have been put forward; 
 Substitution, a substitution environment mapping schema variables to terms (presented 
earlier on this section); 
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 Candidates, a list of candidate arguments, which are added to the argument graph only 
after all of its schema variables are instantiated in the substitution environment, to 
ensure that all statements in the graph are ground atomic formulas. 
Carneades is implemented in a modular way, which allows the space of states to be searched 
using any heuristic search strategy, many of which have been implemented (such as depth-first 
search, breadth-first, iterative-deepening). For all the strategies a resource limit, restricting the 
number of states which may be visited in the search space, may be specified, to assure 
termination of the search procedure. The system is also extensible. 
4.2.4.2. Argument from Ontology 
Carneades 1.0.2 allows to import of both the TBox and the ABox of OWL/RDF knowledge 
bases. The import, however, does not keep the inferential potentiality of the ABox, which would 
be possible by translating the axioms into LKIF rules, but rather imports a series of single 
statements about the knowledge base, not distinguishing between asserted and inferred 
knowledge (which is obtained by using a Pellet reasoner). This is not only a technical choice, 
but it also has to do with the role played by ontologies. It can be argued that arguments from 
ontologies should not be defeasible, since ontologies are typically defined using some subset of 
first-order logic, which is of course monotonic. One might claim that all communication 
presumes a shared ontology which is not subject to debate. [Gordon et al. 2009] consider 
arguments from ontology as defeasible, to the same extent as arguments from theory are 
defeasible. Even if one accepts that a community in principle shares some ontology, this does 
not imply that a model of this ontology in some representation language, such as OWL, is 
adequate or beyond dispute, and also when a community or some institutional authority has 
declared or accepted the ontology as binding, arguments from such agreements and authorities 
Fig. 4.2 – The argument search dialogue box, with nodes restrictions. 
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remain subject to critical questions. One way to represent this is to consider argument from 
ontology as a defeasible argumentation scheme: Walton [Walton 2006] defined a scheme called 
Argument from verbal classification, which can be considered as a kind of argument from 
ontology. 
Argumentation scheme for Argument from Verbal Classification 
Individual Premise:  
a has property F. 
Classification Premise:  
for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G. 
Conclusion:  
a has property G. 
Critical Questions: 
a. Does a definitely have property F, or is there room for doubt? 
b. Can the verbal classification (in the second premise) be sent to hold strongly, or is it one 
of those weak classifications that is subject to doubt? 
Also the scheme of argument from theory can be used: 
Argumentation scheme for Argument from Theory 
Derivability premise:  
T ⊦ P 
Theory premise:  






a. Even though P is necessarily true if T is true, the argument can be challenged by 
questioning the theory premise. Is the theory T really coherent? 
In Carneades 1.0.2, this is translated into a built-in presumption which comes along with every 
argument coming from ontology: this presumption is the validity of the ontology being used as a 
source of arguments. It is therefore not possible to examine which axioms of the ontology are 
involved in the inferencing, and neither to distinguish between asserted and inferred knowledge. 
This also means (see below) that no back-feeding of new information into the axioms of the 
Abox is possible.  
4.2.4.3. Arguments from cases and testimonial evidence 
As already seen in 1.4.2., despite the several research project in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence and Law on this subject, computational models of case-based reasoning are still at 
an early developmental stage, used mostly for legal teaching purposes, and the same can be said 
about a common theory of legal reasoning with cases in legal philosophy. 
Carneades implements a reconstruction of Cato (see 1.4.2.2.) by [Wyner and Bench-Capon 
2007]. For some legal issue, the precedent cases are analysed to collect the set of factors (a 
proposition which tends to favor one of the parties) which were found relevant for deciding the 
issue. Each precedent case is modeled as a set of such factors together with the decision of the 
court regarding the main claim. Starting from the set of factors known (or assumed) to be true in 
the current case, Carneades constructs (for each precedent) a set of six partitions of the union of 
the factors of the current case and the precedent case: 
 Intersection of pro-plaintiff factors in the precedent case and in the current case; 
 Intersection of pro-defendant factors in the precedent case and in the current case; 
 Set of pro-defendant factors in the precedent case which are not in the current case; 
 Set of pro-plaintiff factors in the precedent case which are not in the current case; 
 Set of pro-defendant factors in the current case which are not in the precedent case; 
Fig. 4.3 – Presumptions bringing forth the argument from ontology. 
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 Set of pro-plaintiff factors in the current case which are not in the precedent case. 
Unfortunately, this reconstruction of CATO does not allow sufficient integration of arguments 
from ontologies or rules, since ontologies and rules are modeled at a finer level of granularity 
(using predicate logic) than the factors in this model of case-based reasoning, which are at a 
more abstract, propositional level. This problem can be overcome by using bridging rules 
(similar to the output/input transformers in [Prakken 2008]), to map predicate logic formulas to 
factors. However, since different instantiations of schema variables in the predicate logic 
formulas can get mapped to the same factor, this solution only allows to map at most one 
predicate logic formula to each factor [Gordon 2010]. 
4.2.4.4. Argument Visualization 
The Carneades software includes a library for generating diagrams of argument graphs using 




The main feature of Carneades’ argument visualization (similarly to [Verheij 2005]) is that 
Carneades’ diagrams are views onto a mathematical model of argument graphs which can be 
modified through the user interface, rather than simply a single, unmodifiable model without a 
mathematical foundation as in Araucaria (see 1.3.4.4.) and Rationale
23, representing Wigmore’s 
                                                     
22 http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/. 
23 http://Rationale.austhink.com. 




(see 1.3.3.2.), Beardsley’s (see 1.3.3.3.), and Toulmin’s (see 1.3.3.4.) diagrams. When 
reconstructing Wigmore charts in Carneades, the key idea is to represent the various types of 
evidence with different argumentation schemes. Testimonial evidence, for example, can be 
understood as instantiation of a scheme for arguments from testimonial evidence [Gordon 
2007b].  
The distinction between the formal model and its visualization is very important to overcome 
typical diagramming issues which rise when roles and interactions in argumentation can be 
visualized in different ways. An example is the visualization of undercutters, arguments directly 
attacking the inferential link between the premises of an argument and its conclusion. In 
Carneades they are modeled as attacks on the major premise of an arguments, but other 
diagramming tools such as ArguMed [Verheij 2005] use a different method, called 
“entanglement”, to visualize undercutters: there, the undercutting argument points to the arrow 
between the premises and conclusion of the argument being undercut. It is possible, however, to 
use this diagramming technique in the Carneades argument visualization, by modifying the way 
the concept of undercutter is translated in the graph. 
4.2.5. Carneades 1.0.2 
The theories and methodologies presented above were assembled in an application capable of 
graphically representing argumentation processes. The program, running on a Java Virtual 
Machine, is a work environment including a GUI and a graph visualizer which automatically 
represents argument graphs through boxes (for statements), circles (for arguments) and arrows 
(for the identification of the role of premises/assumptions/exceptions/conclusion of statements 
in relation to arguments).  
Fig. 4.5 – The GUI. 
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New premises and arguments can be manually added to the graph by using the specific tools 
located on the left hand side of the GUI. It is possible to specify the default status of the 
statement between stated, questioned, accepted, rejected. Arguments can be created and its 
premises/conclusion can be linked directly from the visualization window.  
The find argument... tool exploits the Carneades reasoner to automatically find arguments pro 
and con the selected statement, marked as “target” for the argument search.  
Another tool, called find positions and introduced in [Ballnat and Gordon 2010], provides 
suggestions about how to obtain the desired status for a target statement. In this case, Carneades 
will look for possible configurations of statements status which allow the target statement to be 
Fig. 4.6 – The find argument tool. 




proved as requested, and feed them back to the user in an 
ordered fashion, giving precedence to positions which 
require the least number of questioned statements to be 
proved. 
This reasoning can be conducted not only among the 
arguments which are already present in the graph, but can 
also rely on an automatic argument construction. This 
can be done by combining the find argument and find 
positions tools, although this is not an automatic 
function. In order for Carneades to automatically build 
arguments which bring to the acceptation/rejection of the 
target statement, its knowledge base must be enriched by 
importing a set of rules, representing templates of 
possible arguments, and a set of triples, representing 
accepted/rejected statements. While rules are imported as 
an XML file in LKIF-Rule language, the triples can 
either be imported from XML triples or in the form of 
OWL ontologies, whose not only explicit knowledge is 
imported, but also triples inferred using an in-built 
adaptation of the Pellet reasoner. 
4.2.6. Carneades 2.x 
At the time of the research, Carneades is undergoing a vast renewal under different aspects, 
towards a new version which is going to be released in the near future.  
An important change concerns the language used for rules representation: XML will be replaced 
by s-expressions. The objective is to improve readability computability and enhance a layered 
structure for expressing the rules’ syntax, although Clojure (the language used for introducing s-
expressions) presents some issues mainly due to its relying on Horn clause logics (see below 
4.3.2.). 
4.2.7. New Features  
Following the indications coming from the testing of the first Carneades, the new semantics for 
assumptions and exceptions will be slightly modified. In Carneades 1.0.2, the qualification of 
the premise type does not influence the statement itself, but rather the link between the 
statement and the argument. This solution had the disadvantage of allowing incoherent 
behaviours of statements, which resulted to be false and true at the same time
24
. Therefore, 
                                                     
24 in Carneades 1.0.2, if a statement appears as the assumptions for one argument, and the exception to one other 
argument, and if it appears as stated, this would not prevent neither of the two arguments from being valid. Hence, 
the reasoning on the argument graph would stem from the (assumed) acceptability of the statement on one side 
(assumption) and on the (assumed) rejection of the same statement on the other side (exception). 
Fig. 4.8 – The import window. 
163 
 
Carneades 2.x presents a new modelling based on default weights which are assigned to 
statements, ranging on a scale from 0 to 1 as follows: 
0.00 rejected 
0.25 assumed false 
0.50 stated 
0.75 assumed true 
1.00 accepted 
The GUI has been redesigned into a multiuser, three-tiered Web-based interface. This change in 
the approach to the system is coherent not only with the recent trends in academic and 
experimental programming, but also with Carneades’ attitude to enhance semantic interaction in 
a social environment. A web-based interface would allow a more fluid integration of Carneades 
with online repositories and sources for knowledge, rules, and argumentation schemes. It could 
Fig. 4.9 – Process Model of the Policy Modelling Tool in [IMPACT 2013] 
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include a public repository of argument graphs, which would strongly enhance the 
comprehension of this system’s potentialities.  
4.2.7.1. The Policy Modeling tool 
The new version of Carneades is implemented into a wider Policy Modeling tool. The tool uses 
computational models of policies, applying methods from AI & Law and Computational 
Models of Argument, to help users understand the legal effects of alternative policies in 
particular fact situations or cases. The Tool’s applications are those eGovernment, eDemocracy-
oriented applications which aim at helping citizens and other stakeholders to better understand 
the proposed policies, so as to better enable them to contribute informed arguments to policy 
debates Inside this suite, the goal of the Carneades Argumentation System is to represent 
argumentation theory of philosophy into a computational tool through formal model. This 
model is exploited by several tools which fulfill different argumentation-related tasks such as: 
 Argument reconstruction; 
 Argument visualization and browsing; 
 Structured surveys, similar to Parmenides [Atkinson 2006]; 
 Policy analysis, realizing a kind of rule-based expert system. 
The system presents itself as a multiuser, web-based service. Similarly to version 1.0.2 it runs 
on Java Virtual Machine, which ensures interoperability, and brings with him its web server and 
database engine. Doesn´t need to be configured and is currently available in open-source format 
at carneades.github.com. 
As explained in Figure 4.9, the tasks fulfilled by the tools involve different actors, which access 
– as users – the same tools for different purposes: starting from the right: the authority to present 
issues for the debate, participants to answer polls and navigate argument graphs and the 
moderator to model the argument templates in order to extract useful data from these polls. 
The tasks that can be carried out by the specific tools are: 
 Summarizing the arguments of a debate in an argument graph such as that of Figure 
4.10; 
 Visualizing, browsing and navigating argument graphs; 
 Critically evaluating arguments; 
 Obtaining clear explanations, using argument graphs, of the different effects of 
alternative policies in particular cases; 
 Forming opinions, participating in polls and ranking stakeholders by the degree to 
which they share your views. 
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At the current state, four tools of the suite are already implemented: the argument formalization, 
the graphs, the polling system and the policy analysis tool. A manual is available in draft 
version, and the whole system is packaged in a self-installing java file. 
Possible applications of the Policy Modelling Suite include: 
 eDemocracy/eParticipation, improving the quality, efficiency, inclusiveness and 
transparency of democratic public policy deliberations;  
 Claims processing, improving the efficiency and correctness of claims processing 
procedures, both in public administration and the private sector, for example with 
regard to social benefits or insurance claims; 
 Regulatory compliance, helping companies to comply with regulations; 
 Case management, better managing complex legal cases in law firms, by creating 
maps of relationships between claims, legal arguments, case and statute citations, and 
testimonial and documentary evidence; 
 Humanities education, facilitating the learning of critical thinking and analysis skills, 
particularly in law, philosophy, religion and other humanities fields, where competing 
theories are constructed by interpreting texts. 
 The modelling of judicial precedents with Carneades  4.3.
4.3.1.  Version 1.0.2 
The Carneades argumentation system and its background theory were used in the present 
research to enrich the semantics of the Legal Ontology beyond the mere classification of claims, 
legal statuses and judicial interpretations on the basis of the considers/applies properties: the 
ontology set is in fact capable of telling which concepts are used in a decision and how they are 
used, but it cannot tell why (see Chapter 3). In fact, it is impossible to infer the so-called ratio 
decidendi followed by the judge from the mere binding of a material circumstance to a legal 
status. Moreover, as seen in 3.5.2., DL axioms allow defining the concept of applicable rule (or, 
from the opposite perspective, relevancy under article x) and to infer knowledge about the 
Fig. 4.10 – An example argument graph in Carneades 2.x 
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applicability of each rule on each case, but only to a limited extent. In fact, exceptions (as well 
as assumptions) can be represented, but will not bring any inferential capability because of the 
open world assumption. Moreover, the insertion of an exception into the axiom of an 
“applicable” class will in fact prevent any inference on the members of that class unless the 
declared knowledge base is complete (i.e. by explicitly stating which statuses do not belong to a 
particular individual, which means explicitly stating, for each status which is used as an 
exception in the axiom, not only the individuals who are actually bound to it but also those who 
aren’t). This brings down much of the power of the system built so far, and therefore the 
ontology set needs to be attached to some extension which could handle defeasible logics, in 
order to allow more complex reasoning on the knowledge contained in the decisions’ texts. 
The aim of the research done on the Carneades system is to create a suitable environment where 
the knowledge extracted from the decision’s text can be processed and managed, in such a way 
as to enable a deeper reasoning on the interpretation instances grounding the judicial decision. 
Examples of this deeper reasoning include:  
 Finding relevant precedents which were not explicitly cited in the decision;  
 Finding anomalies in the evaluation of material circumstances, in the light of cited 
precedents and similar cases;  
 Validating the adjudication(s) of the judge on the claim(s) brought forward by the 
parties during the trial, on the basis of applicable rules, accepted evidence and 
interpretation;  
 Suggesting possible weak spots in the decision’s groundings;  
 Suggesting possible appeal grounds and legal rules/precedents/circumstances that 
could bring to a different application of the rules and/or to a different adjudication on 
the claim. 
This is possible thanks to the mix of OWL-DL reasoning, semantically managing static 
information on the elements of the case, and rule-based defeasible reasoning, which ought to 
represent the dynamics of norms and judicial interpretations. The present approach focuses on 
the argument from ontology feature of Carneades: the program is in fact capable of accepting 
(or rejecting) the premises of arguments on the basis of the knowledge contained in some 
imported OWL/RDF ontology (see below 3.1). This allows to build complex argumentation 
graphs, where the argument nodes represent legal rules and the statements are accepted or 
rejected also on the basis of knowledge coming from the ontology and/or data inserted by the 
user. 
In this perspective, the Carneades argument graph may either represent: 
 A reconstruction of a judicial decision's contents in terms of laws applied, factors 
taken into considerations, and interpretations performed by the judge. The conclusion of 
the argumentation represents the final adjudication of the claim, and the Carneades 
reasoner will accept or reject the claim as a result of the application of the judicial 
interpretations contained in the decision's groundings (this is the kind of representation 
which will be shown in the present application); 
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 A collection of argumentations paths leading to a given legal statement (such as 
"contract x is inefficacious"). On the basis of manually-inserted statements concerning 
the object of the case (statuses or factors concerning the material circumstance, i.e. 
contract x) the Carneades reasoner suggests possible argumentation paths leading to the 
acceptation (or rejection) of the desired legal statement.  
In both cases, however, the system presents to the user not only argumentation paths which have 
been proved as valid (i.e. rules whose conditions have all been met), but also possible, 
incomplete argumentation paths where one or more of the premises is still undecided: under this 
perspective, Carneades provides a semantic environment where different laws, legal statuses 
and precedents are related to each other. From that point, the user can go further by querying the 
knowledge base to retrieve precedents where similar (or different) interpretations are made: in 
this way, he can realize which differences – if any – exist between two or more precedents. It is 
like browsing case-law in a law journal in order to compare different decisions, but in the 
Carneades environment this can be done directly with legal concepts, not only to verify a 
combination of circumstances and laws under a logical point of view, but also to receive 
suggestions from the system on which law, precedent or circumstance could lead to a different 
outcome. 
The implementation of Carneades has been carried through different tasks:  
 Enriching the semantic content of the Legal Ontology by representing the fine-
grained knowledge contained in the decision’s text, in an environment where this 
expansion of the knowledge base does not entail an overburdening of the OWL 
reasoners (which would compromise the usability of the tool due to the exponential 
growth of the reasoning time when enlarging ontology-based KBs);  
 Modelling a rule system representing the dynamic relationships created by judicial 
interpretations and law applications, providing the basis for answering a wide range of 
queries about the case in the light of (cited and uncited) precedents; 
 Importing the knowledge of the ontology set in such a way that the two can 
successfully interact, allowing exchange of knowledge from the Ontology Set to the 
Carneades model (and, possibly, also vice versa). 
4.3.2. Ontology Import 
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The first activity consisted in verifying the import system in Carneades 1.0.2, which resulted to 
be complete (importing both declared and inferred knowledge). In this initial phase, the Legal 
Ontology imported is still the complete ontology set (core+domain) containing axioms for 
Relevant clauses as well as Inefficacious clauses. The consistency of the imported 
knowledge was verified through simple queries, asking Carneades about the acceptability of 
some assertion, using only the knowledge base imported from the ontologies. In these simple 
cases, the representation of the argumentation scheme was rather simple and brought no new 
information on the surface. As it can be seen in Figure 4.11, the only arguments coming into 
play are arguments from ontology. The argument named HermiT represents the inference made 
by the reasoner, and the premise “valid http://www.semanticweb.org/o..” is the (assumed) 
premise that the ontology at that URL is valid. This behaviour is related to the import system 
used in Carneades 1.0.2: all knowledge (explicit and derived) is imported without keeping track 
of their origin. Therefore, it is not possible to argue about the inferences made by the ontology 
reasoner, or to analyze/modify/exclude any of the axioms bringing inferences. Moreover, it is 
not possible to use these axioms to process new information coming out from Carneades’ 
argumentation engine: all statements which do not come from the knowledge base of the 
ontology, but rather use external knowledge (Carneades rules or custom statements) will not be 
processable under the ontology’s axioms, and vice versa. This problem in re-feeding new 
knowledge on the ontology inferencing engine is a major issue, which will be further discussed 
later in 4.5.3.  
4.3.2.1. Adding Factors 
The next step is to enrich the knowledge base with information coming from the decision’s text, 
where not only 




from the law 
text) were used, 




come into play. It is important to make a distinction between legal statuses and factors, but at 
the same time the border between these two concepts is not very easy to identify. For example, 
the legal status AddedToPrecompiled (stating that a specific clause has been manually 
added to a precompiled contract) appears as part of a main premise in rule Article 1342co1, but 
also constitutes an important factor in judicial interpretations towards the attribution of the 
Knowable legal status (relevant in rule Article 1341co1). The circumstance of the clause being 
added to a precompiled contract can therefore be represented as a legal status, as a factor, or as 
both of them. Nevertheless, it is necessary to either define a standard in distinguishing between 
these two, or to renounce to this distinction entirely, using only one class and a couple of 
properties (this issue on properties, trying to set a flexible and modular ratio between 
consider/applies, hasfactor and judged_as will be further discussed in 4.5.7.). The present 
Fig. 4.11 – Example of argument from ontology in the argument graph. 
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research maintains an open approach in defining those concepts, allowing the markup of an 
element as both factor and legal status. 
Even if they could semantically be treated equally, the syntactic involvements of factors are 
much looser than those of legal statuses: once a legal status is assigned to a material 
circumstance (either through explicit insertion, interpretation or reasoning), a series of possible 
consequences may be triggered, including statements concerning law applicability or legal 
consequences. On the other hand, when a factor is applied_by a material circumstance, the 
possible consequences include only the possible assignment of a legal status, but this is never 












automatic: the argument bringing to the assertion “applies A X” has always some assumed 
premise in addition to the factor(s) required for that interpretation. The assumption consists in 
some judgement or doctrine to be accepted in the specific case. This, of course, does not happen 
when applying legal rules, which do not require acceptance (being rules subject to different 
exceptions, e.g. those coming from the rules hierarchy).  
The link between the factor and the consequent status is therefore weak and defeasible. On the 
other hand, concepts expressed by the factors are broad and can be shaped differently when they 
appear in different precedents. In this way, when reasoning about factors, the system is capable 
of bringing forward many possible interpretations, assigning different combination of factors to 
the material circumstance, thus bringing a wide and hopefully inspiring list of possible 
interpretations of the fact. These suggestions are also ranked by Carneades through the find 
positions tool (Figure 4.7), which suggests first the argumentation which require less yet 
unknown information to be asserted, while at the same time using many already accepted (or 
rejected) assertions as valid premises. 
The following list describes the factors individuated in the decisions sample, divided into 
categories which depend on the legal status(es) whose interpretation the factors lead towards. 
What follows is indeed a partial, open list. 
Factors related to a contract clause’s oppressiveness (legal status: Oppressive_Clause): 
 InsuranceCoverageLimitation: the clause contains a limitation in the coverage of the 
insurance contract; 
 RiskExclusionForElectricPhenomena: the clause contains an exclusion of the 
insurance coverage for damages consequent to electric phenomena; 
 RiskExclusionForElectricDevices: the clause contains an exclusion of the insurance 
coverage for damages occurred to electric devices; 
 InsuranceRiskExclusion: the clause significantly reduces the insurance coverage of 
the risk; 
4.13c 
Fig. 4.13 (a, b, c) – Example of factors to legal statuses. 
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 InsuranceObjectSpecification: the clause defines the object of the insurance coverage; 
 InsuranceDrunkDriverExclusion: the clause excludes the insurance coverage for 
damages caused by a drunk driver; 
 SoleRightInAgency: the clause states that the agent has to be the sole agent for the 
counterpart (in a territory); 
 WithdrawalForBothParties: the clause allows both parties to withdraw from the 
contract; 
 ExpertOpinion: the clause forces the parties to rely on an expert’s opinion in case of 
disputes on the contract’s content; 
Factors related to a contract unilaterality or precompliedness (legal statuses: Unilateral; 
Precompiled): 
 Precompiled: contract was precompiled (previously prepared by one of the parties); 
 GeneralClauseSubsumption: bla; 
 Peradesione: the contract was of a particular tipe, called per adesione in Italian Civil 
Code: it is a kind of contract where the acceptant can only accept the fixed conditions 
set by the proponent; 
 Negotiated: the contract has been object of negotiations between the parties.; 
 ObjectExcludesPeradesione: the object of the contract excludes it being a contract per 
adesione; 
 
Factors related to a clause’s specific signing (legal status: SpecificallySigned): 
 RecallObjectOrNumber: the space devoted to specific signing recalls the object or the 
number of the clause; 
 RecallObjectAndNumber: the space devoted to specific signing recalls the object and 
the number of the clause;  
 RequiredObjectOrNumber: the present judgement considers sufficient the indication 
of object or number of the clause; 
 RequiredObjectAndNumber: the present judgement requires the indication of both 
object and number of the clause; 
 RecallAllClauses: the space devoted to specific signing contains a recall of all the 
clauses of the contract; 
 RecallNonOppressiveClauses: the space devoted to specific signing contains a recall 
of clauses of the contract which are not oppressive; 
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 SpecificSigningThroughRecall: the clause is specifically signed through a signing in a 
dedicated space distinct from the clause itself; 
 SingAtEndOfPage: the page containing the clause has been signed; 
 ProductionDuringTrial: the clause has been produced during the trial; 
 KnownDocument: the document is known to the parties; 
 KnownDocumentRecall: the clause consists in a document recalled by the contract; 
 InsuranceDocumentRecall: the clause consists in an insurance document recalled by 
the contract. 
4.3.3. Creating rules 
In order to support automatic argument construction within Carneades 1.0.2, legal rules (those 
formerly included in the Legal Ontology as “axioms”) and interpretation instances have been 
represented in LKIF-Rules language. It is possible to distinguish three kinds of rules used to 
support automatic argument construction in the present research: 
Rules representing law relevancy: they bring together different legal statuses and apply a 




<s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co1"><v>C1</v> falls under 
the discipline of Article 1341 comma 1 of Civil Code 
</s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the 
discipline of <i value="&oss;Art1341co1cc">Article 
1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </i></s> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;General"> general status</i> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral status</i> </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> not applies <i 






Rules representing law application: the application of a legal consequence is a further step, 
and is represented by a different rule. This is the phase when possible exceptions to the 
application of the rule may come into play. Here is an example: 
<rule id="LAWCONS_Inefficacy rule"> 
 <head> 
<s pred="&oss;Inefficacious"><v>C1</v> Is 






falls under the  discipline of Article 
1342 comma 2 of Civil Code </s> 
 <not exception="true"><s 
pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v>  applies <i 
value="&oss;ReproducingLawDisposition"> a    
law  disposition</i> </s></not> 
 <not exception="true"><s 
pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v>    applies <i 
value="&oss;International"> an international  





Rules representing precedents: these can be called rules of precedent, because they actually 
bring together different factors and apply a legal status to the material circumstance which 
considers these legal statuses. Since the actual applicability of the precedent is not a matter of 
logic defeasibility, but rather depends on the evaluation of the judge, this rule only brings 
forward an assumption that the material circumstance could be interrpeted in the light of a 
certain precedent. Therefore, every rule of precedent includes assumptions which represent the 





<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 




<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor <i 
value="&oss;ProducedDuringTrial"> is produced during 
trial</i></s> 
<assumable="true"><s pred="&ossjudged_as"><v>C1</v> is 
judged as with <i value="&oss;Cass.460/1983">precedent 
Cass. 460/1983</i> is accepted</s>  
<not exception="true"><s 
pred="&osshasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ProducedNotToEnact"> was produced with the 
intention non to enact it</i></s></not> 
 </body> 
</rule>  
Rules enhancing semantics: managing statuses and factors in a specific domain, it is necessary 
to introduce some semantic rules that allow some more inference on the possible status and 
factor applicable to a specific circumstance. These rules do not directly come from law, and 
neither from judicial interpretation. Their role is to establish a link between low- and high-level 
factors, so that more complex concepts can be represented with a single factor in higher rules, 
and at the same time the semantics of these complex factors can be kept intact, allowing the 
factor to be bound to material circumstances which have the required characteristics, but 
expressed in lower-level concepts. These rules may come from taxonomies, contract 
dispositions, natural or scientific evidences, or even very strong legal doctrine. It doesn’t 
comprehend exceptions (as in legal rules) or assumptions (as in rules of precedent) and 
therefore does not constitute a “node” in the defeasible argumentation process. Nevertheless, it 
is necessary to represent this “taxonomy” in LKIF-Rule because of the problem with importing 
the ontology and its axioms: if represented only in OWL, in fact, Carneades would only be able 
to apply the axioms to the (stated and inferred) knowledge of the Ontology Set, and would be 
unable to repeat the reasoning on new knowledge coming out of the application of the LKIF 
rules. If the solution of translating axioms into rules is adopted (see the issue in 3.4.3.3), this 
whole category could be moved to the Ontology Set (which is its preferrable place, being a 
“taxonomic” classification rather than a defeasible logics language). Here are two examples: 
<rule id="TEC_RecallObjectORNumber"> 
 <head>       
<s pred="Recalls_ObjectORNumber"><v>B1</v> recalls 





   <or> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor 
<i value="&oss;RecallsNumber"> recalls 
number</i> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor 
<i value="&oss;RecallsObject"> recalls 
object</i> </s> 





<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;General"> general status </i></s></not> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;Specific"> specific status </i></s> 
 </body> 
</rule> 
Under a different perspective, the first three types of rules represent three phases of a procedure, 
which is anyway not to be followed strictly: 
 Rules representing precedents take into account stated (and possible) factors to be 
applied to the various material facts of the case, highlighting possible precedents that 
apply some legal status to the circumstances; 
 Rules representing law relevancy take into account stated (and possible) legal statuses 
to be applied to the various material circumstances of the case, highlighting relevance 
under legal rules. The system distinguishes between legal statuses contained (or 
inferred) in the knowledge base of the Ontology set, and those coming from rules 
representing precedents; 
 Rules representing law application finally take into account circumstances which are 
already relevant to some law, verifying that no exceptions (i.e. coming from other laws) 
apply to the case, and if none applies the circumstance is labeled with the legal 
consequence provided by the relevant law. 
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This proceeding can also be tracked backwards, starting from the simple query about some 
specific legal consequence being applicable to a material circumstance (i.e. a contract). The 
system then builds a tree of possible argumentation paths, including all the four types of rules 
presented above. Any of the statements introduced by the reasoner can be then further searched 
for arguments: if a law relevancy statement is highlighted, rules representing law relevancy will 
be used to show plausible paths that could lead to the desired consequence (accept/reject the 
statement), while if a statement applying a legal status to a circumstance is highlighted, rules 
representing precedent will be used to show precedents that lead to the desired consequence. 
4.3.4. The query graph 
 In order to show the argument building process undergone by Carneades, a demo.xml 
Carneades argument graph was created. The graph includes 27 issues, one for each sentence of 
the research sample, imported from the OWL judicial ontology set together with several module 
containing the rules used in the sample sentences (see Appendix). Each issue concerns the 
application of a specific legal consequence (Inefficacious) to a specific material 
circumstance (i.e. ME_LaSorgente_Clause8). Through the find argument tool, Carneades 
builds the argumentation tree in Figure 4.14. 
Asking Carneades to verify the acceptability of a query, the system assigns a dialectical status 
to the main issue, showing also the argumentative path followed to come to the conclusion. 
Highlighting further statements in the path, it is possible to ask Carneades to analyze the 
question in further details, suggesting possible logic and juridical paths through which it could 
be possible to come to the acceptance of (or rejection of, or to not decide) the highlighted 
statement. In this way, it is possible for the user to explore the interpretation instances which 
Fig. 4.14: example of Carneades argumentation tree on the decisions sample. 
178 
 
play some role in the decision, scouting possible paths that could lead to a different outcome for 
the claim. 
4.3.5. Classification of Judgements through Adjudication 
Carneades rules can be used to reproduce not only the reasoning of the judge when dealing with 
interpretations (linking a material circumstance to a legal status) but also when dealing with 
adjudication (linking a legal claim to a legal outcome). In particular, the following rules (in 
LKIF-Rule language) was conceived: 
<rule id="Adjudication"> 
 <head> 
  <s pred="&oss;accepts"><v>J1</v> accepts <v>C1</v></s> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  <s pred="&oss;Judgement"><v>J1</v> is a judgement </s> 
  <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>J1</v> applies <v>S1</v></s> 
  <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>S1</v> applied_by 
<v>C1</v></s> 
  <s pred="&oss;Claim"><v>C1</v> is a claim </s> 










  <s pred="&oss;Judgement"><v>J1</v> is a judgement </s> 
  <s pred="&oss;accepts"><v>J1</v> accepts <v>C1</v></s> 
  <s pred="&oss;held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by 
<v>P1</v></s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasrole"><v>P1</v> has role <i 











  <s pred="&oss;Judgement"><v>J1</v> is a judgement </s> 
  <s pred="&oss;accepts"><v>J1</v> accepts <v>C1</v></s> 
  <s pred="&oss;held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by 
<v>P1</v></s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasrole"><v>P1</v> has role <i 





<not><s pred="&oss;ProPlaintiff"><v>J1</v> was not 
decided following plaintiff’s claim </s></not> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  <s pred="&oss;Judgement"><v>J1</v> is a judgement </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;accepts"><v>J1</v> accepts 
<v>C1</v></s></not> 
  <s pred="&oss;held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by 
<v>P1</v></s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasrole"><v>P1</v> has role <i 







<not><s pred="&oss;ProDefendant"><v>J1</v> was not 
decided following defendant’s claim </s></not> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  <s pred="&oss;Judgement"><v>J1</v> is a judgement </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;accepts"><v>J1</v> accepts 
<v>C1</v></s></not> 
  <s pred="&oss;held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by 
<v>P1</v></s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasrole"><v>P1</v> has role <i 
value="&oss;Defendant"> defendant </i></s> 
 </body> 
</rule> 
This allows the reasoner to classify the claim following the actual judge’s decision, 
distinguishing the following cases: 
 If it applies the same rules of one of the claims, that claim is accepted; 
 If it doesn’t, that claim is rejected; 
 If a “third solution” is found by the 
judge, both claims appear as rejected. 
This structure allows to check not only the 
formal adjudication (if the accepts property is 
already written in the T-Box of the Legal 
Ontology representing the case at hand), but – 
thanks to the first rule presented in this section – 
it also allows to check the substantial 
adjudication, verifying whether the sentence 
applies the statuses and laws as suggested either 
parties, or whether it doesn’t. It is however to be 
noted that this latter function doesn’t involve a 
complex reasoning but rather represents a kind 
of advanced “lookup” function. 
 The application of Carneades by 4.4.
the present research 
4.4.1. Introduction: Querying the 




In the present section, an example of judgement representation is given. The task of the user in 
this example is to check which cases (i.e. in the presence of which factor, or in which tribunal) 
an oppressive clause is judges as inefficacious. The first step consists in querying the Carneades 
System to retrieve a list of contract clauses which have been considered oppressive (either by 
the parties as an undisputed fact, or following a judicial interpretation). Figure 4.15 shows the 
resulting list. 
In the present example the second result (ME/LaSorgente_Clause8) will be further analysed. 
Please notice that this instance does not represent a legal case, but rather a contract clause. 
Information contained in the ontology allows retrieving in any moment the details concerning 
the case (court, date, parties, the decision’s text, and so on) but such information will not be 
shown on the argumentation tree: in it, only simple statements concerning the contract clause, 
other material circumstances related to it (i.e. the contract it is contained in), legal statuses, and 
interpretation instances – the statements which are relevant to the dynamics of the judicial 
argumentation – are found, those who pertain to the identification of the case being retrievable 
but not shown here. 
4.4.2.  Reasoning on law applicability 
The next step is to ask the system Whether ME/LaSorgente_Clause8 can be considered 
inefficacious in the light of applicable laws and judicial interpretations made by the judge in the 
precedent (Figure 4.16 shows the results). 
The system found two applicable laws to argue the inefficacy of the clause (left part of Figure 
4.16): if the conditions of one of these two laws are met, and no exception exists (in this case, 
possible exceptions - broken lines - are the contract being an international contract, and the 
contract reproducing law dispositions), the clause is inefficacious.  
The requirements for a clause to be relevant under one of these two laws are presented in the 
central part of Figure 4.16: 
Fig. 4.16 –  Argumentation PRO the contract clause being inefficacious. 
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In order for the clause to be relevant under Article 1341co1 it must be general, unilateral and 
not knowable by the other party by using ordinary diligence (following is the rule in LKIF-Rule 
language). 
<rule id="LAW_Art1341co1"> 
  <head> 
<s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co1"><v>C1</v> falls under 
the discipline of Article 1341 comma 1 of Civil Code 
</s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the 
discipline of <i value="&oss;Art1341co1cc">Article 
1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </i></s> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;General"> general status</i> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral status</i> </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> not applies <i 




In order for the clause to be relevant under Article 1341co2 it must be general, unilateral, 
oppressive and not specifically signed (following is the rule in LKIF-Rule language). 
<rule id="LAW_Art1341co2"> 
<head> 
<s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co2"><v>C1</v> falls under 
the discipline of Article 1341 comma 2 of Civil Code 
</s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the 
discipline of <i value="&oss;Art1341co2cc">Article 
1341 comma 2 of Civil Code </i></s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <v>S1</v> 
</s> 




<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;General"> general status</i> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral status</i> </s> 






4.4.3.  Reasoning on judicial interpretations 
The clause was found to be oppressive (since a clause concerning competence derogation is part 
of the list of article 1341co2), general and unilateral (dark boxes with a tick are accepted 
statements, dark circles with “+” are valid pro arguments). The arguments used to accept these 
statements are arguments from ontology, which means that the relative information has been 
manually inserted in (or inferred by) the database and it is not possible to further explain those 
positions. The search, however, was not deep enough to determine whether this clause is 
specifically signed or not, nor whether it was knowable or not (white boxes represent undecided 
– stated or questioned – statements). 
4.4.3.1. Introducing pro arguments 
The next step is to ask Carneades to produce argumentation towards the acceptance/rejection of 
the yet undecided statements. Carneades first searches for arguments pro the clause being 
specifically signed: Figure 4.17a shows that the requirement for a judicial interpretation towards 
the specific signing of the clause is met: the clause is "correctly recalled" and therefore can be 
considered as specifically signed following some precedent (unless the "recall exception" 
applies). Following is the rule: 
<rule id="TEC_SpecificSigningByRecall"> 
<head> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 




<s pred="CorrectlyRecalled"><v>C1</v> is correctly 
recalled</s> 
<not exception="true"><s pred="RecallException"> 





Figure 4.17b explains why the "correctly recalled" premise has been marked as "accepted" by 
Carneades: the ME/LaSorgente contract contained a distinct box (usually placed at the end) 
which recalls object and number of the oppressive clause, and the box has been signed by the 
other party. It is unknown whether the indication of both object and number in the distinct box 
is required for the recall to be considered correct in the present case (it depends on the 
precedents that the judge decides to follow: both may be required, or just one of the two may 
suffice) but it doesn’t matter, as long as the case fulfils the most restrictive requirement of 
indicating both the object and the number. Following is the rule: 
<rule id="TEC_CorrectObjectANDNumber"> 
Fig. 3.17a 








<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by 
<v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="Recalls_ObjectANDNumber"><v>B1</v> recalls 
object and number</s> 
</body> 
</rule> 
Fig. 4.19 – Argumentation on the acceptation of the exception. 
Fig. 




4.4.3.2. Introducing con arguments 
A position to support the specific signing of the clause was found, the argument being called 
Specific Signing Through Recall, but it is prone to an exception which has not yet been 
explicitly rejected. Before checking it, it is possible to check if there is some plausible 
argumentation path leading to the opposite conclusion (con the clause being specifically 
signed). Carneades found two paths leading to the opposite conclusion (Figure 4.18, darker 
circles with “-“ are valid con arguments), and therefore the statement “applies 
ME/LaSorgente_Clause8 SpecificallySigned” has turned white – and undecided – 
again. The bottom argument, called NEGINST_NotSpecificallySigned, is a simple 
instantiation of a negation, turning a positive status notA into a negative status A (this fiction is 
necessary to translate between Description logics-, open-world-based OWL ontologies and 
defeasible rules while keeping full OWL expressivity and should be rendered unnecessary by 
the implementation of OWL2’s Negative Object Property Assertion). Going further backwards, 
it turns out that the statement “ME/LaSorgente_Clause8 judged_as 
NotSpecificallySigned” is an argument from ontology: it represents a judicial 
interpretation made by the judge in the case which had that very clause 
(ME/LaSorgente_Clause8) as its object. Hence, the judge actually interpreted that clause as 
not having been specifically signed – But why? That question is answered by the second 
argument (JINT_RecallNonOppressiveClause): this argument signifies that the box which 
contains the specific signing contains also clauses which are not oppressive. This, under some 
interpretation, may render invalid the signing made on the box: in particular, the relevant 
precedent (Cass.1860/1998, which means Cassation Court decision n. 1860 of 1998) is not only 
suggested, but thoroughly accepted: this means that the judge, while interpreting the case where 
ME/LaSorgente_Clause8 was involved, explicitly cited that precedent in his decision. 
4.4.3.3. Reasoning on exceptions 
The evidences presented above suggest that the solution taken by the judge was to consider the 
clause as not specifically signed, but in order to verify the consistency of this one last step is 
needed, namely, checking if the exception for the pro argument towards the specific signing of 
the clause applies (Figure 4.19, darker boxes with “x” are rejected statements). Following is the 
rule responsible (with multiple heads) responsible for both the support for the con argument and 
the undercutting of the pro argument. 
<rule id="JINT_RecallNonOppressiveClauses"> 
<head> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> doesn't apply <i 
value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> specifically signed 
status </i></s></not> 






Fig. 4.20 – The complete argumentation graph  
<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by 
<v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor <i 
value="&oss;RecallsNonOppressiveClauses"> recalls also 
non oppressive clauses</i></s> 





Figure 4.20 shows the complete argumentation graph of Figure 4.16. The oppressive clause has 
been judged as inefficacious, and the graph shows why (white boxes) it could be that a similar 
case gets a different outcome. 
4.4.4.  Suggesting New Argumentation Paths 
Carneades can also suggest new interpretations for known facts, in the light of existing norms 
and relevant precedents. The system can analyse the relevance of the same clause 
(ME/LaSorgente_Clause8) under article 1342co2. Under that perspective, the clause still lacks 
an acceptable argument pro or con its knowability. Trying to find some arguments pro the 
188 
 
knowability it turns out that Carneades has noticed the signed box which recalls clause 8. Using 
a different legal reasoning, he takes into account the rule JINT_KnownDocumentRecall, 
introduced by TribPiacenza2.1 (a decision which is inside the knowledge base of the Domain 
Ontology):  
<rule id="JINT_KnownDocumentRecall"> 
<head>       
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is not <i 




<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;RecallsSeparateDocument">recalls a 
separate document</i></s> 
<and><s pred="&oss;recalls"><v>C1</v> recalls 
<v>D1</v></s><s 
pred="&oss;SeparateDocument"><v>D1</v> is a 
separate doc</s></and> 
</or> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>D1</v> has factor <i 
value="&oss;KnownToParties"> is known to the 
parties</i> </s> 
  <not> 
<not assumable="true"><s 
pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i 
value="&oss;Cass.3929/1999"> precedent Cass. 
3929/1999</i> </s></not> 
  </not> 
</body> 
</rule> 
Following this interpretation, if a clause is recalled by a document which is known to the 
parties, the clause has to be considered knowable. Carneades also found out that the distinct box 
is a contractual agreement, and therefore presumes (dotted green line) that the interpretation 
TribPiacenza2.1 can be applied to the case. This specific interpretation of the case 
ME/LaSorgente was not contained in the decision text (which does not talk about the profile of 
knowability, and this is testified in the ontology by the lack of judged_as properties linking the 
clause to one of its I/O statuses) and neither it cites the precedent of TribPiacenza2.1, but 
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Fig. 4.21 – Suggested arguentation PRO the clause being knowable. 
nevertheless Carneades suggested this way of argumenting pro the target statement (Figure 
4.21). 
 This could give hints on the practicability of such a strategy in a similar case, or arise 
comments on the difference between the legal concepts of "knowability" and "specific signing" 
in the terms of the relevance of the number and kind of clauses which are recalled in a separate 
document. 
4.4.5.  Other Applications 
The example only showed how to model one single case, albeit giving the idea of which 
different directions can be taken from there. In this environment, it is in fact possible to conduct 
many and more complex activities even with the small number of cases already contained in the 
OWL knowledge base: it is possible to query precedents (such as TribPiacenza2.1) in order 
to understand the characteristics of the case, and to compare them to other precedents or to a 
new case; it is possible to investigate the relevancy of a clause having certain characteristics 
under a specific norm or judicial interpretation, and those characteristics can be either manually 
inserted as statements in the argumentation graph, or automatically extracted from precedents or 
knowledge bases (even outside the Domain Ontology). The defeasible logic behind the reasoner 
and the solid proof standards system allow a complete analysis of possible exceptions to rules 
and interpretations, through a positions searching activity: the system takes - in turns - the part 
of the attacker and the defendant and produces arguments pro and con the given statement. 
These advanced and more automated functions are however hindered by two limits of the 1.0.2 
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version: the lack of automatic management of weights and proof standards, since arguments did 
not automatically inherit weights from rules (but this has been overcome in version 2.x, see 
4.2.6.1.) and the reasoning times which rise exponentially when incrementing the rule base and / 
or the ontology KB beyond a relatively small threshold. 
4.4.6. Version 2.x 
The same experiment was tried with the new version of Carneades, which is still under 
construction (for a presentation of the features introduced in version 2.x, see above 4.2.6.). The 
main differences in the approach were the following: 
 Although previewed, at the actual stage Carneades 2.x does not include an import 
engine for ontologies. The knowledge had therefore to be inserted in the rules file, to 
give the basis for reasoning on the rules to be checked.  
 The new version dismissed the XML language in favor of s-expressions. 
One of the features in the new rule language which is most interesting in the present research is 
the built-in hierarchisation of rules, which are divided in sections and schemes. Every section is 
an individual (identified by a name) but also a composition of schemes, each of which is in turn 
individually identified. The section element allows also an internal hierarchy: a section may 
well contain other sections, the top- and bottom layers being ‘theory’ and ‘scheme’, 
respectively. This feature allows to reach a certain degree of similarity between the 
interpretation of the legal document and the form of the syntax representing it: it is in fact 
possible to represent a legal rule using more than one Carneades scheme (because of the 
complexity of the logics behind the law clause) while at the same time maintaining the 
correspondence of a single law clause with a single Carneades section. Unfortunately, its level 
of granularity does not ensure the filling of the gap between representation and reasoning in all 
situations, as explained in issue 3.3.4.5. 
Here is an example of a rule written in the new Carneades rule language: 
[(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341" :creator 
"Marcello") 
    :schemes  
    [(make-scheme               
     :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1" :creator 
"Marcello") 
     :conclusion (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x) 
     :premises [(pm '(applies ?x General)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Unilateral)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Not_Knowable))]) 
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  (make-scheme               
     :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2" :creator 
"Marcello") 
     :conclusion (Relevant_ExArt1341co2 ?x) 
     :premises [(pm '(applies ?x ?y)) 
     (pm '(Oppressive_Status ?y))  
      (pm '(applies ?x General)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Unilateral)) 
      (pm '(not(applies ?x 
SpecificallySigned)))])])] 
The main problem with the new version of the rule engine resides in its schemes being some 
sort of Horn clauses. As described in 1.2.2.3, a Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive 
literal. Horn clause logics allows inference to be made substantially more focused than in the 
case of general resolution: as long as a resolution is restricted to Horn clauses, in fact, some 
interesting properties appear. This could enhance computability, but unfortunately the limitation 
of Horn rules to one conclusion limits the balance between interpretation of legal text and 
expressivity of rules, which can no more represent legal rule with a 1:1 ratio, but must 
necessarily be modeled as an abstract net of relation where each node can evoke at most one 
higher level node. This issue constitutes part of the wide problem of mixing a faithful 
representation of a text's semantics with a syntactical model for reasoning on the concepts (see 
Chapter 5). 
 Issues 4.5.
Importing ontologies, adding factors and writing rules in the LKIF-Rule and Carneades 
languages highlighted some critical aspects in the modelling process. In particular, the issue was 
about the correct design and management of information between the ontologies and the rules: 
some of the axioms already modeled in the ontologies, in fact, could better meet their 
potentialities if modeled as an LKIF rules instead. The issue, anyway, should be solved with 
general criteria, since its implications are many and important, starting with the different logic 
used (description logic for OWL vs. defeasible logic for LKIF). Furthermore, the knowledge 
imported from the ontology includes the inferred knowledge, but it is not possible to re-use the 
ontology axioms to obtain new inferences on the basis of the knowledge created by Carneades’ 
reasoner. This suggests the distinction between static information (thesauri, taxonomies, 
administrative and procedural data) to be included in the ontology, and legally relevant 
information (legal statuses, subsumptions, inclusion of a material circumstance into the scope of 
a norm) to be modeled as rules for the purposes of the argument evaluation. It is also possible to 
enhance Carneades with a system capable of translating OWL axioms into defeasible rules, and 
Carneades 2.x should include this feature. However, neither this solution is optimal, since it 
alters the logics underlying SWRL (OWL) rules, therefore creating a significant risk of semantic 
(or syntactic) shift. This will be better examined in Chapter 5. 
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4.5.1. Description logics vs. the Carneades framework 
While DL is very powerful and useful, monotonic logics are not sufficient for modelling legal 
rules, such as the rules of consumer law, in an expressive and verifiable way, while at the same 
time maintaining the structure of the legislation and regulation they are ought to represent: 
legislation is typically organized as general rules subject to exceptions, and arguments made by 
applying legal rules are defeasible. Moreover, the application of laws depends on time, and 
various legal rules may conflict with each other: these conflicts are resolved using legal 
principles about priority relationships between rules. 
Carneades includes proof standards, which according to [Governatori 2011] can be represented 
through a kind of priority relation in defeasible logics. The new Carneades 2.x also includes, in 
its rule system, the rule property <strict> which allows to specify (through the values 
true/false) if a <scheme> is either strict of defeasible. However, this property does not ensure 
full expressivity of the defeasible logics constituents, since it represents defeaters or metarules 
through weights, which should – in theory – represent a more concrete and meaningful way than 
direct superiority relation (see Chapter 5). 
4.5.2. Identifying a border between semantic representation and syntactic modelling.  
One of the main goals of the framework built so far was to fill the gap between the text and the 
reasoning, allowing for knowledge contained in judicial decisions to be semantically enriched 
(while maintaining at the same time a strong connection to the text) and that knowledge to be 
processed under rules which are open-textured and fully modifiable by the user. In order to 
achieve that, a twofold approach was used, which comprehended also the use of different 
systems, theories and logics. As long as these systems rely on different logics, it will be 
necessary to define a precise border between these two systems, identifying the common tools 
as well as those which are exclusive of one of the two. 
The semantic representation system is centered on the Legal Ontology: expressions, 
qualifications, media, agents and (in the future) time-related metadata are defined in their 
properties, and additional resources (such as axioms, inverse properties, and property chains) 
allow to automatically complete the knowledge extracted from the decision’s text, transforming 
some isolated statements into a consistent network of relations between material circumstances, 
media, agents, laws, judicial interpretations and claims. 
The judicial argumentation system is centered on the set of rules. It builds argumentation 
graphs by creating statements which process general rules (as major premises) and statements 
coming from the ontology (as minor premise) to create new statements, which in turn can be 
used for further argumentation. The rules to be represented here are law dispositions, judicial 
interpretation patterns, and logic operators used to represent common structures in the domain. 
Despite the appearances, distinguishing which kind of modelling is required is not 
straightforward for all kinds of information. For example, the property chain creating the 
judged_as link between the material circumstance and the legal rule needs to be represented also 
in the Legal Ontology (so that the reasoners can automatically sort the decisions depending on 
the interpretation instances contained in it, and this sorting depends very often on which 
material circumstance is linked to which legal status) but, at the same time, it is not desirable to 
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create an equivalence of type judged_as = applies in the Legal Ontology, as this would 
create an enormous number of inferences which would void any search done using either the 
first or the second property. Instead, this rule of equivalence is fundamental in the judicial 
argumentation system to elevate the interpretation instances to the higher rank of “legal bonds”, 
which in turn allow reasoning on law relevancy and applicable legal consequences without 
losing information on the origin of the bond (factual bonds being directly shown as imported 
from the ontology, while interpretation instances are firstly imported as judged_as relations 
and only in a second time converted into “applies” relations). 
4.5.3. The ontology import feature 
Importing statements from ontologies is a key feature in Carneades, since it allows to create 
argument graphs using not only a knowledge base marked in XML, but also knowledge inferred 
from that base using OWL axioms. However, the ontology import system in Carneades 1.0.2 
has two main weaknesses: it introduces statements from the ontology without distinguishing 
between stated and inferred knowledge, and it does not allow feeding back statements into the 
reasoner to infer new knowledge from the ontology axioms. 
An approach to the issue, which will be implemented in Carneades 2.x and was already 
discussed in Stefan Ballnat’s Ph.D thesis (see also [Ballnat and Gordon 2010]) and is available 
as an expansion of Carneades 1.0.2, consists in translating owl axioms into rules. Instead of 
running the reasoner on the OWL file and then importing a list of statements into the knowledge 
base of Carneades, it is in fact possible to translate the A-Box of the ontology into s-expressions 
(rules), while keeping the T-Box in the form of statements. In this way, only the knowledge 
explicitly stated in the original OWL file would appear as imported by the ontology, while all 
inferred knowledge would be represented in the graph as one (or more) arguments involving the 
ontology axiom as the argument, its components as premises, and the inferred knowledge as the 
conclusion. 
Such a system for translating axioms into rules could represent the first step for a complete and 
reciprocal integration between the two sides of the logic layer of the Semantic Web cake, but a 
fundamental limit to this possibility is the conflicts which would arise between the different 
logics involved (first order predicate logic for OWL vs. defeasible logics for the rules). Rules 
that are designed to work within an ontology could bring to undesired results if forced to 
operate into a defeasible environment. This issue is related to the precedent, regarding the need 
to distinguish between semantics and syntax: in fact, the power of syntactic expressivity 
(managing data, in a web of data perspective) would gain from this option, while the need for a 
proper representation of the document's semantics (in a web of document perspective) would be 
properly fulfilled only if all features of description logics, underlying OWL reasoners, are 
exploited. This will be better examined in Chapter 5. 
4.5.4. The issue of IDs for rules 
In order to keep a strong link between the law text and the legal rule language, it is necessary 
that the rule language allows the assignment of an ID to each rule and its segments, with a 
sufficient level of granularity. IDs, in fact, can be used to link the statement to the fragment of 
text which expresses it. Both the LKIF-rule language and the Carneades rule language do allow 
assignment of IDs to rules. 
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On this behalf, Carneades 2.x includes two different metadata concerning rule properties: 
<source>, to indicate the source text, and <header>, to identify the author of the rule 
model. These blocks can process data expressed in the Dublin Core standard, allowing to assign 
an URI and an ID to its values, thus ensuring a full semantic expressivity. It is, of course, 
possible to assign the same source to different sections or schemes. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to assign different IDs to the body and head of a <scheme>. 
This is due to a precise design choice: Clojure, in fact, allows IDs for parts of code, but 
Carneades does not have the ambition to reach such a level of granularity. This is albeit 
necessary in order to maintain a complete adherence of the syntactic structure of rules to the 
representation of the interpretation of the legal document where those rules (or parts of rules) 
found their existence: in fact, it is not uncommon that the body of an abstract rule of law is 
located in an article, while its head is located in the following article, or even in a different law. 
Without a function to assign IDs to the constituting elements of a rule, it is not possible to 
ensure a complete and unambiguous system of linking of abstract legal rules to the fragments of 
law from which they originate.  
4.5.5. Tuning of factors, statuses, material circumstances and interpretration instances 
In the ontology set, the core mechanism for representing the knowledge is the qualifies 
property, and its subdivision into the considers and applies sub-properties. This system 
allows to create bonds between material and abstract concepts, without creating a relation of 
identity between these elements or confusing the ontology about what is a material element, 
which are the abstract concepts bound to it, and which kind of link is binding them. In the core 
ontology, the abstract classes are defined with an open approach, i.e. a legal status can appear on 
both sides of the triple: it can be the resulting status which is applied to a circumstance by a 
judicial interpretation, or a requirement for a legal consequence to be applied. Nevertheless, 
under a taxonomic point of view, the borders between the concepts of legal rule, material 
circumstance and legal consequence are sufficiently defined, and there is no major risk of 
misplacement of an element of the judicial decision when classifying it under those categories.  
However, delving deeper into the judicial interpretation instances means highlighting not only 
the legal statuses already identified by the law, but finding new “characteristics” which the court 
considered as relevant in the process of subsuming a material circumstance with those 
characteristics under a legal status. It is in that phase that factors come into play. A factor is an 
abstract concept that defines some material circumstance through some neutral, non-formalized 
characteristic. Anything can be a factor, as far as it is taken under consideration as a relevant 
definition for the material circumstance upon which it is being argued. 
Under a logical point of view, there is no practical reason for distinguishing between factors and 
legal statuses, as they play the same role in the axiom and argumentation systems, the only 
difference being theat they instantiate different argument schemes. However, under a juridical 
point of view, there is a strong semantic distinction between attributes which are considered as 
important by the law, and attributes which are taken into consideration by a private agreement 
or a court. Keeping these two classes will strongly improve queries and searches, which are 
pointed either at high, official legal concepts or lower, more experience-driven factors. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to create a strong distinction between these two classes: in fact, 
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neither legal statuses are official, being only a representation of a normative expression 
contained in the law’s text. This means that a characteristic which is created as a legal status in 
some domain, can count as a factor in some other domain, or vice versa. The open structure of 
these concepts does not prevent the system to work even in the lack of a clear distinction of 
these concepts. However, until a strong policy is found and applied in the classification of the 
attributes into the factor and legal status classes, it won’t be possible to rely on that semantic 
distinction between higher and lower level attributes. 
A similar issue arises in the distinction between material circumstances and other elements, 
such as interpretation instances and legal rules. In fact, it can happen that some judicial 
interpretation takes into consideration some law text or some precedent. In the cases where 
those elements are taken into consideration in order to apply some status (or factor) to them, 
they are considered as circumstances: a single event which is being qualified by ascribing it to 
one or more mental categories. This actually turns them into material circumstances for the 
purpose of that interpretation instances, because in that case a law text or a precedent is no 
different from a person’s behavior, or an event: they are some external things which are about to 
receive some qualification, which in turn could subsume them under some secondary axiom 
which gives them more attributes, and so on. 
Also in this case, it will be probably necessary to formalize these cases in order to prevent an 
uncontrolled spreading of these categorization: for example, if all legal rules and judicial 
interpretation would acquire automatically the status of material circumstances, this would void 
the semantics brought by the material circumstance class, and searches and queries involving 
this concept would bring no significant or very noisy results. 
4.5.6. Enhancing scalability: From statuses through factors to elements, from general 
concepts to details 
The layered structure of the Legal Ontology (from legal statuses to factors) allows a controlled 
and useful redundancy of knowledge on interpretation instances contained in the decision’s text, 
which enhances reasoning capabilities by optimizing the arguments search following a multi-
layered structure. 
In fact, the search for arguments can be conducted on a step-by-step basis, starting from the top 
level (looking for applicable laws and major precedents, which take into consideration only 
legal statuses) and then specifying the statements introduced by the reasoner with a direct search 
trying to justify the interpretation of some material instance as a specific status. Please notice 
that it makes no difference whether the statement being examined is accepted, rejected or 
questioned in the knowledge base: the argumentation system will look into lower-level rules 
which have the required statement as head (conclusion) and build a graph further dissecting the 
issue, proposing possible paths towards the acceptability of the assertion concerning the legal 
status.  
The main advantage of this layered structure is the possibility to represent the decision at an 
exact depth level (more precisely at the exact depth level reached by the court) without affecting 
the chance to build, starting from it, argumentation hypotheses at a shallower or deeper level. 
For example, if the decision simply stated that “a clause signed at the end of page is not 
specifically signed”, without specifying if some recall was made at the end of the page, the 
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information can be represented at a simple legal statuses level. However, if another decision (or 
a law, or technical considerations) further define the concept of end of page, i.e. taking into 
consideration the emphasis made on the signing at the end of each sheet, this kind of 
information will be coded at a deeper level but linked to the same “end of page” concept. Each 
of these two precedents will then appear when arguing about the other one, either at a shallower 
or deeper level of reasoning (in the first case, the system will simply propose to accept the 
precedent excluding the specific signing, while in the second one the system will propose to 
check the existence of an emphatic recall at the end of page and then to accept the 
corresponding precedent). 
Even a bottom level could be built, representing material circumstances in terms of linguistic 
phenomena. For example, the formula of a “distinct box recalling oppressive clauses” could be 
modeled, in order to allow NLP tools to automatically spot this kind of text and suggesting the 
existence of such a factor (or legal status) on a contract clause. 
4.5.7. The tuning of properties 
Parallel to the issue of the factor/status distinction, stands the issue related to the modelling of 
properties which link a material circumstance to its attributes. In fact, the property chain 
judged_as constitutes a model of many possible “inferred links” which bring forward 
compact and important semantics for the argumentation to use. In order to represent the kind of 
link created by the consider/applies combination it could in fact be sided by a has_factor 
property, a agreed_as property, and so on. Unfortunately, the current semantics for property 
chains does not allow to restrict the type of instance which “stands in the middle” of the chains 
(i.e. judged_as only if the “middle” instance is of type Judicial_Interpretation, 
agreed_as only if it is a Contractual_Agreement). This leaves two possible solutions: 
 Defining a basic property as a result of the chain, then further specifying it with 
subclasses automatically assigned by the reasoner through appropriate axioms; 
 Distinguishing considers and applies properties through the creation of specific 
subclasses for some subclasses of qualifiers, which can then be automatically inferred 
through axioms. 
Unfortunately, both solutions have the problem of greatly increasing the quantity of data to be 
managed by the model, thus compromising its reasoning performances. 
4.5.8. Reification of negative properties in the ontology 
When creating the Core and Domain ontologies, in order to maintain the semantics of negative 
properties (ex. A contract clause is not specifically signed), this negative assertion has to be 
reified by creating a specific status (i.e. not_specificallysigned). This choice was forced 
by the open world assuption used by the DL standing behind computational ontologies. In fact, 
when working with classes (e.g. representing the specifically signed status with a class 
Contract>SpecificallySignedContract) would have allowed the representation of 
a negative attribute by introducing axioms with the not(SpecificallySignedContract) 
variable in it, but in no way would it have been possible to represent this semantics when 
dealing with a triple of type  
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ObjectProperty a b 
In the present application of Carneades 1.0.2, however, the original semantics of negative 
attributes is restored, through some “rules enhancing semantics” such as: 
<rule id="NEGINST_NotSpecificallySigned"> 
 <head> 
  <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i  
   value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> specifically 
signed status    </i></s></not> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i   
   value="&oss;NotSpecificallySigned"> specifically 
signed status   </i></s> 
 </body> 
</rule> 
In this way, the argumentation rules (and consequently the graphs they create) can directly refer 
to the semantics of positive or negative properties, referring to them with the formulas C1 
applies SpecificallySigned and not(C1 applies SpecificallySigned) 
respectively. This allows full semantics representation in the argument construction and 
evaluation phase, including the correct management of presumptions and exceptions. It is also 
possible to use Boolean operators (true/false) for representing this, but since the reasoning 
involves both rules and ontology, which have a different approach on "negation as failure", the 
solution could create undesired results. Setting both the positive and negative statements as a 
positive status, instead, ensures that the same requirements apply for these statements to be 
matched. 
OWL 2.0 introduces a new feature called Negative object property assertion which, in the form 
NegativeObjectPropertyAssertion(OP a b) states that the individual a is not 
connected by the object property expression OP to the individual b. This will allow the 
semantics to be fully represented also in the Core and Domain ontologies, removing the need 
for instances reificating negative properties. The present research revealed that when 
representing knowledge in a logic language with an open world assumption, it is always better 
to instantiate all entities, including negative ones. This because the aim is to distinguish between 
cases where no proof of the positive status is present from cases where the proof of the negative 
status was reached. Moreover, proving the lack of some circumstance in a trial is as relevant as 
proving its presence (for example, see Carneades’ system of burden of proof, where the proof 
standard (or status) for the negation of the target statement can be derived if know the proof 
standard required for the acceptance of the target statement. Since stating that some material 
circumstance has a certain negative property is semantically different from stating that some 
material circumstance does not have a certain positive property, and the two statements are 
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treated differently by OWL reasoners when deriving new knowledge, the present research will 
keep reificating negative statuses, properties and classes at the ontology level. 
4.5.9.  Resolving conflicts between rules: weights 
The modelling of the hierarchical structure of rules is a fundamental step towards a complete 
representation of the legal argumentation process. Without an instrument to manage conflicts 
between rules, it would be impossible to apply more than a few rules at a time, and to produce 
argumentation graphs involving different disciplines. Even outside the field of law application, 
a hierarchy between rules is fundamental to represent the relative strength of precedents 
(depending i.e. on the court who issued them, or on the number of citations, or on the date of 
issue) and therefore to enhance the find positions process. Finally, it allows enriching the 
argumentation scheme with detailed, technical rules or minority reports which – once given a 
small hierarchical power – can successfully represent minor pieces of reasoning without them 
affecting the “major” reasoning process (that involving law rules or precedents). 
The Carneades System allows the assignment of weights to arguments, which is exactly the 
system needed to give an absolute hierarchy to rules which allows the same value to be assigned 
to more arguments. Unfortunately, Carneades 1.0.2 does not allow to assign a weight to a rule 
(thus transferring that value to any argument created through that rule), but only to manually 
specify the weight of single arguments in the graph. Fortunately, Carneades 2.x overcomes this 
limitation through an integration of automatic weight assignment and manual customization. 
The new Carneades Rule Language, in fact, allows to assign weight to a scheme and this weight 
will be transferred to any argument built using that rule. At the same time, it is possible to 
manually assign weights to single arguments through the GUI. This function is mostly used in 
the Policy Modeling tool, where assigning weights to competing arguments is the main way to 
reason on these abstract policy proposals, and the weight represents the personal persuasion on 
the efficacy of the arguments. In an environment such as the present one, where weight should 
represent the authority of the legal act, weight should be assigned in the light of metarules 
modelling the hierarchy of legal sources. Therefore, it should be possible not only to specify the 
weight of the single scheme, but also to derive the weight of the argument from the application 
of specific rules which analyze the source of the scheme and every other relevant aspect (time, 
object, presence of empowering acts and so on). 
While trying to reduce Carneades’ argumentation structure to defeasible logics, Governatori 
introduced the concept of weight mapping: a function that takes as input a weight function and 
produces a set of superiority relations [Governatori 2011], which could constitute one of the 
useful additions to the argumentation system. Following is a short presentation of the function: 
Definition of weight mapping: Given a Carneades Argument Evaluation Structure S = <Arg, 
Ass, W, PS> (where Arg is an acyclic set of arguments, Ass is a consistent set of literals, W is a 
weight function assigning a real number in the interval [0,1] to every argument, and PS is a 
function mapping propositions to proof standards) and the threshold α, β, γ (as defined in 3.2.5), 
let a = <Pa,Ea,ca> and b = <Pb,Eb,cb> be two arguments in Arg such that ca = ~cb. A weight 
mapping is a function mwgt that takes as input a weight function and produces a set of 
superiority relation as follows: 
marg(a) >pe marg(b) iff W(a) >W(b); 
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marg(a) >ce marg(b) iff 
1. W(a) > a and 
2. W(a)-W(b) > b; 
marg(a) >bd marg(b) iff: 
1. W(a) > a and 
2. W(a)�W(b) > b and 
3. W(b) < g; 
>dv = 0. 
This representation is an interesting translation of the concept of argument weighting in a more 
formal language, but does not constitute an alternative to the argumentation theory. The idea of 
replacing argumentation theory with defeasible logics is indeed intriguing, but does not 
constitute a step towards the filling of the gap between legal documents and computer-based 
management of their semantics: in legal reasoning, in fact, several different aspects of 
argumentation theory are involved. The whole process of introducing arguments pro or con a 
given statement, for example, is to be viewed not only in its relational aspects but also in its 
procedural aspects (argumentation as a dialogue) which identify several steps and different 
patterns or tasks in the argumentation process and in its single actors. The concept of "burden of 
proof " is strictly related to these dialogical aspects, and being weight mapping dependant from 
burden of proof, it is impossible to describe it in defeasible logics without a support from 
argumentation theory, and in particular from procedural aspects of it. For a complete discussion 
on the subject see 4.6. 
4.5.10. The need for a temporal model 
Temporal coordinates play a fundamental role in legal systems, and the temporal attribute for 
laws (and precedents) is qualitatively different from other attributes, or statuses, of normative 
entities: it has to do with the efficacy of laws themselves, and may determine the applicability of 
a law in place of one other, or of a different version of the same law. Moreover, there are three 
temporal coordinates to be taken into account for each rule (time of force, time of efficacy, time 
of application) and a proper diachronic modelling of legislation should feature all of them, in 
order to provide a complete analysis on the effects of combinations of norms [Palmirani et al. 
2011a]. In fact, when examining a factual circumstance under a legal perspective, the time 
factor matters twice: it matters for the time of the fact, but also for the time when the fact is 
being analyzed under the law – this is particularly true in criminal law (where the favor rei 
principle exists). Moreover, legal phenomena such as the vacatio legis and the suspension 
periods force to distinguish between the time of force and the time of efficacy of legal 
expressions, and to detach them from the time of existence of its material support. 
If it is true that every system which manages legal rules should feature a complete model for 
temporal coordinates, this is even truer for a system such as the judicial argumentation system 
of the present research: in fact, building a collection of different decisions taken in different 
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points in time necessarily involves a variation in the applicable rules. Without a proper 
modelling of the three temporal axes, it is not possible to compare different decisions, 
preventing any possible reasoning on two remote precedents even when they share other 
characteristics such as the object of the claim. The solution of creating different rules for 
different versions of the law, apart from requiring a huge amount of work and leaving the 
problem of the plurality of temporal axes unresolved, represents a falsification of the original 
law expressions which compromises the 1:1 ratio between representation of the legal document 
and syntactic modelling of its normative content. The norm should always remain unique, while 
temporal coordinates should ensure the crop of the applicable rules on a case-by-case basis. 
At the current stage, the rule system adopted in Carneades 2.x lacks modelling of temporal 
coordinates for laws. The adoption of the Dublin Core standards could allow representation of 
temporal information through the “coverage” element, which allows delimiting the spatial and 
temporal coverage of a resource. However, this does not allow performing advanced reasoning 
at the level of declarative semantics, but only to conduct queries on the metadata or to write 
metarules which take these properties into consideration, using the procedural attachment, 
which doesn’t consider the semantics of the values but treats them as literals. It is possible to 
further formalize the coverage element by building a specification of the Dublin Core language. 
Any further step towards the formalization of a temporal model for argumentation systems 
should instead rely on the last emerging standards such as LegalRuleML [Palmirani et. al. 2011] 
representing the path towards a standardization of the logics layer in the Semantic Web cake 
(see 2.4.6.3. and 5.6.). 
4.5.11. Deontic operators. 
Carneades also lacks proper deontic logics representation. There is no explicit modelling of 
deontic operators, even though it is possible represent them syntactically via modals such as: 
(obligated (transfer ?x)) 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to process this information for deontic reasoning, since deontic 
reasoning is not implemented in Carneades, but it is possible to model its constituents in a rule-
like equation such as: 
Permission B = (not (obligated (not P))) 
The importance of deontic logics in legal reasoning, and the issues concerning its representation 
in a legal argumentation system, will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
 Relational vs. Procedural aspects of argumentation 4.6.
4.6.1. Introduction 
When trying to resolve some of the issues presented above, it is argued that the various aspects 
of argumentation can be properly represented through logics: in particular, [Governatori 2011] 
shows how proof standards proposed in the Carneades framework correspond to some variants 
of defeasible logics, which could imply that an implementation of defeasible logics is able to 




Logics provide abstract formulas to represent relationships between concepts. With fine tools 
such as defeasible logics it is possible to successfully represent the complex relations between 
legal rules, but can they manage the application of these rules, which represent a fundamental 
step towards the computation of the acceptability of an argument? In theory it could be the case, 
since the act of substitution of abstract symbols in formulas with the values of the situation to be 
computed should be an automatic process where it doesn't matter which material concept is 
added as the interpretation of that abstract symbol. For example, if we have a + b = c, we can 
interpret this simple rule as meaning many different things (for example a=1, b=2, c=3, 
+=addition, or a=blue, b=yellow, c=green and += mix) and this would not affect the truth 
function of the equation. On the contrary, in the concrete legal field the single elements bring 
with them particular conditions (minor rules or metarules), assumptions, exceptions, values, 
which can significantly alter the outcome of the abstract formula representing the rules. 
4.6.2. The Issue 
Most of the application scenarios of legal rules are centered around dialogues with two or more 
parties, in which claims are made and competing arguments are put forward to support or attack 
these claims (this includes judgements, which are the focus of this paper, but also parliamentary 
debates and other legal acts). Following Walton (see 4.2.1.), there are several kinds of 
dialogues, with different purposes and different protocols. This view of arguments as dialogues 
(or processes) contrasts with the mainstream, relational conception of argument in the field of 
computational models of arguments, typified in [Dung 1995] (see 1.3.2.1.) where argumentation 
is viewed not as a dialogical process for making justified decisions which resolve disputed 
claims, but as a method for inferring consequences from an inconsistent set of propositions. To 
see the difference between these conceptions of arguments, notice that a proposition which has 
not been attacked is acceptable in this relational model of argument, whereas in most dialogues 
a proposition which has not been supported by some argument is typically not acceptable, since 
most protocols place the burden of proof on the party which made the claim. 
Following the mathematical model of Doug Walton's philosophy of argumentation and 
Aristotle's classification, Gordon in [Gordon and Walton 2009] describes argumentation as 
being divided into three layers: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. While logics deal with the so called 
relational aspects of argumentation, dialectic directly addresses the procedural aspects of it. In 
the light of this first distinction, the claim that Defeasible Logics can manage the acceptability 
of arguments appears to be an effort to flatten the representation of the first two layers into mere 
logics, which does not seem to take into consideration the difference of tasks evoked by 
different argumentation patterns (or argumentation schemes - see above), nor the dialectical (or 
procedural) aspects of argumentation. 
In [Gordon 2008] it is argued that legal reasoning is not only deductive, because legal concepts 
cannot be fully defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. Legal concepts which are 
defined this way are but hypotheses or theories which cannot be mechanically followed using 
deduction when one tries to apply these concepts to decide legal issues on concrete cases. As 
[Hart 1961] puts it, “Legal concepts are open-textured”. The process of determining whether the 




«Contrary to some popular notions, law is not a matter of simply applying rules to facts via 
modus ponens, for instance, to arrive at a conclusion. Mechanical jurisprudence, as this 
model has been called, is somewhat of a strawman. It was soundly rejected by rule skeptics 
like the realists. As Gardner puts it, law is more rule guided than rule-governed.» [Rissland et 
al. 2003] 
Robert Alexy's discourse theory of legal argumentation explains how judicial discretion can be 
restricted without resorting to mechanical jurisprudence or conceptualism. In the early works of 
AI & Law on the subject, argumentation was modeled as deduction in a nonmonotonic logic, 
i.e. as a defeasible consequence relation. The Pleadings Game - introduced in [Gordon 1994] - 
still uses nonmonotonic logics and in particular defeasible logics to represent legal reasoning, 
but these logics are have a procedural layer on top of them which treats the whole 
argumentation as a process, with a sequence of moves by the players which are affected by the 
precedent ones. Moreover, the task of that game is not that of winning a claim, but that of 
identifying the main issue of what Toulmin in [Toulmin 1958] defines as substantial arguments.  
Also the abstract framework for argument-based inference formalized in Prakken's work 
described in [Prakken 2010] combines Dungean semantics with structured argument. The 
framework is suitable for modelling reasoning with argument schemes, which are used to reveal 
implicit premises and to identify specific possibilities of undercutting the argument through 
what Prakken calls domain-specific defeasible rules. The concept of accrual of arguments, 
introduced in [Prakken 1995], distinguishes between arguments whose weight can be added 
when trying to prove a conclusion, and argument whose weight does not sum up. If such a 
distinction is not made, the application of mere logic formulas to compute these arguments will 
lead to inaccurate, even counterintuitive results. 
Concerning procedural aspects, Walton's argumentation theory identifies a sequence of stages in 
a dialogue-like argument, where in each stage some moves are allowed to the player (as in The 
Pleadings Game) and those moves influence the possibilities for further stages. In particular, the 
concept of stages of the argumentation process is fundamental for the allocation of the burden of 
proof, which brings the discourse back to the first consideration of this section about the 
relationship between Dungean Semantics and the dialogical conception of argumentation 
contained in [Walton 1998]. Proposable exceptions, tacit acceptance, second grade preclusions, 
irrelevance: logics alone, no matter how powerful, cannot properly evaluate the acceptability of 
those argument if they cannot identify the stage of the process at which those arguments are 
introduced and consequently correctly allocate the burden of proof on one of the competing 
parties, and this in turn is not possible without a dialogical (procedural) conception of 
argumentation. Defeasible logics can effectively manage complex interaction of rules such as 
the concept of proof standards. But an argument is much more than just rules, and representing 
the tasks and patterns presented above by relying only on a set of rules would require a huge 
effort, and yet produce a complicated and ungovernable result. This is, because these rules 
would have to simulate dialogical characteristics of argumentation, which are very different 
from relational ones. 
In the Pleadings Game, argumentation was viewed procedurally, as dialogues regulated by 
protocols, but this was accomplished by building a procedural layer on top of a non-monotonic 
logic. In LKIF, the relational interpretation of rules is abandoned entirely, in favor of a purely 
procedural view, and is thus more in line with modern argumentation theory in philosophy 
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[Walton 2006] and legal theory [Alexy 1989]. Argumentation, as [Gordon 2008] puts it, “cannot 
be reduced to logic”. 
In the Carneades Application, therefore, argumentation schemes are managed in an upper layer 
than rules. In this perspective, rules are just one of many sources for argument construction 
along with ontologies (OWL) and cases (Cato, see 1.4.2.2.), whose different logics and formats 
are translated and mixed into an argument graph [Gordon 2010]. The architecture used to 
instantiate these sources into argument schemes is presented in [Gordon 2011a]. 
4.6.3.  Two Examples 
The demonstrations based on famous U.S. courts precedents, such as those presented in 5.4., are 
aimed at modelling arguments starting from the legal concepts, and show how the reliance on 
argument schemes and competency question is necessary in order to achieve a reconstruction of 
the original arguments and to correctly evaluate them. However, those tests do not pay attention 
to the connection of those concepts with the metadata contained in the source legal document. 
This is also the approach of Ashley's seminal contributions to the subject: the systems presented 
in [Ashley, 1991] and [Aleven, 2003] are in fact oriented to the teaching of argumentation in 
law classes, rather than to the performing of automatic reasoning on the metadata contained in 
the legal documents. 
The approach of the present research is more practical, as described in 3.1., and this approach 
will be kept also in finding evidence of the need for a modelling of the procedural aspects of 
argumentation into the emerging rule standards. It appears that the modelling of argument 
schemes is the only viable choice to properly perform legal reasoning, and for this purpose the 
concept of argument scheme should include templates which represent procedural aspects of 
legal processes (such as the acts available to the parties during a court trial). The two examples 
that follow are in fact taken from the same sample of 27 decisions concerning Consumer 
Contracts, which constitutes the knowledge base of the research described in the beginning of 
this paper. 
4.6.3.1. First Example 
The first example is the decision issued on October 31st, 2006 by the First section of the 
Tribunal of Salerno, concerning the acceptability of an arbitration clause contained in a public 
statute (the statute of the Italian Football Federation). The argument put forward by the defender 
is that the judge is incompetent, since the litigation had to be settled by means of an arbitration 
following art. 24 of the statute. The argument, however, was presented to the court only at a late 
stage of the trial. The judge, therefore, specifies that if the claim was formally qualified as a 
request for “competence regulation” (as the defender himself defined it), it would be 
inacceptable since those kind of claims can be presented only in the early stages of the trial. The 
judge, however, decides that the claim concerns the object of the trial, not a competence 
regulation. Therefore, the claim is acceptable and the judge declares his incompetence in favor 
of the arbitration court indicated in the statute. 




 <s id="s122"> applies TribSalerno_I Judge_not_competent</s> 
 <s id="s222">considers TribSalerno_I StatutoFIGC_clause10</s> 
 <s id="s322">contained_in StatutoFIGC_clause10 StatutoFIGC</s> 
 <s id="s422">contains StatutoFIGC StatutoFIGC_clause24</s> 
 <s id="s522">applies StatutoFIGC_clause24 Arbitration</s> 
 </statements> 
<arguments> 
  <argument id="arg1"> 
   <conclusion statement="s122"/> 
   <premises> 
     <premise statement="s222"/> 
     <premise statement="s322"/> 
     <premise statement="s422"/> 
     <premise statement="s522"/> 
   </premises> 
  </argument> 
</arguments> 
The LKIF syntax doesn't permit to be dynamic and the sentences are manually applied to the 
rules during the argumentation modelling. With the Clojure the expressiveness was enhanced 
including dynamicity with the rules, boolean operators and also meta-schema of argument to 
apply: 
(def a1 (make-argument 
  :header (make-metadata 
  :description {:en "the judge of Salerno is incompetent, 
because art. 24 of the FIGC statute introduces a mandatory 
arbitration for all claims concerning the statute" }) 
  :scheme "competency regulation" 
  :conclusion (not (applies TribSalerno_I Judge_not_competent) 
  :premises [((considers TribSalerno_I StatutoFIGC_clause10))(pm 
'(contained_in StatutoFIGC_clause10 StatutoFIGC))(pm '(contains 




This is a typical example of how procedural aspects of the legal argumentation can influence the 
outcome of a claim, and therefore the application of rules (an more generally the logic layer) has 
to take into account these aspects, in order to achieve a correct evaluation of the acceptability of 
arguments. 
4.6.3.2. Second Example 
A second example can give some hint on how arguments, even arguments from legal rules, can 
be introduced in the judgement for tasks different from that of applying the rule contained in the 
legal norm. In the decision given by the Tribunal of Rovereto on July 13th, 2006, an article of 
the Civil Code concerning oppressive clauses, which lists them by subject and considers as 
oppressive all clauses introducing “a limitation in concluding certain contracts with third 
parties”, is used as an argument to prove that “there is a general disfavor in the system towards 
all pacts introducing limitations to competition”. The argument of the oppressive clause is used 
together with the argument coming from article 81 of the EC Treaty, which explicitly forbids 
such pacts.  
We can see how, in this case, the article of the Civil Code is evoked in the decision's text, and 
must therefore be marked up and linked to the text of the law. The reasoner should however be 
aware that this rule doesn't have to be used for its general purpose, which is defining an 
oppressive clause, but rather for the purpose of supporting the statement that “there is a general 
disfavor in the system towards pacts introducing limitations to competition”. This can be 
achieved by defining a framework for argumentation and by introducing argumentation 
schemes. In the example, the argument involving the article of the Civil Code would not be an 
argument from legal rules, but rather an argument from authority (or similar), and therefore the 
article of the Civil Code would not be transformed into an argument by translating the logic 
form of the rule it expresses, but rather by referring to the authority of the Civil Code and of the 
institution that issued it (which in this case is the Italian Parliament). 
 
 Conclusions 4.7.
The Carneades application presented in this chapter was intended to show how an 
argumentation system can be used to process semantic data in a complex way. The arguments 
construction and the rules representing code- and case-law could never meet their full 
potentialities if not supported by a semantically rich knowledge base, such as the Legal 
Ontology Set presented in Chapter 3. The application is thus a demonstration of how a shared 
logics and syntax for legal rule representation, combined with a standard core ontology for legal 
concepts, would constitute the ideal starting point for a totally new conception of case-law 
classification, browsing and management.  
The application represents an advancement of the state-of-the-art in the field because it creates a 
complete juridical environment performing a real benchmark of Carneades' capabilities: the 
sample (constituted by 27 precedents) has been completely represented in the ontology set and 
in the rules, thus heavily stressing the Carneades and OWL reasoners and showing their limits 
in terms of computability. Moreover, the ontology set used in the present application was not 
specifically modeled upon Carneades, rather representing an effort towards a standard 
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representation of legal text's contents which ensures isomorphism with the source document and 
interoperability with different applications in the rules and logics layers. 
The present chapter showed how the present Judicial Framework achieves a good representation 
of judicial argumentation, both in his static aspects (classification of the judgement and of the 
other legal acts involved) and in his procedural development, thanks to a mix of OWL-DL, 
defeasible logics and argumentation theory. The next chapter will delve deeper into the issues 
presented in 4.5., providing examples of how they can be faced and laying down a set of 







Enhancing Legal Semantics 
 
 
“Language is a process of free creation; its laws and principles are fixed, but the manner in 
which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied. Even the 
interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation.”  
– Noam Chomsky, Language and mind. 
 
“I will argue that in the literal sense the programmed computer understands what the car 
and the adding machine understand, namely, exactly nothing.” 
– John R. Searle, Minds, brains, and programs. 
 
 Introduction 5.1.
The judicial framework for semantic enrichment of judicial decisions and for defeasible 
reasoning on the decision’s motivation described in chapters 3 and 4 highlighted several critical 
aspects in legal knowledge representation, some of which were already known to the literature 
of the field. The present chapter makes a sum of the critical aspects met so far, and elaborates 
them in order to lay down a set of requirements for the ideal legal rules language, while the next 
chapter is dedicated to hybrid reasoners, which exploit both the legal rules and ontology 
languages. Two projects in the field are analyzed in the light of the requirements. 
The present chapter will also analyze different approaches to the representation of judicial 
knowledge. In it the following topics will be therefore presented: 
 Open vs. closed world assumption, analyzing feats and flaws of these alternative 
characteristics of logic languages; 
 Data representation, trying a mediation between the two conceptions of the web of 
knowledge bases: the original web of documents, and the new web of data; 
 Advanced legal concept representation, showing how to model the effects of a 
complex legal figure (suspension of efficacy) in order to support NLP; 
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 Representation of case-law, taking a classic US case, Popov vs. Hayashi, and 
analyzing four possible representations by the major AI&Law experts, to underline 
differences in the proposed solutions and to see how they can be combined – or 
improved. 
Successively, a summary of the requirements for a rule markup language as identified during 
the present research is presented. It is divided into two sets of requirement: ontological 
requirements, for the correct binding of the abstract concepts to the part of the original text, and 
syntactical requirements, for the correct representation of the connections between abstract legal 
concepts. 
Finally, the LegalRuleML language is presented. This language is a work-in-progress, would-be 
standard language for legal rules. It contains most of the features discussed in the present 
chapter, and therefore it is taken as the starting point for the ideal legal rules language. The 
presentation also highlights where the standard built so far fails to capture aspects and semantics 
of judicial documents, as identified by the present research. 
 Open world assumption vs. Closed world assumption 5.2.
The present research delves deep into the state-of-the-art of information technologies for 
representation of knowledge and reasoning. This implies a lot of logics being involved, and of 
different types. The galaxy of logics was presented in Chapter 1. The present section is focused 
on the two kinds of formal logics which are mostly used in the Semantic Web: description 
logics, used for knowledge representation, and defeasible logics, used for reasoning and 
argumentation. These logics have several differences, the most important being that between the 
closed world assumption of defeasible logics and the open world assumption of description 
logics (see 2.2.5.1.). 
 
In the legal field, the concept of truth can be substituted with that of legal validity, thus negation 
as failure would imply believing invalid every predicate that cannot be proven to be valid. This 
is very useful when performing legal reasoning: when comparing a set of precedents to find 
which legal outcome seems legitimated by the case-law, it is necessary to restrict the answer 
within such incomplete information. On the contrary, assuming an open world is extremely 
useful when representing the legal documents. In this way, the concepts can be classified with 
the maximum rate of enrichment. With the open world approach, in fact, it is sufficient to create 
an item “judicial decision” for it to be subsumable under virtually any sub-category of judicial 
decisions. So, until negative attributes (or an attribute which is disjointed with another) are 
included, this item will remain available to the information retrieval system. This allows for 
incomplete databases to be automatically populated with additional statements by the 
description logic-based reasoners, and this without ambiguity about whether a specific 
statement derives from explicit information in the source legal documents, or that statement was 
generated by the ontology reasoner in the lack of opposite indication. 
The ideal solution seems therefore to be a combination of the two logics. In this way it is 
possible to perform an effective argumentation on a knowledge base which is maximally 
enriched by the ontology reasoners. However, in trying to perform this combination, several 
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issues arise. In particular, as seen in Chapter 4, some statements which are useful when sorting 
the legal knowledge base become an obstacle when performing argumentation. It would be 
therefore necessary to “clean” some of the inferences from the ontology reasoner before passing 
to the argumentation. But how is it possible to distinguish between the useful inferences (those 
who provide the necessary shallow-level reasoning which allows the modularity of the ontology 
and the rule set) from the undesired ones? It is also important, as already noticed in Chapter 4, 
that the translation of enriched knowledge should work in both ways: not only from ontology to 
argumentation, but also from argumentation to ontology. In this way, the classificatory 
functions could be completely demanded to the ontology layer, therefore achieving an efficient 
distinction of functions between the semantic layers, without losing any information which 
could emerge from the application of the defeasible rules. 
The integration of these two logics into a rule language which polishes the inferences of OWL-
DL, while at the same time preserving the useful part of the knowledge enrichment they 
produce, requires hybrid reasoning capabilities. Therefore, after having set out (in the rest of 
this chapter) the requirements for such an integration, Chapter 6 looks forward to hybrid 
reasoners for a solution in that sense. 
 Web of documents vs. web of data 5.3.
In the first years of internet, the web of documents provided the necessary meta-model for 
knowledge interconnection through an extension of the classification methods adopted before 
the revolution brought by ITs. Counter posed to this approach is the arising approach of the web 
of data (presented in 2.1.1.), where the conception of document as distinct information container 
is set aside and the chunks of information (the pieces of content) are under the spotlight as the 
pivot of data management.  
The web made of documents is the first version of the World Wide Web, and thus, as for all 
initial phases, it looks like it is deemed to be overcome in time. It is, however, not that simple: 
the ITs have reached interesting goals on behalf of management of information as documents, 
for example by achieving a complex and comprehensive classification system (presented in 
section 2.3.). 
Even though the advantages of the Linked Data approach are undeniable, and without any desire 
to entrench our view behind the constituted standards (which, in any case, have already 
changed), it must be noted that in many cases the data managed on the web are important not for 
the information contained in them, but rather for the speech act (the corresponding material 
document) they represent. For example, a speech given by a(ny) President may have a relevance 
which transcends its content, and is related to the time, circumstances, and events precedent or 
successive to the speech itself. Those properties can be referred only to that specific act, and the 
importance of this link is so strong that any extraction of chunks of information provides pieces 
of data whose total value is way inferior to that of the act as a whole. In the legal field, this is 
even truer: It is irrelevant to collect a large mass of data if, in order to extract it and put it 
together, the link between those contents and their juridical sources is weakened.  
For these reasons, the approach to legal knowledge representation should study and exploit the 
arising technologies for the management of information on a content-basis, but at the same time 
maintain the high standards achieved in document classification. 
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5.3.1. An approach to the knowledge acquisition bottleneck 
The problem of the knowledge acquisition (for a presentation of the issue see 3.5.1.) for these 
structured data is central in the Linked Data approach, to such an extent that it was faced by 
[Berners Lee 2009] while presenting Linked Data to the world. In the present section some 
possible approaches to the issue besides NLP techniques are poited out, starting from the 
crowdsourcing argument of Berners-Lee himself:  
“Linked Data is all about […] people doing their bit to produce a little bit, and it all 
connecting. That's how Linked Data works. You do your bit. Everybody else does theirs. You 
may not have lots of data which you have yourself to put on there but you know to demand it. 
And we've practiced that”. [Berners-Lee 2009] 
In the legal field, crowdsourcing could seem difficult to approach, yet it has the potentials to 
really overcome the knowledge acquisition problem. It is extremely time-consuming to enrich 
legal texts with structured data, and in order to get an accurate result the user marking up the 
legal text must be not just a legal expert, but also a specialist in that legal field. Even at that 
point, the markup may not be complete: annotating some legal text always implies an 
interpretation of that text, and also case-law from famous courts brings on explicitly 
contradictory interpretations of the law. It may then be necessary to model different 
interpretations of a piece of text, and to model the relations between these interpretations. How 
can all these structured data be gathered? 
Lately, the professionals of legal matters spend a lot of their time working in front of a 
computer, using software such as word editors and law collections. There lays the solution to 
the issue: to allow multiple, semi-automatic annotation of legal text through a tool 
implementing a word editor and an interface which allows to compare the user’s interpretation 
with those of other professionals, using a social structure to rate and polish the structured data. 
The most complete, shared, and useful data will emerge and the legal texts will be able to 
feature a multiple markup of different views on the document, which would take indefinite time 
to achieve with a focused data insertion by a restricted group of experts. 
The ideal users (and content creators) for such a social platform are the lawyers and the judges. 
In order for a product such as this to penetrate the category of lawyers (often reluctant to 
change) it should prove better than commercial legal software for case-law retrieval. This could 
prove no huge challenge, since this software usually only allow basic search plus some 
structured data only at the document level (i.e. the classification of the decision depending on 
their subject, the issuing authority, etc.). Providing to the lawyers a tool which allows them to 
look for specific (combinations of) legal categories or concepts would greatly improve the 
number of useful hits while at the same time reducing the time needed to perform those 
searches. Judges, on the other hand, are public workers: to interpret and explain the law is their 
job, and the enhancement of their decisions through structured data could be set as a duty for 
their office. This would represent an enrichment of the case-law directly from the source, which 
has two positive aspects: first, it provides a basic set of structured data for every (newly issued) 
judicial decision, therefore providing an outline of its contents. Second, this basic data would 
come from the most authoritative agent in the process: the judge. All other data, added 
successively, would acquire a particular meaning when put in comparison to the “original” data 
(for example, a dissenting interpretation, or a note on successive decisions citing this one). 
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 Modelling advanced legal concepts 5.4.
5.4.1. Introduction 
The contents of a legal act are very complex objects to model, not only for the issues presented 
above (logics to be used, strong inheritance from the source document, specificity and 
ambiguity of language, etc.). Juridical concepts are (quite) ambiguously expressed by legal texts 
because they deal with a fictional world (that of legal norms) which is itself very complex: it is 
made of several different layers, influenced by different sources in different ways, and – most 
complex-increasing element of all – it adapts to circumstances. In fact legal rules, which should 
(in theory) express strict (general, abstract) relations between behaviours and sanctions, in the 
practice are never applied straightforwardly. For example: 
 Legal rules are subject to exceptions, which are not exhaustively listed in a single 
location; 
 Legal rules are influenced by other legal rules, and this influence may be not evident 
from the singular analysis of either of the two rules; 
 The interpretation of legal rules is not free, but rather bound to authoritative precedents 
which provide the criteria for the subsumption of facts under legal rules. The ways these 
criteria are followed (and sometimes the criteria themselves) are, however, complex and 
inconsistent enough to create a gray area where one cannot be sure whether a legal rule 
applies or not to a specific case; 
 The provisions laid down by legal rules apply in a temporal frame which is different 
from the time of existence of its source documents, and even from that of the legal rule 
itself.  
In the present section a key aspect in legal knowledge modelling will be analyzed, namely, the 
management of temporal dimensions. The successive section proceeds with a deeper analysis of 
some of the aspects listed above, through a sample modelling of a complex legal concept: that 
of efficacy suspension of norms. 
5.4.2. Handling change: the temporal dimension  
Temporal dimensions, as well as the geospatial parameters, play a fundamental role in 
legislative interpretation and application. Jurisdiction is usually closely linked to geospatial 
information (e.g., Danish law states whether or not a Danish statute applies in Greenland; a 
regional law applies only in its territory): in these cases the temporal dimension determines a 
norm’s efficacy, and consequently also the purview of its application. In the words of 
[Palmirani et al. 2010], legal theory identifies at least three axes in a norm’s temporal domain:  
 An interval of force, which acts on the legal text or on a text fragment (article, title, 
paragraph, etc.); 
 An interval of efficacy, acting on the legal text or on a text fragment; 
212 
 
 An interval of applicability, acting on the norms expressed in the legal document 
rather than on its text. 
The interval of force is defined as the period during which a normative document or provision 
forms part of the normative system. This period may change over time as the document is 
modified. Thus, the document’s interval of force may be:  
 Extended by prorogation;  
 Brought forward by anticipation;  
 Struck out by annulment, as when the document is found to be unconstitutional;  
 Reinstated or revived, following abrogation (the interim period between abrogation and 
renewal being a “gap” in the legal system). 
The document is said to be efficacious, or into operation, when it “expresses its normative 
efficacy” or, better yet, when it may or must be applied. A document’s period of efficacy will 
coincide most of the time with its period of force, except when the period of efficacy is:  
 Anticipated, thus beginning before its entry into force (retroactivity);  
 Extended, thus making it last longer than its period of force (ultra-activity);  
 Suspended, by way of a suspension;  
 Postponed, so that it begins after the time of its entry into force (postponement);  
 Stretched by prorogation. 
A norm’s interval of applicability is the period during which the norm is applied in the concrete, 
thus producing the effects set out in its provisions. Application normally coincides with efficacy 
of the document expressing the norms, but the two sometimes differ. The date on which a norm 
has to be applied guides the judge in applying the norm as part of the case law. 
Moreover, such a temporal model should be assigned independently to different parts of the rule 
such as the antecedent and the consequent (the head and body of the rule) , while at the same 
time maintaining isomorphism between the legal resource and the formalized rule, following the 
principle stated by [Bench-Capon and Gordon 2009]. 
5.4.2.1. Managing the lifecycle of a legal norm  
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Apart from events influencing the efficacy or applicability of a norm, there are many events 
which affect the relation between form and content of a norm, or its subject matter, during its 
period of force. For example, the normative expression could be affected by actions of 
integration, modification or repealing. In [Lima et al. 2008] the effects of those events on the 
legal document are represented in the FRBR00 standard (see 2.4.2.1.) by a new instance of 
Individual Work with its instance of Self-contained Expression. The date of creation of those 
instances is the date when the modifying norm enters into force. The process is explained in 
Figure 5.1.  
5.4.2.2. Anatomy of a time-related modificatory provision  
Based on this temporal model, which equally applies to the text and to the norms, [Palmirani et 
al. 2011a] contains a proposal for an anatomy of time-related modificatory provisions: 
 ActiveNorm (URN). This is a known provision stating a modification; 
 PassiveNorm (URN, internal/external, complete/incomplete, negative/positive, 
single/multiple). This is the provision to which a modification applies. The 
PassiveNorm is usually expressed in the text as a normative reference. An ActiveNorm 
and a PassiveNorm may collapse in a single document, forming a reflexive 
modificatory provision, acting on the same text with a self-referring modification; 
 Action (Type of action, duration of the action, date_application of the action, 
implicit/explicit). This is the type of action the active (or modifying) provision entails 
for the passive (or modified) one. Actions are organised into a taxonomy, and each 
action can have a date of application different from the date when the law containing 
the provision is set to come into force. It is therefore possible to find that a modificatory 
application has been advanced (brought forward, preponed) or postponed. The action’s 
Fig. 5.1 – Dynamics of norms in [Lima et al. 2008] 
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duration is a relevant argument for applying the modifications (e.g., a six-month 
suspension starting on 31 July 2010); 
 TemporalArguments (describing the start or end of a norm’s period of force, efficacy, 
or application). A modificatory provision is described by three dates: the date of the 
provision’s entry into force, the date on which it becomes efficacious, and the date 
starting from which it is applied. The goal is to model these temporal arguments so as to 
help NLP tools detect them automatically; 
 Conditions (event, space, domain). A temporal modification is sometimes limited to an 
event, a geographic area, a class (or domain) of application. When a modificatory 
provision is subordinated to an uncertain event, the action is “frozen” until the condition 
is resolved. This part of the language is very complex to detect, but the idea is to use a 
logic formalism to transform these cases into rules with which to logically validate time 
when the conditions are met. This will determine the time starting from which a 
modificatory provision will take effect. 
Considering that textual modifications contain several hidden temporal modificatory provisions 
(e.g., substitution of a date), it is important to extract meaningful elements from each 
modificatory class and to analyze both the legal language expressing each class and the 
compositional rules or forms used in this language. A degree of regularity in the language and in 
the expressions used in active modificatory provisions exists, not only for textual modifications 
but also for exceptions, extensions, and temporal modifications. 
5.4.2.3. LKIF-Rule Extension for modelling temporal dimensions 
[Palmirani et al. 2011a] presents a modification of the LKIF-Rule language introducing 
temporal arguments. The extension is made adding the following metadata blocks: 
 events, listing neutral temporal events; 
 timesInfo, interpreting the events as time intervals through start/endpoints or 
duration info; 
 rulesInfo, connecting the rules with the time parameters. 
Following are examples of these blocks and how they are combined to transform neutral events 
into qualified time intervals. First of all, a list of events is laid down: 
<events> 
<!-- events of the Order 2007 UK--> 
<event id=”e1” value=”2007-07-25T01:01:00.0Z”/> 
<!-- Terrorism Act of 2006 --> 
<event id=”e2” value=”2006-03-03T01:01:00.0Z”/> 
<event id=”e3” value=”2006-07-17T01:01:00.0Z”/> 
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<event id=”e4” value=”2006-07-25T01:01:00.0Z”/> 
</events> 
These events are recalled in the timesInfo block: 
<timesInfo> 
 <!-- Order 2007--> 
 <times id=”t1”> 
  <time start=”#e1” timeType=”efficacy”/> 
  <time start=”#e1” timeType=”inforce”/> 
 </times> 
 <times id=”t2”> 
  <time start=”#e1” duration=”P01Y” 
timeType=”application”/> 
 </times> 
 <!-- Terrorism Act 2006 --> 
 <times id=”t3”> 
  <time start=”#e3” timeType=”efficacy”/> 
  <time start=”#e3” timeType=”inforce”/> 
 </times> 
 <times id=”t4”> 
  <time start=”#e4” timeType=”application”/> 
 </times> 
</timesInfo> 
These qualified time intervals are recalled in the legal text through the timesBlock attribute 
(see below). 
The example in [Palmirani et al. 2011a] explains the modelling possibilities made available by 
such an extension of a rule language. The example involves the Terrorism Act of UK of year 
2000 and its modifications brought by the Terrorism Act of year 2006 and the Order of 2007. 
Section 25 of the Terrorism Act of 2006 (modifying the detention period set by Terrorism Act 
of 2000 from 28 days to 14 days) was suspended by the Order of 2007 for the duration of one 
year. This creates four possible scenarios for the application of the norm: 
 The original 28-days detention period, from 2000 to 2006; 
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 The 14-days detention period between 2006 and 2007; 
 The 29-days detention period for 1 year starting on 2007; 
 The 14-days detention period from year 2008 on. 
The timesBlock attribute, assigned to the sentences, defines the temporal parameters of the 
various parts of the rule.  
Following is the representation of section 25 of Terrorism Act of 2006: 
<rule id=”rule3” ruleType=”strict” timesBlock=”t3”> 
<!—Sect. 25 Terr. Act/2006 modifies Sch. 8 Terr. Act/2000> 
 <head timesBlock=”t3”> 
  <s pred=”mod:substituted” id=”id4a”> 
<v value=”sche8_2000”>x</v> is modified as if for “28 
days” there were substituted “14 days”</s> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
  <s pred=”mod:intoOperation” id=”id4b” timesBlock=”t3”> 
  <v value=”rule5”>y</v> into operation. </s> 
 </body> 
</rule> 
Finally, the representation of the Order of 2007, suspending the application of section 25 of the 
Terrorism Act of 2006. 
<rule id=”rule1” ruleType=”strict” timesBlock=”t2”> 
<!—Disapplication sect. 25 of the Terrorism Act 2006 --> 
 <head timesBlock=”t2” 
  <s pred=”mod:suspension” id=”id1a”> 
  <v value=”sec25_2006”>x</v> is suspended </s> 
</head> 
<body> 
 <s pred=”mod:enterInForce” id=”id3b” timesBlock=”t1”> 





Through these rules and blocks, the meaning of a suspension switching the days of detention 
from 14 to 28 in an interval of time starting at e1 (2007-07-25T01) and lasting one year 
(P01Y) is modeled. On the basis of this KB, a reasoner could correctly identify the four 
different scenarios of application of the norms, through time, and tell which is the maximum 
duration of detention at a given time. 
5.4.3. Modelling the semantics of suspension provisions 
The present section presents an example of advanced legal concept modelling. In this example, 
the concept of suspension of efficacy is modeled with a bottom-up approach: the concept is 
modeled starting from the statutory evidence (a sample of laws where this legal effect is 
concerned) in order to present a model which could be implemented in a NLP tool, but yet 
ensures a full support for advanced semantic features. 
The aim of [Palmirani et al. 2011b] was to model the suspension of efficacy with FrameNet so 
as to facilitate automatic detection of arguments in the text, using NLP tools based on a shallow 
semantic parser. The focus is on suspension because it is more complex and rich with arguments 
than other temporal modifications, and because it is often used as a legislative drafting 
technique for introducing a temporary law
25
. The need for temporary laws arises for two main 
reasons: when the topic is complex and yet urgent, being therefore necessary to find a temporary 
solution, and when the society needs time to fully apply the new dispositions. Suspension may 
be defined as the action through which a textual provision interrupts the efficacy of a legal text 
(or fragment thereof) for a given period [Guastini 1998]. In the present model, the text and the 
actor are one and the same thing: while other authors [Boer et al. 2009] view modifications as 
documents expressing an authority’s action and role, this is a simpler model based on a 
ontology of documents rather than on a model of the legal system’s actors and institutions. 
Therefore, in this model, all the norms (or rules) contained in a text affected by a suspension are 
deemed inefficacious without giving account for the authors and the issuing authorities.  
Suspension is based on the rationale that some norms so strongly affect their addressees 
(citizens, businesses, social actors) that an adequate period is needed for them to tune into the 
process. It is important to clearly recognize, identify and distinguish this rationale over the time 
even if suspension may come by a variety of different modifications: in other words, it is 
important to track the entire suspension process even if it is fragmented across several intervals 
of efficacy, because each macro-suspension is driven by a normative principle. Therefore, the 
aim is to capture not only a suspension’s arguments but also its unity, so as to bring the 
suspension into relation with its underlying normative rationale. 
5.4.3.1. Characteristics of the suspension provision 
                                                     
25 See The Arizona Legislative Bill Drafting Manual 2009, pag. 6; Texas Legislative Council Drafting Manual, pag. 
58, and other US Legislative Drafting Manual. 
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a suspension provision can be either explicit or implicit, depending on the language of the 
provision in question. Under a temporal point of view, an explicit suspension can be either 
defined or undefined: 
 A suspension is defined when its period—the period during which a norm’s efficacy is 
interrupted—is explicitly stated in the text, with the suspending provision clearly 
indicating a beginning and an end (or an initiating and an ending event). Because the 
interval is unambiguously defined, it need not be interpreted; 
 A suspension is undefined when the interval during which a norm’s efficacy is 
interrupted is not explicitly set out in the suspending provision. In those cases, the text 
often needs to be interpreted to detect the correct value. This class of suspension 
includes at least three subclasses:  
 sine die suspension (without an ending date);  
 suspension subordinated to an external event (e.g., “Article 5 is suspended for a six-
month period starting from entry into force of the Treaty”);  
 suspension intervals described with a set of other parameters such as the duration (e.g., 
“Article 5 is suspended for four months starting from 31 December 2010).  
One mode of introducing an implicit suspension is by disapplication, which is brought about by 
a secondary or local law acting through the subsidiarity principle. Disapplication takes also 
place when resolving conflicts of laws between regional and national law or between national 
law and European regulations. When a document disapplies another document, the latter is 
frozen, its efficacy being suspended. If the disapplying document is repealed, however, the 
suspended document is restored to its former efficacy in order to avoid creating a gap in the 
legal system. This particular mode of suspension is difficult to detect without contextual 
information, such as the issuing authority, the level on which the law was issued, and the rules 
framing the legal system. 
Another important case to consider is that of a suspension provision being modified. A 
suspension is usually reflexive, with the law introducing the suspension being the same as that 
affected by it (this is a role usually devoted in Italy to a law’s closing articles). However, it is 
not unusual to see a later provision modifying the suspension for the same reasons that led to its 
introduction. For example, Decision 2000/185/EC says under Article 3 that the decision itself 
“shall apply from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2002,” thus limiting the document’s efficacy. 
Later, Decision 2002/954/EC modified the second subparagraph of Article 3 by replacing “31 
December 2002” with “31 December 2003.” Then, finally, a third Directive again changed the 
term, from “2003” to “2005”. The rationale guiding this suspension remains the same, and it is 
important to capture this by first detecting the arguments characterizing the suspension’s 
modification—so as to identify and adjust the main suspension of efficacy—and then describing 
the phenomena in their atomicity. Note in this specific case that the language of the provision 
describes efficacy under an inclusion principle and creates two intervals of suspension (one 
running from the date of entry into force to 1 January 2000, and the other lasting indefinitely – 
sine die – from the second event). 
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5.4.3.2. Language Regularity of Suspension Provision 
In order to model, and consequently extract, semantics from laws introducing or modifying a 
suspension of efficacy, [Palmirani et al. 2011b] has surveyed a large body of norms that legal 
practitioners have semantically annotated with Norma-Editor on the basis of the NormeInRete 
XML schema definition DTDv2.0. The collection includes about 29,000 documents dating from 
2005 to 2009, all of them published in Italy’s Official National Gazette (issued by the country’s 
High Court of Cassation) and selected on the basis of a project on turning these documents into 
an XML format which CIRSFID worked on over the last five years. On this body of documents 
a linguistic analysis was performed, in order to isolate patterns for each type of suspension 
provision. The articles processed are 46,483, and the total modifications are 95, representing 
0.2% of the articles. The suspending documents are 90, representing 0.3% of all the documents 
processed. 
The language of suspension has a sufficient degree of regularity to fill the gap between the legal 
lexicon and the rules of suspension: the provisions always express their temporal arguments and 
coordinates by way of some temporal expression (an adverb, conjunction, or preposition 
indicating a continuing, definite, or indefinite time), and they always include a (direct or 
indirect) reference to the norm whose efficacy is being suspended (PassiveNorm). 
The logical structure of the suspension norm is PassiveNorm is suspended in 
TemporalArguments. Ten terms directly evoke a suspension of efficacy in the document sample. 
All these terms suspend efficacy, but not all in the same way. More to the point: 
 Ten terms (efficacia, efficace, applicarsi, valido, validità, effetto, applicazione, vigore, 
concernere, and durata) introduce an inclusion of efficacy, which means that the 
PassiveNorm will be applied inside the TemporalArguments (“Law X is applied from 1 
January 2004 until 31 December 2005”); 
 Two terms (sospendere and disapplicare) introduce an exclusion of efficacy, which 
means that the PassiveNorm will not be applied inside the TemporalArguments. In 
other words, it will be applied outside these arguments (“Law X is suspended from 1 
January 2004 until 31 December 2005”). 
The negation of an inclusive form makes the form exclusive, and the same happens with the 
verb cessare (cease) (Law X ceases to be efficacious on 1 January 2004). 
In the logical structure presented above, two elements accompany a suspension-evoking 
element. They are PassiveNorm, representing the norm whose efficacy will be suspended for a 
certain period, and TemporalArguments, time expressions (or time markers) defining the time at 
which a modification of efficacy is to take effect. 
5.4.3.3. Modelling Suspensions Using FrameNet 
FrameNet—a lexicon-building project developed at Berkeley University and presented in 
[Baker et al. 1998] —examines words by their meaning and describes the conceptual structures 
of sentences. This makes it possible to map the main parts of speech (verbs, nouns, etc.) and to 
couple them with the legal concepts expressed by the words in question (concepts such as 
suspension, modified suspension, and disapplication). In order to turn the previously presented 
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elements into Frame Elements within the FrameNet project, it is necessary to model two layers 
of semantics. 
Two frames will be created on the first layer, namely, the Efficacy_Inclusion and 
Efficacy_Exclusion frames, which on the second layer will be merged into the 
Main_Suspension frame expressing its meaning in terms of lack of efficacy.  
frame (Efficacy_Inclusion) 
frame_elements (Passive_Norm, Period_Start, Period_End) 
scene (Passive_Norm has efficacy from Period_Start to Period_End) 
frame (Efficacy_Exclusion) 
frame_elements (Passive_Norm, Period_Start, Period_End) 
scenes (Passive_Norm is suspended from Period_Start to Period_End, Passive_Norm has 
not efficacy from Period_Start to Period_End, Passive_Norm has efficacy until 
Period_End) 
frame (Main_Suspension) 
frame_elements (Passive_Norm, Suspension_Start, Suspension_End) 
scenes (Passive_Norm is suspended from Suspension_Start to Suspension_End, 
Passive_Norm has efficacy from Suspension_End to Suspension_Start) 
 
Fig. 5.2 – Frames representing suspension of efficacy. 
Efficacy_Inclusion 
(efficacia.n, efficace.adj, applicarsi.v, valido.adj, validità.n, effetto.n, applicazione.n, 
vigore.n) 
Efficacy_Exclusion  
(sospendere.v, disapplicare.v, cessare.v+efficacia.n, non.adv+Efficacy_Inclusion) 
 
Fig. 5.3 – Relevant terms evoking the Efficacy_Inclusion and the Efficacy_Exclusion frame. 
The TemporalArguments of the shift in efficacy is captured by the Period_Start and Period_end 
Frame Elements (FEs), and the target norm is marked as Passive_Norm. Frame Element Groups 
(FEGs) represent the occurrence of FEs in the examined provisions (P=Passive_Norm, 
S=Period_Start, E=Period_End). 
FEG Annotated Example Frequenc
y 
P, S, E [P L’obbligo di cui all’articolo 51, comma 1, della legge 27 dicembre 




decreto] [E fino al 31 dicembre 2006]. 
P, E [P Le disposizioni del presente provvedimento ] hanno efficacia [E sino a 
tutto il 7 maggio 2007]. 
32 
P, S [P Le disposizioni del presente provvedimento] cessano di avere 
efficacia [S il giorno successivo alle votazioni di ballottaggio di cui al 
comma 1]. 
30 
P, S+E [P Le disposizioni della legge 29 dicembre 1988 n. 554] si applicano 
[S+E negli anni 1989 e 1990] 
18 
S+E, P [S+E Per l’anno 2008] non si applicano [P le disposizioni di cui 
all’articolo 1, commi 648 e 651, della legge 27 dicembre 2006 n. 206] 
3 
S, P [S A partire dal quindicesimo giorno dalla data della pubblicazione della 
presente legge] cesserà l’efficacia [P del decreto ministeriale 22 agosto 
1994, n. 582] 
4 
 
Fig. 5.4 – Frequency of Frame Element Groups for temporal arguments in the examined sample. 
The Main_Suspension frame is modelled by inheriting the Process frame. Suspension is 
therefore treated as a process, with a “target” represented by the Passive_Norm (carried over 
unchanged from the first layer) and whose state is affected by one or more events: it starts with 
the event Suspension_Start event and/or ends with the Suspension_End event.  
FEG Annotated Example Frequenc
y 
P, S [P Le disposizioni del presente provvedimento] hanno efficacia [S sino 
a tutto il 7 maggio 2007]. 
48 
S, P [S A partire dal quindicesimo giorno dalla data della pubblicazione 
della presente legge] cesserà l’efficacia [P del decreto ministeriale 22 
agosto 1994, n. 582] 
4 
P, S, E [P L’obbligo di cui all’articolo 51 della legge 27 dicembre 2002, n. 
289], è sospeso [S dalla data di entrata in vigore del presente decreto] 
[E fino al 31 dicembre 2006]. 
2 
P, E, S [P Il presente provvedimento] acquista efficacia [E dalla data di 
indizione dei comizi elettorali per i referendum regionali] [S sino a tutto 




S+E, P [S+E Per l’anno 2008] non si applicano [P le disposizioni di cui 
all’articolo 1, commi 648 e 651, della legge 27 dicembre 2006 n. 206] 
3 
P, E [P L’applicazione dei commi 1 e 8 dell’articolo 177] resta sospesa [E 
fino alla data di entrata in vigore del regolamento di cui al comma 5] 
13 
P, E+S [P Le disposizioni della legge 29 dicembre 1988 n. 554] si applicano 
[S+E negli anni 1989 e 1990] 
15 
 
Fig. 5.5. Frequency of Frame Element Groups in the main suspension frame. 
The following table explains how the Period_Start and Period_End elements are transformed 
into Suspension_start and Suspension_end, marking respectively the beginning and end of a 
period where a norm lacks efficacy.  
 Efficacy_Inclusion Efficacy_Exclusion 
Period_Start Suspension_End Suspension_Start 
Period_Stop Suspension_Start Suspension_End 
 
Fig. 5.6. – Conversion of period markers into suspension markers. 
Also, a Suspension_Modification frame will be created to capture provisions modifying a 
suspension previously introduced by another norm. It is quite easy to distinguish between the 
two kinds of provisions, since they are textual modifications lacking a term that evokes an 
efficacy frame and contains some Change_event_time frame. In order to properly interpret the 
modification, there needs be a comparison between the Suspension_Modification and the 
Main_Suspension (contained elsewhere). For this reason, the Suspension_Modification element 
will be presented in FrameNet without any semantic specification of its content, since the exact 
interpretation of the provision will be entrusted to other tools. 
frame (Suspension_Modification) 
inherits from (Change_Event_Time) 
frame_elements (Passive_Norm (=Event), Suspending_Expression (=Event), 
Suspension_Start (=Landmark_Time), Suspension_End (=Landmark_Time), 
Undefined_Suspension_Modification (=Destination_Time)) 
scene (Passive_Norm Suspending_Expression is postponed from 
Suspension_End to Undefined_Suspension_Modification) 
 
Fig. 5.7 – The suspension modification frame. 




Moreover, the start of the process can be advanced or postponed by another norm, and the same 
can happen to its end. These events will be represented in four specific frames, subclasses of the 
Suspension_Modification frame. 
5.4.3.4. From the Text Structure to the Legal Semantics 
 
The FrameNet model described above is designed for automatic detection of the provisions (and 
relative arguments) by which a norm is suspended, with the help of NLP tools. On the structural 
level, a parser automatically detects references, dates, and other metadata in a legislative text 
and translates this information into XML tags and metadata using legal XML standards (such as 
Akoma Ntoso and NiR). The XML file is then processed by a deep syntactical parser based on a 
NLP tool. Detecting the treebank and the main linguistic structural elements can help 
understand the semantics acquired from a FrameNet analysis of the suspension. Efficacy-
evoking terms help understand the type of provision in question: if the evoking word occurs as 
the subject, then the prepositional phrase is marked as Passive_Norm (as in “Efficacy of law 
X”); if the evoking word occurs as the predicate, the Passive_Norm element will be represented 
by the subject (“Law X is suspended”). Words expressing time are marked as Period_Start or 
Period_End. 
FrameNet distinguishes between Efficacy_Inclusion and Efficacy_Exclusion frames, and the 
frame’s Period_Start and Period_Stop are converted into Suspension_Start and Suspension_End 
accordingly. FrameNet also recognises the presence of a nearby Change_Event_Time frame and 
introduces a Suspension_Modification frame in place of a Main_Suspension (which should 
already be effective in Passive_Norm). In this case, the frame’s Suspension_Start and 
Suspension_End are replaced with Start_Modification and End_Modification and a reasoner 
processes the Suspension_Modification frame in light of the Main_Suspension contained in the 
Passive_Norm, distinguishing advancement and postponement of start/end events 
(Start_Advancement, Start_Postponement, End_Advancement, End_Postponement). 
The regularity of the modificatory provisions and the frequency of the textual ones encourage 
research in the direction indicated. Moreover, the results obtained from applying NLP tools bear 
out our methodology: a more detailed vocabulary of verbs can be extracted from a large 
database, and that would make it possible to reinforce the linguistic classifications in 
conjunction with a taxonomy of modificatory provision. On the other hand, when dealing with 
temporal modifications more contextual information is needed, together with an account for the 
linguistic patterns used for expressing the action, a more powerful instrument for describing 
regularity, and a connection with the lexicon. It is for this reason that FrameNet may turn out 
useful. 
[Palmirani et al. 2011b] presents a first outcome of this approach, meant to be an advancement 
when it comes to modelling legal language while taking into account the theory of law. This 
research showed how important it is to fully understand the legal phenomena and to model them 
with logical rules, which in turn are supported by the state-of-the-art in language processing. It 
showed how the concept of suspension requires advanced modelling in order to lay down the 
necessary set of metadata to fully capture its meaning and its effects: this kind of effort has to be 
replicated for every legal phenomenon, and at the same time it is necessary to leave space for 
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modification of such models, so that the tool evaluating the legal concept can rely on a custom 
theory which is the one that the user wants to adopt. As already noticed in this chapter, such 
tools assume more and more the appearances of the ancestral tools called legal philosophy and 
legal doctrine. 
 Different perspectives on representing judicial knowledge 5.5.
5.5.1.  Introduction 
The present section contains a comparison of the main models used in the state-of-the-art of 
legal knowledge representation and reasoning. Those approaches (and most of the solutions they 
embody) have already been presented in this thesis, but in this section they will be analysed 
together in one of their applications. The purpose is to understand the differences between these 
approaches, and to compare the features presented by those authors with those indicated so far, 
seeing if they deal with the same issues pointed out in the present chapter, and how effectively 
they do it.  
Most of the research in the legal subjects uses some famous examples as a test field for theories 
and applications. In case-law, the example used as a paragon is the American case of Popov v. 
Hayashi
26
, decided by the honourable Kevin M McCarthy, a pioneer in AI & Law (see 1.4.1.). 
The case concerned the possession of a baseball hit by Barry Bonds for his record breaking 73rd 
home run in the 2001 season. Such a ball is very valuable (Mark McGwire’s 1998 70th home 
run ball sold at auction for $3,000,000). When the ball reached the crowd, Popov caught it in the 
upper part of the webbing of his baseball glove, in a catch which does not give certainty of 
retaining control of the ball, particularly since Popov was stretching and could have fallen. 
However, Popov was not given the chance to complete his catch: he was tackled and thrown to 
the ground by others trying to secure the ball, which fell off his glove. Hayashi, himself 
innocent of the attack on Popov, picked up the ball and put it in his pocket, so securing 
possession. 
5.5.2. A legal ontology to represent the case 
[Wyner and Hoekstra 2010] presents an OWL ontology called Legal Core Ontology, to make 
explicit the conceptual knowledge of legal case domain, support reasoning on the domain, and 
annotate the text of cases. 
The ontology is intended to be open to additions (i.e. with ontologies representing domain-
specific knowledge) focusing only on legal concepts which are strictly related to case-law: it is 
broadly compatible with [Costa et al. 1998]. It also leaves concepts such as events/processes, 
causation, time, space, propositional attitudes, and so on to external extensions. 
Another important design choice concerns the representation of extra-legal or upper domain 
knowledge: it is represented in the Legal Case Ontology only as far as legal representation on 
                                                     
26 Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal.Superior Dec 18, 2002) (NO. 400545). 
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the matter differs from the general one (for example, a tomato is considered a fruit under a 
biological ontology, a vegetable under a legal one). 
Following this approach, and similarly to the ontology created during the present Ph.D research, 
the ontology does not represent the dynamics of reasoning, but the static data over which 
participants argue: i.e. it assumes that some cause of action holds in the case, without 
representing how this comes to be. 
The central concept of the ontology is the case class, which is connected to the other main 
concepts Decision, Jurisdiction, Participant, Argument Scheme, Element, Evidence, Legal 
Concept, Legal Document. Among those, Argument Scheme and Legal Concept are particularly 
interesting, as they introduce argument schemes and factors into the case ontology. 
5.5.3. Bench-Capon: introducing dimensions and factors 
The reconstruction in [Bench-Capon 2012] goes beyond the mere classification of concepts, but 
does not delve into pure formal reasoning either. Here, the case is dealt with logics, and the 
argumentation is built upon the theory construction style of [Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003]. 
Following this methodology, a set of factors is identified together with the value they promote 
and the side they favour (this is done by starting with a dimensional analysis and using the 
various points on these dimensions as factors, just like Cato derived factors from the dimensions 
of Hypo). The factors are then assigned to a set of cases (precedents) which have to be 
compared to Popov vs. Hayashi, and their outcome is recorded. 
As far as logics is concerned, the analysis highlighted the need for defeaters in the sense of 
Defeasible Logic. However, the author also notes that only some of the factors behave as 
defeaters (rules blocking a conclusion while not licensing the negation of that conclusion), and 
so factors can no longer be seen as homogeneous and do not straightforwardly relate to rules. 
This result seems to confirm the choice made for IBP in [Brüninghaus and Ashley, 2005], where 
a distinction between factors was found to be required in order to be able to resolve conflicts 
appropriately. 
Also argument schemes are used to represent the case, but this is achieved at the cost of 
renouncing to dimension (and the different degrees of support they allow): for this reason, 
factors are split into a pro-plaintiff and a pro-defendant version. 
5.5.4. Evaluating arguments with values 
Values, together with defeasible logics, were first used to model the arguments of Popov v 
Hayashi in [Wyner et al. 2007]. This reconstruction was based on prior works on valued-based 
argumentation systems [Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003] and on modelling practical reasoning 
[Atkinson 2005]. It used several argumentation schemes, including arguments from witness 
testimony and defeasible modus ponens. However the single arguments were not modelled. The 
analysis of the decision is done through a set of defeasible rules which allow intermediate 
conclusions to be derived from the facts. Arguments are built from these intermediate 
conclusions and attack relations are asserted between them, building a Dung abstract 
argumentation framework. The last part of the decision (the equitable solution) is modelled 
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using a value-based argumentation framework. The whole reconstruction was done manually, 
without support from a software tool for their formal methods. 
5.5.5. Prakken’s argumentation framework  
The framework of [Prakken 2010] is applied in a practical representation of the Popov vs. 
Hayashi case in [Prakken 2012]. Here, the concepts of defeasible rules and Dung semantics 
constitute the semantics for argument acceptability.  
The representation of the famous case allows the author to apply one of the pillars of his 
framework, namely the concept of reinstatement: an argument with defeaters is still justified if 
all its defeaters are in turn defeated by a justified argument. 
The two technical solutions used to represent the case (and successfully evaluate the arguments 
in accordance with judge McCarthy's decision) were rule-exception structures and arguments 
about the validity of rules, which turned out to be sufficient to capture value-based reasoning, 
since, as the author notices, “the only value that was at stake in this case, fairness, was 
reconstructed as a condition of a validity rule”. 
Another peculiarity of the experiment was the concept of two-steps argument: the passage from 
the premise to the final conclusion is mediated by an "intermediate conclusion". This better 
captures the dependency relations between the elements of arguments, since complex arguments 
are usually not expressed with the classic attack-counterattack relations. In accordance with 
Gordon's view on attacking arguments, the argument against the final conclusion is seen as a 
separate kind of speech act: a challenge of the conclusion, which can in turn be replied with a 
further argument for that premise.  
This introduces dialogical aspects into the argumentation modelling, bringing this model of the 
dynamics of the Popov vs. Hayashi case very close to the goal of the present research in the 
representation of the judicial reasoning. 
5.5.6. Reconstructing the case with some Carneades tools 
The Carneades Argumentation System has been tested in the Popov vs. Hayashi case in [Gordon 
and Walton 2012]. The paper illustrates Carneades’ support for argument reconstruction, 
evaluation and visualization. However, not all features of Carneades were used in that 
demonstration: argument construction from knowledge base, in particular, was not used as the 
knowledge of the domain would have needed to be modelled at a finer level of granularity.  
5.5.7.  A comparison of the argument models for Popov vs. Hayashi presented so far 
5.5.7.1. Tasks 
The purposes of the OWL ontology in [Wyner and Hoekstra 2010] are quite similar to those of 
the ontology set of the present research: to make explicit the implicit knowledge of legal cases 
that legal professionals have, and to build a database of cases which applies automated case-
based reasoning rules to answer queries on the knowledge base, even over the internet with a 
web-based tool. When dealing with the choice of lexicon, the authors decide to set aside the 
existing standards, which are considered too general, and build a language from the scratch 
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following [Ashley 2009] which sets out three roles for legal case ontologies: to support case-
based reasoning, to distinguish between deep and shallow analogies, and to induce and test 
hypotheses. The task of supporting reasoning is treated only to a certain extent, since it is not 
intention of the ontology to introduce rules relating cases to each other (which is the heart of 
case-based reasoning).  
The example presented in [Bench-Capon 2012] is an effort to apply the dimensions and factors 
approach to case based reasoning in AI and Law.  
[Wyner et al. 2007] wants to show that useful argument schemes and associated critical 
questions can be extracted from a complex case, then input into an argumentation framework in 
order to reach the claim of the case. It provides an example of how a real case can be 
represented and reasoned with using argument schemes and argumentation frameworks, thus 
providing an empirical basis for further research and applications of argumentation. 
Prakken’s example was aimed at testing the suitability of the abstract framework of [Prakken 
2010] for modelling the argumentation structure of the decision.  
[Gordon and Walton 2012] is focused on reconstructing and critically evaluating Judge 
McCarty’s arguments in his decision, similar to what has previously been made in [Gordon and 
Walton 2006]. 
5.5.7.2. Methodology 
The methodology chosen for the OWL ontology presented in [Wyner and Hoekstra 2010] is 
very interesting for the purposes of the present research: in fact, instead of trying to minimise 
reasoning by highly specifying the ontology (i.e. by explicitly asserting all subclasses and 
property relations), the approach followed attempts to maximise reasoning (i.e. deriving classes 
and subclasses from class restrictions and axioms): this allows individuals to vary their 
properties depending on the context in which they appear, which is exactly what an ontology 
representing case-law needs (i.e., a person can be the plaintiff in one case, a defendant in 
another case; a certain characteristic of a contract can be judged as sufficient for the 
adjudication in one case, and not sufficient in another one). 
In [Bench-Capon 2012], in order to apply the dimensions and factors approach to Popov v. 
Hayashi, first a suitable group of precedent cases is assembled. These are: 
 Keeble v. Hickergill, where the defendant, out of malice, scared ducks away from the 
plaintiff’s pond; 
 Pierson v. Post, where the plaintiff intercepted and killed a fox which the defendant was 
hunting; 
 Young v. Hitchens, where, while fishing, the defendant spread a net inside the plaintiff’s 
bigger net, catching the trapped fish; 
 Ghen v. Rich, where the defendant bought a whale washed ashore after having been 
harpooned by the plaintiff. 
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These cases are then represented first using factors and then dimensions, which allow a finer 
grained, and hence more satisfactory, representation of the issues involved. The cases and the 
various factors are, in this way, rearranged in several ways in order to highlight the complex 
network of common points and differences. Next, Hypo-style three ply-arguments are 
constructed: in turns, the plaintiff and the defendant cite favorable precedents, explaining their 
analogies with the current case in order to win the claim, and try to distinguish adversarial 
citations. 
 The example provided in [Wyner et al. 2007] proceeds in four phases: 
 It is established what facts the court will acecept, based on the presentation of the case; 
 From the facts, rules are provided enabling to reason from the facts to intermediate 
terms (some of which are legal terms and some not), that then form the basis of the legal 
analysis;  
 Arguments, which are applications of the rules, are expressed abstractly and organized 
into an abstract argumentation framework which specifies the attack relations between 
the arguments, from which sets of acceptable arguments can be identified; 
 Values are associated with the arguments, further refining the argumentation 
framework. Given an audience, understood as a value-ranking on arguments, the final 
outcome of the case is calculated. 
Prakken’s formalization defines arguments as inference trees formed by applying two kinds of 
inference rules, strict and defeasible rules, as described in 1.3.2.2. as an application of the 
principles of defeasible logics presented in 1.2.7.).  
The methodology used in the reconstruction and evaluation in [Gordon and Walton 2012] is 
summarized as follows: 
 All statements (atomic propositions) of arguments are listed, and each is given a 
identifier; 
 Premises and conclusions of arguments are identified among the statements; 
 The Carneades Mapping Tool is used to create the argument diagram, linking shared 
statements of arguments; 
 Each statement is given a proof standard; 
 Each argument is labelled with an argumentation scheme; 
 Statements which are assumed to be true without argument by the audience (in this 
case, the judge) are marked. 
At this point, the Carneades Software is capable of using the arguments to reason forwards from 
the accepted and rejected statements, noting which arguments are applicable because all of their 
premises hold, and which statements are acceptable because the applicable arguments satisfy the 
statement’s proof standard.  
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Finally, argumentation schemes can be used to critically evaluate the arguments, revealing 
implicit premises and critical questions. 
5.5.7.3. Implementation of Factors, Dimensions, and Values 
In [Wyner and Hoekstra 2010] values are considered only to the extent of the cause of action 
(the claim) they sustain, while dimensions and factors are merged in the OWL ontology in a 
subclass of the legal concept class called factor. The authors notice that these factors should 
have a hierarchical organization, where basic level factors relate to higher level, more abstract 
factors. This is however not necessarily a structure of strict subsumption so cannot simply be 
expressed as a class hierarchy. For this reason, factors are not furtherly defined in the ontology 
(factor-based reasoning being, by the way, beyond its scope). Comparing the case to similar 
precedents, [Bench-Capon 2012] identifies the following factors: 
 F1 Not-Caught: The animal was neither in the bodily possession of the plaintiff, nor 
mortally wounded. Advances the purpose of legal certainty by providing a clear 
deﬁnition of possession. It is pro-defendant; 
 F2 Own/Open: Own applies if the plaintiff was hunting on his own land and advances 
the purpose of protection of property rights. Open applies if the plaintiff was hunting on 
open land. Both are pro-plaintiff; 
 F3 Livelihood: The plaintiff was engaged in earning his living. The purpose advanced 
is the protection of valuable activity, and it is pro-plaintiff; 
 F4 Competition: The defendant was in competition with the plaintiff. This advances 
the purpose of promoting free enterprise, and is pro-defendant. 
It turns out that Popov vs Hayashi presents only F1 and F4, and that no factor favoring Popov is 
present. A more subtle analysis is needed to do justice to Popov’s case, it remains to see if 
dimensions can supply what is required. The reference work for the role of dimensions is 
[Bench-Capon and Rissland 2001]. As well as considering the different degrees of closeness to 
bodily possession, they suggest that the key importance of land ownership (at least in cases 
where the question of trespass does not arise) is that the owner of the land may be considered to 
own the animals in virtue of their presence on his land, without any need to physically seize 
them. Moreover, the factors relating to livelihood seem rather narrow: they do not allow to take 
account of the arguably socially useful role of Post’s fox hunting, nor of the fact that the 
defendant in Keeble was acting out of malice. Without this there is no account neither for the 
strength of Post’s case nor of Keeble’s, and these strengths do matter in the current case. Bench-
Capon hence uses the following four dimensions to represent the cases: 
 D1 Possession: This would range from the extreme pro-defendant position where the 
animal was roaming entirely free, through chase being started, hot pursuit, mortal 
wounding to the extreme pro-plaintiff position of actual bodily possession; 
 D2 Ownership: This would range from the the extreme pro-defendant position where 
the animals never entered the plaintiff’s property, through various degrees of frequency 
of presence, from straying to regular and predictable visits, to the extreme pro-plaintiff 
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position where the animal was incapable of leaving the land, where we had a fox on an 
island, for example; 
 D3 PlaintiffMotive: Rather than simply focussing on whether the plaintiff was earning 
his livelihood, the suggestion here is that a range of increasingly worthy motives should 
be considered, starting from malice, through pleasure and social service to livelihood; 
 D4 DefendantMotive: As for the plaintiff motive, but relating to the defendant. 
This ﬁner grained representation allows to arrange the cases on four dimensions in the following 
way (naming the most pro-plaintiff case on each dimension ﬁrst). Note that the Ownership 
dimension applies only to Keeble. 
 Possession: Ghen, {Popov, Young}, Keeble, Pierson; 
 Ownership: Keeble; 
 PlaintiffMotive: {Ghen,Young, Keeble} Popov, Pierson; 
 DefendantMotive: Keeble, Pierson, Popov, {Ghen,Young}. 
The dimensions discussed so far are all taken from analysis of the wild animal cases, which was 
undertaken without any thought of Popov. This is, of course, in the spirit of systems such as 
Hypo and Cato which presuppose a set of cases to which the current case will be presented. 
Bench-Capon thinks instead about a representation with Popov at the forefront, which is in line 
with [Levi 1948], holding that past cases are potentially reinterpreted in the process of being 
applied to new cases. Looking at the section of McCarthy’s decision in which he discusses the 
evidence in order to establish the facts on which he will base his decision, it turns out he has 
three major concerns: 
 He establishes that Popov did not complete his catch, and so he was never in possession 
of the ball; 
 He is able to establish that Popov was prevented from attempting to complete the catch 
by an illegal action on the part of a group of unidentiﬁed persons; 
 He establishes that Hayashi was not one of the people involved in the illegal act.  
Only the ﬁrst of these facts relates to a dimension (possession), while the other two do not relate 
to the dimensions identiﬁed so far, and therefore Bench-Capon identifies new dimensions which 
can effectively face the McCarthy’s concerns and yet be applicable to the precedents: 
 Possession: Ghen, Keeble, {Young, Popov}, Pierson; 
 Interference Illegal: Popov, Keeble, Pierson, Young, Ghen; 
 Defendant Behaviour: Keeble, Pierson, Young, Ghen, Popov; 
 Activity to Encourage: Ghen, Keeble, Pierson {Young, Popov}. 
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As a result, it turns out that the factors based approach aligns the case with Pierson, and the 
dimensions approach with Young. However, considering the perspective just developed, Popov 
(and Pierson) has a dimension on which Young can be distinguished: the interference was 
illegal. Although this was not something that the analyses is previous papers recognised, it was 
a clear consideration of the judge in the Popov case. Thus Bench-Capon showed practically how 
a new case (Popov) requires to modify the analysis of precedents (Young) to include an 
additional dimension. It is not surprising that a new case can lead to a reinterpretation of 
existing cases. Case law should not be seen as a static body of knowledge, but as something 
which evolves and adapts. In the words of [Levi 1948]: 
“The movement of common or expert concepts into the law may be followed. The concept is 
suggested in arguing difference or similarity in a brief, but it wins no approval from the court. 
The idea achieves standing in society. It is suggested again to a court. The court this time 
reinterprets the prior case and in so doing adopts the rejected idea.” [Levi 1948] 
For more on this subject, see 1.3.7.5. 
In [Wyner et al. 2007] factors are not considered, while values are introduced into the argument 
scheme-based reasoning through a specific argument scheme, called Argument from purpose, a 
variant of the scheme for practical reasoning which represents McCarthy’s teleological 
reasoning. 
Being fully developed upon formal logics, the models of Prakken and Gordon have small space 
for factors and values. As for Atkinson, factors are present only as facts (statements) and only in 
this form could some comparison between different precedents be possible. Values have even 
less space in the representation of Prakken (only fundamental fairness appears in the premises 
of a cause of action for equity), and Gordon tries to overcome this lack with the equitable 
solution principle, which actually introduces values into McCarty’s reasoning. This is how 
Gordon and Walton achieved the goal of matching the final outcome of Popov vs. Hayashi 
through an automatic application of rules, facts and schemes by the Carneades system. 
5.5.7.4. Modelling of arguments 
The OWL ontology of [Wyner and Hoekstra 2010] contributes to the modelling of arguments 
by defining arguments schemes, in particular the eyewitness and expert schemes. As the authors 
declare, there are significant issues concerning how much of the semantics of arguments 
schemes can be expressed as OWL-DL class restrictions. In order to incorporate them, the 
authors define unique necessary and sufficient conditions for arguments schemes. For instance, 
the presence of an expert witness testimony indicates that the argument scheme used to provide 
the rationale for a case was at least of the type. The authors also notice that argument schemes 
may include exception clauses and often express plausible reasoning pattens rather than certain 
ones, and are therefore outside the scope of DL. This is the reason why argumentation schemes 
are used only for classifying cases according to the reasoning patterns used to make a 
determination. Notably, the authors also propose the modelling of legal theories, legal rules, and 
causes of action as argument schemes, even if they don’t proceed in that direction since they 
recognize these as complex concepts which merit further consideration and development. 
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The reconstruction in [Bench-Capon 2012] follows the idea of Cato that an argument based on 
following a precedent could be presented as a cascade of argumentation schemes. The program 
starts by comparing the factors present in the current case and a precedent and partitioning them 
according to whether there are present in both cases or only one. It then uses the following 
argument schemes: 
 AS1: the main scheme, which argues that the current case should be decided in the same 
way as the precedent on the basis of their shared factors. The preference between 
factors is justiﬁed by AS2 but is subject to an exception represented by AS4. This 
scheme favors the proponent (the plaintiff given the above partitions); 
 AS2: this states that the shared plaintiff factors were preferred to the shared defendant 
factors in the precedent. It is subject to an exception represented by AS3. It favors the 
proponent; 
 AS3: this says that the precedent was stronger for the plaintiff, on the basis of its 
factors. If, however, there are factors with the same value in the current case, these may 
provide a counter argument. This attacks AS2 and so favors the opponent; 
 AS4: this says that the current case is stronger for the defendant on the basis of factors 
in a precedent. If, however, there are factors with the same value in another precedent 
favoring the defendant, these can be used as a counter argument. This attacks AS1 and 
so favors the opponent; 
 AS5: this is an additional argument to ﬁnd for the plaintiff based on strengths in the 
current case not used in AS3. This provides additional support for the proponent; 
 AS6: this is an additional argument to ﬁnd for the plaintiff based on weaknesses in the 
precedent case favoring the defendant not used in AS4. This also provides additional 
support for the proponent. 
Because dimensions are not used here, the degree of support is not considered. For this purpose 
therefore a pro-plaintiff and a pro-defendant factor are used, relating to each of the ﬁve values. 
The arguments reconstruction of [Wyner et al. 2007] gets very close to the state-of-the-art of 
legal arguments representation, with facts, rules and arguments. First, the authors define a basis 
of established facts F1-F6, and then build arguments in the form of simple logical rules, starting 
from the concepts of possessions and introducing the specific rules about baseballs and gloves, 
control, motion of the object, contact, and so on. These specific rules are, in turn, backed by 
precedents, or by custom and practice. 
In [Prakken 2012], all arguments are built through logic formulas, “from scratch” so to say, 
starting from the building blocks of argument schemes: the rule validity scheme and the 
defeasible modus ponens scheme (see 1.3.4.2.). In this way, the schemes for Witness testimony 
and Video tape are built. Facts (F1-F9) and three sources of rule validity (V1-V3) are then 
formalized, before proceeding with the set of rules concerning possession, catching, physical 
control, qualified possession. Some of these elements are then used to build the analogical rule 




In the example in [Gordon and Walton 2012], arguments are modeled depending on the answers 
they are meant to resolve. First, the following factual issues are modeled:  
Did Popov catch the ball?  
Was Hayashi guilty of any wrongdoing? 
At that point, arguments schemes are introduced in the form of critical questions, which in turn 
present themselves in the graph as a special type of premise (exceptions and assumptions). 
Other graphs are built for issues such as the cause of action, the ownership and the possession of 
the ball, the backing of the conversion warrant, Popov’s right to possess the ball, and finally the 
need for an equitable solution. Here, facts are not used as a starting point to form complex 
statements, but the statements are considered to be the main blocks of argumentation. This 
approach abstracts a bit from the legal elements (and restitutes a structure which brings weaker 
resemblance to the small factors involved in the case), yet it leaves an open end to the text 
metadata layer. 
5.5.7.5. Modelling of attack relations 
As previously said, the OWL ontology does not consider the dynamic aspects of argumentation. 
Attack relations are therefore not modeled, and argument schemes are present only for the 
classification of the reasoning patterns.  
[Bench-Capon 2012] uses argument schemes to build a graph of the decision, which represents 
the reasoning in the case as a tree of argument schemes. 
The root of the argumentation represented in the graph of Figure 5.8 is the claim that the case 
should be found for the plaintiff. The children of a claim node are the argument schemes which 
have been instantiated to support or attack it. The children of these scheme nodes are the 
premises and any exceptions. Premises and exceptions may themselves be claims of further 
argument schemes. The central argument, which is based on the preference for malicious 










Keeble was found 
for plaintiff 







Fig. 5.8 – Graph representing argumentation for Popov in [Bench-Capon 2012]. 
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interference over the fact that the animal was not caught, is attacked by the lack of utility in 
Popov’s activity. But if we prefer Public Order to Utility, we may reject this counter argument. 
The argument is also problematic because Popov lacks the bad defendant motive, Keeble’s 
valuable activity, and Keeble’s possession claim based on land ownership. In order to reject 
this, we must prefer Public Order to all the three values represented by these factors, even in 
combination. Finally we have an additional argument for Popov in that his efforts might deserve 
some reward. A similar graph can be constructed to show the case for the defendant based on 
Young, as in Figure 5.9.  
Here the validity of the argument turns on whether we give sufﬁcient weight to Public Order to 
block the preference using either AS3 or AS4, but even if we do, there are arguments available 
based on the valuable nature of Young’s activity against the selﬁsh gains sought by Popov. 
Taken together the two graphs imply that Public Order must be accorded supreme importance if 
Popov’s case is to stand, and even this may not be sufﬁcient to ﬁnd for Popov. Bench-Capon 
concludes that “Public Order might be given this high importance if it were desired to send a 
clear message that impeding people attempting to catch valuable balls would be futile, since that 
person would be awarded the ball even if it were recovered by someone who himself did no 
wrong”. 
In [Wyner et al. 2007] arguments are evaluated in a Dungean argumentation framework. An 
argument An, for some n, is an application of rule Rn, for that n. In addition to arguments based 
on the rules, four additional arguments are introduced, labeled with questions, intended to 
represent the inference on the basis of arguments which, unlike video and witness testimony, are 
not observable. A graph is built, showing that three arguments have to be accepted. In order to 
consider the arguments from purpose, a set of practical reasoning arguments are built and a 
parallel value-based graph is built: 
 PR1: Where interruption of completing the catch so establishing possession was illegal: 
decides for Popov, prevents assault being rewarded, promotes the value of public order; 
Find for Hayashi 
legitimateInterference 
valuable 




















Fig. 5.9 – Graph representing argumentation for Hayashi in [Bench-Capon 2012]. 
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 PR2: Where it has not been shown that Hayashi did not have possession and did nothing 
wrong: does not decide for Popov, would punish Hayashi, demotes the value of 
fairness; 
 PR3: Where Hayashi had unequivocal control of the baseball: decides for Hayashi, 
provides a bright line, promotes clarity of law; 
 PR4: Where interruption of completing the catch so establishing possession was illegal; 
do not insist on unequivocal control; which would reward assault; demoting the value of 
public order;  
 PR5: Since Hayashi was not an assailant, ﬁnding for Hayashi would not reward assault; 
 PR7: Where interruption of completing the catch so establishing possession was illegal: 
Popov should sue the assailants of the assault, would not punish Hayashi, promotes the 
value of fairness; 
 PR8: Since assailants cannot be identiﬁed, suing those responsible for the assault is not 
a viable action.  
The practical reasoning arguments are presented in Figure 5.10. In order to evaluate the 
justifiable arguments, it is necessary to identify the value ranking first. McCarthy has explicitly 
said that fairness will be his primary value. Thus, both PR1 and PR3 are defeated. PR5 will 
defeat PR4, and PR8 will defeat PR7, since both must be objectively accepted given the facts. 
This leaves only PR2 and PR6. Note that these are not in conﬂict: the result is that McCarthy 
can decide neither for Popov nor for Hayashi. In fact, he decided that the ball should be sold and 
the proceeds divided between the two. 
Attacking relations in [Prakken 2012] follow an argumentation theory based on dungean 
semantics which distinguishes between justified, overruled and defensible arguments. The final 
conclusion of its application to the argument graphs is that both Popov and Hayashi should win. 
Judge McCarthy did not resolve these conﬂicts with preferences, so that both rebuttals result in 
symmetric defeat relations. Instead, McCarthy defeated the two rebuttals by premise-attacking 
them on their assumptions, resulting in asymmetric premise-defeat and since the two defeaters 
themselves have no defeaters, they are both justiﬁed. MC is the rule found by McCarty to 
decide the case: 
PR8 Fact 
PR2 Fairness PR5 Fact PR6 Fairness 
PR1 Public Order PR3 Clarity PR4 Public Order 
PR7 Popov sue assailants 
Fig. 5.10 – Graph representing arguments in [Wyner et al. 2007]. 
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x has a legitimate claim to property y and x is plaintiff in a conversion case and 
z has a legitimate claim to property y and z is defendant in a conversion case and 
the claims of x and z are equally legitimate and 
nobody else has a legitimate claim to y then presumably 
x and z must equally share the value of property y 
The scheme can be extended with argumentation for each of the mutually rebutting arguments, 
as well as for the grounds of validity of rule MC. Prakken also gives account for the allocation 
of burden of proof. In the present case it was uncontroversial that Popov had the burden of 
persuasion for his main claim with a proof standard ‘preponderance of evidence’ and that there 
were no shifts in the burden of persuasion for sub-issues. As suggested by [Prakken and Sartor 
2009], this can be modelled in the present framework by requiring that Popov wins if and only 
if a justiﬁed argument for his main claim can be constructed. In his work, Prakken applies proof 
standards by deciding whether an undercutter or invalidity argument must be moved against an 
evidential argument: the lower the proof standard, the easier such a counterargument will be 
moved.  
In [Gordon and Walton 2012] arguments are evaluated following the argumentation theory 
described in Chapter 3. The evaluation is based on Dungean semantics and critical questions are 
modeled as exceptions. The deliberation problem was represented as the statement there exists 
an equitable solution to the case. For resolving the equity issue, three alternatives are modeled:  
 Giving the ball to Popov;  
 Giving the ball to Hayashi; 
 Selling the ball and dividing the proceeds equally between Popov and Hayashi.  
While the first two alternatives are rejected with rather formal means, the third one seems rather 
obvious and intuitive, and therefore tricky to model in a legal setting. The authors rely on the 
principle of equitable division, sustained by three arguments:  
Popov and Hayashi must equally 
share the value of the balll 
Popov has a legitimate 
claim on the ball 
MC
Hayashi must return the 
ball to Popov 
Hayashi does not have to 
return the ball to Popov 
Popov is plaintiff in 
conversion case 
The claims of Popov 
and Hayashi are equally 
legitimate 
Nobody else has a 
legitimate claim to the 
ball 
Hayashi is defendant in 
conversion case 
Hayashi has a legitimate 
claim on the ball 
rebuttal rebuttal 
Fig. 5.11 – Graph representing the final conclusion in [Prakken 2012]. 
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 An argument from authority, citing a law review article by professor Helmolz which 
proposed applying the principal of equitable division to resolve disputes between 
finders of lost property; 
 An argument from legal tradition, pointing out that the principal of quitable division 
has its roots in ancient Roman law; 
 By citing two precedent cases in which the principle of equitable division had been 
applied. 
The authors also note that, in supporting these arguments (three of which are from practical 
reasoning, and one from tradition), premises had to be left implicit because of lack of space in 
the diagram. For example, stating that dividing property equally among persons with equally 
good claims to the property promotes the value of equity, is missing. But as evidenced by the 
legal argument about the authority of a judge to divide property in such cases, clearly not all 
arguments in a deliberation need be arguments from practical reasoning. 
 Requirements for a Rule Markup Language 5.6.
5.6.1. Introduction 
Following is a review of all the elements which are fundamental in a proper knowledge 
representation framework for the legal field. These elements have all been presented in chapters 
3, 4, 5, and therefore they will not be fully explained, but simply recalled in order to list them 
and to provide easy reference for the evaluation of present (and future) efforts in this field. 
Fig. 5.12 – Graph representing the final solution in [Gordon and Walton 2012] (light grey equals to 
refused, dark grey equals to accepted). 
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5.6.2. Ontological requirements 
5.6.2.1. Four-Layers classification of legal documents 
When constructing a map of concepts, it is fundamental to be able to disambiguate between 
pure, abstract concepts and mere instantiations of the concept, or tokens. This should be done, 
however, without taking a specific perspective: it may well happen, in fact, that the concept to 
be modeled is abstract in one case, and concrete in the next case. A layered model for legal 
documents should therefore include IDs for at least the first three FRBR layers: Work, 
Expression, Manifestation. The Item category should be used in the referral to mere documents 
(not legal acts) when the focus is on the specificity of a single instance of that document (i.e. 
clauses appearing only in the consumer’s copy of the contract). 
5.6.2.2. Connection to Linked Data 
The commitment to the community, and the mix of advantages and duties it entails, is not a 
mere modelling choice, nor a strategy or an approach: it is, evidently, a philosophical shift in the 
concept of scientific production of our age.  
It would be nice to have all legal documents modeled by the same, single legal expert, possibly 
a world-renown leader of the legal doctrine in that legal field. Unfortunately, this is not feasible 
since the cost of such an effort would be excessive. Once upon a time, at the beginning of the 
last era, knowledge was collected by noble people who had not a job in the sense that this word 
has nowadays. Encyclopedias were built this way. In our times, we reached a far opposite goal: 
that of perfectly dividing labor between a large number of people. Still, however, such works 
are undertaken by single people. These are monographies which do not pretend to be up-to-date. 
In the light of these considerations, we realize the need to rely on the network and on the 
chances brought forward by social platforms, which allow everyone who’s willing to join the 
effort to do so, while at the same time keeping an eye for quality through a peer evaluation 
system. A such built system would, in theory, represent a better tool than legal doctrine: it 
could, in fact, take the place of law reviews in enriching the laws with comments on their 
(common and uncommon) interpretations and applications. This is the reason why the legal 
ontology described in chapter 2 should become part of the Liked Data initiative. It would be a 
way to manifest the intended approach of this kind of legal data collection.  
At the same time, the legal ontology would get benefit from several databases which are already 
part of the Liked Data. In particular, the databases of Liked Data from which the ontology 
would best benefit would be official law collections such as data.gov.uk in the United Kingdom. 
In Italy, the official online repository of www.normattiva.it is an excellent source of structured 
data. As noted by [Tiscornia et al. 2011], the adoption of the Linked Data principles for 
publication of legal data, joined with existing efforts of standardization in the identification and 
representation of legal information, would open the way to a whole range of innovative legal 
services and applications based on top of a Legal Data Cloud. 
In order to exploit the Linked Data network, the ontology would need dereferenceable URIs, 
namely URLs. Emerging standards for legal rules representation such as LegalRuleML should 
ensure legally valid references through full support for W3C's and IETF's URIs and IRIs as 




In knowledge representation, it is necessary to clearly establish the relationships intercurring 
between the form and the substance. In the legal field, this is much more important, since in that 
field the form drastically influences the substance. For a proper representation, isomorphism 
should thus be ensured in both directions: from the data to the text fragment and from the text 
fragment to the data. It must be possible to link multiple legal concepts to the same text 
fragment, and at the same time to indicate the same text fragment as expressing several, distinct 
legal concepts. See 5.6.1. for how LegalRuleML achieves this, and how this solution can be 
pointed at as an example of good practice for this aspect. 
5.6.2.4. Logical representation of advanced legal concepts 
Advanced legal concepts derive from complex social processes which lasted millennia. A full 
account for the semantics of these concepts cannot be fully provided by a single (or a small set 
of) interpretation(s), formally coded responding to general criteria. In other words, law is so full 
of exceptions, distinctions, stratifications, that every categorization involves a certain loss of 
semantics. Therefore in an accurate representation very legal concept (legal figure, or legal 
category) should speak for himself, being individually described by a set of logic formulas (and, 
possibly, even some specific logical modules in the modal logic environment). This means not 
only that rules have to be specifically modeled upon the norms they are due to express, but also 
that the categorization axioms (the ontology properties) have to give account for this specificity.  
In a linked, social perspective, the modelling choices can be saved as ontology design patterns 
[Gangemi 2007] in order to be discussed, evaluated, classified and reused. This approach would 
bring two substantial benefits: 
 Building a collection of legal design patterns that can be polished, improved and 
updated over time to reach a consensus on the possible meanings of advanced legal 
concepts; 
 Providing a set of described, evaluated solutions to the legal expert facing modelling 
issues. 
The example given for efficacy suspension in 5.3.3. is meaningful in this perspective: 
distinguishing the suspension frame into efficacy inclusion and efficacy exclusion forms is a 
modelling choice, requiring a certain extent of legal awareness. These choices, despite being 
rather general, are not an immutable truth on the law but simply the representation of a common 
procedure in Italian legal drafting. Modelling these peculiarity is necessary to achieve a 
complete interaction between the text and the norm, and modelling them in a customizable, 
authored way is necessary to provide full control over the process, removing the constraints to 
the modelling choices and thus setting the necessary site where conflicting premises on legal 
interpretation (in other words, the legal doctrine) can be stored. 
5.6.2.5. The Middle-Out Approach 
Observing legal knowledge from the perspective of ITs, it turns out that its construction is in 
fact a mix of the approaches called bottom-up (case-law is a paramount of such a methodology) 
and top-down (legal doctrine, legal philosophy, and mechanisms such as law-decrees or laws 
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enacting EU directives). These two approaches cannot be clearly distinguished in all cases, and 
it happens that the same legal document presents a contribution to the legal knowledge which is 
itself a mix of these (i.e. a decision of a constitutional court typically combines arguments from 
legal principles and arguments from precedents).  
In the semantic framework, there is no space for distributing these modelling perspectives to 
different layers of the Semantic Web stack. It is always in the ontology layer that the two 
approaches need to be mixed. In chapter 3, the two approaches create a distinction between the 
core and domain ontology modules, where the core module holds general concepts and elements 
functional to the shallow reasoning, and the domain module holds the collection of the 
precedents and an extensive list of all their elements, from the material circumstances put to the 
attention of the judge to the legal statuses and norms they evoke. 
It is, however, just a functional distinction which doesn’t mean much: the core and domain 
concepts are closely related, and there are very few concepts which cannot be altered in a legal 
knowledge representation. The core module, therefore, cannot include all the legal concepts 
derived from a top-down approach, because some of them represent a perspective and therefore 
have to be included in subsets of the legal ontology to prevent inconsistencies with other 
perspectives on the same concepts. Shrinking the range of the core, immutable module of the 
ontology, it becomes clear that it is the domain ontology module which carries the burden of 
representing the legal perspectives. These modules will therefore contain a substantial part of 
the top-down knowledge base, as well as the whole bottom-up content. 
5.6.2.6. Description Logics 
Choosing the logics for the representation of legal knowledge is an extremely complex task. The 
implication of the various logics (and of theirs subsets) are wide and sometimes difficult to 
recognize, requiring advanced study of the subject or a meticulous test of the various solutions. 
Fortunately, the Semantic Web community already reached a certain degree of understanding 
(and shared standards) at the Ontology Layer, and we can then refer to the choices of the W3C 
on the matter. In particular, we can rely on their choice of adopting OWL-DL Description 
Logics for their OWL language (even if the notation of OWL is more close to first-order logic, 
the logics itself is undoubtedly a subset of description logics). In particular, the language of 
OWL2 is DL SROIQ(D). These letters stand for a set of characteristics which define a subset 
of the description logics language. Following is a complete list of the features of this language 
(please note that the letter S includes both AL and C). 
 AL = attributive language, the base language, which allows: 
o atomic negation (negation of concept names that do not appear on the left hand 
side of axioms); 
o concept intersection; 
o universal restrictions; 
o limited existential quantification; 
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 C = complex concept negation; 
 S = transitive roles; 
 R = limited complex role inclusion axioms; reflexivity and irreflexivity; role 
disjointness; 
 O = nominals. (Enumerated classes of object value restrictions - owl:oneOf, 
owl:hasValue); 
 I = inverse properties; 
 Q = qualified cardinality restrictions (cardinality restrictions that have fillers other 
than owl:Thing); 
 (D) = use of datatype properties, data values or data types.  
Any knowledge representation language pretending to build on the achieved standards in the 
community must come to terms with these characteristics. The present research, in fact, already 
exploits most of them: 
 Atomic negation is fundamental to avoid the instantiation of negative entities (i.e. 
“NotSpecificallySigned”), but atomic negation hinders reasoning due to the open world 
assumption; 
 Concept intersection is widely implemented in class intersections to define complex 
classes; 
 Universal restrictions, as distincted to existential restrictions, are also widely used in 
legal concepts definition (i.e. a distinct signed box containing only oppressive clauses 
implies a specific signing); 
 Limited existential quantification allows a generic quantification of elements in the 
ontology, and is therefore a basic building block of the ontology; 
 Complex concept negation, the negation of classes as part of an axiom, is widely used 
in legal relevancy, i.e. (contained_in (not)SpecificallySigned); 
 Transitivity is important in the actual ontology design, which relies a lot on properties 
to link material circumstances to legal statuses. The same can be said about limited 
complex role inclusion axioms and inverse properties; 
 Qualifyed cardinality restrictions are not yet exploited in the ontology, but they 
represent a cornerstone for modelling themporal parameters (i.e. the period of validity 
of a certain representation of a norm); 
 Datatype properties, data values or data types is obviously useful in quantifying 
elements such as sums of money and time parameters. 
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5.6.2.7. Reasoning  
The legal ontology should be capable of performing shallow reasoning on the static elements of 
its knowledge base. Such reasoning functions (in particular, reasoning on legal relevance) 
should constitute a set of modules to the ontology, to be used only if necessary: the risk of 
creating conflicts with defeasible rules seems too big to pretend reasoning axioms to be the 
skeleton of the ontology. The range (and purpose) of these modules are two: 
Data completion, to automatically fill the net of data related to a law, a legal case, a judicial 
sentence. In order to ensure a full isomorphism with the legal text, in fact, the information 
asserted in the ontology is only that which can be directly linked to the source document. The 
problem is that many legal documents cite other pieces of information without providing a full 
range of informations about it. DL helps to overcome this problem, automatically assigning, on 
the basis of the type of document, “default” values to fill the missing data. In some cases (when 
the document has a simple, immutable content), this simple data completion activity can be 
“embedded” directly into the base ontology. In other cases (when we are completing data about 
a document which evolves over time), this function may cause redundant or inconsistent data.  
Reasoning on legal relevance allows to perform advanced queries on the ontology. The 
complexity and depth of the reasoning is not comparable with that resulting from the application 
of defeasible rules, but the OWL reasoning has the advantage of taking place within the KB 
itself. In other words, some information about the content of the legal document (the outcome of 
the judgement, the kind of interpretations performed, the concepts of law involved) could be 
calculated on the fly while performing searches on the database, without involving defeasible 
reasoner in that phase. Later, the results coming from this reasoning can be explored using 
argumentation to perform complex tasks. For a framework due to be used in the Semantic Web, 
such a differentiation of tasks between layers of the semantic stack could prove precious for an 
optimization of resources and an improvement in computability. 
5.6.2.8. Modularity 
For a tool managing interpretations and perspectives on legal phenomena such as the present 
project, to include all the contributions at once is not the optimal solution. This is not due only 
to computability issues (complex axioms for reasoning on legal relevance can include more than 
five variables: reasoners cannot compute all the possible combinations of a large set of 
statements in reasonable time): in fact, the different contributions – even on the same legal 
subject or issue – may lead to undesired or inconsistent implications. It is therefore necessary 
that the single contributions get wrapped in several internally consistent ontology modules, 
which refer to the core ontology but are otherwise autonomous from each other. In this way, the 
tools managing the knowledge base can import one or more of these modules and merge them 
into a single ontology before running the reasoner. In case of inconsistencies or inefficiencies in 
reasoning on the merged ontology, the tool can take a step back and conduct autonomous 
reasoning on the single ontologies, highlighting the inconsistencies. It is then possible to switch 
off some of the reasoning features of the ontology set in order to provide a consistent knowledge 
base to the rule layer. It is also possible to conduct argumentation on an inconsistent knowledge 
base, without removing the features causing the inconsistency, but in that case the defeasible 
reasoner should conduct autonomous reasoning (and thus build autonomous graphs) on the 
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single ontology modules. These modules can then be presented together to the user as a single 
graph, highlighting the overlapping and the inconsistent parts. 
To achieve this modularity, an important help may come from the reasoning capabilities of 
OWL (on the contrary, it is not possible to rely on defeasible logics since the construction of the 
knowledge base has to take place within the ontology layer of the Semantic Web cake, thus 
involving only the standards achieved in that sector). The ontology reasoner can in fact detect 
the concepts which are present in each module, and therefore extend the knowledge base by 
merging other modules into the initial selection, on the basis of their contribution to the issue 
which is being analyzed at the moment. 
5.6.3. Syntactical requirements 
5.6.3.1. Defeasible Logics 
If compared to the ontology layer, the rule layer is far from constrained by consistency. This is 
well received, as every representation of legal reasoning must be capable of managing explicitly 
inconsistent information, since (at least apparent) inconsistency is a constituting part of legal 
doctrine. 
When building the knowledge base with OWL ontologies, it turns useful to introduce 
disjunctions between classes and negations, in order to enhance the reasoning capabilities of the 
ontology sets. These disjunctions, however, revert to disadvantages when conflicting legal rules 
(laws, agreements, or judicial interpretations) form the basis for rule-based reasoning. It can 
well happen that a contract is labeled as “signed” and “not signed” contemporarily, as a result of 
the application of two different rules. In order to perform effective reasoning on the case, 
however, it is necessary to (have the opportunity to) decide which rule to apply to the specific 
case: this is allowed by distinguishing rules between strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters.  
Defeasible logics allow not only to resolve conflicts between rules whose heads are the opposite 
one to another, but also to search the rule base for specific kind of rules: for example, the user 
can look for rules which explicitly defeat an undesired legal consequence, or to distinguish 
between rules whose activation will imply some legal consequence despite any conflicting norm 
from those whose provision will be valid only unless other rules apply. 
5.6.3.2. Deontic Logics 
It would be impossible to model the content of legal provisions without deontic operators, as 
they add necessary semantics to basic actions, providing not only modalities of, but also reasons 
for them. [Governatori and Rotolo 2008] proposed an extension of Defeasible Logics to capture 
combinations of mental attributes and deontic concepts, as well as consequence relations. To 
add deontic logics means to extend defeasible logics with some particular modal operator. In 
doing this there are two options: 
 To use the same inferential mechanism as basic defeasible logics and to represent 
explicitly the modal operators in the conclusion of rules; 
 To introduce new types of rules for the modal operators to differentiate between modal 
and factual rules. 
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The differences between the two approaches are three: 
 In the first approache there is only one type of rule, while the second accounts for 
factual and modal rules; 
 In the first approach needs the introduction of a set of p-incompatible literals for every 
literal p; 
 In some cases, the first approach must account for conversions – rules that permit to use 
a rule for a certain modality as it were for another modality – which make it less 
conceptual than the second approach.  
 The second approach can use different proof conditions based on the modal rules to 
offer a more fine grained control over modal operators. 
For these reasons, it seems the case to adopt the second approach, called Modal Defeasible 
Logic and already adopted in [Lam and Governatori 2009] for the SPINdle rule engine. 
5.6.3.3. Dungean Semantics 
The application of defeasible logics brings a reduction of the implications brought forward by a 
set of rules, which do not apply indistinctively to the whole knowledge base but rather interact 
with each other by destroying bonds which other rules would otherwise create. This reduction of 
information is functional to a subsequent phase of the argument construction from rules: the 
phase of the argument evaluation.  
When all the rules which compose the rule set have been applied, a set of valid arguments is 
presented, each of them stating (or negating) one or more statements (the consequence) if one or 
more statements (the premises) meets the rule’s requirements. These rules interact with each 
other (for example by providing valid premises for other rules to apply), and a net of statements 
linked by the rules is formed.  
For a series of reasons, however, it is possible that several argument do not “trigger” (they do 
not appear as valid) even if the major, explicit premises are true. The cause may be that a minor 
premise is not explicitly stated as true (lack of metadata, enthymemes), that some rule which 
would defeat the present argument is still applicable (means that its requirements are not yet 
met, but neither excluded), or that the fact to be proved is so basic that its truth cannot be 
derived by means of other rules (regressio ad infinitum).  
In those cases, a strict application of the negation-as-failure principle would drastically reduce 
the effectivity of the argumentation.  
For this reason, it is fundamental that the argumentation layer follows Dungean semantics, in 
order to maximize the number of statements triggered as a consequence of the application of the 
rules to the knowledge base. This prevents that some interesting results remain buried under the 
surface of the arguments graph (avoid false negatives), while it is rather simple to polish the 
results by excluding the arguments which appear into the argumentation even if none of its 
premises is directly concerned in the specific case (false positives). The same approach could be 
applied to the choice between ambiguity blocking and ambiguity propagation (see 6.2.1.1.) 
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5.6.3.4. Argumentation Schemes 
Support for argumentation schemes is necessary in order to correctly instantiate rules into 
arguments, highlighting the implicit premises through critical questions. The solution can be 
used to merge the different contributions to the argument graph, correctly nesting the conclusion 
into a net of premises and exceptions. Oversimplified interpretation rules will then reveal their 
weaknesses, if the knowledge base fails at providing information to answer the critical 
questions. 
Argumentation schemes can also be used to model the process itself: instead of managing the 
contribution to some abstract argument (i.e. towards the validity or invalidity of a contract with 
certain characteristics), they can be used to complete the scheme which represents the reasoning 
of the judge in a specific case. This is also useful to reveal missing parts in the decision’s 
groundings. 
It is also worth exploring the possibility of extending the concept (and use) of argument 
schemes beyond the mere classification of [Gordon and Walton 2009]: argumentation schemes 
could, in fact, be used to model the types of intervention that the parties (or the judge) can 
operate into a process. For example, a competency regulation claim could evoke a specific 
argument scheme which reveals implicit premises about when and how such a claim can be 
raised in a process. This use of argumentation schemes would allow a complete management of 
the trial as a dialogical process, and enhance the interaction of semantics and syntax for those 
specific claims (which are labeled in the ontology and consequently elaborated through rules 
and argumentation schemes). It has, however, the disadvantage of exponentially increasing the 
number of schemes, which contradicts the spirit behind the concept of argumentation schemes 
(intended to be a relatively small numbers of patterns of reasoning, and not an exhaustive list of 
legal dialogical tools). 
5.6.3.5. Proof Standards 
Proof standards naturally complete the argument scheme approach, providing a complete 
representation of argumentation processes. When managing a single legal dispute, proof 
standards allow adding information on the single arguments (claims and counter-claims), 
assigning weights to arguments and proof standards to premises. Balancing the weights of the 
single argument until the result of their combination coincides with that of the real case, the user 
makes explicit information which was before implicit (sometimes even to the judge which 
weighted those arguments). This kind of deduction is an important elicitation that turns very 
useful when trying to use those arguments outside their original case: it is in fact possible to 
create a “mixed” case when different arguments from different precedents are put forward to 
prove a single claim, common to all the precedents. This brings to interesting results in case-law 
comparison, and can be used to represent factors and dimensions.  
Similarly to argumentation schemes, also proof standards can be extended to represent the 
authority of the contributions: case-law, jurisprudence and law can be classified on the basis of 
their strength (there is stronger case-law, stronger jurisprudence, stronger law) and this strength 
can be represented through different proof standards assigned to arguments which defeat those 
contributions. In this way, different positions on the same legal issue can be weighted and the 




In the framework built during the present research, the class legal status was modeled upon the 
concept of factors as described in [Bench-Capon 2012]. In theory, it is possible to use the legal 
status class to model factors of cases, and to use them to reason on case-law. However, factors 
are intended as a further level of granularity than legal statuses. Providing information about 
every factor for every element of the ontology is not viable (due to knowledge acquisition 
bottleneck and computability issues – not to mention the lack of relevance of a large part of 
them). For this reason, there should be no strong constraint depending on factors on the 
ontology set: in this way, there is no risk that meaningful inferences are prevented from lack of 
metadata concerning factors. On the rule level, however, it is possible to rely on factors to evoke 
particular arguments. In case of lack of information, the reasoner could nevertheless suggest 
factors that, if present, would constitute the basis for factor-based arguments. 
5.6.3.7. Dimensions 
Dimensions behave differently than factors or values. They do not simply distinguish from 
presence or absence of an element, but rather set a graduated scale between two extremes. The 
concept was introduced for analysis of case-law, but it can be used whenever a comparison has 
to be made between elements which do not have a fixed value assigned, but whose relative 
placement is the only relevant information available. 
This distinction is similar to the design dilemma on argument weight: is it better to assign an 
arbitrary value to each argument, using these values to perform a (partial) ranking, or should we 
explicitly place each argument in an ordered list, from the strongest to the weakest? The issue 
was analyzed in 4.5.9., and here it is just the case to recall how both solutions should be 
implemented in the system, and the reasoner engine should be able to mediate between the two, 
i.e. compiling a ranking on the basis of the arbitrary values (and resolving the tie-related issues), 
or – on the contrary – assigning increasing values starting from the last argument in the ranking. 
5.6.3.8. Values 
Values can be treated like factors: their information can be exploited as long as it is present. 
Therefore, no constraints on the ontology set should involve values. On the rule layer, it is 
possible to build arguments which rely on values, and they can be suggested by the reasoner if 
no information on the values is present.  
For an efficient representation, it would be useful to evoke, together with the argument whose 
value is present (or missing), also counterarguments and undercutters. In this way, the user can 
properly evaluate the possibility that others values are missing in the ontology representation, 
values which would prevent the validity of suggested argument. It is important to distinguish 
between the different approaches to argument analysis (factors, dimensions, values). These data 
can be used together, but not carefree if we want to keep a straight approach to the analysis of 
legal phenomena, and avoid the mix of heterogeneous arguments and theories. 
5.6.3.9. Temporal reasoning 
Temporal parameters are fundamental for an automatic management of law sources, and for a 
correct representation of the applicable norms at the time of the judicial decision. Temporal 
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reasoning allows to highlight the part(s) of the decision which have been overruled by more 
recent laws or decisions. As exhaustively described in 5.3.2., temporal parameters should be 
given proper attention in the metadata, ontology and rule layers. 
5.6.3.10. Procedural argumentation 
The analysis of judicial decisions cannot assume a synchronic perspective, or it will be unable 
to explain the invalidity of certain arguments brought forward during the trial. Judicial decisions 
give account for what happened during the hearings at the court, hearings which are in turn 
regulated by legal procedure. In order to represent those dynamics, it is necessary to assume a 
diachronic, procedural perspective. The argumentation graph should therefore be multi-staged, 
representing different phases (steps) of the legal process and using information such as the 
absolute and relative stage in the evaluation of arguments. For example, an exception which can 
be proposed only within a certain stage of the process could be evaluated as invalid on the basis 
of the absolute stage of the dialogue; a counter-claim could be evaluated as invalid on the basis 
of the relative stage of the dialogue (i.e. if the claim to be countered was introduced at a much 
earlier stage of the process). 
The metadata for such stages can be modeled as a subset of temporal parameters. Instead of 
using absolute values, the stages are defined (t1, t2, …, tn) and then recalled by the instances of 
the KB representing the various events of the trial. The reasoner will use these parameters to 
apply procedural rules, and the outcome will be presented as a multi-stage argument graph. 
The argumentation graph should not only give account for the stages of the process, but also for 
the tasks of the parties. This means that argument graphs may not be directed towards a single 
conclusion. Depending on the stage of the process and on the party performing the 
argumentation (plaintiff, defendant, civil party, judge…) every contribution may have a distinct 
task: not only that of proving the main claim or undermining the opponent’s argument (either 
directly, or indirectly through an attack on its premises), but also that of asking an external 
assessment (a probe, a preemptive appeal to the constitutional court…) or of modifying the 
quantum rather than the an (which means, not trying to prove that no refund is needed, but that 
the sum to be refunded is different). Representing such diverse tasks (even if not in a single 
graph) may overcomplicate the representation, nevertheless it is fundamental in order to catch 
the different purposes of the various contributions (for example, a doctrinal contribution may 
simply introduce a consideration to some argument or solution, without influencing the 
acceptability of that argument in any way whatsoever). 
5.6.4.  A table summarizing the requirements for a rule markup language  
Following is a table that summarizes the requirements described so far, together with an 
indication of how the present project (based on OWL and on the Carneades Argumentation 
System) meets/fails to meet them. 
Ontological requirements 
 
Judicial Framework “Judging Contracts 
1.0” 
Carneades Argumentation System 
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Four-Layers classification of legal documents 
 
The LKIF ontology does not support such 
distinction. The system could anyway be 
extended in that direction. 
Connection to Linked Data 
 
The new Carneades Policy Modeling tool is 
based on a web-based interface, therefore 




LKIF ensures a good isomorphism with its 
devoted classes such as medium and 
expression. 
Logical representation of advanced legal 
concepts 
 
Nor LKIF or Carneades provide support for 
NLP tools. Semantic construct to represent 
advanced legal concepts and their language, 
however, are possible. 
The Middle-Out Approach 
 
Carneades allows the import of knowledge 
from case-based reasoning as well as from 
manually inserted knowledge. 
Description Logics 
 
Carneades successfully imports knowledge 
from OWL ontologies, but (at the current 




Carneades is able to import reasoning 
performed by the ontology. It is also possible 
to translate OWL’s axioms into LKIF-Rules. 
Modularity 
 
Carneades allows importing several files 
(ontologies and/or rulebases). This permits to 
build the KB by combining elementar 






Carneades supports defeasible logics, but 




Carneades represents Dungean semantics, or, 
at least, it can be easily replicated in the 





Carneades supports argumentation schemes, 
even if automatic weight assignment did not 
work in version 1.0.2. 
Proof Standards 
 
Carneades supports assigning proof standards 
to arguments, even if this did not ensure 
automatic inferencing in 1.0.2, due to the lack 
of automatic weight assignment. 
Factors 
 




In order to perform a reasoning on dimensions 
in judicial cases similar to [Bench-Capon 
2012] the reasoner, given the rules, the facts 
and the conclusions of reasoning, should 
produce the (best possible) priority relation 
between the rules. This seems difficult to 
represent in Carneades, which has no priority 












Procedural argumentation is represented in the 
Carneades tool, and a sequence of reasoning 
procedures with different goals is possible 
inside the application. 
 
5.6.5. The Reasoner  
Considering the importance of combining two different approaches and two layers of the 
Semantic Web stack, the pivot of the whole framework is the reasoner, combining the ontology 
with the rule set to reproduce the argumentation process. In the light of the issues related to the 
use of Carneades, aspresented in 3.5., it is necessary to design a hybrid reasoner which can 
handle different kinds of reasonings and combine them to compile a multi-staged argumentation 
graph. 
The next chapter concludes the research by analyzing the requirements of such a hybrid 




[Palmirani et al. 2011c] presents LegalRuleML, an extension of RuleML
27
. LegalRuleML 
enhances legal rules modelling by introducing fundamental features such as isomorphism, 
defeasible logics, jurisdiction and authority, legal temporal parameters, legal deontics operators, 
qualifications, semantic of negation, behaviors. The language also allows the inclusion of 
elements and statements compliant with external ontologies.  
The syntax and structure of this language are a work in progress: therefore all tags, elements, 
attributes recalled here follow syntax proposals presented in the TC, and some of them may not 
correspond to the definitive syntax of LegalRuleML
28
. The requirements expressed are 
nevertheless important for tackling some of the problems identified in the present chapter. The 
main characteristics which will be examined in the present research are isomorphism and 
defeasible logics, but also the features of qualification, behaviors and semantic of negation will 
also be addressed - as they already were in Chapter 4. Deontics represent a necessary addition to 
the rule modelling, in order to better represent some concepts while at the same time 
maintaining isomorphism, and they will be implemented successively. A proposal for 
implementing argumentation schemes is then presented. Finally, temporal parameters are 
proposed, as already presented in 5.3.2.: the concept of temporal dimensions of norms is crucial 
to legal knowledge representation, nevertheless it represent a complex system and parallel to the 
present research, concerning norm applicability on a subsumptive rather than on a temporal 
parameter. 
5.7.1. Achieving isomorphism  
The <ruleInfo> section of the LegalRuleML standard encloses all information needed to 
effectively bind the rules to the text. First, the <identifications> and <references> 
elements give ad ID and a URI to the authors of rules and to the source documents respectively. 
The <sources> element recalls these IDs both for entire rules (referring to the ID of the 
parent element <implies>) and even for the single statements rules are composed of 
(referring to the ID of the children elements <atom>). Following is an example of 
<ruleInfo> section: 
<lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo2" appliesTo="#rule2"> 
 <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock2"> 
  <lrml:source element="#atom1" idRef="#art1341-com2"/> 
  <lrml:source element="#atom2" idRef="#art1341-com1"/> 
                                                     
27  RuleML is an XML based language for the representation of legal rules using formal semantics. See [Lee and 
Sohn 2003]. 
28 Documents of the OASIS LegalRuleML TC are available at https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/documents.php?wg_abbrev=legalruleml. The mailing list describing the work in progress can 
be browsed at https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/legalruleml/. 
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  <lrml:source element="#atom3" idRef="#art1341-com1"/> 
  <lrml:source element="#atom4" idRef="#art1341com2"/> 
 </lrml:sources> 
 <lrml:strength iri="&dfsont;defeater"/> 
 <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
 <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
 <lrml:times idRef="#t1"/> 




Inside the <ruleInfo> section, which defines a set of variables to be recalled by single rules 
(i.e.: <implies id=”rule2” refersTo= "ruleInfo1">), two children elements 
are particularly fit for enhancing isomorphism between the rule system and case-law: 
 <jurisdiction> semantically specifies the national (or regional) scope of the 
norm, linking to an element in the ontology. For the purposes of the present research, 
it is very useful in distinguishing between local, regional, national, european and 
international law, and also in determining the scope of precedents distinguishing 
between the different regional courts. 
 <authority> semantically specifies in the same way which legal authority gave 
force to the legal text. The efficacy and applicability of the legal rule is a direct 
consequence of this enacting power (represented in the LKIF-Core ontology by the 
"attitude" class). This element is fundamental to model all the information necessary 
to distinguish between different precedents, i.e. giving priority to Cassation Court and 
Constitutional Court decisions.  
Modelling the legal rules in the LegalRuleML language highlighted the potentialities of this tool 
in achieving isomorphism and representing defeasibility and temporal parameters. In particular, 
the <ruleInfo> section introduces detailed information on the context of the rule. This rule-
centric metadata approach favours the isomorphism with the legal text when facing changes in 
the source documents, and the localization of all information related to the rule in a unique 
XML node. In this way it is possible to explicitly refer to the source documents of each part of a 
rule, also when a rule takes origin from multiple documental sources, allowing the engine to 
understand which part of the rule comes from which document. At the same time, different rule 
authors are allowed to model the same text fragment in different ways, being always clear which 
author modelled which rules on a certain legal document. As it should be clear, this system 
represents the ideal background for a social tool reproducing legal doctrine, where different 
jurists model their version of the norm by writing slightly different rules (in terms of legal 
                                                     




concepts, deontics, or procedural dynamics) for the same (combination of) legal text 
fragment(s). 
5.7.2. Introducing elements of defeasible logics 
LegalRuleML includes, in the <lrml:Context> section, the element 
<lrml:appliesStrength iri="#type"/> which defines the type of each rule in the 
defeasible logics dynamics (types are strict/defeasible/defeater). Priority relations are built 
through the <lrml:Overrides over="#rule2" under="#rule2"/> element
30
, 
in the following form:  
<lrml:overrides id=”ovr1”> 
  <lrml:rule keyref="#rule_3"/> 
  <lrml:rule keyref="#rule_2"/> 
</lrml:overrides>31 
This implementation of defeasibility should allow a better management of exceptions than in 
LKIF-Rule, where exceptions had to be made explicit in the rule syntax. If an exception 
presents itself in the form of two legal fragments not explicitly referring to each other but rather 
disposing opposing legal consequences (i.e. efficacy vs. inefficacy) it is possible to model these 
rules independently, and then create a priority relation reflecting the actual hierarchy between 
the two norms. Moreover, this solution allows a relative management of hierarchy, without the 
need to assign arbitrary "weight" values to each rule. However, this approach has some 
backsides: see 4.5.9. for details. 
5.7.3. Introducing temporal parameters to the Rule 
The <lrml:Context> section permits also to assign 
<lrml:appliesTemporalCharacteristics keyref="#tblock1"/> element, 
not indeed a normal attribute but rather a section introducing a whole different layer: it contains 
information on the time periods of the legal rule’s coming into force, efficacy, application. The 
representation of temporal dimensions of legal rules using three axes is a crucial addition 
towards the automatic management of legal rules in connection with their legally binding 
                                                     
30 This tag is developed jointly with RuleML (http://ruleml.org/) and in particular with the Defeasibility RuleML TG 
(http://ruleml.org/1.0/defeasible.html). 
31 This implementation of defeasibility should allow a better management of exceptions than in LKIF-Rule, where 
exceptions had to be made explicit in the rule syntax. If an exception presents itself in the form of two legal 
fragments not explicitly referring to each other but rather disposing opposing legal consequences (i.e. efficacy vs. 
inefficacy) it is possible to model these rules independently, and then create a priority relation reflecting the actual 
hierarchy between the two norms. Moreover, this solution allows a relative management of hierarchy, without the 
need to assign arbitrary "weight" values to each rule. The proposal can be found at https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/download.php/46454/2.1.1defeasibility.0 06.doc. Meaningful comments by TC member Tara 




documents [Palmirani et al. 2010], and LegalRuleML allows to specify these time coordinates 
for each rule, starting from the identification of the relevant points in time through a list of 
<lrml:TimeInstant> such as:  
<lrml:TimeInstant id="e2" value="1942-04-21T01:01:00.0Z"/>. 
LegalRuleML allows to specify these time coordinates for each rule. Events' IDS are recalled by 
the <timeBlock> element, which adds information on the event which occurs (start, 
end) and on the axis which is affected:  
<lrml:timeBlock id="t1"> 
 <lrml:time start="#e2" refType="&lkif;#efficacy"/> 
</lrml:timeBlock>32 
 
In this way it is possible to reach a deep granularity of annotation not possible in LKIF in order 
to enrich each parts of the rule (body, head, atom) with the temporal parameters. 
5.7.4. Semantic qualification of Negation 
Distinguishing the concept of negation as failure from that of explicit negation is important in 
the legal field. Moreover, the representation of legal knowledge made by the present research 
has to deal with both the semantics when filling the gap between the text representation and the 
normative syntax. LegalruleML contains the modules neg_module.xsd and naf_module.xsd 
which can be linked to express de desired semantics (or a specific concept ontologies through 








The LegalRuleML TC is now working on the deontic operators and behaviors using specific 
elements like <lrml:Obbligation>. Also LKIF permitted deontic operators, but they were 
not connected with temporal parameters and textual origin sources that was a limit in the 
                                                     




Carneades proof-of-concept. The operators needed to manage deontic logic and behavious like 
violation and reparation are defined in the legal_operators module, shown in Figure 5.13. 
Behaviors represent a particular sequence of deontic operators that starts with an obligation or a 
prohibition and ends with a 
permission. The violation is a unary 
relationship that refers to the 
obligation/prohibition subject of the 
violation. The reparation is a unary 
relationship providing a link to the 
relevant penalty. These particular 
behavioral patterns are not modeled 
in LKIF. In this perspective, 
normative statements are also divided 
in two main categories following the 
theory of law: prescriptive statements 
<lrml:PrescriptiveStateme




Following is an application of the system to the present framework:  
To model the content of a contract, the first step is to model the rule which contains in the 













<Rel>is contained in contract</Rel> 












The consequence for violating the exclusivity clause (to pay a penalty fee) is then assumed as a 
fact: 
<Atom id="ExclPen">  
<penalty id="ExPn-pnl1"> 
<obligation id="obl2" subject="z" beneficiary="x" 
timesBlock="#t2"> 
<Atom id="ExPn-pnl1-atm1"> 
<Rel>award of penalty fee to</Rel> 
<Var>z</Var> 





A new rule that connects the reparation with the violation of the clause, and the reparation with 
the penalty (see the penalty="ExPn-pnl1" attribute) is created. The reparation is triggered 
only if the subject violated the clause and has paid the penalty fee to the other party.  
<Implies id="Excl-rep"> 
<then> 








Reasoning with deontics has not been implemented by the present research as it does not 
represent a central aspect for the purposes of the present framework, which focuses on judicial 
subsumptions material circumstances under legal concepts, stretching up to the evaluation of 
obligations and rights and to the application of legal consequences only to a limited extent. 
Nevertheless, deontics are needed for proper reasoning and LegalRuleML provides the way to 
implement them in the present research. 
5.7.6. Argumentation Schemes 
Considering that the argumentation of the judge is a particular implementation of a selected set 
rules coming from the law, and that the judge follows a particular schema of argumentation 
reasoning, three levels are needed:  
 To model the rules coming from the law that are valid erga omnes; 
 To describe the pattern of the judge reasoning that could be reused in other similar cases 
through analogy;  
 To model the premises as meta-rules valid only inter pares or for the specific case. 
 Therefore arguments have to be calculated dynamically on the base of the facts applied 
to the rules.  
The results of the present research suggest the following new elements for distinguish the rule 
and the arguments: 
<lrml:hasStatement> 
 <lrml:ArgumentStatement key="arg1"> 
  <lrml:hasTemplate> 
   <lrml:Argument key=":rule1" schema="&argument-
ontology;#compRegulation">  
    <lrml:Conclusion>  
     <ruleml:not key=":not1"> 
     <ruleml:Atom> 
      <ruleml:Rel iri="#applies"/> 
      <ruleml:Var>X</ruleml:Var> 
      <ruleml:Ind>Judge_not_competent </ruleml:Ind> 
     </ruleml:Atom> 
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     </ruleml:not> 
    <lrml:Premises>  
     <ruleml:Atom></ruleml:Atom> 
     <ruleml:Atom></ruleml:Atom> 
     <ruleml:Atom></ruleml:Atom> 
    </lrml:Premises> 
   </lrml:Argument> 
 </lrml:hasTemplate> 
</lrml:ArgumentStatement> 
[Governatori 2011] demonstrated how it is possible to model the arguments as a particular case 
of defeasible logic, nevertheless in the context of LegalRuleML, which features a strong 
distinction between PrescriptiveStatement and ConstitutiveStatement, it is necessary to 
introduce a new typology, namely ArgumentStatement, for distinguish the arguments from 
normative and constitutive rules. Secondarily a schema could be applied to the argument using 
the attribute schema="&argument-ontology;#compRegulation". The arguments 
have to be maintained at a meta-level that is able to invoke the rules according to the schema 
adopted by the judge.  
5.7.7. A table summarizing the features of LegalRuleML and how they meet the 




Four-Layers classification of legal 
documents 
 
LegalRuleML gives account for the four-layer 
classification based on the FRBR. 
Connection to Linked Data 
 
One of the tasks of LegalRuleML is an approach to 
modelling orientated towards Linked Data not only for the 
semantics of raw data (acts, contracts, court files, 
judgements, etc.), but also of rules in conjunction with 
their functionality and usage. The Italian Senate has made 










Several blocks of LegalRuleML are dedicated to annotate 
the original legal sources and to connect them to rules, so 
permitting an N:M relationship also on the authorial level. 
Advanced legal concepts 
representation 
 
LegalRuleML is explicitly built to represent complex 
effects of legal phenomena, but a tool for NLP or for 
facts/rules parsing is missing. 
The Middle-Out Approach 
 
LegalRuleML does not include the model for automatic 
case based reasoning. An external module is required. 
Description Logics 
 
LegalRuleML does not include an OWL/RDF ontology. It 
must be therefore built outside, exporting to 




RuleML’s modular system of schemas for XML permits 






LegalRuleML includes full support for defeasible logics. 
Dungean Semantics 
 
 LegalRuleML do not explicitly model Dungean 
semantics. Specific rules could simulate it (presuming 
with a defeasible rule that every statement is true) but the 
structure of the rules would be far from intuitive.  
Deontics 
 
LegalRuleML includes full support for deontics. 
Argumentation Schemes 
 
LegalRuleML does not give explicit account for 
argumentation schemes. Any support for argumentation 
would thus require an extension of LegalRuleML. 
Proof Standards 
 
LegalRuleML does not explicitly model proof standards. 
[Governatori] explains how to write defeasible rules that 
represent proof standards. 
Factors 
 
LegalRuleML allows including factors into the reasoning 
process, but it is necessary to extend the reasoner in order 






In order to perform a reasoning on dimensions in judicial 
cases similar to [Bench-Capon, Representing Popov v. 
Hayashi with Dimensions and Factors, 2012] the reasoner, 
given the rules, the facts and the conclusions of reasoning, 
should produce the (best possible) priority relation 
between the rules. The reasoner is the one responsible for 
this, while LegalRuleML seems adaptable to the task. 
Values 
 
Being there no argument schemes, it is not possible to 
introduce values through a specific argument scheme. It is 
therefore necessary to simulate the role of purpose-based 




LegalRuleML includes an advanced temporal model that 
can manage combined effects of norms such as multiple 
efficacy suspensions (see chapter 2). 
Procedural argumentation 
 
LegalRuleML does not give explicit account for the 
argumentation process. It could be extended, exploiting its 
good temporal model, to identify steps in a sequence and 











A State of the Art of Hybrid Engines 
 
 
[Das] “Hin‐ undHerwandern des Blicks zwischen Lebenssachverhalt und Rechtsnormen ist 
das generell kennzeichnende Merkmal der Rechtsanwendung.” 
One’s attention must shift back and forth between the evidence and legal sources when 
trying to subsume facts under legal terms. 
– Karl Engisch, Logische Studien zur Gesetzesanwendung. 
 
“True information does good.” 
– Julian Assange. 
 
 Introduction 6.1.
Several of the modelling issues which stand beyond the requirements described in the last 
chapter can be faced through the so-called hybrid approach. In the conception of [Hermann 
1997], hybrid systems overcome the limitation of rule bases in representing sample data by 
splitting the rulebase itself into two parts, one formulated by a human expert, and another one 
generated by machine learning. The acquisition is guided by a fuzzy neural network capable of 
translating knowledge into rules and of applying linguistic fuzzy variables from fuzzy logic
34
. 
The hybrid system described in [Hermann 1997] was conceived to automatically acquire case-
based knowledge in addition to explanation-based knowledge from an expert. It is meant to be 
used in medical diagnoses, and its usefulness is demonstrated through an application to the 
diagnoses of electroencephalograms, proving to be able to outperform the visual diagnosis by a 
human expert for some phenomena. 
In this concluding chapter, two hybrid structures for knowledge management are presented, and 
their features are analyzed in order to verify which issues (of the ones underlined in the last 
chapter) they seem apt to resolve. 
 SPINdle 6.2.
                                                     




6.2.1.  Overview 
SPINdle is an open-source, defeasible logic engine for business process software which 
automatically detects compliance levels to complex business rules and governance procedures. 
Its powerful reasoning engine written in Java computes the consequence of theories in both 
basic and modal defeasible logics, detecting anomalies. Its reasoning is scalable, and it supports 
variants of defeasible reasoning such as ambiguity propagation and well-founded semantics. 
Results from [Lam and Governatori 2009] show that SPINdle can handle inferences with 
thousands of rules in less than three seconds, increasing almost linearly proportional to the size 
of the theories tested. It is also possible to optimize those performances and the memory usage 
through different settings. The software can be used as a standalone theory prover, or be 
embedded as a defeasible logic rule engine. 
6.2.1.1. Ambiguity propagation and well-founded semantics 
Before describing the architecture of SPINdle, two preliminary concepts will be explained: that 
of ambiguity propagation (as counterposed to ambiguity blocking) and that of well-founded 
semantics.  
A literal is ambiguous if there is a chain of reasoning that supports the truth of the literal, and 
another that supports the truth of its negation, and the superiority relation does not resolve this 
conflict. With the ambiguity blocking behavior, neither the literal nor its negation are added to 
the facts; with the ambiguity propagation, both of them are added. While the ambiguity 
blocking (according to [Stein 1992]) results in unnatural patterns of conclusions, ambiguity 
propagation results in fewer conclusions being drawn. SPINdle supports both, as either of them 
can be convenient, depending on the circumstances.  
Well-founded semantics was originally developed by [Van Gelder 1991] to provide reasonable 
interpretation of logic program with negation, and has been applied to extended logic programs 
and non-monotonic reasoning. It is a skeptical approximation of answer set semantics such that 
every well-founded consequences of a logic program P is contained in every answer set of P. 
While some programs are not consistent under answer set semantics, well-founded semantics 
assigns a coherent meaning to all programs, mainly by removing loops without external support 
which give birth to unfounded sets. 
For more on ambiguity propagation and well-founded semantics, see [Lam and Governatori 
2010]. 
6.2.2.  System architecture 
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The SPINdle architecture consists of three major components which interact with each other in 
the way shown in Figure 6.1. 
 The I/O Manager provides an interface to the users in loading the defeasible theories 
and storing the conclusion after computation. It has two components: 
o the Theory parser downloads the theory file, parses the document, and 
translates it into a data structure that can be processed by the reasoner; 
o the Theory outputter stores the modified theory or exports it as an XML string 
for agent communications; 
 The Theory Normalizer is responsible for performing the pre-processing phase, where 
a theory is transformed using the techniques described in [Antoniou et al. 2001] into an 
equivalent theory without superiority relation and defeaters, in order to simplify the 
reasoning process. More specifically, it performs four tasks: 
o transforming the theory to regular form; 
o emptying the superiority relation; 
o emptying the defeaters; 
o transforming defeasible rules with multiple heads into an equivalent set of rules 
with single heads; 
 The Inference engine is responsible for the conclusions generations phase which is 
based, following [Maher 2001] on a series of theory transformations that allow to: 
o assert whether a literal is probable or not, and the strength of its derivation; 
o reduce and simplify the theory. 












6.2.2.1. Defeasible Theories 
Defeasible theories in SPINdle share a common structure which contains the main elements of 
defeasible logics, namely: 
 Facts, in form of (modal) states of affairs, describing information in the domain which 
is known to be true in the form >>[M]a, where [M] is the model operator representing 
mental states of the literal a; 
 Rules describing the relations between premise(s) and conclusion in the form 
rX[M]:a1,a2,...,aX,-b1,-b2,...,-bX->c1,c2,...,cX, where a, b, c 
represent facts (premise, negated premise and conclusion respectively) and -> 
represents a strict rule (while a defeasible rule is represented through the symbol =>); 
 Defeaters that prevent some conclusion to occur through the symbol ~>; 
 Superiority relations defining priorities among rules in the form r1>r2. 
6.2.2.2. The Temporal Model 
SPINdle’s temporal model is based on the theory described in [Governatori et al. 2005], which 
is focused on the temporal dynamic treatment of obligations, in connection to the model of 
directed obligations. The model, however, does not take into account the three-layered structure 
of time intervals for legal rules (See 5.3.2.) and therefore it is not suited to represent obligations 
arising from laws: in those cases it is not possible to write the laws once and for all, because the 
reasoner would not be able to properly calculate retroactive effect of reviviscence of repealed 
law, or the concept of suspension and suspension of the suspending provision. 
6.2.2.3. The Inference Process 
Original defeasible theory 
Regular form theory transformation 
Defeaters removal transformation 
Superiority relations removal transformation 
Conclusions generation 
Fig. 6.2 – Defeasible theory inference process in SPINdle 
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As already stated in 6.2.1., SPINdle divides the reasoning process into two phases: pre-
processing and conclusions generation (Figure 6.2). 
After a defeasible theory has been loaded into the system, SPINdle determines the types of 
theory normalizer and inference engines to be used based on the elements that appear in the 
theory. It then applies different types of transformations depending on the requirements of the 
associated inference approach, or on the user’s choice. SPINdle identifies the constraints in the 
theory that cannot be honored by the inferencing engines, prompting the user for a choice 
between alternatives. Finally, the reasoner inferences on the theory following two steps for each 
fact:  
 Asserts the fact (an atom) as a conclusion and removes the atom from the rules where 
the atom occurs positively in the body, and deactivates (removes) the rule(s) where the 
atom occurs negatively in the body. The atom is then removed from the list of atoms; 
 Searches for rules with empty head. It takes the head element as an atom and searches 
for rule(s) with conflicting head. If there are no such rules then the atom is added to the 
list of facts and the rule will be removed from the theory. Otherwise the atom will be 
added to the pending conclusion list until all rule(s) with conflicting head can be proved 
negatively. 
On termination (when one of the two steps fails, or when the list of facts is empty), the reasoner 
outputs the set of conclusions. 
Since each fact is processed once, and since for each fact the whole set of rules is scanned, the 
complexity of the above algorithm is the product of the number of distinct facts for of the 
number of rules in the theory. This can however be improved through the use of proper data 
structure (a list for each fact which indicates the rules it occurs in) which reduces the complexity 
to the product of the number of facts for the maximum number of rules a fact is associated with. 
Also, the algorithm is a generalized version that is common for both standard defeasible logic 
and modal defeasible logic. In the case of modal defeasible logic, due to the modal operator 
conversions, an additional process adding extra rules to the theory is needed. In addition, for a 
fact with a modal operator, besides its complement, the same literal with modal operator(s) in 
conflict with the first one should also be included in the conflict literal list, and only the fact 
with strongest modality will be concluded. 
6.2.3. An example of judicial reasoning based on SPINdle  
SPINdle can be used as a standalone theory prover or it can be embedded into Java applications 
as a defeasible rule engine. The present section contains a brief example of how the Judicial 
Framework of the present research could be represented in the SPINdle rule language, and 
which are the expected results from its theory prover. Embedding of SPINdle into an application 
for judicial argumentation, or extending it in one of its various customizable aspects (theory 
parser, theory outputter, theory normalizer, inference engine) has not been tried by the present 
research. In order to reach the expressivity of the Carneades System, however, the defeasible 




The following example contains a model of the rules (presented in 4.3.3.) which deals with the 
application of the effects of a law. Assumed that a circumstance a is relevant under the law 
Art1341co1, rule representing exceptions to the application of that law are modelled. 
db20: =>efficacious(clause) 
db21: contentType(clause), @applies=general, 
@applies=unilateral, @applies=-knowable =>-efficacious(clause) 










The reasoner should return the following conclusions, where +D means definitely provable, -








From this application, it can be seen that the priority relation allows to build very 
straightforwardly when dealing with exceptions (avoiding the RelevantExArt Intermediate 
class, described in 4.3.3.). The approach of a relative ranking rather than an absolute “strength” 
of rules has however some backsides: particularly in the judicial settings, where the hierarchy of 
sources is not always clear and contradicting positions from the very same institution may exist 
(it is the case of the Court of Cassation in Italy, which often keeps a contradictory stance on a 
topic for several years, until it reaches a uniformity of judgement among all its sections), 
adopting a logics that forces to resolve contradiction may prove counterproductive. Thus, it may 
be convenient to use this approach when dealing with laws, but when dealing with legal 
interpretations and legal sources such as case-law and jurisprudence it is necessary to represents 
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the conclusions brought forward by the rules also when they contradict each other. Considering 
that the intention is to rely on OWL databases, the need to represent intermediate classes 
(RelevantExArt) does not disappear by adopting this way of resolving inconsistencies. It 
thus seems the case to rely on absolute values, not using superiority relations at all. 
6.2.4.  An Evaluation of SPINdle under the ontological and syntactical requirements set 
by the present research 




Four-Layers classification of 
legal documents 
 
The rule language could be extended to include such 
information. Modal components of the defeasible model may 
be exploited in that direction. 
Connection to Linked Data 
 




The rule language and I/O manager could be extended to 
ensure a strict link between the text and the data. 
Advanced legal concepts 
representation 
 
Modal defeasible logics allow complex constructs for the 
representation of the dynamics of legal concepts. 
Middle-Out Approach 
 
The theory parser can be extended to read OWL ontologies. 
Description Logics 
 
Modal component of the logical model ensure the conservation 
of information from description logics. 
Modularity 
 
The I/O manager does not load multiple theories, so the 
modules which are relevant for the reasoning have to be 











SPINdle does not explicitly model Dungean semantics. 
Specific rules could simulate it (presuming with a defeasible 
rule that every statement is true) but the resulting structure of 
the rules would be far from intuitive. 
Deontics 
 
Support for modal defeasible logics allows the representation 




SPINdle does not explicitly model argumentation schemes. 
[Governatori 2011] argues that its model is sufficient to 
represent argumentation schemes (see chapter 4.6.). 
Proof Standards 
 
SPINdle does not explicitly model proof standards. 
[Governatori 2011] explains how to write rules for SPINdle 
that represent proof standards. 
Factors 
 
The rule language allows to include factors into the reasoning 
process, but it is necessary to extend the reasoner in order to 
process factors in the same way as [Bench-Capon 2012]. 
Dimensions 
 
In order to perform a reasoning on dimensions in judicial cases 
similar to [Bench-Capon 2012] the reasoner, given the rules, 
the facts and the conclusions of reasoning, should produce the 
(best possible) priority relation between the rules. This would 
require a drastic customization of the reasoning engine. 
Values 
 
Being there no argument schemes, it is not possible to 
introduce values through a specific argument scheme. It is 
therefore necessary to simulate the role of purpose-based 
reasoning in a way similar to [Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003] 
or through modal logics. 
Temporal reasoning 
 
SPINdle gives account for time and time intervals, but its basic 
model does not include three-layered structure for 
force/efficacy/application times of legal norms. The rule 
language and the reasoner should be extended in that direction. 
Procedural argumentation 
 
The SPINdle model seems to lack the proper structures to 
manage a turn-based argumentation process, simulating 
multiple stages of reasoning where each stage’s task is 






Drools is a business rule management system. Its hybrid rules engine started as a production 
rule system based on the Rete algorithm (see [Forgy 1982]), until version 5.x introduced Prolog 
style backward chaining reasoning as well as some functional programming styles. The Drools 
Rete implementation is called ReteOO, signifying that Drools has an enhanced and optimized 
implementation of the Rete algorithm for object oriented systems. It combines Object Oriented 
(OO) Paradigm entities with rules in order to let them interact in a transparent way. The rule 
engine is nested into a business logic integration platform, which combines the rules with 
workflow and event processing tools to create an enterprise framework for the construction, 
maintenance, and enforcement of business policies in an organization, application, or service. 
6.3.1.1.  Drools Expert  
The Drools Expert module is a declarative, rule based coding environment. A Drools rule has 
the following structure: 
rule "name" 
  attributes 
  when 
    condition 
  then 
    action  
It is not a classical conditional 
structure if-then of propositional 
logic (see 1.2.2.1.). Instead, the 
when-then model is adopted. 
Using the Rete algorithm, Drools 
executes the conclusions whenever the patterns in the conditions (which follow a precise 
syntax) are matched by a fact. The Expert module contains decision tables, rule templates, a 
guided editor and ruleflow authoring tools. 
6.3.1.2. jBPM 
jBPM is a Business Process Management (BPM) Suite, allowing to model business goals by 
representing in a flow chart the steps that need to be executed to achieve that goal. The core of 
jBPM is a light-weight, extensible workflow engine written in pure Java that allows the 
execution of business processes using the latest BPMN 2.0 specification, a standardized 
specification that defines a visualization and XML serialization of business processes and can 
be extended to include more advanced features. It can run in any Java environment, embedded 
in an application or as a service.  
6.3.1.3. Drools Fusion 
The most interesting part for the present research, even if it handles concepts (such as agents 
and event-based reasoning) which have barely been touched by the present thesis, is Drools 
Fusion, the module responsible for enabling event processing capabilities. Complex Event 
Business Logics Integration System 
Fig. 6.3 the components of the Drools system. 
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Processing, or CEP, is a kind event processing that deals with the task of processing multiple 
events with the goal of identifying the meaningful events within the event cloud. CEP employs 
techniques such as detection of complex patterns of many events, event correlation and 
abstraction, event hierarchies, and relationships between events such as causality, membership, 
and timing, and event-driven processes 
To achieve the flexibility and power of behavioural modelling (see [Rapisarda and Willems 
2006]), a platform must understand Rules, or Processes, or Events as primary concepts and 
allow them to leverage on each other strengths, without taking the perspective of only one of 
them. 
Drools Fusion, in this scenario, is an independent module, but still completely integrated with 
the rest of the platform, that adds a set of features to enable it to: 
 Handle events as first class citizens: events, in Drools 5.x, are a special entity that 
represent a record of a significant change of state in the application domain. They have 
several unique and distinguishing characteristics, like being usually immutable, having 
strong temporal constraints and relationships. Drools Fusion understands events by 
what they are and allows users to model business rules, queries and processes 
depending on the presence or absence of them; 
 Support advanced event management: Drools Fusion supports both streams and 
clouds of events. In case of streams it supports asynchronous, multi-thread feeding of 
events. It also supports calculations on moving windows of interest, be it temporal or 
length-based windows. Finally, it is able to identify the events that are no longer needed 
and dispose them as a way of freeing resources and scaling well on data volumes. 
 Support reasoning over absence of events: Drools Fusion leverages on the 
capabilities of the Drools Expert engine, allowing complete and flexible reasoning over 
the absence of events, including the transparent delaying of rules in case of events that 
require a waiting period before firing the absence. 
 Support for temporal reasoning: Drools Fusion adds a set of temporal operators for 
modelling and reasoning over temporal relationships between events (see below 
6.3.2.1.). 
6.3.1.4. Drools Guvnor 
Drools Guvnor is a centralized repository for Drools Knowledge Bases, including web based 
GUIs, editors, and tools to store versions of rules, models, functions, processes related to the 
KB. Access is controlled, and it is possible to lock down access and restrict features so domain 
experts (not programmers) can view and edit rules without being exposed to all the features at 
once. 
6.3.2. A Drools-based rule language for the legal domain 
In [Palmirani et al. 2012] an inference engine based on Drools ver. 5.4 is presented. The engine 
relies on a hybrid technology as described in [Bragaglia et al. 2010] and [Sottara et al. 2010], 
and uses LegalRuleML (see 5.6.)as rule language. Its aim is to sustain expert systems able to 
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take into consideration all the events 
occurred during a given time lapse 
and to match them to appropriate 
conclusions by means of a rulebase. 
For the legal domain, in fact, the 
best option is to build an expert 
system focalized on concrete 
applications, which is also the 
reason why Drools seems a valid 
candidate for the job. It needs, 
however, several extensions in order 
to properly manage legal 
knowledge. It needs in particular: 
 a complex temporal model capable of managing retroactivity (see next section); 
 a module to effectively import/export LegalRuleML files; 
 a more abstract model for defeasibility; 
 a refined front-end interface for the rule viewer integrated with Drools. 
6.3.2.1. The temporal model  
The model used by Drools to perform temporal reasoning is the model of [Allen 1983] (see 
Figure 6.4). This model is effective only then dealing with business-like rules, which refer to 
events which live in the present and die in the future. On the contrary, dealing with legal events 
and legal rules involves a complex mix of past, present and future to deal with: for example, a 
modification may occur in the present but have a retroactive effects. For this reason the 
temporal attributes implemente by Drools to manage the lifecycles of events and rules are not 
enough to represent the legal domain. In [Palmirani et al. 2012] this limitation had been partially 
supplied by adding temporal constraints as patterns to be matched: this was done by introducing 
events as instances, with a precise timestamp and duration. These temporal parameters can be 
added to every rule, or as metarules to control the rule flow with jBPM. It is possible, for 
example, to force the rule engine to activate only the rules that match certain temporal 
parameters, allowing to effectively deal with rule versioning. This kind of rule flow 
management, however, cannot deal effectively with multiple versions of legal rules which are 
applicable in the same time. In this case it is possible to use the construct salience to rank the 
rules, but this ranking has to be explicit and preemptive: it cannot be derived through a function, 
and has to be manually set for all the rules. 
6.3.2.2. Current state of the project 
An example of legal rules written in LegalRuleML language is contained in the Appendix. In 
the current state, it is not possible to test them within a proper reasoner, since the extension of 
Drools suggested in [Palmirani et al. 2012] has not been realized yet. It would be interesting to 
verify how this new model supports the temporal dimensions, and how it supports arguments. In 
Fig. 6.4 – Allen’s temporal model 
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fact, as already said in Chapter 5, if this new rule language seems promising under the aspect of 
time management, it lacks proper instruments to manage the argumentation process. 
6.3.3. An Evaluation of a Drools/LegalRuleML-based rule language under the 
ontological and syntactical requirements set by the present research 
Complexively, Drools has similarities with the IMPACT Policy Modeling tool based on 
Carneades 2.x (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/apps/projects/logos/8/247228/080/deliverable 
s/001_IMPACTD42.pdf): in particular, both the systems are intended to cover the gap between 
complex abstract rules, written by IT specialists, and practical use cases, to be managed by 
domain experts. Both rely on defeasible rules to achieve this goal, and are aimed at producing 
evaluations and suggestions to the user, mostly through the visualization tool. The main 
difference between the two program suites is that the IMPACT Policy Modeling tool uses 
argument schemes while Drools uses rules templates, the latter not being capable of influencing 
the concept burden of proof (significatively enough, burden of proof itself does not seem to be 
as hard-coded in Drools as it is in the project from IMPACT). However, the advanced 
conception of rules, processes and events brought forward by the Drools Fusion module seems 
to hold a great potentiality for the representation of argumentation as a process. Following is a 
table summarizing how the features of Drools (in the implementation which features 
LegalRuleML for the rule language and Akoma Ntoso for the metadata) meet the requirements 





Four-Layers classification of legal 
documents 
 
The Akoma Ntoso standard explicitly supports this. 
Connection to Linked Data 
 
One of the tasks of LegalRuleML is an approach to 
modelling orientated towards Linked Data not only for the 
semantics of raw data (acts, contracts, court files, 
judgements, etc.), but also of rules in conjunction with 
their functionality and usage. The Italian Senate has made 






Several blocks of LegalRuleML are dedicated to annotate 
the original legal sources and to connect them to rules, so 
permitting an N:M relationship also on the authorial level. 




Advanced legal concepts 
representation 
 
Akoma Ntoso and LegalRuleML are explicitly built to 
represent complex effects of legal phenomena, but a tool 
for NLP or for facts/rules parsing is missing. 
The Middle-Out Approach 
 
Akoma Ntoso is able to provide semantically rich metadata 
for bottom-up ontology and rules construction, but in order 
to introduce a top-down core ontology it is necessary to 
build an ontology outside of the system, and Drools can be 
configured to reason on both the Akoma Ntoso metadata 
and the ontology set. 
Description Logics 
 
Akoma Ntoso relies on XML, but does not include an 
OWL/RDF ontology. The ontology must be therefore built 




RuleML’s modular system of schemas for XML permits 










Nor LegalRuleML or Drools explicitly model Dungean 
semantics. Specific rules could simulate it (presuming with 
a defeasible rule that every statement is true) but the 
structure of the rules would be far from intuitive. A better 
investigation of Drools’ features could uncover the 








LegalRuleML does not give explicit account for 
argumentation schemes. Any support for argumentation 
would thus require an extension of LegalRuleML, Drools 
Fusion and jBPM. A possible extension is presented in 
5.6.6. 
Proof Standards LegalRuleML does not explicitly model proof standards. 
[Governatori 2011] explains how to write defeasible rules 
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 that represent proof standards. 
Factors 
 
The rule language allows to include factors into the 
reasoning process, but it is necessary to extend the 




In order to perform a reasoning on dimensions in judicial 
cases similar to [Bench-Capon 2012] the reasoner, given 
the rules, the facts and the conclusions of reasoning, 
should produce the (best possible) priority relation 




Being there no argument schemes, it is not possible to 
introduce values through a specific argument scheme. It is 
therefore necessary to simulate the role of purpose-based 
reasoning in a way similar to [Bench-Capon and Sartor 
2003] or through modal logics. 
Temporal reasoning 
 
LegalRuleML includes an advanced temporal model that 
can manage combined effects of norms such as multiple 
efficacy suspensions (see 5.3.2). 
Procedural argumentation 
 
LegalRuleML does not give explicit account for the 
argumentation process. Drools’ advanced management of 
events as first-class citizen could be exploited to 
implement an interconnection between steps of a process 
and tasks of the reasoning. 
 
 Conclusions 6.4.
Reasoning on the semantics of judgements is different, complex, and extremely useful. As this 
thesis demonstrates, it takes the best of the state-of-the art in knowledge representation and 
argument reconstruction to reproduce the semantics of judgements and doctrine. A consistent 
part of the results, however, has been already achieved by the giants before us, and our role as 
dwarfs on their shoulders is to reach an agreement on the required standard on the rule and 
logics layer of the Semantic Web in the legal field. LegalRuleML constitutes an ideal starting 
point on this behalf, while reasoning requires the features of modal defeasible logics with an 
account for modern argumentation theory and complex temporal representation of documents, 
something which has not yet been achieved by a single application. The central result of the 
present research is thus the set of requirements contained in 5.5., as they constitute a possible 
starting point for a new race of AI & Law community towards the representation of legal 
reasoning with Information Technologies.  
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The research showed that it is possible not only to create the argumentation diagrams in the 
style of Wigmore & Toulmin, and to conduct reasoning on them (which was already achieved 
by Araucaria), but also to create them automatically, importing semantics from a case-based 
ontology. The feature of Carneades of argument from ontology had never been applied to such a 
concrete and complex sample. 
Finally, the present research would like to constitute a call for the constitution of a wide 
international community composed of lawyers, IT experts, judges and legal professionals, 
because there is (still?) no way of representing knowledge so complex as legal knowledge 
without relying on the most complex processors of the universe, namely the human brain. And 
legal information is so vast, and ever-changing, that a single (or a limited number of) brains will 
never be able to build a comprehensive jurisprudence of legislation and case-law, nor to keep 
the pace of its modifications. For these reasons, this work is concluded by citing a phrase 
contained in 5.5.2.2.: 
The commitment to the community, and the mix of advantages and duties it entails, is not a 
mere modelling choice, nor a strategy or an approach: it is, evidently, a philosophical shift in 
the concept of scientific production in our age.  
 Further Work 6.5.
6.5.1. The Judicial Assistant Tool 
On the basis of the ontology set described in Chapter 3 and of the argumentation system 
described in Chapter 4 a software could be built, which manages judicial sentences enriching 
the knowledge contained in them in the following ways: 
 Finding relevant precedents that are not explicitly cited in the decision; 
 Validating the adjudications of the judge on the claims brought forward by the parties 
during the trial on the basis of applicable rules, accepted evidence, and interpretation;  
 Suggesting legal rules/precedents/circumstances that could bring to a different 
adjudication of the claim. 
Advanced features of the Judicial Assistant tool may include: 
 Compliance check of contract drafts, i.e. through a plugin of a word processor using 
NLP techniques to recognize sentences and clauses that could be relevant under 
consumer law; 
 Juridical analysis tools for legal professionals, enriching case-law collections by 
semantically relating and grouping precedents for lawyers to browse, making the 
precedent extraction process for legal cases easier and more effective; 
 Judgement management tools for courts and tribunals, useful to evaluate and optimize 
judgements (i.e. integrated into a word processor to help the judge while writing the 




 Impact analysis tools for legislators, providing a list of (common or uncommon) 
judicial interpretations for a given law, in order to take them into account when 
modifying that law; 
 New tools representing formalized legal doctrine and case law, where legal experts 
could rely on a social platform to share their views and interpretations on a law or a 
precedent, using a graphical interface and a formal argumentation structure instead of 
plain text. 
6.5.2. Generalization of Patterns 
In order to test and refine the set of ontologies built from the Italian consumer contracts-related 
case law (or at least its core part) a set of foreign sentences in the same field could be analyzed, 
in order to verify the differences between the meanings of the main legal concepts and the 
possibility of representing those differences in the ontologies. This is an important topic in 
European Law and in the perspective of the growing phenomenon of international citation. By 
developing a multi-lingual, multi-system judicial ontology it would be possible to study and 
compare law principles under an international perspective. The same research can be conducted 
on argumentation patterns: recurrency of argumentation patterns in different legal systems could 
be compared and connections with differences in law principles or specific discipline could be 
studied. 
6.5.3.  International judicial taxonomy 
The research could further develop in the direction of multi-lingual approach to legal ontologies 
by trying to create better semantic connections between the legal text and the rules represented 
in it. With help from lexicon-related projects, such as FrameNet (see 5.3.3.3.) and Legal 
Taxonomy Syllabus of the University of Turin (see [Ajani et al. 2008]), the research can try to 
fill the gap between the formalization of language and the representation of legal principles. It 
will be probably necessary to identify two layers in the ontology set, transversal to the core and 
domain components: one more connected to the linguistic and lexicon part, and another linking 
the legal concepts. In this way, the research could study the differences between languages in 




 Personal Remarks 6.6.
As G. W. F. Hegel writes in the opening quote of this thesis (0.), “World history is a court of 
judgement”: it is there that the correspondence between the ideas and the facts is verified. 
Following Hegel: “Truth in philosophy means that concept and external reality correspond”. 
The kind of judgement Hegel ascribes to World history is hence a quest for Truth, rather than a 
quest for Justice.  
The object of this thesis is strictly connected to logics, which tells about the concept of Truth 
and how to get as close as possible to it, no matter if we can never seize it. In a world where the 
suffering of many depends on the manipulation of this precious and fragile concept, any quest 
for Truth is to be lived and fostered as a quest for making something better of this place. The 
final goal of Research should thus be that of shredding the clouds which cloak our perceptions: 
in the teaching of the great philosopher Hannah Arendt it is in those clouds that the very roots of 
contemporary barbarism lie. 
This thesis, apparently, also buzzes around a concept which is equally difficult to seize, to the 
point that in a perfect World it would have no meaning: the concept of Justice. [Kelsen 1957] 
defines the longing for justice as men's eternal longing for happiness: it is happiness that man 
cannot find alone, as an isolated individual, and hence seeks in society. It is, together with 
Freedom, one of the hallowed concepts of our times, but any quest for Justice is a dangerous 
enterprise: different conceptions of Justice are, in fact, the origin of wars between peoples
36
. 
Moreover, zeal can hide the most human, desirable and powerful feeling: compassion. Western 
civilization has so much to learn on this behalf!  
Chomsky fairly interprets World history as a court of judgement of our times in his lecture 
Government of the Future:  
“We have today the technical and material resources to meet man’s animal needs. We have 
not developed the cultural and moral resources or the democratic forms of social organization 
that make possible the humane and rational use of our material wealth and power. 
Conceivably, the classical liberal ideals, as expressed and developed in their libertarian 
socialist form, are achievable. But if so, only by a popular revolutionary movement, rooted in 
wide strata of the population, and committed to the elimination of repressive and 
authoritarian institutions, state and private. To create such a movement is the challenge we 
face and must meet if there is to be an escape from contemporary barbarism.” [Chomsky 
2005] 
“Democratic forms of social organization that make possible the humane and rational use of our 
material wealth and power”, this is what we should all be focusing on now. Not Finance. 
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all the Italians which, across time and space, taught me through images and words how to stay 
human. How beauty survives in the mud. How competence, passion and patience can flourish 
among corruption and emptiness. While trying to endure my thought goes to Vittorio Arrigoni 
(1975-2011), a nonviolent paladin against barbarism. One of the few just men of those troubled 
times. 
I would have never made it to the end of this work without the constant help and support from 
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The Judicial Framework 
 
 
a.1. The ontology 
 




<!DOCTYPE Ontology [ 
    <!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
    <!ENTITY xml "http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" > 
    <!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" > 
    <!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" > 
]> 
<Ontology xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/Judging_Contracts_Core.owl" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     ontologyIRI="http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/Judging_Contracts_Core.owl"> 
    <Prefix name="rdf" IRI="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"/> 
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    <Prefix name="norm" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-core/norm.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="owl2xml" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl2-xml#"/> 
    <Prefix name="xsd" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"/> 
    <Prefix name="legal-action" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-core/legal-
action.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="expression" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/expression.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="Judging_Contracts_Core" 
IRI="http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/Judging_Contracts_Core.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="rdfs" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"/> 
    <Prefix name="owl" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"/> 
    <Import>http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-core/lkif-core.owl</Import> 
    <Declaration>       <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Communicated_Attitude"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Declaration"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Expression"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualification"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualified"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="legal-action:Legislative_Body"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="legal-action:Public_Body"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Contract"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Legal_Document"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Legal_Expression"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Norm"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Precedent"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Adjudication"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Agreement"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Claim"/>    </Declaration> 
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    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Interpretation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Outcome"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Jurisdiction"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Law_Declaration"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Legal_Consequence"/>     </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Legal_Status"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <Class IRI="#Material_Circumstance"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:attitude"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluated_by"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluates"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:held_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:medium"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allowed_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allows"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallowed_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallows"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
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    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Adjudication"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Adjudication"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Judicial_Outcome"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Adjudication"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Judicial_Claim"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Agreement"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Communicated_Attitude"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Expression"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Norm"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
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            <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Legal_Status"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Material_Circumstance"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:attitude"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Agreement"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:medium"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Contract"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Expression"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualification"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
310 
 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:attitude"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Jurisdiction"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:medium"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Precedent"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Claim"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Judgement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Legal_Status"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
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            <Class IRI="#Material_Circumstance"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicial_Outcome"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Jurisdiction"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Declaration"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Jurisdiction"/> 
        <ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:held_by"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="legal-action:Public_Body"/> 
        </ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Law_Declaration"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Declaration"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Law_Declaration"/> 
        <ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:held_by"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="legal-action:Legislative_Body"/> 
        </ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
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    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Consequence"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Legal_Expression"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Norm"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Legal_Consequence"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Legal_Status"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:attitude"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Law_Declaration"/> 
        </ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
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    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Rule"/> 
        <ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:medium"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Legal_Document"/> 
        </ObjectAllValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Legal_Status"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Material_Circumstance"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Judicially_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Material_Circumstance"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#applied_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
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        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluated_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluates"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allowed_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allows"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallowed_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallows"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <InverseObjectProperties> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#applied_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#applies"/> 
    </InverseObjectProperties> 
    <InverseObjectProperties> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considers"/> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#considered_by"/> 
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    </InverseObjectProperties> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Adjudication</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The final assessment of a judge on a 
claim.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Adjudication</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Adjudication</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Agreement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The empowering attitude of contractual 
agreements.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Agreement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Agreement</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Contractual_Agreement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The content of a contract. Takes into 
consideration a specific Material circumstance and applies a legal status to 
it.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Contractual_Agreement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contractual Agreement</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Judgement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The syntactic representation of a 
judicial decision&#39;s contents</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Judgement</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judgement</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Claim</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Is the claim brought in front of the 
judge by one of the parties.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Claim</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judicial Claim</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Interpretation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judicial interpretations are 
performative expressions contained in sentences (i.e. subsumptions). They take into 
consideration a Factual circumstance and apply a legal status to it.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Interpretation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judicial Interpretation</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
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        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Outcome</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judicial Outcome</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="owl:incompatibleWith"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicial_Outcome</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Is the outcome applied by the judge to 
every judicial claim. i.e. &quot;accepted&quot;, &quot;rejected&quot;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicially_Qualified</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Anything that is qualified by a 
judicial expression.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Judicially_Qualified</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Judicially Qualified</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Jurisdiction</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The empowering attitude of 
judgements</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Jurisdiction</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Jurisdiction</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
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        <IRI>#Law_Declaration</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The empowering attitude of legal 
rules</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Law_Declaration</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Law Declaration</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Legal_Consequence</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">A legal consequence is the consequent 
of a legal rule. In the form of regulative rules &quot;if A then B&quot;, B is the Legal 
Consequence. i.e. a sanction.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Legal_Consequence</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Legal Consequence</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Legal_Rule</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The content of a legal document. 
considers anything having a given (combination of) legal status(es) and applies a 
(combination of) legal consequence(s) to it.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Legal_Rule</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Legal Rule</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
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        <IRI>#Legal_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">A legal status is an abstract concept 
which is created by a law (or more rarely by doctrine or customs). It can be taken by a 
judgement or a contract and applied to some Factual circumstance, more or less 
arbitrarily. I.e. &quot;knowable&quot; is a legal status.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Legal_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Legal Status</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Material_Circumstance</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">a Factual Circumstance is any fact or 
act which occurred in the Factual world, and which is taken into consideration by a law, 
a contract, or a judgement.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Material_Circumstance</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Material Circumstance</Literal> 





<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 3.2.3.1824) http://owlapi.sourceforge.net --> 




<!DOCTYPE Ontology [ 
    <!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
    <!ENTITY xml "http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" > 
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    <!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" > 





     xml:base="http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Domain.owl" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     
ontologyIRI="http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Domain.owl"> 
    <Prefix name="mereology" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="rdf" IRI="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"/> 
    <Prefix name="norm" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-core/norm.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="xsd" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"/> 
    <Prefix name="Judging_Contracts_Domain" 
IRI="http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Domain.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="expression" IRI="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/expression.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="Judging_Contracts_Core" 
IRI="http://codexml.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Core.owl#"/> 
    <Prefix name="rdfs" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"/> 
    <Prefix name="owl" IRI="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"/> 
    <Declaration>    <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Adjudication"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>    <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Agreement"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judgement"/>    
</Declaration> 




    <Declaration>   <Class 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Outcome"/> 
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicially_Qualified"/>  </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Jurisdiction"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Law_Declaration"/> 
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Consequence"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Material_Circumstance"/>  </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Contract_Clause"/>   </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Efficacious_ViaException"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Exception"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Full_Contract"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Inefficacious"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Reproducing_LawDisposition"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Communicated_Attitude"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Declaration"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Expression"/>    </Declaration> 
322 
 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualification"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="expression:Qualified"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Legal_Expression"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Norm"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applied_by"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:attitude"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluated_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluates"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="mereology:contained_in"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allowed_by"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allows"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallowed_by"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallows"/>   </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>    <NamedIndividual IRI="#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#AddedToPrecompiled"/>    </Declaration> 
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    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#AgenziaImmobiliareD_NG&amp;PF_ClauseX"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1219co3cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co1cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co2cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co1cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co2cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1743cc"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual 
IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#AutomobilClubEuropeo_GeCapital_ClauseX"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#BC_BancaCreditoCooperativo_Clause6"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdABariII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAMilanoII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdARomaII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/>  
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalUnilateral"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4"/> 
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Exception_Limitation"/>    </Declaration> 
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    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ExpertOpinion"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ISPB_SAI_clause_12"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co1"/>   </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1342co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#International"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Clause*"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Contract"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Law180_1993Art2co2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#LiabilityLimitation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#LimitationTowards3rdParties"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_Arbitration"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_CompentenceDerogation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ContractWithdrawal"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ResponsibilityLimitation"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Knowable"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#PrevailsOverPrecompiledClauses"/>    
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/>    
<Deeclaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityExtension"/>    </Declaration> 
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    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityLimitation"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/>   
</Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#STF_KSBClause10.2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#StatutoFIGC_Clause24"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual 
IRI="#ToroAssicurazioni_ImpresaAutoimpianti_ClauseB"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribComoI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribFirenzeIII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribGenovaI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1.2"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribModenaII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMondovi_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int2.1"/>   </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNapoliI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNolaII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribRomaIX_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSalernoI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSavonaI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTraniI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribVeneziaI_Int1"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/>    </Declaration> 
    <Declaration>   <NamedIndividual IRI="#VF_BPTR_clauseX"/>    </Declaration> 
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    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Contract_Clause"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="mereology:contained_in"/> 
                <Class IRI="#Full_Contract"/> 
            </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Efficacious_ViaException"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Inefficacious"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacious"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
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                <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/> 
            </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
            <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
            </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Knowable"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
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                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Knowable"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <ObjectHasValue> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
            <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co1cc"/> 
        </ObjectHasValue> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co2"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
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                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
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                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co2"/> 
        <ObjectHasValue> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
            <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co2cc"/> 
        </ObjectHasValue> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co1"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#AddedToPrecompiled"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#AddedToPrecompiled"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="mereology:contained_in"/> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
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                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
            </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co1"/> 
        <ObjectHasValue> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
            <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co1cc"/> 
        </ObjectHasValue> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co2"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co1"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
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    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co2"/> 
        <ObjectHasValue> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
            <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co2cc"/> 
        </ObjectHasValue> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Reproducing_LawDisposition"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
                </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
                <ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                    <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
                </ObjectHasValue> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
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    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
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                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectComplementOf> 
                <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co1"/> 
            </ObjectComplementOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co2"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
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            <ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
                    </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                    <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
                    </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
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                </ObjectUnionOf> 
                <ObjectUnionOf> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                    <ObjectHasValue> 
                        <ObjectProperty 
abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
                        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
                    </ObjectHasValue> 
                </ObjectUnionOf> 
            </ObjectUnionOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <EquivalentClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co2"/> 
        <ObjectIntersectionOf> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
            <ObjectComplementOf> 
                <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co2"/> 
            </ObjectComplementOf> 
        </ObjectIntersectionOf> 
    </EquivalentClasses> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Adjudication"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judgement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Material_Circumstance"/> 
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        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judgement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
            <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        </ObjectSomeValuesFrom> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Material_Circumstance"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Exception"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contract_Clause"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Contract_Clause"/> 
        <ObjectMaxCardinality cardinality="1"> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
            <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        </ObjectMaxCardinality> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
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        <Class IRI="#Efficacious_ViaException"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacious"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Exception"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Full_Contract"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacious"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Consequence"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1341co2"/> 
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        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co1"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Relevant_ExArt1342co2"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Reproducing_LawDisposition"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co1"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <SubClassOf> 
        <Class IRI="#Valid_ExArt1341co2"/> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="norm:Normatively_Qualified"/> 
    </SubClassOf> 
    <DisjointClasses> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
    </DisjointClasses> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8"/> 
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    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AddedToPrecompiled"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AgenziaImmobiliareD_NG&amp;PF_ClauseX"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1219co3cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co1cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co2cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
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    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co1cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co2cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1743cc"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AutomobilClubEuropeo_GeCapital_ClauseX"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BC_BancaCreditoCooperativo_Clause6"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
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        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdABariII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAMilanoII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdARomaII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalUnilateral"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Exception_Limitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Exception_Limitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ExpertOpinion"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
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    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ISPB_SAI_clause_12"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Inefficacy"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1342co2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#International"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#International"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
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    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Clause*"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Contract"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Rule"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Law180_1993Art2co2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LiabilityLimitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LiabilityLimitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LimitationTowards3rdParties"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LimitationTowards3rdParties"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
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        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_Arbitration"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_CompentenceDerogation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ContractWithdrawal"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#NonOppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Knowable"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Consequence"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#PrevailsOverPrecompiledClauses"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Art1341-1342_Exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityExtension"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class IRI="#Oppressive_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
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    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#STF_KSBClause10.2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#StatutoFIGC_Clause24"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ToroAssicurazioni_ImpresaAutoimpianti_ClauseB"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribComoI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
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    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribFirenzeIII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribGenovaI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1.2"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribModenaII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMondovi_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int2.1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
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        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNapoliI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNolaII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribRomaIX_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSalernoI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSavonaI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTraniI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Judicial_Interpretation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribVeneziaI_Int1"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Legal_Status"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <ClassAssertion> 
        <Class abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:Contractual_Agreement"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#VF_BPTR_clauseX"/> 
    </ClassAssertion> 
    <SameIndividual> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityExtension"/> 
    </SameIndividual> 
    <DifferentIndividuals> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
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    </DifferentIndividuals> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co1cc"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co1"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1341co2cc"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co2"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co1cc"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#PrevailsOverPrecompiledClauses"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1342co2cc"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Inefficacy_ExArt1342co2"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ExpertOpinion"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Exception_Limitation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdABariII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdABariII_Int1"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#VF_BPTR_clauseX"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Specific"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAFirenzeI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAMilanoII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdAMilanoII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdARomaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ResponsibilityExtension"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CdARomaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ToroAssicurazioni_ImpresaAutoimpianti_ClauseB"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
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    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ISPB_SAI_clause_12"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Clause*"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AddedToPrecompiled"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="mereology:contained_in"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Clause*"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Contract"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Contract"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Precompiled"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LimitationTowards3rdParties"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#STF_KSBClause10.2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CompetenceDerogation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#STF_KSBClause10.2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#StatutoFIGC_Clause24"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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        <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribBariIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribComoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribComoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribFirenzeIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribFirenzeIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LLoyd_FF_Clause*"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribGenovaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_CompentenceDerogation"/> 
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    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ExpertOpinion"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribIsernia_int1.2"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribModenaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribModenaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMondovi_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMondovi_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AutomobilClubEuropeo_GeCapital_ClauseX"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1743cc"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribMonzaI_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNapoliI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Arbitration"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNapoliI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNapoliI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNolaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ContractWithdrawal"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNolaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribNolaII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Knowable"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#STF_KSBClause10.2"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#International"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribRomaIX_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Art1219co3cc"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribRomaIX_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribRomaIX_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSalernoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Law180_1993Art2co2"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSalernoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#StatutoFIGC_Clause24"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSalernoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ReproducingLawDisposition"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSavonaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribSavonaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#BC_BancaCreditoCooperativo_Clause6"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#No_ResponsibilityLimitation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
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    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LiabilityLimitation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#ISPB_SAI_clause_12"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Not_Knowable"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
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        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#NotSpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#Unilateral"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#General"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTorinoVIII_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTraniI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#SpecificallySigned"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribTraniI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AgenziaImmobiliareD_NG&amp;PF_ClauseX"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribVeneziaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#LiabilityLimitation"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
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    <ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#TribVeneziaI_Int1"/> 
        <NamedIndividual IRI="#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2"/> 
    </ObjectPropertyAssertion> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applied_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualified_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:qualifies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#assumption"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty IRI="#exception"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluated_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
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    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="expression:evaluates"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allowed_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:allows"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallowed_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="norm:disallows"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <InverseObjectProperties> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applied_by"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
    </InverseObjectProperties> 
    <InverseObjectProperties> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considers"/> 
        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
    </InverseObjectProperties> 
    <SubObjectPropertyOf> 
        <ObjectPropertyChain> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:considered_by"/> 
            <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:applies"/> 
        </ObjectPropertyChain> 
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        <ObjectProperty abbreviatedIRI="Judging_Contracts_Core:judged_as"/> 
    </SubObjectPropertyOf> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause 2.020 of contract between Byte 
Software House spa and Azienda Ospedaliera Universitaria di messina policlinico Gaetano 
Martino</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AOUMessina_ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">AOU Messina / Byte Software House 
Clause 2.020</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause 8 of the contract between 
Acquedotto Pugliese spa and C. C.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AcquedottoPugliese_CC_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Acquedotto Pugliese / CC Clause 
8</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AddedToPrecompiled</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause has been manually added to a 
precompiled contract</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AddedToPrecompiled</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Added to precompiled</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AgenziaImmobiliareD_NG&amp;PF_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause x of the contract between 
Agenzia Immobiliare D. di M. D. and N. G., P. F.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AgenziaImmobiliareD_NG&amp;PF_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Agenzia Immobiliare D / NG e PF Clause 
&#39;x&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 8 of contract between unknown 
parties</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Alfa_Beta1_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Alfa1 / Beta1 clause 8</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Arbitration</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns arbitration</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Arbitration</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Arbitration</Literal> 
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    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1219co3cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1219 comma 3 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1341-1342_Exception</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contract clauses applying any of these 
statuses are pulled out of the scope of application of article 1341 and 1342 civil 
code.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1341-1342_Exception</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Exception to articles 1341 and 1342 
civil code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1341co1cc</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Articolo 1341 comma 1 
Codice Civile: &#39;Le condizioni generali di contratto predisposte da uno dei 
contraenti sono efficaci nei confronti dell’altro, se al momento della conclusione del 
contratto questi le ha conosciute o avrebbe dovuto conoscerle usando l’ordinaria 
diligenza.&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1341co1cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1341 comma 1 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
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        <IRI>#Art1341co2cc</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Articolo 1341 comma 2 
Codice Civile: &#39;In ogni caso non hanno effetto, se non sono specificamente approvate 
per iscritto, le condizioni che stabiliscono, a favore di colui che le ha predisposte, 
limitazioni di responsabilità, facoltà di recedere dal contratto o di sospenderne 
l&#39;esecuzione, ovvero sanciscono a carico dell&#39;altro contraente decadenze, 
limitazioni alla facoltà di opporre eccezioni, restrizioni alla libertà contrattuale nei 
rapporti coi terzi, tacita proroga o rinnovazione del contratto, clausole compromissorie 
o deroghe alla competenza dell&#39;autorità giudiziaria.&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1341co2cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1341 comma 2 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1342co1cc</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Articolo 1342 comma 1 
Codice Civile: &#39;Nei contratti conclusi mediante la sottoscrizione di moduli o 
formulari, predisposti per disciplinare in maniera uniforme determinati rapporti 
contrattuali, le clausole aggiunte al modulo o al formulario prevalgono su quelle del 
modulo o del formulario qualora siano incompatibili con esse, anche se queste ultime non 
sono state cancellate.&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1342co1cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1342 comma 1 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1342co2cc</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Articolo 1342 comma 2 
Codice Civile: &quot;Si osserva inoltre la disposizione del secondo comma 
dell&#39;articolo precedente.&quot;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
375 
 
        <IRI>#Art1342co2cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1342 comma 2 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1743cc</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Articolo 1743 Codice 
Civile: &quot;Il preponente non può valersi contemporaneamente di più agenti nella 
stessa zona e per lo stesso ramo di attività, né l&#39;agente può assumere 
l&#39;incarico di trattare nella stessa zona e per lo stesso ramo gli affari di più 
imprese in concorrenza tra loro.&quot;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Art1743cc</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 1743 Italian Civil 
Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 2 of contract between 
Assicurazione Generali Spa and C. sas.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AssicurazioniGenerali_Csas_SectionA_Clause2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Assicurazioni Generali / C. sas Clause 
2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#AutomobilClubEuropeo_GeCapital_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause unknown of contract between 
Automobil Club Europeo srl and Ge Capital Servizi Finanziari spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#AutomobilClubEuropeo_GeCapital_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">AutomobilClubEuropeo / GeCapital Clause 
&#39;x&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#BC_BancaCreditoCooperativo_Clause6</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 6 of the contract between B. C. 
and Banca Credito Cooperativo di Alba, Langhe e Roero scrl</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#BC_BancaCreditoCooperativo_Clause6</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">B.C. / Banca di Credito Cooperativo 
Clause 6</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 2.8 of contract between B.L. and 
Assitalia spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#BL_Assitalia_Clause2.8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">B.L. / Assitalia clause 2.8</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 31 of contract between C. G. and 
Carige Assicurazioni spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CG_CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause31</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">C. G. / CarigeAssicurazioni_Clause 
31</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 6 of contract between C. G. and 
Intesa Vita spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CG_IntesaVita_Clause6</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">C. G. / Intesavita clause 6</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CdABariII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Bari, 
3rd section in decision n. 461 of May 25th, 2004</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CdABariII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Court of Appeal of Bari Interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CdAFirenzeI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Court of Appeal 
of Firenze, 1st section, in decision of December 10th, 2004</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CdAFirenzeI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Court of Appeal of Firenze 
interpretation 1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CdAMilanoII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation by the Court of Appeal 
of Milano 2nd section in decision n. 1154 of April 24th, 2007</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CdAMilanoII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Court of Appeal of Milano 
interpretation 1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CdARomaII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Court of Appeal 
of Rome 2nd section in sentence n. 628 of February 14th, 2008.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CdARomaII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Court of Appeal of Roma interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CompetenceDerogation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns a derogation to the 
judicial competence</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CompetenceDerogation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Competence derogation</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 21 of contract between Comune di 
Porto Azzurro and Daneco Gestione Impianti spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ComunePortoAzzurro_Daneco_Clause21</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Comune Porto Azzurro / Daneco Clause 
21</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 16 of contract between 
Condominio di via del Gambero n. 40 and B. M.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CondominioViaDelGambero_BM_Clause16</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Condominio Via del Gambero / B. M. 
clause 16</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause unknown of contract between 
Condominio di via Rasori n. 9 and Impresa Edile Santacroce sas</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
380 
 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#CondominioViaRasori_Santacroce_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Condominio Via Rasori_ 
Santacroce_Clause x</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause allow particular conditions of 
withdrawal for both parties</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ContractWithdrawalForBothParties</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contract withdrawal for both 
parties</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Contract_Clause</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">A part of a contract</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Contract_Clause</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contract Clause</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Efficacious_ViaException</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contractual agreements classified under 
this are relevant under some laws which disposes inefficacy, but are nevertheless 
efficacious because they fall into the scope of some exception.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Efficacious_ViaException</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Efficacious through Exception</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause 4 of contract between Europa 
Palace Hotel spa and Seat Pagine Gialle spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#EuropaPalaceHotel_SeatPagineGialle_Clause4</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Europa Palace Hotel / Seat Pagine 
Gialle clause 4</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Exception</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">An exceptional status: it pulls the 
expression it is applied to out of some norm´s scope of application.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Exception</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Exception</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Exception_Limitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns a limitation to the 
exceptions that can be opposed to the proponant</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
382 
 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Exception_Limitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Limitation to exceptions</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ExpertOpinion</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns an expert 
opinion</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ExpertOpinion</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Expert Opinion</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Full_Contract</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The expression representing the whole 
contract. Can be further identified by contract clauses.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Full_Contract</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Full Contract</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#General</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause is general (a general condition 
is common to a series of contracts)</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
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        <IRI>#General</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">General</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause C of contract between IBI 
Immobiliare Italiana srl and A.A., C. F.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#IBIImmobiliare_AACF_ClauseC</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">IBI Immobiliare / A.A. and C. F. clause 
C</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ISPB_SAI_clause_12</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 12 of contract between Istituto 
Sorveglianza Provinciale Bergamasco spa and SAI spa.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ISPB_SAI_clause_12</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">ISPB / SAI clause 12</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacious</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">An agreement (contract or clause) to 
which the legal consequence ´inefficacy´ has been applied.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacious</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Inefficacious Agreement</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The legal consequence of inefficacy: 
the contractual agreement (or other legal expression) has no effects.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Inefficacy</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause is inefficacious under article 
1341 comma 1 Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Inefficacy under article 1341 comma 1 
Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause is inefficacious under article 
1341 comma 2 Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Inefficacy under article 1341 comma 2 
Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1342co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause is inefficacious under article 
1342 comma 2 Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Inefficacy_ExArt1342co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Inefficacy under article 1342 comma 2 
Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#International</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">The contract is international: its 
parties are of different countries.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#International</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">International</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Knowable</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause was knowable by the other party 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract by using ordinary diligence</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Knowable</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Knowable</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#LLoyd_FF_Clause*</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause &#39;*&#39; between Lloyd 
Nazionale Assicurazioni spa and F.F. Consulenze e Assicurazioni sas</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#LLoyd_FF_Clause*</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Lloyd&#39;s / F.F. clause *</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#LLoyd_FF_Contract</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contract between Lloyd Nazionale 
Assicurazioni spa and F.F. Consulenze Assicurazioni sas</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#LLoyd_FF_Contract</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Lloyd&#39;s / F.F. contract</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Law180_1993Art2co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Article 2 comma 2 Law 
180/1993</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#LiabilityLimitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns a limitation to the 
liability of the proponant</Literal> 
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    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#LiabilityLimitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Liability limitation</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#LimitationTowards3rdParties</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns a limitation to 
contractual freedom towards third parties</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#LimitationTowards3rdParties</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Limitation towards third 
parties</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 8 of contract between M. E. and 
La Sorgente sas</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ME_LaSorgente_Clause8</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">M.E. / La Sorgente clause 8</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause x of contract between M &amp; A 
Computer sas and Cartasì spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#MeAComputer_Cartasi_ClauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">M &amp; A Computer / Cartasì Clause 
&#39;x&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 12 of contract 
between New Edge di D. F. and Foto Village s.a.s. </Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#NewEdge_FotoVillage_clause12</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">New Edge / Foto Village clause 
12</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#NonOppressive_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">non oppressive status (under the 
consumer law conception of oppressiveness)</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#NonOppressive_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Not oppressive </Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#NotSpecificallySigned</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause has not been specifically 
signed</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#NotSpecificallySigned</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Not specifically signed</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Not_Knowable</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause was not knowable by the other 
party at the time of the conclusion of the contract, even using ordinary 
diligence</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Not_Knowable</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Non knowable</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Not_Unilateral</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause was not unilaterally predisponed 
by the proponant</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Not_Unilateral</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Not unilateral</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 3.1 of contract between Novus 
Wohnbedarf Vertriebs gmbh and B. spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
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        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#NovusWohnbedarfVertriebs_Bspa_Clause3.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Novus Wothnbedarf Vertriebs / B. spa 
clause 3.1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Oppressive_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">oppressive status (under the consumer 
law conception of oppressiveness)</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Oppressive_Status</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Oppressive</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Precompiled</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Contract was precompiled by the 
proponant</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Precompiled</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Precompiled</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#PrevailsOverPrecompiledClauses</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">An added clause prevails over 
precompiled clauses of the contract following Article 1342 comma 1 Civil Code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
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        <IRI>#PrevailsOverPrecompiledClauses</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Prevails over precompiled 
clauses</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">To be relevan uder comma 1 of article 
1341 civil code, a clause must be general, unilaterally written by one of the parties, 
and not knowable by the other party at the time of the conclusion of the contract by 
using ordinary diligence.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Relevant under article 1341 comma 1 
civil code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">To be relevant under article 1341 comma 
2 of civil code a clause must be oppressive, general, unilaterally written by one of the 
parties and not specifically signed by the other party.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Relevant under article 1341 comma 2 
civil code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1342co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">To be relevant under comma 1 of article 
1342 civil code a clause must constitute an addition to a precompiled 
contract.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1342co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Relevant under article 1342 comma 1 
civil code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1342co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">To be relevant under comma 2 of article 
1342 civil code a clause must be relevant under comma 1 and not specifically signed by 
the party which did not prepare the precompiled contract.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Relevant_ExArt1342co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Relevant under article 1342 comma 2 
civil code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ReproducingLawDisposition</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause reproduces a law 
disposition</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ReproducingLawDisposition</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Reproducing law disposition</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Reproducing_LawDisposition</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">a clause whose content corresponds to 
that of a law disposition in force.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
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    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Reproducing_LawDisposition</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Reproducing law disposition</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ResponsibilityExtension</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns an extention of the 
responsibility of the acceptant</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ResponsibilityExtension</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Extension of responsibility</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ResponsibilityLimitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause concerns a limitation to the 
responsibility of the proponant</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ResponsibilityLimitation</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Limitation of responsibility</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause 15f of contract between S. C. 
and la Piemontese Assicurazioni spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
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        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#SC_LaPiemonteseAssicurazioni_Clause15f</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">S.C. / La Piemontese Assicurazioni 
Clause 15f</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#STF_KSBClause10.2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">clause 10.2 of contract between STF spa 
and KSB ag</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#STF_KSBClause10.2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">STF / KSB clause 10.2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Specific</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause is specific (not 
general)</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Specific</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Specific</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#SpecificallySigned</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause was specifically 
signed</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
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        <IRI>#SpecificallySigned</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Specifically signed</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#StatutoFIGC_Clause24</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause 24 of the Statute of the FIGC, 
Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#StatutoFIGC_Clause24</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Statuto F. I. G. C. clause 24</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#ToroAssicurazioni_ImpresaAutoimpianti_ClauseB</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause B of contract between Impresa 
Autoimpianti di L. A. and Toro Assicurazioni spa</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#ToroAssicurazioni_ImpresaAutoimpianti_ClauseB</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Toro Assicurazioni / Impresa 
Autoimpianti clause B</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribBariIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Bari 
3rd section in decision n. 87 of January 15th, 2009</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribBariIII_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Bari interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribComoI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Como 
in decision of May 20th, 2004</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribComoI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Como interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribFirenzeIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Firenze 3rd section in decision of November 7th, 2006</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribFirenzeIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Firenze interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribGenovaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Genova in decision of February 19th, 2003</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribGenovaI_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Genova interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribIsernia_int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation of the Tribunal of 
Isernia in decision n. 65 of January 20th, 2010</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribIsernia_int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Isernia interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribIsernia_int1.2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation of the Tribunal of 
Isernia in decision n. 65 of January 20th, 2010</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribIsernia_int1.2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Isernia interpretation 
2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribModenaII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Modena 2nd section in decision of November 2nd, 2005</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribModenaII_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Modena interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMondovi_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation of the Tribunal of 
Mondovì in decision of November 14th, 2006</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMondovi_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Mondovì interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMonzaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Monza 
in decision of January 21st, 2003</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMonzaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Monza interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMonzaI_Int2.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation by the Tribunal of Monza 
in decision of November 9th, 2006</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribMonzaI_Int2.1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Monza interpretation 
2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribNapoliI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Napoli in decision of January 13th, 2005</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribNapoliI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Napoli interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribNolaII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Nola 
2nd section in decision of may 20th, 2008</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribNolaII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Nola interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribPiacenzaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal xml:lang="it" datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the 
Tribunal of Piacenza on sentence 507 of July 6th, 2009</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribPiacenzaI_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Piacenza interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Piacenza in decision n. 599 of September 21st, 2009</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Piacenza interpretation 
2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribRomaIX_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Rome 
9th section in decision n. 147 of January 4th, 2008</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribRomaIX_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Roma interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribSalernoI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Salerno 1st section in decision of October 31st, 2006</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribSalernoI_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Salerno interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribSavonaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Savona in decision of July 24th, 2005</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribSavonaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Savona interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Torino 3rd section in decision of October 1st, 2008</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Torino interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Torino 3rd section in decision n. 7785 of november 25th, 2008</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoIII_Int2.1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Torino interpretation 
2</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by Tribunal of Torino in 
sentence January 13th, 2003</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Torino interpretation 
3</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoVIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Torino, 8th section, in decision of November 26th, 2005</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTorinoVIII_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Torino interpretation 
4</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTraniI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of Trani 
in decision n. 23 of January 23rd, 2009</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribTraniI_Int1</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Trani interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#TribVeneziaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Interpretation by the Tribunal of 
Venezia, in sentence of July 11th, 2002</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#TribVeneziaI_Int1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Tribunal of Venezia interpretation 
1</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Unilateral</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause was unilaterally 
predisponed</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Unilateral</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Unilateral</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#VF_BPTR_clauseX</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Clause unknown of the contract between 
V. F. and F. B. srl</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#VF_BPTR_clauseX</IRI> 
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        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">V. F. / B. P. &amp; T. R. clause 
&#39;x&#39;</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Valid_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">A clause which is valid under article 
1341 comma 1 civil code (not inefficacious)</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Valid_ExArt1341co1</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Valid under article 1341 comma 1 civil 
code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:comment"/> 
        <IRI>#Valid_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">A clause which is valid (and therefore 
not inefficacious) under article 1341 comma 2 civil code.</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
    <AnnotationAssertion> 
        <AnnotationProperty abbreviatedIRI="rdfs:label"/> 
        <IRI>#Valid_ExArt1341co2</IRI> 
        <Literal datatypeIRI="&rdf;PlainLiteral">Valid under article 1341 comma 2 civil 
code</Literal> 
    </AnnotationAssertion> 
</Ontology> 
<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 3.2.3.1824) 
 
 
a.2. The rules  
 





<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rb [  
 <!ENTITY oss "http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/2011/8/prova1.owl#" > 
]> 
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" href="../../../../../../schemas/LKIF.css"?> 
<?oxygen RNGSchema="../../../../../../schemas/LKIF.rnc" type="compact"?> 
<lkif> 
  <theory id="art1341"> 
    <imports> 




               <head> 
         <s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co1"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of <i 
value="&oss;Art1341co1cc">Article 1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </i></s> 
        </head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;General"> general status</i> 
</s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral 
status</i> </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> not applies <i value="&oss;Knowledgeable"> 
knowledgeable before contract sign</i> </s></not> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
      
<rule id="LAW_Art1341co2"> 
               <head> 
         <s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1341 comma 2 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of <i 
value="&oss;Art1341co2cc">Article 1341 comma 2 of Civil Code </i></s> 
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        </head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <v>S1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;Oppressive_Status"><v>S1</v> is an oppressive status</s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;General"> general status</i> 
</s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral 
status</i> </s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> not applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed</i> </s></not> 
 </body> 
      </rule> 
 
<rule id="LAWCONS_Inefficacy rule"> 
               <head> 
         <s pred="&oss;Inefficacious"><v>C1</v> Is inefficacious: has no effects </s> 
        </head> 
<body> 
<and><or><s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co1"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 1341 
comma 2 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="Relevant_ExArt1342co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 1342 
comma 2 of Civil Code </s></or> 
<not exception="true"><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;ReproducingLawDisposition"> a law disposition</i> </s></not> 
<not exception="true"><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;International"> an international agreement</i> </s></not></and> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="TEC_JudicialSubsumption"> 
               <head> 
         <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies status <v>S2</v> </s> 
        </head> 
<body> 








<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;NotSpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="NEGINST_NotKnowledgeable"> 
 <head> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Knowledgeable"> 
specifically signed status </i></s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Not_Knowledgeable"> specifically 
signed status </i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="NEGINST_NotGeneral"> 
 <head> 




<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Specific"> specific status 
</i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="NEGINST_NotUnilateral"> 
 <head> 






<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Not_Unilateral"> not unilateral 
status </i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="LAWEXCL_Art1341co1"> 
 <head> 
<not><s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co1"><v>C1</v> doesn't fall under the discipline of 
Article 1341 comma 1 of Civil Code </s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<or><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Specific"> specific status 
</i></s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Unilateral"> not unilateral 
status </i></s></not> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Knowledgeable"> knowledgeable 
status </i></s></or> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="LAWEXCL_Art1341co2"> 
 <head> 
<not><s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1341 comma 2 of Civil Code </s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<or><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Specific"> specific status 
</i></s> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Unilateral"> not unilateral 
status </i></s></not></or> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
</rules> 




    <imports> 
    </imports> 
<rules> 
<rule id="LAW_Art1342co1"> 
               <head> 
         <s pred="Relevant_ExArt1342co1"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1342 comma 1 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of <i 
value="&oss;Art1342co1cc">Article 1342 comma 1 of Civil Code </i></s> 
                     <s pred="&oss;normatively_striclty_worse"><v>C1</v> is applied 
instead of<v>C2</v></s> 
        </head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v> </s> 
      <s pred="&oss;contained_in"><v>C2</v> is contained in <v>A1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;Precompiled">precompiled </i></s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> <i value="&oss;AddedToPrecompiled">is added to 
precompiled </i></s> 
<not exception="true"> <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C2</v>applies <i 
value="&oss;AddedToPrecompiled">is added to precompiled </i></s></not> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="LAW_Art1342co2"> 
               <head> 
         <s pred="Relevant_ExArt1342co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of Article 
1342 comma 2 of Civil Code </s> 
<s pred="&oss;considered_by"><v>C1</v> falls under the discipline of <i 
value="&oss;Art1342co2cc">Article 1342 comma 2 of Civil Code </i></s> 
        </head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;Precompiled">precompiled </i></s> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> <i value="&oss;AddedToPrecompiled">is added to 
precompiled </i></s> 





      </rule> 
      <rule id="NEGINST_NotPrecompiled"> 
            <head>             
                  <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is not <i 
value="&oss;Precompiled">a precompiled contract</i></s></not> 
            </head> 
            <body> 
                              <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;NotPrecompiled">a not precompiled contract</i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
</rules> 
  </theory> 
<theory id="CompromissoryClauseRules"> 
        <imports> 
       </imports> 
        <rules>    
            <rule id="JINT_NoCompromissory1"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is not<i 
value="&oss;ArbitrationAgreement">an arbitration clause</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;BindingSurvey">excludes coverage for violation of the traffic regulation 
rules</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an insurance contract</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged with <i value="&oss;ExtensiveInterpretation"> 
extensive interpretation</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                    <not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is not judged with <i value="&oss;AnalogicInterpretation"> 
analogic interpretation methods</i> </s> 
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                    </not> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.14302/1999"> precedent Cass. 
14302/1999</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_NoCompromissory2"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is not <i 
value="&oss;ArbitrationAgreement">an arbitration clause</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;NonRitualArbitration">an irritual arbitration</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.8788/2000"> precedent Cass. 
8788/2000</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_Compromissory"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;ArbitrationAgreement">an arbitration clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <or><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;NonRitualArbitration">an irritual arbitration</i></s> 
                        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;RitualArbitration">a ritual arbitration</i></s></or> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;PreventsJurisdiction">prevents normal jurisdiction</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.19865/2003"> precedent Cass. 
19865/2003</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
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            <rule id="JINT_BindingSurvey"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;BindingSurvey">an arbitration clause</i></s> 
                    <not><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;NonRitualArbitration">a ritual arbitration clause</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;TechnicalEvaluation">involves technical evaluations</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an insurance contract</i></s> 
                    <not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;hasfactor" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;LegalEvaluation"> involves legal 
evaluations</i> </s> 
                    </not> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.14909/2002"> precedent 
Cass.14909/2002</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_IrritualArbitration"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;NonRitualArbitration">an irritual arbitration clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <or><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;LegalEvaluation">involves legal evaluations</i></s> 
                        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;DisputeResolution">involves a dispute resolution</i></s></or> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> applies <i 
value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an insurance contract</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 




                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_StatutoryArbitration"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;SpecificallySigned">specifically signed</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;ArbitrationAgreement">an arbitration clause</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> applies <i value="&oss;Statute">a 
statute</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.4351/1993"> precedent Cass. 
4351/1993</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
        </rules> 
    </theory> 
<theory id="GeneralClauseRules"> 
    <imports> 
    </imports> 
<rules>      
<rule id="JINT_KnownDocumentRecall"> 
  <head>             




<s pred="&oss;recalls"><v>C1</v> recalls <v>D1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>D1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;KnownToParties"> is known 
to the parties</i> </s> 
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<and assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i 






        <imports> 
        </imports> 
        <rules>    
<rule id="JINT_InsuranceCoverageLimitation"> 
    <head>             
        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i value="&oss;LiabilityLimitation">a clause 
limiting liability</i></s> 
    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ExcludesCoverageForTrafficRegulationViolation">excludes coverage for 
violation of the traffic regulation rules</i></s> 
        <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> has factor<i value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an 
insurance contract</i></s> 
        <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" assumable="true"><v>C1</v> 
is judged as <i value="&oss;TribVeneziaI_Int1"> precedent Trib. Venezia 11 july 2002</i> 
</s> 
        </not></not> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_RiskExclusionElectricPhenomena"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ReducesRiskAssumed"> clause reducing risk taken elsewhere</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 




                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;contains"><v>A1</v> contains <v>C2</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C2</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;CoversLightningDamage">covers damage caused by lightnings</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;TribTorinoI_Int1"> precedent 
Trib. Torino gg mm aaaa</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_RiskExclusionElectricDevices"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ReducesRiskAssumed"> clause reducing risk taken elsewhere</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ExcludesElectronicDevices">shrinks the risk assumed by the insurance 
company</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;contains"><v>A1</v> contains <v>C2</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C2</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;CoversElectricDevices">covers damage caused to electric devices</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;TribTorinoI_Int1.2"> precedent 
Trib. Torino  gg mm aaaa</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
<rule id="JINT_InsuranceRiskExclusion"> 
    <head>             
        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i value="&oss;LiabilityLimitation">a clause 
limiting liability</i></s> 
    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i value="&oss;ReducesRiskAssumed"> 
clause reducing risk taken elsewhere</i></s> 
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        <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> has factor<i value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an 
insurance contract</i></s> 
        <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" assumable="true"><v>C1</v> 
is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.816/1979"> precedent Trib. Cass. 816/1979</i> </s> 
        </not></not> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_InsuranceObjectSpecification"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;No_ResponsibilityLimitation">a clause limiting liability</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;SpecifyObject"> clause reducing risk taken elsewhere</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an insurance contract</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.16719/2003"> precedent Cass. 
16719/2003</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_InsuranceDrunkDriverExclusion"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;SpecifyObject">a clause specifying the object of contract</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;considers"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;DrunkDriver"> drunk driver </i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an insurance contract</i></s> 
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                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;TribTorinoIII_Int1"> precedent 
Trib. Torino gg mm aaaa</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
 
            <rule id="JINT_SoleRightInAgency"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;ReproducingLawDisposition">a general clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;SoleRight">grants exclusive rights</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;AgencyAgreement">agency agreement</i></s> 
                   <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is 
judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.6369/2001"> precedent Cass. 6369/2001 </i> </s> 
                   </not></not> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is 
judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.14667/2004"> precedent Cass. 14667/2004 </i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is 
judged as <i value="&oss;Art1743cc"> article 1743 cc</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_Withdrawal4BothParties"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;Oppressive_Status"> <i 
value="&oss;ContractWithdrawalForBothParties">contract withdrawal for both parties 
</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
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                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ContractWithdrawalForBothParties"> clause reducing risk taken 
elsewhere</i></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;Precompiled"> precompiled contract</i></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;Unilateral"> unilateral contract</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.6314/2006"> precedent Cass. 
6314/2006</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_ExpertOpinion"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;Oppressive_Clause"> <v>C1</v></s></not> 
                    <not><s pred="&oss;applies"> <v>C1</v><i 
value="&oss;CompetenceDerogation"> a comp derogation</i></s></not> 
                    <not><s pred="&oss;Oppressive_Status"><i value="&oss;ExpertOpinion"> 
e</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;ExpertOpinion"> e</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.2277/2006"> precedent Cass. 
2277/2006</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 





    <imports> 
          </imports> 




  <head>             




<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;RecallsNumber"> recalls 
number</i> </s> 






  <head>             
<s pred="Recalls_ObjectANDNumber"><v>B1</v> recalls object and number</s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;RecallsNumber"> recalls 
number</i> </s> 







         <s pred="CorrectlyRecalled"><v>C1</v> is correctly recalled</s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by <v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="Recalls_ObjectORNumber"><v>B1</v> recalls object or number</s> 
<not exception="true"><s pred="required">it is required <i value="ObjectANDNumber"> for 
both object and number to be recalled</i></s></not> 
</body> 





         <s pred="CorrectlyRecalled"><v>C1</v> is correctly recalled</s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by <v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="Recalls_ObjectANDNumber"><v>B1</v> recalls object and number</s> 
</body> 




         <s pred="required">it is required <i value="ObjectANDNumber"> for both object 
and number to be recalled</i></s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v>applies <i value="&oss;Cass.6976/1995">precedent Cass. 
6976/1995</i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="JINT_ObjectANDNumberNOTRequired"> 
 <head> 
<not><s pred="required">it is required <i value="ObjectANDNumber"> for both object and 
number to be recalled</i></s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v>applies <i value="&oss;Cass.1317/1998">precedent Cass. 
1317/1998</i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="JINT_RecallAllClauses"> 
 <head> 
<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> doesn't apply <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s></not> 





<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by <v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;RecallsAllClauses"> recalls 
all clauses</i></s> 
<not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i 





<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> doesn't apply <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s></not> 
<s pred="RecallException"> <v>C1</v> is subject to the exception</s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> recalled by <v>B1</v> </s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>B1</v> has factor <i 
value="&oss;RecallsNonOppressiveClauses"> recalls also non oppressive clauses</i></s> 
<s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> applies<i value="&oss;Cass.5860/1998">precedent 
Cass.5860/1998</i></s> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="TEC_SpecificSigningByRecall"> 
<head> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="CorrectlyRecalled"><v>C1</v> is correctly recalled</s> 








<not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> doesn't apply <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s></not> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;SigningAtEndOfPage"> is 
signed at the end of page</i></s> 
<not><not assumable="true"><s pred="valid">The <i value="&oss;Cass.4793/2000">precedent 
Cass. 4793/2000</i> is accepted</s></not>  
</not><not exception="true"><s pred="CorrectlyRecalled"><v>C1</v> is correctly 
recalled</s></not> 
</body> 
      </rule> 
<rule id="JINT_ProducedDuringTrial"> 
 <head> 
<s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> applies <i value="&oss;SpecificallySigned"> 
specifically signed status </i></s> 
</head> 
<body> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;ProducedDuringTrial"> is 
produced during trial</i></s> 
<not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is judged as with <i 
value="&oss;Cass.460/1983">precedent Cass. 460/1983</i> is accepted</s> </not> 
</not><not exception="true"><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 





 <rule id="JINT_KnownDocument"> 
  <head>             
   <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;KnownToParties"> is 
known to the parties</i> </s> 
   <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;Knowledgeable"> is known 
to the parties</i> </s> 
  </head> 
  <body> 
       <and><s pred="&oss;recalled_by"><v>C1</v> is recalled by <v>D1</v></s> 




      <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i 
value="&oss;TribPiacenzaI_Int2.1"> precedent Trib. Piacenza gg mm aaaa</i> </s></not> 
   </not></body> 
 </rule> 
<rule id="JINT_KnownDocumentRecall"> 
  <head>             




 <or> <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;RecallsSeparateDocument">an insurance contract</i></s> 
  <and><s pred="&oss;recalls"><v>C1</v> recalls <v>D1</v></s><s 
pred="&oss;SeparateDocument"><v>D1</v> is a separate doc</s></and> 
 </or> 
 <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>D1</v> has factor <i value="&oss;KnownToParties"> is known 
to the parties</i> </s> 
<not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i 




  <head>             




 <or> <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;RecallsSeparateDocument">an insurance contract</i></s> 
  <and><s pred="&oss;recalls"><v>C1</v> recalls <v>D1</v></s><s 
pred="&oss;SeparateDocument"><v>D1</v> is a separate doc</s></and> 
  </or> 
 <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> 
is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
<s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> has factor<i value="&oss;InsuranceContract">an 
insurance contract</i></s> 
<not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged 







  </theory> 
<theory id="UnilateralPrecompiledRules"> 
        <imports> 
        </imports> 
        <rules>    
<rule id="TEC_Precompiled"> 
    <head>             
        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;Precompiled">a precompiled 
contract</i></s> 
    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> was build for<i 
value="&oss;MoreAcceptants">more acceptants</i></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> was build for<i value="&oss;OneProponent">one 
proponent</i></s> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
<rule id="TEC_NoPrecompiled-Contract"> 
    <head>             
        <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;Precompiled">a not 
precompiled contract</i></s></not> 
    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> was build for<i value="&oss;OneAcceptant">one 
acceptant</i></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> was build for<i 
value="&oss;MoreProponents">more proponents</i></s> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
<rule id="TEC_NoUnilateral-Clause"> 
    <head>             




    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
        <or><and><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> was build for<i 
value="&oss;OneAcceptant">one acceptant</i></s> 
            <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>C1</v> was build for<i 
value="&oss;MoreProponents">more proponents</i></s></and> 
            <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;NotPrecompiled">a not 
precompiled contract</i></s></or> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
<rule id="TEC_NoUnilateral-Prepared"> 
    <head>             
        <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i value="&oss;Unilateral">a unilateral 
clause</i></s></not> 
    </head> 
    <body> 
        <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/expression.owl#held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by in <v>P1</v></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>P1</v> is <i value="&oss;Proposer">the 
proposer</i></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>P1</v> is <i value="&oss;Customer">the 
customer</i></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>P1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Occasional">occasional</i></s> 
        <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/expression.owl#held_by"><v>C1</v> is held by in <v>P2</v></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>P2</v> is <i value="&oss;Contractor">the 
contractor</i></s> 
        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>P2</v> is <i value="&oss;Professionist">a 
professionist</i></s> 
    </body> 
</rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_GeneralClauseSubsumption"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i value="&oss;General">a 
general clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
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                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;Unilateral">is unilateral</i></s> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;Precompiled">precompiled</i></s> 
                    <not exception="true"><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> has factor<i 
value="&oss;AddedToPrecompiled">is added to precompiled</i></s></not>  
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>C1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.13605/1999"> precedent Cass. 
13605/1999</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
                      <rule id="JINT_PerAdesione-consequence"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i value="&oss;Unilateral">a 
unilateral clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione"></i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;TribTorinoVIII_Int1"> precedent 
</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_NotPerAdesione-consequence"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>C1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Unilateral">a unilateral clause</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
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                    <or><not><s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione">agreed through mail</i></s></not> 
                        <s pred="&oss;applies"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;NotPer_Adesione">agreed through mail</i></s> 
                        <not><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione">agreed through mail</i></s></not> 
                        <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;NotPer_Adesione">agreed through mail</i></s></or> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.12153/2006"> precedent Cass. 
12153/2006</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_PerAdesione-causes"> 
                <head>             
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i value="&oss;Per_Adesione">a 
unilateral clause</i></s> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                   <not exception="true"> <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;AgreedThroughNegotiation">agreed through direct negotiations</i></s></not> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;GenericTerms">agreed through mail</i></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;ObjectSoldToThird">agreed through mail</i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;TribTorinoVIII_Int1"> precedent 
Trib Torino gg mm aaaa</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_NotAdesione_Negotiations"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione">a Per Adesione contract</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;AgreedThroughNegotiation">agreed through direct negotiations</i></s> 
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                   <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.11757/2006"> precedent Cass 
11757/2006</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule> 
            <rule id="JINT_NotPerAdesione-cause"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione">a unilateral clause</i></s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;HasExtrahordinaryObject"></i></s> 
                    <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;HasRelevantValue"></i></s> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;CdAMilanoII_Int1"> precedent CdA 
Milano gg mm aaaa</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 
            </rule>    
            <rule id="JINT_LAWEXCL_Art1341Exclusion"> 
                <head>             
                    <not><s pred="Relevant_ExArt1341co2"><v>C1</v> falls under the 
discipline of Article 1341 comma 2 of Civil Code </s></not> 
                </head> 
                <body> 
                    <s pred="http://www.estrellaproject.org/lkif-
core/mereology.owl#contained_in"><v>C1</v> is contained in <v>A1</v></s> 
                    <not> <s pred="&oss;hasfactor"><v>A1</v> is <i 
value="&oss;Per_Adesione">agreed through direct negotiations</i></s></not> 
                    <not><not assumable="true"><s pred="&oss;judged_as" 
assumable="true"><v>A1</v> is judged as <i value="&oss;Cass.12153/06"> precedent Cass. 
12153/2006</i> </s> 
                    </not></not> 
                </body> 








a.2.2. Rules in LegalRuleML language 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE Document [ 
 <!ENTITY xs "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
 <!ENTITY ruleml "http://ruleml.org/"> 
 <!ENTITY dfs "http://ruleml.org/dfs/"> 
 <!ENTITY legalruleml "http://legalruleml.org/legalruleml/"> 
 <!ENTITY dfsont "/ontology/defeasible.owl#"> 
 <!ENTITY lkif "http://legalruleml.example.org/legalOntology/lkif-core/"> 
 <!ENTITY lkif-clo 
"http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Core.owl#"> 
 <!ENTITY lkif-dlo 
"http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/Judging_Contracts_Domain.owl#"> 
 <!ENTITY jurisdictions "http://example.org/jurisdictions.owl#"> 
 <!ENTITY authorities "http://example.org/authorities.owl#"> 
 <!ENTITY ACTcc "http://akomantoso.org/it/act/cc/1942-03-16/262/ita/main"> 
 <!ENTITY cassprecedent1 "http://akomantoso.org/it/precedent/cc/1981-08-
01/3681/main"> 
 <!ENTITY cassprecedent2 "http://akomantoso.org/it/precedent/cc/1994-05-
06/4423/main"> 
 <!ENTITY cassprecedent3 "http://akomantoso.org/it/precedent/cc/1998-02-
09/1317main"> 
 <!ENTITY cassprecedent1 "http://akomantoso.org/it/precedent/cc/1998-06-
12/5860/main"> 








<RuleML xmlns="http://ruleml.org/spec" xmlns:dfs="&dfs;" xmlns:xsi="&xs;-instance" 
xmlns:xs="&xs;" xmlns:lrml="&legalruleml;" xmlns:dc="&dc;" xmlns:dcterms="&dcterms;" 
xmlns:unibo="&unibo;" xml:base="http://legalruleml.example.org/example/"> 
 <!-- The present collection of 5 rules represents two norms coming from the law 
(rule1 and rule2) and 3 judicial interpretations carried out  by the Cassation Court 
(rule3, rule4, rule5). interpretation 3  has a head which is the opposite of the head of 
rules 1 and 2.  
The conflict is resolved with priority relations ovr1 and ovr2. Also rules 4 and 5 have 
inconsistent heads, and a different priority relation (ovr3) manages that too. 
 Art. 1341 C.C. 
Condizioni generali di contratto.  
[I] (rule1) Le condizioni generali di contratto predisposte da uno dei contraenti sono 
efficaci nei confronti dell'altro, se al momento della conclusione del contratto questi 
le ha conosciute o avrebbe dovuto conoscerle usando l'ordinaria diligenza.  
[II] (rule2)In ogni caso non hanno effetto, se non sono specificamente approvate per 
iscritto, le condizioni che stabiliscono, a favore di colui che le ha predisposte, 
limitazioni di responsabilitï¿½facoltï¿½i recedere dal contratto o di sospenderne 
l'esecuzione, ovvero sanciscono a carico dell'altro contraente decadenze, limitazioni 
alla facoltï¿½i opporre eccezioni, restrizioni alla libertï¿½ontrattuale nei rapporti 
coi terzi, tacita proroga o rinnovazione del contratto, clausole compromissorie o 
deroghe alla competenza dell'autoritï¿½iudiziaria. 
Art. 1341 Italian Civil Code 
General contract conditions. 
[I](rule1) General contract conditions written by only one of the parties are 
efficacious towards the other party only if at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract he had knowledge of them or could have known them using ordinary diligence. 
[II](rule2)In any case are inefficacious, if not specifically accepted by writing, 
conditions establishing, in favor of the proponent: responsibility limitations, the 
capacity to withdraw from the contract or to suspend execution; or stating against the 
other party: disqualifications, limitations to exceptions, contractual restrictions 
towards third parties, prorogation or renewal of the contract, arbitration agreements or 
competence derogations.  
Cass. Civ. Sez. I 8 giugno 1981, n. 3681. 
(rule3) La clausola, secondo la quale in difetto di contestazione l'estratto conto si 
intende approvato, non puðŸ¤³sere considerata vessatoria, con le conseguenze di cui 
all'art. 1341, comma 2 c.c., poiche' essa non fa che riprodurre il disposto dell'art. 
1832 dello stesso codice.  
Cassation Court (Civil Division I) sentence n. 3681 of june 8th 1981. 
(rule3) The clause by which in case of dispute the account stated is intended as 
approved cannot be considered oppressive, with the consequence of article 1341 comma 2 
civil code, because it does nothing else than reproducing the disposition of article 
1832 of Civil Code. 
Cass. Civ. Sez. III 6 maggio 1994, n. 4423 
(rule3) In tema di assicurazione della responsabilitï¿½ivile derivante dalla 
circolazione di veicoli a motore, la clausola che subordina la copertura assicurativa 
alla circostanza che il conducente dell'automezzo assicurato abbia conseguito la patente 
di guida, poiche' Ã¨ applicazione di una disposizione di legge, non assume natura 




Cassation Court (Civil Division III) sentence n. 4423 of may 6th 1994. 
 
(rule3) In the subject of puclic-liability insurance for driving motor vehicles, the 
clause subordinating the insurance coverage to the circumstance that the driver of the 
insured vehicles has a driving licence, because it applies a law disposition, is not 
oppressive and does not need specific acceptation by writing. 
Cass. Civ. Sez. III 9 febbraio 1998, n. 1317 
(rule4) Agli effetti previsti dall'art. 1341 c.c., e ' ufficiente che la sottoscrizione 
delle clausole onerose sia apposta dopo un'indicazione idonea a suscitare attenzione, 
quale quella che richiama il numero o il contenuto delle singole clausole, anche se 
individuate con riferimento al numero d'ordine o lettera ed all'oggetto di ciascuna di 
essa. 
Cassation Court (Civil Division III) sentence n. 1317 of february 9th 1998. 
(rule4) For the purposes of article 1341 c. c., it is sufficient that the specifical 
signing of oppressive clauses is affixed after an indication sufficient to draw 
attention, such as that recalling the number or the content of single clauses, even if 
individuated through the reference to the number or the letter or the object of each of 
them. 
Cass. Civ. Sez. II 12 giugno 1998, n. 5860 
(rule5)Non sussiste il requisito della specifica approvazione - a pena di 
nullitï¿½ilevabile d'ufficio - della deroga convenzionale alla competenza territoriale a 
favore di un foro esclusivo se la sottoscrizione apposta sul modulo prestampato richiama 
genericamente gli art. 1341, 1342 c.c. per tutte le condizioni generali di contratto, 
senza distinzione tra vessatorie e non. 
Cassation Court (Civil Division II) sentence n. 5860 of june 12th 1998. 
(rule5)The requirement of specific signing is not met Â– the nullity being raised 
automatically Â– for derogation of competence if the signing affixed on the precompiled 
module recalling article 1341, 1341 c.c. for all general conditions of contracts, 
without distinguishing between oppressive and non-oppressive clauses.--> 
<Assert> 
 <lrml:metadata xmlns="http://legalruleml.example.org/nome-del-caso/"> 
  <lrml:identifications> 
   <lrml:identification id="aut1" iri="&unibo;/person.owl#m.ceci" 
as="author"/> 
   <lrml:identification id="aut2" 
iri="&unibo;/person.owl#m.palmirani" as="co-author"/> 
   <lrml:identification id="parliament" 
iri="&unibo;/organization.owl#ItalianParliament.owl" as="legislator"/> 
  </lrml:identifications> 
  <lrml:references id="referenceBlock1"> 
   <lrml:reference id="art1341" iri="civilcode#art1341" 
refType="&lkif;#Code"/> 




   <lrml:reference id="art1341-com2" iri="&ACTcc;#art1341-co2" 
refType="&lkif;#Code"/> 
   <lrml:reference id="cass3681-1981" iri="&cassprecedent1;" 
refType="&lkif;#Precedent"/> 
   <lrml:reference id="cass4423-1994" iri="&cassprecedent2;" 
refType="&lkif;#Precedent"/> 
   <lrml:reference id="cass1317-1998" iri="&cassprecedent3;" 
refType="&lkif;#Precedent"/> 
   <lrml:reference id="cass5860-1998" iri="&cassprecedent4;" 
refType="&lkif;#Precedent"/> 
  </lrml:references> 
  <lrml:events> 
   <!-- events realted to the creation of the rule--> 
   <lrml:event id="e1" value="2012-06-25T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
   <!-- event of efficacy of the code art. 1341 --> 
   <lrml:event id="e2" value="1942-04-21T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
   <!-- events realted to the precedent's applicability--> 
   <lrml:event id="e3" value="1981-08-01T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
   <lrml:event id="e4" value="1994-05-06T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
   <lrml:event id="e5" value="1998-02-09T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
   <lrml:event id="e6" value="1998-06-12T01:01:00.0Z"/> 
  </lrml:events> 
  <lrml:timesInfo> 
   <lrml:times id="t1"> 
    <lrml:time start="#e2" refType="&lkif;#efficacy"/> 
   </lrml:times> 
   <lrml:times id="t2"> 
    <lrml:time start="#e3" refType="&lkif;#applicability"/> 
   </lrml:times> 
   <lrml:times id="t3"> 
    <lrml:time start="#e5" refType="&lkif;#applicability"/> 
   </lrml:times> 
   <lrml:times id="t4"> 
    <lrml:time start="#e6" refType="&lkif;#applicability"/> 
   </lrml:times> 
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  </lrml:timesInfo> 
  <lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo1" appliesTo="#rule1"> 
   <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock1"> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule1" idRef="#art1341-com1"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule1" idRef="#art1341"/> 
   </lrml:sources> 
   <lrml:strength iri="&dfsont;defeasible"/> 
   <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
   <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
   <lrml:times idRef="#t1"/> 
   <lrml:creationDateTime idRef="#e1"/> 
   <lrml:authority idRef="#Parliament"/> 
  </lrml:ruleInfo> 
  <lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo2" appliesTo="#rule2"> 
   <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock2"> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom1" idRef="#art1341-com2"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom2" idRef="#art1341-com1"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom3" idRef="#art1341-com1"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom4" idRef="#art1341com2"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom5" idRef="#art1341com2"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#atom5" idRef="#art1341com2"/> 
   </lrml:sources> 
   <lrml:strength iri="&dfsont;defeater"/> 
   <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
   <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
   <lrml:times irRef="#t1"/> 
   <lrml:creationDateTime idRef="#e1"/> 
  </lrml:ruleInfo> 
  <lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo3" appliesTo="#rule3"> 
   <lrml:strength iri="&dfsont;defeater"/> 
   <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock3"> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule3" idRef="#cass3681-1981"/> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule3" idRef="#cass4423-1994"/> 
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   </lrml:sources> 
   <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
   <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
   <lrml:times idRef="#t2" appliesTo="#atom1"/> 
   <lrml:authority idRef="#cassationCourt"/> 
   <lrml:creationDateTime idRef="e2"/> 
  </lrml:ruleInfo> 
  <lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo4" appliesTo="#rule4"> 
   <lrml:strength iri="&dfs;defeater"/> 
   <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock4"> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule4" idRef="#cass1317-1998"/> 
   </lrml:sources> 
   <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
   <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
   <lrml:times idRef="#t3"/> 
   <lrml:authority idRef="#cassationCourt"/> 
  </lrml:ruleInfo> 
  <lrml:ruleInfo id="ruleInfo5" appliesTo="#rule5"> 
   <lrml:sources id="sourceBlock5"> 
    <lrml:source element="#rule4" idRef="#cass5860-1998"/> 
   </lrml:sources> 
   <lrml:jurisdiction iri="&jurisdictions;italy"/> 
   <lrml:author idRef="#aut1"/> 
   <lrml:times idRef="#t4"/> 
   <lrml:authority idRef="#cassationCourt"/> 
  </lrml:ruleInfo> 
 </lrml:metadata> 
 <Rulebase node="#rulebase1" mapClosure="universal"> 
  <implies id="rule1"> 
   <!-- Art. 1341 Italian Civil Code 
General contract conditions. 
[I]General contract conditions written by only one of the parties are efficacious 
towards the other party only if at the time of the conclusion of the contract he had 
knowledge of them or could have known them using ordinary diligence.--> 
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   <then> 
    <Atom> 
     <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;considered_by">considered 
by</Rel> 
     <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
     <Ind iri="#art1341-com1"/> 
    </Atom> 
   </then> 
   <if> 
    <And> 
    <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-dlo;General"> General</Ind> 
     </Atom> 
     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-dlo;Unilateral"> Unilateral 
</Ind> 
     </Atom> 
     <Not> 
      <Atom> 
       <Rel iri="&lkif-
clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
       <Var 
type="&dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
       <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;Knowledgeable">Knowledgeable</Ind> 
      </Atom> 
     </Not> 
    </And> 
   </if> 
  </implies> 
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  <!-- Art. 1341 Italian Civil Code 
[II]In any case are inefficacious, if not specifically accepted by writing, conditions 
establishing, in favor of the proponent: responsibility limitations, the capacity to 
withdraw from the contract or to suspend execution; or stating against the other party: 
disqualifications, limitations to exceptions, contractual restrictions towards third 
parties, prorogation or renewal of the contract, arbitration agreements or competence 
derogations. --> 
  <implies id="rule2"> 
   <then> 
    <atom id="atom1"> 
     <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;considered_by">considered 
by</Rel> 
     <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
     <Ind iri="#art1341-com2"/> 
    </atom> 
   </then> 
   <if> 
    <And> 
     <atom id="atom2"> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-dlo;General"> General</Ind> 
     </atom> 
     <atom id="atom3"> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-dlo;Unilateral"> Unilateral 
</Ind> 
     </atom> 
     <atom id="atom4"> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
     </atom> 
     <atom id="atom5"> 
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      <Rel iri="&lkif;#member_of">isA</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
lo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-
lo;Oppressive_Status">Oppressive_Status</Ind> 
     </atom> 
     <Not> 
      <Atom id="atom6"> 
       <Rel iri="&lkif-
clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
       <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
       <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;SpecificallySigned">SpecificallySigned</Ind> 
      </Atom> 
     </Not> 
    </And> 
   </if> 
  </implies> 
  <implies id="rule3"> 
   <!-- Cassation Court (Civil Div. I) sentence n. 3681 of june 8th 
1981. 
 
The clause by which in case of dispute the account stated is intended as approved cannot 
be considered oppressive, with the consequence of article 1341 comma 2 civil code, 
because it does nothing else than reproducing the disposition of article 1832 of Civil 
Code. 
 
Cassation Court (Civil Div. III) sentence n. 4423 of may 6th 1994. 
 
In the subject of puclic-liability insurance for driving motor vehicles, the clause 
subordinating the insurance coverage to the circumstance that the driver of the insured 
vehicles has a driving licence, because it applies a law disposition, is not oppressive 
and does not need specific acceptation by writing. --> 
   <then> 
    <And> 
     <Not> 
      <atom id="atom5"> 
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       <Rel 
iri="&lkif;#member_of">isA</Rel> 
       <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
       <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;Oppressive_Status">Oppressive_Status</Ind> 
      </atom> 
     </Not> 
     <Not> 
      <Atom> 
       <Rel iri="&lkif-
clo;considered_by">considered by</Rel> 
       <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
       <Ind iri="#art1341-com2"/> 
      </Atom> 
     </Not> 
    </And> 
   </then> 
   <if> 
    <Atom> 
     <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
     <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
     <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;ReproducingLawProvision">ReproducingLawProvision</Ind> 
    </Atom> 
   </if> 
  </implies> 
  <implies id="Rule4"> 
   <!-- Cassation Court (Civil Div. III) sentence n. 1317 of february 
9th 1998. 
 
For the purposes of article 1341 c. c., it is sufficient that the specifical signing of 
oppressive clauses is affixed after an indication sufficient to draw attention, such as 
that recalling the number or the content of single clauses, even if individuated through 
the reference to the number or the letter or the object of each of them. --> 
   <then> 
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    <Atom> 
     <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
     <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
     <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;SpecificallySigned">SpecificallySigned</Ind> 
    </Atom> 
   </then> 
   <if> 
    <And> 
     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-
clo;recalled_by">recalled_by</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Box">Contract_Box</Var> 
     </Atom> 
     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;RecallsObjectAndNumber">RecallsObjectOrNumber</Ind> 
     </Atom> 
    </And> 
   </if> 
  </implies> 
  <implies id="Rule5"> 
   <!-- Cassation Court (Civil Div. II) sentence n. 5860 of june 12th 
1998. 
 
The requirement of specific signing is not met Â– the nullity being raised automatically 
Â– for derogation of competence if the signing affixed on the precompiled module 
recalling article 1341, 1341 c.c. for all general conditions of contracts, without 
distinguishing between oppressive and non-oppressive clauses. --> 
   <then> 
    <Not> 
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     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-clo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;SpecificallySigned">SpecificallySigned</Ind> 
     </Atom> 
    </Not> 
   </then> 
   <if> 
    <And> 
     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-
clo;recalled_by">recalled_by</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Clause">Contract_Clause</Var> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Box">Contract_Box</Var> 
     </Atom> 
     <Atom> 
      <Rel iri="&lkif-dlo;applies">applies</Rel> 
      <Var type="&lkif-
dlo;Contract_Box">Contract_Box</Var> 
      <Ind iri="&lkif-
dlo;RecallsNonOppressiveClauses">RecallsNonOppressiveClauses</Ind> 
     </Atom> 
    </And> 
   </if> 
  </implies> 
  <Overrides id="ovr1"> 
   <Rule keyref="rule_3"/> 
   <Rule keyref="rule_2"/> 
  </Overrides> 
  <Overrides id="ovr2"> 
   <Rule keyref="rule_5"/> 
   <Rule keyref="rule_4"/> 
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a.2.3. The rules in Clojure language 
 
;;; Copyright (c) 2010 Fraunhofer Gesellschaft  
;;; Licensed under the EUPL V.1.1 
 
(ns carneades.engine.test-Art1401 
  (:use clojure.test 
        carneades.engine.shell 
        carneades.engine.argument 
        carneades.engine.scheme 
        carneades.engine.caes)) 
 
(def theory1  
  (make-theory 
    :sections  
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Inefficacy" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "General-Inefficacy" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Inefficacious ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(considered_by ?x ?y)) 
     (pm '(applies ?x Clause_Inefficacy))]  
      ])]     
(def theory2 
  (make-theory 
    :sections  
    [(make-section  
442 
 
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(applies ?x General)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Unilateral)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Not_Knowledgeable))]) 
  (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Relevant_ExArt1341co2 ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(applies ?x ?y)) 
     (pm '(Oppressive_Status ?y))  
      (pm '(applies ?x General)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x Unilateral)) 
      (pm '(not(applies ?x SpecificallySigned)))]) 
    
      ])] 
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342co1-1" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Better_ExArt1342co1 ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(contained_in ?x ?c)) 
      (pm '(applies ?c Precompiled)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x AddedToPrecompiled))]) 
  (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342co1-1" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Worse_ExArt1342co1 ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(contained_in ?x ?c)) 
      (pm '(applies ?c Precompiled)) 
      (pm '(not(applies ?x AddedToPrecompiled)))]) 
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  (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342co2" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Relevant_ExArt1342co2 ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(contained_in ?x ?c)) 
      (pm '(applies ?c Precompiled)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x ?y)) 
      (pm '(Oppressive_Status ?y)) 
      (pm '(not(applies ?x SpecificallySigned)))]) 
    
      ])] 
 [(make-section ; a GENERAL rule! 
  :header (make-metadata :title "Inefficacy" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "General-Inefficacy" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(Inefficacious ?x)] 
          :premises [(pm '(considered_by ?x ?y)) 
     (pm '(applies ?y Clause_Inefficacy))]  
      )])]      
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341-Consequences" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1-Consequence" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(considered_by ?x Art1341co1cc)] 
          :premises [(pm '(Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x))]  
    :exceptions [(pm '(applies ?x International)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x ReproducingLawDisposition))]) 
   (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2-Consequence" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(considered_by ?x Art1342co1cc)] 
          :premises [(pm '(Relevant_ExArt1342co1 ?x))] 
    :exceptions [(pm '(applies ?x International)) 
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      (pm '(applies ?x ReproducingLawDisposition))])])] 
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342-Consequences" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [ 
    (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342co1-Consequence" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(normatively_striclty_worse ?x ?y)] 
          :premises [(pm '(contained_in ?x ?c)) 
      (pm '(contained_in ?y ?c)) 
      (pm '(Better_ExArt1342co1 ?x)) 
      (pm '(Worse_ExArt1342co1 ?y))]) 
    (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1342co2-Consequence" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(considered_by ?x Art1342co2cc)] 
          :premises [(pm '(Relevant_ExArt1342co2 ?x))] 
    :exceptions [(pm '(applies ?x International)) 
      (pm '(applies ?x ReproducingLawDisposition))]) 
    
      ])] 
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1-Exclusion" :creator "Marcello") 
       :schemes  
       [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1-Exclusion-2" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x))] 
          :premises [(pm '(not(applies ?x General)))]) 
    (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co1-Exclusion-3" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x))] 
          :premises [(pm '(not(applies ?x Unilateral)))]) 
  (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341-Exclusion-4" :creator "Marcello") 
445 
 
          :conclusions ['(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x))] 
          :premises [(pm '(applies ?x Knowledgeable))]) 
 [(make-section  
  :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2-Exclusion" :creator "Marcello") 
  :schemes  
  [(make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2-Exclusion-1" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x))] 
          :premises [(pm '(applies ?x SpecificallySigned))])  
  (make-scheme                             
          :header (make-metadata :title "Art1341co2-Exclusion-2" :creator "Marcello") 
          :conclusions ['(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co2 ?x))] 
          :premises [(pm '(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co1 ?x)))]) 
    ])]      
       )) 
 
(def max-goals 500)   
(def generators (list (generate-arguments-from-theory theory1)))                   
 
(defn ag [facts query]  ; 
  "(seq-of literal) literal -> argument-graph 
   construct and evaluate an argument graph" 
  (argue (make-engine max-goals facts generators) 
         carneades-evaluator 
         query)) 
                                    
(deftest test-engine-example1 
         (let [facts '((not (applies AOUMessina/ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020 
SpecificallySigned)) 
    (applies AOUMessina/ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020 
ArbitrationAgreement) 
    (applies AOUMessina/ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020 General) 




    (applies Art1341co2 Clause_Inefficacy) 
    (Oppressive_Status ArbitrationAgreement) 
    ) 
               query '(Inefficacious AOUMessina/ByteSoftwareHouse_Clause2.020)] 
           (is (in? (ag facts query) query)))) 
      
(deftest test-engine-example2 
         (let [facts '((not (contained_in AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_ClauseX 
AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_Contract)) 
    (applies AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_Contract Precompiled) 
    (applies AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_ClauseX 
SpecificallySigned) 
    (applies AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_ClauseX Unilateral) 
    ) 
               query '(not (Relevant_ExArt1341co2 AgenziaImmobiliareD/NgPF_ClauseX))] 
           (is (in? (ag facts query) query)))) 
      
(deftest test-engine-example3 
         (let [facts '((not (contained_in LLoyd/FF_Clause Lloyd/FF_Contract)) 
    (applies Lloyd/FF_Contract Precompiled) 
    (applies LLoyd/FF_Clause AddedToPrecompiled) 
    (applies LLoyd/FF_Clause SpecificallySigned) 
    ) 
               query '(not (Better_ExArt1342co1 LLoyd/FF_Clause))] 
           (is (in? (ag facts query) query)))) 
      
      
      
 
